MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): AIRBORNE LANDINGS IN OPERATIONS OF A NON-NUCLEAR PERIOD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100200001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 29, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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QENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Airborne Landings
in Operations of a Non-Nuclear Period
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report
is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles
of the Journal "Milita Thought." This article discusses the
overall comp exities of airborne landing operations which would
be conducted on NATO territory during a non-nuclear phase of a
war. p sis is placed on the hostile environment
created by NATO missile and fighter aircraft defenses. As in
previous articles, readiness for transition to nuclear warfare
during the non-nuclear war phase is an essential requirement
for all units. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (85) for
1968.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensi-
tive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know
basis within recipient agencies.
W. E. Colby
Deputy Director for Operations
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
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Intelligence Information Special Report
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF Late 19 6 8
INFO.
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Airborne Landings in Operations
of a Non-Nuclear Period
SOURCE Documentary
Summary
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (85) for 1968 of the
SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought." The author of this
article is Colonel Ye. Grebish. The author discusses the com-
plexities of airborne landings conducted during offensive
operations by the ground troops against NATO. He takes into
account the deployment and strike capabilities of NATO air defense
weapons and concludes that landing operations could best be con-
ducted up to a depth of 150 kilometers within the NATO Central
Air Defense Zone after enemy air defenses have been neutralized by
fighter-bombers and bombers of the air army of the front concerned
in the operation, in conjunction with long-range aviation bombers.
Aircraft reserved for a nuclear strike mission would not be
utilized. He also discusses the selection of appropriate drop
zones and concurs that airborne troops and military-transport
aviation must remain under the command and control of the Supreme
High Command rather than be transferred to the front.
End of Summary
There is no information in available reference materials
which can be firmly associated with the author. Military Thought
has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three ver-
sions in the past--TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is
no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version con-
tinues to be published. The SECRET version is published threl50x1-HUM
times annually and is distributed down to the level of division
commander.
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Airborne Landings in Operations of a Non-Nuclear Period
by Colonel Ye. Grebish
Among the problems of a non-nuclear period of combat actions,
a prominent place is occupied by the problem of the use of airborne
landings of various types and, particularly, by the solution of
such questions as the possibilities for using each type of landing,
the extent and nature of the primary missions, the methods of
carrying out these missions, and the factors involved in providing
comprehensive support for them.
As is known, the most important condition in the use of
iairborne landings of all types is that they reach the designated
jlanding areas with minimal losses. This is achieved by decisive
neutralization of enemy air defense means in the flight zone of
military-transport aircraft and on its flanks, and of enemy units
and large units in and near these areas. Using conventional means
of destruction, a mission of this complexity can be fulfilled only
within certain limits, which depend above all on the actual capa-
bilities of these means.
Along with the enemy installations which must be neutralized
before and during an airborne landing, the most stable installa-
tions with regard to numbers and deployment sites are the means of
the territorial air defense system in the theater of military
operations. This is exp ainec by the fact that the air defense
system in a theater of military operations is created in peacetime
and can be thoroughly evaluated in advance. The means in the
interior of the Central Air Defense Zone of the combined armed
forces of NATO in Europe may be distributed in the following way.
[See table on page 5.]
Taking into account the various combat characteristics of
antiaircraft guided missiles and fighter aircraft with regard to
range and maneuverability, we shall make separate analyses of
their distribution and the strike capabilities of different means.
From the table it is evident that the build-up of surface-to-
air missiles to a depth of 150 kilometers is relatively uniform,
with forty-four percent of the total missiles within these limits.
Another twenty-six percent is distributed over the next fifty
kilometers, i.e., the amount jumps up, substantially increasing
the demands on our means for their neutralization.
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Quantity of re
Distance of resources
in percentages
from East German
border, in kilometers
Antiaircraft
Fighter
guided missile
battalions
aircraft
squadrons
Up to 50
8'%"
0
From 50 to 100
18%
0
From 100 to 150
18%
10
From 150 to 200
26%
0
Over 200
3 0'~
9 02s
Total 1
1001 1
100?
