PROPOSED NATIONAL CLEARANCE/INVESTIGATIVE POLICY (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2009
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: August 7, 1980
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Proposed 11N11ational Clearance/Investigative Policy (U)
FROM: EXTENSION NO. SECOM-D-316
DATE
7 August 1980
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
DATE
building)
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
Jbo
D/P
Attached is a cover memo
2.
to C/SCC/CIWG.
It was prepared after
3
seeing response
DD/OS
f~
U~
P
to D/0 request for comment
and tries to incorporate
4.
them.
Signature as C/SEC0.1 is
5
recommended.
1& 3-,Ldvice to D/OS is
6.
requested.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
r
15.
FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
I-79 EDITIONS
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA_-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
CONHDE ' HAL if
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-316
1 9 AUG 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Donald P. Gregg
National Security Council Staff Member
SCC Counterintelligence Working Group
SUBJECT: Proposed National Clearance/Investigative
Policy
1. The 5 February 1980 meeting of the SCC Counter-
intelligence Working Group heard a report from my predecessor
on the differing personnel security standards within the
Intelligence Community. The SCC/CIWG then asked the DCI
Security Committee to study the problem from a government-
wide viewpoint and make recommendations for a national clear-
ance/investigative standards policy.
2. Attached is a further analysis of these clearance
differences within the Intelligence Community along with
identification of factors bearing on the problem and some
tentative suggestions for a solution
3. There are enormous problems in this area and they
will not easily be solved, aggressiveness and eagerness not-
withstanding. The resource implications are particularly
significant. So are the possibilities suggested such as a
national policy sanctioning the broader use of polygraph
which could have favorable impact on resource requirements.
4. In a series of meetings scheduled starting after
Labor Day the Security Committee will systematically address
the specific issues and problems involved. We will seek to
0RlGINAL C' Signer
^G Aug st 1986
L BEASGIJ:....:_ ::.
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
1111
a
determine what is needed in today's environment to make
valid assessments of loyalty, character and trustworthiness.
We will try to determine how best to obtain the necessary
data, including the value of the polygraph. We will attempt
to prepare cost/risk alternatives for SCC/CIWG consideration
5. Any reactions you have from your vantage point would
be most useful and appreciated, particularly if received
before 10 September. I hope to give you by the ens
September a target date for overall completion.
Attachment
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/att
1 - D/OS w/att
1 - OS Registry w/att
1 SECOM Chrono w/att
SECOM Subject w/att
SECOMJ
Revised
lh~8/ rjw (8/19/80)
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
PROPOSED NATIONAL CLEARANCE/INVESTIGATIVE POLICY
Background: Executive Order (EO) 10450 dated 27 April 1953
was established and designed to be the standard against which
(civilian) employment in.the Federal Government would be measured
and gauged. The qualities required of the Federal employee
are reliability, trustworthines-s, good conduct and character,
and unswerving loyalty to the United States.
In orderto,measure these qualities, the. EO established
two levels of investigation based-upon the sensitivity of the
position to be occupied by the individual. If the position had
the potential for having a material adverse effect on national
security, the position was to be designated as sensitive. Such
designation required that the candidate for employment be the
subject of a full field investigation. The alternative was a
nonsensitive position which required an investigation including
national agency checks and written inquiries to appropriate law
enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references,
and schools attended by the applicant.
In the application o.f EO 10450, the first and foremost. factor
in making the determination between a sensitive and nonsensitive'
position was the degree of access to classified material. Access
to Top Secret material was-considered to place the. position in
the sensitive category although classification per se was not
mentioned or defined in EO 10450. Also, there was an accepted
standard that originated with EO 10450 for defining the full field
investigation.- While the EO applied only to: civilian employment,
the standard full-field investigation extended even to the military.
when a Top Secret clearance was required.