Thus, in our example, access _js_best_ to_that part of the
Central Zone bounded by a depth of 150 kilometers, in which fewer
than half of all surface-to-air missiles are deployed (in absolute
;.terms, up to twelve battalions). In addition, these weapons are
distributed along the entire front of the zone, with considerably
air divisions composed o ig ter~b offers ma be dr wn
from t e air a Y.o w e ron in whose zone the airborne landing
is ein carried out. If we consider that a certain por won
ese divisions wit 'fie in a constant state of readiness for mount-
ing an initial nuclear strike, then six to thirt sglladon~s of
f-bombers and booms mushp,~..~ th i r c-mma tion .
The use of these aircra?t will make it possible to neutralize an
equal number of battalions of antiaircraft guided missiles and
antiaircraft artillery, or two to three times as many separate
batteries and radiotechnical posts (control points).
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Central Air Defense Zone will intensify as a result of actions by
enemy field antiaircraft weapons located in this flight zone.
However, within the limits being examined the neutralization of
air defense means, en"ta fired weapons 1'n -3a ount may be
reckon with the fact that surface-to-air missile fire in the
fewer of them lying within the flight zone of military-transport
aircraft, a zone 120 to 150 kij2M!~ters wide. We must, it is true,
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In addition to front aviation, long-range aviation may also
be drawn upon for neutralizing the enemy air defense system,
particularly his antiaircraft weapons in a selected area. Part of
its missions will be carried out not only in support of airborne
landings but also in support of its own actions. The neutraliza-
tion of enemy antiaircraft weapons located in the tactical zone
must be carried out by forces of the rocket troops and artillery
of the front.
The relatively large radius of operations of enemy fighter-
interceptors, and their maneuver capabilities, make it impossible
to set a definite zone within which aircraft must be destroyed at
their bases or in the air. In this case, the methodology used in
analyzing the distribution and neutralization of antiaircraft
weapons is no longer suitable. As can be seen from the attached
table, only ten percent of the air defense fighter squadrons are
based to a depth of 200 kilometers. However, the system of
detection and guidance and the combat capabilities of fighter
aircraft make it possible to use squadrons in the forward part of
the zone even if they are based at a considerably greater depth.
Therefore, the mission of combat with fighter aircraft of the
enemy air defense will obviously be carried out as part of the
larger strategic mission of winning air supremacy.
The complexity of overcoming the enemy air defense system
demands the application of various means and methods to reduce
possible losses among military-transport aircraft and landing
troops. Thus, in addition to neutralizing numerous air defense
installations, it is very important to make the correct choice of
flight zones for military-transport aircraft, and of flight
altitudes over certain sectors of the route, and to take a whole
complex of measures for combat with enemy radioelectronic means.
In choosing the i f_lht__zones for military-transport aircraft,
,we must choose the axes with the weakest air defense s stem, taking
Tinto account Ehe weapons o enemy ground troops. This requirement
j must be given preference even if it causes a lengthening of the
~ route somewhat.
The flight altitude of military-transport aircraft must be
!minimal by the time they enter the zone of enemy radar detection.
This not only increases the security of the landing but substan-
itially lowers the chances of aircraft being hit by enemy active
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1air defense weapons. True, operating at extremely low altitudes
increases the possibility of losses from small arms fire, but the
effectiveness of such fire can be sharply reduced if flights to
the drop zone and back are made after AArk- Ni ht is also the
most favorah _t'-" fo *h~ horne landing itse
makes it more difficult for enemy troops o operate in the drop
ozone, and the surprise of a night strike furthers the creation of
Lpanic in enemy ranks.
In the overall complex of measures taken by the Supreme High
Command and by the branches of the armed forces for combat with
enemy radioelectronic means, the means of military-transport
aviation can play an important role. Group and individual means
of j mm g, when used purposefully (to protect isolated aircraft,
co at formations of large units, and the overall operational
structure of military-transport aviation), .an reduce the level
of losses an average of fifteen to twenty percent.