The standard then developed for the full field was an
investigation of the most recent 15 years of the individual's
life or investigation from age 18, whichever was the shorter
period. The selection of a 15-year period of coverage was based
upon the historical event of the German/Soviet nonaggression
treaty of 1939 which caused the- Communist Party of the United
States to s ~i.cch e "party line" 180 degrees in its ,:tti t::de
towards the Nazi ov%ern ment of Germany. This change in "Dirty
line" made a similarly observable change in 1941 with the invasion
of the Soviet Union by the Germans. Since the period of the
early 1950s was highlighted by an aggressive effort to purge
any and, all communists from federal employment, it was considered
necessary for an investigation to extend back in time, at least
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96MO1138ROO0400010053-7
to 1939, to determine the political affiliations of the individual
during that 1939-1941 period deemed to be critical. Since EO
10450 was promulgated in 1953, coverage back to 1939 amounted
to 15 years, which then became accepted as the standard for a
full field investigation by all of the investigative agencies.
The 15-year background investigation was accepted as the
period of coverage required by Director of Central Intelligence
Directive (DCID) 1/14, which was formulated in 1966-67, for access
to sensitive compartmented information (SCI). Erosion of the
15-year standard first occurred in 1968 when the Civil Service
Commission (CSC),- because of..budgeta-ry and resource limitations,
reduced the period of co.ver.age.for E0.10450 field investigations.
Although described as-.an investigati-on covering the individual's
background and activities during the most recent 15 years or
since age 18, whichever was shorter, with intensive coverage
..of the last S-.year period, CSC's new standard was, in effect,
a basic 5-year period of coverage with some record sources such
as police and military service extending back beyond the 5-year
period. The period of coverage was expanded only when material
derogatory matters were developed which required investigation.
At the same time (1968) sensitive positions were further
defined as being either critical or noncritical sensitive with
only the critical seirsi+-ive positions requiring the newly defined,
five-year full field investigation.
In 1976 the Department of State, in order to speed up case
processing, reduced its 15-year required coverage to 7 years
for those applicants requiring screening under EO 10450 as well
as for the granting of a Top Secret clearance. No change was
made, however, with respect to checking the last institution
of higher learning attended as well as military service records'
without regard to the abbreviated period of coverage.
In 1976 the Department of Defense (DoD), also for budgetary
reasons, reduced its period of EO 10450 investigative coverage
from 15 years to 5 years, except for checks of the last institution
of.higher learning attended and military service records. DoD
also instituted at this time an entirely new criterion for granting
a Top Secret clearance to military personnel. This consist`d
of favorable Nat o:i=_1i Agency Checks (NAC's) plus ten years of
continuous honor i.b to active duty.
Current Practice:. . The above standard remained, in effect,
until December 1979 when the five-year background investigation
was made the minimum requirement for a Top Secret clearance in
DoD for both military and civilian employees. The DoD investigative
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96MO1138ROO0400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96MO1138ROO0400010053-7
organization, the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), also
conducts a special background investigation (SBI) which meets
the 15-year requirement of DCID 1/14 for access to.SCI as well
as for certain other highly sensitive assignments such as presidential
support activities.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has continuously held
to a background investigation of 15 years or coverage since age
17, whichever is shorter. This investigative coverage is augmented
by a polygraph examination for all employees and assignees,
whether. military-or civilian.
The National Security Agency (NSA) has personnel security
requirements substantially the same as CIA in terms of investigative
scope and coverage. NSA also uses the polygraph, but only for
civilian employees.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) background investi-
gation for personnel security screening has remained substantially
unchanged over the years and covers the "entire adult life" of
the individual. The FBI does not routinely employ the polygraph
examination as part of its applicant processing but has recently
adopted a policy. for its use where other means of investigation
have not produced the.i-nfor,mation required. -
Other departments and agencies of the Federal Government,
such as the Department of the Treasury or the Postal Service,
which conduct EO 10450 applicant or security clearance investigations
have patterned their coverage after that of the Office of Personnel
Management (formerly CSC) five-year background investigation.
Treasury, like. the FBI,'does not. normally employ.the polygraph
for applicant processing but has adopted its use to resolve
serious issues in applicant/clearance cases related to the
intelligence functions of the Department.
Attached are graphs depicting the scope of the investigations
conducted by the various agencies. As can be seen, the original
format of the EO 10450-associated 15-year background investigation
has been considerably changed. In addition to reductions in the
period of coverage, changes have been made in the required scope
of cover: e , e. g . , places of res-i.dence, numbers of references,
etc. Legislative changes have also affected investigations in.
terms of the type and amount of data available from NAC's,
particularly t`_e'FBT,'as well as credit and police checks
The State of lkiassachusetts, for example, provides no police ?
criminal record access whatsoever to non-law-enforcement agencies.
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96MO1138ROO0400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
? 1 ?
The effect of these changes over the years in the amount
of coverage in the full field or background investigation is of.
very real concern when interagency or interdepartmental exchanges
of data or material are considered. The same is true of certifi-
cations for visits between agencies or departments. What can
happen is that two persons from different organizations have
access to-material classified Top Secret, the first being cleared
on the basis of a full 15-year background investigation (BI)
plus polygraph, while the second received a clearance based on
a 5-year BI without a polygraph. Thus, national foreign intelligence
at standard levels of classification (for purposes of this paper
referred to as NFI/SLC) receives protection only to the personnel
security standards_of the organization which receives it.
Recent Studies: In early 1979 the NFIB Working Group on
Compartmentation appointed a panel to review the security standards
for personnel clearances. The panel concluded that the minimum
acceptable personnel security screening standard was a S-year BI.
Such a requirement would have had only marginal impact on organizations
receiving NFI/SLC other than the DOD. The other departments and
agencies acting under EO 10450 designate virtually all positions
that receive NFI/SLC as being critical sensitive and, thus, they
would meet the minimum standard of a S-year BI, With the military
personnel as well as the contractors' employees associated with
DOD, neither of whom are included under-E-0 10450, the situation
was, and remains, quite different for two reasons. First, because
of their vast numbers, the cost of conducting 5-year BI's for all
having access to Secret-level information was found to be prohibitive.
Second, to keep NFI/SLC separate from other classified material
(e.g., military data) would require separate facilities for
receiving, handling, storing and transmitting it, which, in
effect, would be the creation of still another compartment.
These factors brought an end to the discussion of raising the
personnel security standards for NFI/SLC.
Several studies of EO 10450 have been conducted with the
objective of modernizing the Order and standardizing its application
to the Federal Government. To the present time such studies
have been without success in accomplishing their objective.
These efforts have encountered the problem. of resource impact
(where they have Su.liClested equating the TOT) Secret investigative
standard with tha:. of DCID 1/14 for SCI or they have net with
resistance because of encroachment on the statutory responsibilities
of the DCI where they have attempted to lower the investigative
standard (e.g., a 5-year BI) across the board, includinc, for
SCI access.
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
Discrepancies exist even within the Intelligence Community,
as was found in a report prepared by the House Permanent Select
.Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in September 1979. The report,
prepared by the Oversight Subcommittee Staff, focused on the security
clearance procedures of CIA, NSA, State and the DoD intelligence-
related organizations, particularly as they pertain to the screening
of applicants for access to SCI. The report highlighted a need
for greater uniformity in investigative procedures and standards
and for improved access to pertinent information. The recommenda-
tions of the HPSCI report are summarized as follows:
1. Establish standards for access to TOP SECRET and SCI
which would be substantially the same, i.e., investigation
to DCID 1/14 standards.
J 2. Establish standards for searching out and reporting
of both positive and negative data in order to have an
effective screening process.
3. Conduct a study to validate the accuracy of the polygraph
as used in the security screening process.
4. Establish Intelligence Community-wide criteria for
use of the polygraph.
5. Examine the benefits and costs of establishing a
centralized office to conduct background investigations
for the entire Intelligence Community in order to assure
uniform procedures and quality control.
6. Promote legislation to assure access for the purpose
of background investigations to criminal justice records
as well as education, employment, credit and medical records,
7. Resolve the inconsistency between EO 10450, the Attorney
General's Domestic Security Investigations Guidelines and
the Privacy Act which preclude obtaining certain information
relevant to screening individuals nominated for access to
SC:[ .
The Investigative Standards Working Group of the DCI Security
Committee recently completed a study of the investigative scope and
adjLid icat ive.proc dares among the Intelligence Community agencies.