The task of overcoming an air defense system with the fewest
possible losses of landing troops and military-transport aircraft
seems to us to be so important that in individual instances the
conditions for its fulfilment may strongly influence the nature and
content of the missions of airborne landings. In our view, this is
the essential feature in the use of airborne landings in a non-
nuclear period. We may even, when considering capabilities for
overcoming enemy air defenses, single out the most urgent tasks
which can best be assigned to airborne landings in each specific
case.
Thus, in our example it is considered advisable to use
airborne landings to a depth of up to 150 kilometers, depending
on how the enemy air defense system is structured and on capa-
bilities for neutralizing it. The extent to which airborne
landings can be used will vary depending on conditions in the
theater of military operations, along the individual axes, and in
various areas; on how the situation develops; and on the compo-
sition of the forces and weapons participating in the operation.
Thg important thing here is not to find somesort of specific and,
at the same time, generally applicable figures in all instances,
A very important condition for the successful use of airborne
landings is the preparation or choice of the drop area. Drop
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areas will obviously be areas in which enemy troops have been
effectively neutralized and are not in any condition to disrupt
the landing or have any serious effect on the landing troops at
the very beginning of their actions. Great difficulties are
involved in achieving this condition, as well as in overcoming
enemy air defenses. On the one hand, difficulties are caused by a
lack of capabilities for striking enemy troops, and, on the other
hand, by the relatively high enemy troop density at this compara-
tively slight depth, into which airborne forces are to be dropped
with the smallest possible losses from air defense weapons. If it
is difficult to come to grips with the first factor, i.e. if it is
not possible to add to existing strike weapons, the second can at
'least be appreciably reduced. This is achieved by several methods.
One of these is to find areas wh; c-h are less densely occu ed
by - times- satis~uireents for the
f l of od combat missions by the landing forces,
since reaching a given area d24 not constitute an end in itself.
The nature of the operational makeup of enemy roops and co a
structures makes it possible to find many such areas if it is a
question of tactical landings. That' _,;li be areas in which rear
service ._rgans are accommoaatea in support or the actions or army
corps of the first echelon, arid_areas-tn which -Launch sites or
"Per _Mg" GG, a ~rP io aced. and others. ire a es
troop density is not great, and the troops themselves, being poorly
/ suited for ground combat, do not have high combat capabilities.
7 There are also many such areas in the combat structures of enemy
large units and units. On this scale, of course, areas which are
weakly held by the enemy will have considerably smaller dimensions
than they would have in the operational depth, but they will be
able to satisfy the requirements of tactical airborne landings of
-1 im; ted size. 5OX1-HUM
The second method consists of choosing the most favorable
time for using airborne landings. This is linked with creating a
situation for the enemy wherein he is prevented from calling on
any significant forces for combat with the airborne landing. Such
a situation may apparently be expected when our ground troops commit
second echelons and reserves to combat, at which time the enemy will
try to parry the strike by drawing on inactive or less committed
troops which he could otherwise use against landing forces.
The choice of timing for airborne landings is also affected
by our evaluation of the condition of the enemy air defense system,
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which will weaken progressively with the successful development of
an offensive operation. However, postponing ' d
or fourth of a a n for t some authors
Of course, the com at effec-
tiveness of the enemy air defense system may be significantly lower
by this time, and the support needed for the drop aircraft may
require fewer forces than on the first or second day of the opera-
tion. This concept also gives up the idea of using airborne
landings as a powerful means of pressure in depth against the
enemy from the very beginning of combat operations in which only
conventional means of destruction are used, operations which are
considered to be of relatively short duration. This does not
mean, of course, that we should rule out instances in which actual
developments make it impossible to use airborne landings before the
third of fourth day of an operation. Thus, only a combination of
methods, using many different ones according to specific circum-
stances, can have a positive effect on the success of airborne
landings and their actions in the enemy rear.