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
This study confirmed the validity of the 15-year coverage
requirement of DCID 1/14. It covered over 5,000\cases
investigated by six different investigative units and adjudi-
cated by ten participating agencies. In addition to the more
standard investigative sources, it also included analysis of
the utilization of polygraph examinations and personnel interviews
with the subject of the investigation.
The examination included an analysis of the period of coverage
required to capture significant adverse information which resulted
in adjudications resolved against. the person being considered for
access. Briefly shown the period of coverage analysis provided
the following information:
WOULD RISK LOSING:
A PERIOD OF COVERAGE RESOLVED AGAINST
OF SIGNIFICANT DATA DATA
5 YEARS 28%
7 YEARS 17%
10 YEARS 9%
15 YEARS - - 4%
11%
The above indicates that target periods of coverage of 5, 7
or 10 years risk losing significant adverse data, including data
resolved against the individual. This survey identified six
cases in which a 15-year period of coverage acquired data serious
enough to resolve against the individual. Put another way, data
resolved against the individuals in those six cases would not
have been identified with less than a 1S-year period of coverage.
In the study a productivity scale was used to rank the sources
that contributed to the identification of adverse information,
both that which was resolved in the individual's favor as well as
that which was resolved against the individual. With only a few
minor variations when considered as a unique source versus a shared
source the rank order for productivity was as follows:
Source
Productivity Index
(Resolved against data)
1.
Polygraph exnrnination
23.48
2.
Developed Sources
2.92
3.
Subject Interview
2.62
4.
Employment Personal Interviews
1.71
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
? ?
Source
5. Police Records
6. Employment Records
7. Credit Sources
8. Listed References
9. Educational Personal Interviews
10. Residence Checks
11. Educational Records
Productivity Index
(Resolved against data)
1.35
.74
.67
From the above it is apparent that the minimum standards set
forth in DCID 1/14 are needed to protect SCI as well as Top Secret
if the definition "exceptionally grave damage to the national
security" really means what it says. The very highest rated
source of adverse information, the polygraph examination, is not
required to be used as an investigative tool by Departments and
Agencies Qf the. Federal Government other than CIA and NSA.
Conclusions: The original scope of EO 10450 was limited to
civilian federal employees. The first step in determining the
sensitivity of the positions they were to occupy was their degree
of access to classified information and material. This brings
forth two questions: Why only civilian federal employees, and
why not affix the degree of investigative coverage directly to
the degree of access to classified information and material as
defined in EO 12065? In a move toward simplification of the
problems, it would be well to take the same step as was taken
by the DCI with the promulgation of DCID 1/14. That is to
create criteria and standards which would apply to all civilian
federal employees, the military, contractors' employees and all
others who are not specifically exempted. Such criteria and
standards would have to address the degrees of sensitivity
identified for each level of classified -material, i.e,, Top
Secret, Secret, :tnd Confidential, and equate to each a minimum
standard of.i.nvestt;ation which would have to be accomplished
with favorable results in order to grant access. The establishment
of these criteria, and standards for access could Lie accomplished
by publishing them as an' annex to E0 12065, which specifically
defines the levels of classification.
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
? ?
. Having arrived at this conclusion, the task yet remains
to graduate the minimum standards of investigative coverage to
each level of classification. It is necessary to make the minimum
standards of investigation compatible insofar as possible with
budgets and personnel resources as well as with the definitions
of each level of classification. The definition of each level
of classification is that information the unauthorized disclosure
of which reasonably could be expected to cause the indicated
degree of damage to the national security:
TOP SECRET - Exceptionally grave damage
SECRET - Serious damage
0
CONFIDENTIAL - Identifiable damage
In addition to the three levels of classification, EO 12065
also defines special access programs. Among these are SCI programs
for which the minimum personnel security standards for access
eligibility to SCI are set forth by the Director of Central
Intelligence in DCID 1/14. These minimum standards and procedures
would be included in the EO 12065 annex. It would further appear
appropriate to accept the first HPSCI recommendation and make
the standards for access to Top Secret the same as the minimum
standards for access to SCI.