In combat actions using only conventional means of destruction,
there is also a considerable limitation on capabilities for support-
ing an airborne landing during combat operations in the enemy rear.
As is known, only aircraft canes with conventional means of
destruction, provide effective support for landings or con-3ucting
combat 171 riPrrs rear at dEta?cF,,~ exceed ng t-he range__ of the
artillery of ground troops. However, in a non-nuclear period, the
combat resources of aircraft (front and long-range) are limited,
since a certain portion of them must be in constant readiness for
making an initial nuclear strike. As a result, a number of missions
which aircraft could fulfil to support actions by airborne landings
are either impossible in general or can be allotted only limited
forces.
This makes it necessary to broaden the fire capabilities of
L airborne landings themselves. This can be achieved by increasing
the quantity and power of organic weapons in the airborne large
units and units and increasing the size of the combat reserves
with which they are dropped (land) in the enemy rear. The latter
requirement is also very important because the difficulties
*Information Collection of the Airborne Troops No. 41,
Military Publishing House, 1967, page 6.
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f_'encountered by military transport aircraft in overcoming enemy
air defenses to drop supplies to landing forces limit the capability
for making supply drops during combat actions. But Q e duration of
rin~st nce Therefore, in drop operations in w is maximum a or s
are made to protect the military-transport aircraft making a
supply drop, airborne landing forces must be provided initially
with a quantity of supplies, particularly munitions, in excess of
what is presently considered adequate.
Finally, one of the conditions for the successful use of
airborne landings is the correct appreciation of the features of
the actions of ground forces advancing from the front. In opera-
tions using nuclear weapons, the missions of airborne landing
forces will, as is known, be coordinated above all with the overall
plan for mounting nuclear strikes, particularly strikes of strategic
designation, and the fulfilment of these missions will depend to a
decisive degree on the results of these strikes. The great distance
of airborne landin es ecially those of o er -
de nation f,- m- - _tha rQQp rom the t hinders them
in car n ou
g;gA p_i the rea eratin t ere
inde eight to ten da s more. The Supreme igh
o A~Ls has e ca a 1 z y to mount e s r'kes against
whatever enemy orce is thre ening the landing to the greatest
degree, and this is enormously important for the attainment of
success by the landing.
The situation is somewhat different under non-nuclear condi-
tions when ground forces carry the main responsibility for routing
the enemy. The use of airborne landings will then depend to a
great extent on the capabilities of troops operating from the front 50X1 HUM
to carry out their combat missions in the allotted time. Therefore,
if we assume that the non-nuclear period includes the initial army
operations, the depth of the missions carried out by troops may be
200 to 250 kilometers and their rate of advance up to 40 or 50
kilometers per day. Under these conditions irbo e
landings will ha o erationa c aracter, i.e., as a rule they
wil e in support of the ron a a e th of u t
kilometer-from the 1in-e ofarmed contact t-hP t"
farther in individual cases. The duration of their combat actions
must be three to five days under these c~tions, a er which they
ma y be expected to 'oin ,,w.i
igures cited concerning the depth of landings corre'- p d to the
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capabilities of support means, as discussed above, and they are
also confirmed to a certain extent by the experience of the 9ne r"
training exercise.
It goes without saying that the considerations which we have
reviewed cannot be considered as a complete rejection of the use
of airborne landings on an operational-strategic scale. The
conditions of a non-nuclear period can give rise to a number of
problems whose resolution will have operational-strategic signifi-
cance even when there are limited capabilities for striking the
enemy at great depth. An important factor in determining the
essence of these problems and methods for solving them is the
military-political situation developing in the theater of military
operations as a whole and in its separate areas before the war and
at the very beginning of military actions.
Thus, airborne landings will find fairly wide application even
in a non-nuclear period of military actions. This is especially
true of operational airborne landings used in support of a front
offensive operation.