In establishing investigative standards for access to
material classified at the Secret level it must be kept in mind
that this involves very large numbers of'contractors employees
and military personnel. Current Secret level clearances, for
other than civilian federal employees, are usually granted on the
basis of National Agency Checks (NAC's) only. Realizing that
such a simple error as a misspelling of a name can result in no
record returns from an NAC, which would result in the granting
of Secret level access, it becomes evident that more is needed
in the way of positive information on which to base access. It
is necessary, therefore, to strike a balance between the large
numbers of Secret clearances and the need for positive information
developed from investigative sources.
It appears essential that investigative requirements for
Secret level ciearoices cover at a minimum the most recent three
years of the li Fe and include a N ~C (with FBI Finger-
print check), review of employment records and interviews at the
current or most recent. significant place of employment, interviews
with at least two persons knowledgeable of the individual's
reputation, character and loyalty as well as a check of police
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
? ?
records at locations of residence within the period of coverage.
In the event that adverse information is developed in the course
of such investigation the coverage would be expanded to develop
sufficient data on which to base a sound and reasonable adjudication.
Access to classified information at the Confidential level
would require a NAC (with FBI fingerprint check) and a check of
police records at the current or most significant location of
residence within the past three years. These inquiries would be
expanded if it was necessary to resolve adverse data.
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
? i
DCID 1/14
Basic Period. o IL Coverage
Education - High School
it - Col-loge
rr
- Interviews
yrent Records
E nploI
Police
Credit
Residence
'Birth Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
\AC
STATE
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
it
- College
- Intervi.e\':s
DnployJnent Records
it - Intervi e;,s
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth F Ci i .r'1, ,}?ip
Polygraph
AGE 5
18 Years
Requires
Judgment
iini:um 3
Optional
Optional
Yes
to
Years
15
Years
i;e;,ed
Not !Js---d
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
? ?
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
l
C
o
cge
Interviews
_~lo> +ent Records
? - lntervi.clts
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth y Citizenship
Listed References
Developed Sources
Personal Intervie:~
Polygraph
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
?
C
ollege
- Interviews
Employment Records
- Intervie.':s
Police
Credit
Rcsidence
Birth y Citizenship
r
Listed
Fri
NAC
AGE 5 10
Years Yea rs
Requ I ed
All (3)
Judgment
Extensively Twice
Used as ?1i:52 __-o_ tn
Yes
AGE 5 10
17 Years rs
P,cc;uired
.J;::1 uent
S
i ~. LC.'ii.:l
nl 1
;es
t=ai t :i rc
A(11.11 t
L.ifc
I.S
Years
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
0 is
Basic Period of Coverage
Education. High School
II
College
- Interviews
'::pio)1n tt Records
Interviews
Police
Credit
Birth Citizenship
Residence
Listed References
D3 velored Sources
Personal Interview
Polygraph
INAC
DIS - SBI (DCIi 1/14)
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - High School
- College
interviews
Enmplo;ent Records
Interviews
Police
Credit
Residence
Birth Citizenship
n..r ter,
Poygraph
NAC
AGE 5 10
18 Years Years
Requi red
Not Required.
Not Required
?.I.inim,um 3
Yes
Not used
Yes
AGE 5 10
18 Years Years
15
Years
L
1 I
Rc uirej--
.Jl,_',:,:!:-;2t
YC5
Not used
Yes
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
 Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7
is
Basic Period _of Coverage
?'_ u 3 ion - High School
se ~
- C0LLcge
- Interviews
Pocorcls
Police
Credit
Resi once
-3irt1 Citizen ship
Listed References
~':elcpeu Sources
Interview
Polygraph
\.AC
Basic Period of Coverage
Education - J Ii ` h School
- College
- I;~t e r~=i ei~; s
L-iployr;ent Records
- Inter i.ews
Police
Cr:41t
Residence
Birth Citizenship
Listed References
D:neloped Sources
?
IS
Years
Clhec:.ed l c0` Ji iered necessar ~
Judgment
Ju!1~ment
For c l fi c t i o o Z a l . le _.at i ,
l a r ..~..,., ~c~.s
Not alic able
Ye s
AGE 5 10
1S Years Years
is
Years
` 1 1: 7 ter.. T T `. r e ?~.
Cir..c,.-d li c.i>>c 1..~ ~.c'1
~ssaz-;-
3
2-3
Approved For Release 2009/01/27: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010053-7