What are the basic principles of organizing the use of opera-
tional airborne landings? Since airborne landings of operational
designation will be used mainly in support of front offensive
operations, it would seem that the staffs of the fronts should be
made responsible for all of the organizational work connected with
the preparation and dropp ng_~ e andings and that tiie
necessary airborne troops and military-transport aircraft should
be included in the composition of the troops of the fronts. How-
ever, various factors make it impossible to take this course, at
least with regard to airborne landings in offensive operations
in the main theaters of military operations. The Supreme High
Command should retain control these landings up to the
orcanization of the drop, as well as of all support for the
landings.
The reason for this is that in preparing an operation in a
given theater of military operations our point of departure must
be the two possible variants of how military actions may begin--
nuclear and non-nuclear. If war begins with a nuclear period,
centralized use of airborne troops is projected for this period.
The missions of airborne landings will be mainly operational-
strategic in content, and the influence of fronts on their 50X1-HUM
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operations will become most substantial only at the end of the
airborne operation. The situation is different in a non-nuclear
period when airborne actions are directly in support of fronts
and are very closely connected with them from the moment of
landing. However, it is very difficult to guess in advance how an
operation will begin in a theater of military operations, since
war is a two-sided process and the nature of the actions of our
Armed Forces depends to a considerable degree on the actions of
the enemy. It is also difficult to establish the moment at which
the two sides will switch to the use of nuclear weapons in
operations with conventional means of destruction.
Airborne troops and military-transport aviation, i.e., the
main operating forces of lan ing operations, are means of the
Supreme High Command, as is known. It would be too complicated
and lengthy a process to transfer them to fronts, along with the
whole complex of functions for directing t Fe_ use of operational
landings, in case military actions have a non-nuclear beginning.
This variant is therefore not widely accepted. In addition,
considering how greatly the use of operational airborne landings
depends on the developing situation in the theater of military
operations, it is easier for the question of their most effective
use to be resolved by the senior command echelon, which sees the
situation in its full breadth, than by the command of the front,
which operates in a limited zone.
Finally, the last, but by no means the least important, factor
is that the complete transfer of control of the use of operational
airborne landings to fronts would require the inclusion in their
composition of the necessary forces of airborne troops, particularly
military-transport aircraft, which is scarcely possible at present,
for a whole series of reasons.
airborne assault landincs wi
Thus we have come to the conclusion that even in military
i, most often be operational in nature. This by no means excludes,
but rattier assumes, t e` ransfer of control of landing operations
to the commanders of fronts directly upon completion of the drops.
,In this case, the means of the Supreme High Command which are drawn
off to support combat actions of airborne landings in the enemy
rear may carry out their missions upon request of fronts nr ac
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part of the overall target designation of means. This affects,
above all, long-range aviation carrying out strikes and conducting
reconnaissance in support of landings; but z so affects transport
aviation dropping necessary combat supplies to landing forces.
1 When airborne landing forces are carrying out missions along
coastal axes, near straits, and on islands, or as part of a
combined landing forces, the fleet commander may be made responsible
fob matters of directing th a er e drop ementing
the coordination orces.
In operations conducted in minor theaters of military
operations, it is advisable to apply a different principle for
organizing and directing airborne landings. The fronts in this
case will be operating on strategic axes which are independent,
isolated, and appreciably removed from other theaters of military
operations. For this reason, separate large units (units) of
airborne troops and military-transport aviation maybe incorporated
beforehand into the compose ion o e'troap's'of the fronts. The
responsibility for the preparation and use of airborne landings
will be placed entirely on the staff of the front. In case of need,
the Supreme High Command will of course assist the fronts with
additional forces and means and will organize the coordination of
landings with formations and large units of branches of the armed
forces being used in the theater in accord with the plans of the
Supreme High Command.
These, in our view, are the features characterizing the use
of airborne landings in offensive operations of ground troops when
armed conflict is conducted with only conventional means of
destruction.
T-g-P S-E-r'-p-P-'T'
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