PROPOSED DISCUSSION ITEMS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR SALGO, THURSDAY, 28 MARCH 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001602330003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 27, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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4EGR
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC No. 01655-85
27 March 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for EUrope
SUBJECT: Proposed Discussion Items for Your Meeting with
Ambassador Salgo, Thursday, 28 March 1985
1. The Ambassador recently had a lengthy meeting with Kadar during
which Kadar gave a lengthy philosophical review of his life. (Attachment
A) The real purpose of the meeting, however, was for Kadar gently to
tell the Ambassador that a visit by President Reagan (which has been
bruited about) would not be desirable at this time. A visit by SECSTATE,
however, would be welcomed. This indicates that the Hungarians do not
want the limelight right now. There are at least two possible
explanations for this. The optimistic one is that Kadar is relaunching a
reform program against some opposition and would not be helped by a
Presidential level demonstration of the closeness of Hungary's ties with
the West. The pessimistic interpretation is that Kadar is waging a
losing battle against domestic and foreign critics of his moderate
policies and would be hurt further by a Presidential visit. Although
with some reservations, I lean toward the first interpretation. You may
want to ask the Ambassador his view.
2. You may want to congratulate the Ambassador on his correct
prediction (attachment 2) that the Party Congress (which will be
concluding the day you will be seeing the Ambassador) will "reelect"
ALL paragraphs are
classified S/NF
r~
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DERV MULTIPLE
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SECRET/NOFORN
Kadar First Secretary.
It a so
appears, however, that Kadar's economic policies are handicapping
intellectuals and workers in heavy industry whose skills do not lend
themselves to "moonlighting" and is probably disliked by the Party
apparatus. Does the Ambassador think the emergence of the reputedly
ideologically orthodox Grosz as Budapest Party Secretary will encourage
the apparatus slowly to sabotage or even reverse the reform program?
3. A related and important social question is whether a prolonged
period of austerity (as seemingly forecast by Kadar in his opening speech
at the Party Congress) will undermine the existing social compact and
lead an increasingly important number of people to question the
historical and current rationale for Hungary's relatively mild but still
authoritarian style of government.
George Kolt
Attachments:
1. NC 6794613-Budapest 2230
2. NC 6805434-Budapest 2241
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
2 - SA/DCI
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - D/EURA
1 - A/NI0/EUR
1 - NI0/EUR chrono
1 - NIO/EUR sub.
NI0/EUR
27MAR85
SECRET/NOFORN
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0 2108372 MAR 85 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STU2469
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DE RUDKDA #2230/01
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
00 RUEAIIB
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
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BT
C O N F I D ENT I A L BUDAPEST
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, HU, US
SUBJ: MARCH 1 CONVERSATION BETWEEN JANOS KADAR AND AMBASSADOR SALGO
2. BACKGROUND. I HAVE MET WITH MR. KADAR ON TI F p,,&FV~ * 1S
OCCASIONS,-TWICE DURING LARGE RECEPTIONS GIVEN BY THE HUNGARIAN POLIT
`I= r
CAL ELITE FOR FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN GENERAL. AT THE VERY FIRST ONE, I
WAS PARTICULARLY INTRODUCED TO MR. KADAR AND WE HAD A FEW MINUTES
CONVERSATION. ON THE SECOND OCCASION, MR. KADAR CAME UP TO ME TO GRE
ET
ME AND TO EXCHANGE PLEASANTRIES OF A SUPERFICIAL NATURE. THE THIRD
OCCASION RESULTED FROM THE VISIT TO HUNGARY BY MR. ARMAND HAMMAR
AND MR. OTIS CHANDLER. I MORE OR LESS INVITED MYSELF TO PARTICIPATE
IN THEIR MEETING WITH KADAR AND WAS TOLD BY KADAR'S OFFICE THAT IF
HAMMAR AND CHANDLER DID NOT OBJECT, KADAR WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO HAVE
ME ACCOMPANY THEM. (REF. 84 BUDAPEST 7844)
3. THE PRESENT VISIT (OUR FOURTH MEETING) WAS A RESULT OF THE
RECENT VISIT OF FERENC HAVASI TO THE UNITED STATES AND TH RUMQRS
REGARDI-NG_A_EP-TENT. AL...VISIT. -BY -PRESIDENT REAGANJd -HUNGARY . HAVASI
HAD INDICATED TO ME DURING THE TROP THAT KADAR WOULD BE RECEIVING ME,
AM) MINISTER KAPOLYI ALSO ADVISED ME OF SAME UPON MY RETURN FROM THE
UNITED STATES. IT WAS MIKLOS NEMETH WHO ENCOURAGED ME TO MAKE A FORM
AL
REQUEST TO SEE KADAR, FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY A SPECIFIC REQUEST FROM
MINISTER KAPOLYI TO PUT IN A REQUEST TO GYULA HORN, THE HEAD OF THE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT OF THE PARTY. MR. HORN WAS OBVIOUSLY AWAITING MY
CALL BECAUSE HE DID NOT APPEAR SURPRISED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THROUG
H
ALLI.HREE_.r,HANNELS.1 WAS UNOFFICIALLY ADVISED..ABOUT FRIDAY'S .FDR.TJ1-
COMING VISIT. GYULA HORN CALLED ON WEDNESDAY MORNING AT 8 A.M. SHARP
TO OFFICIALLY REQUEST THAT I COME ON FRIDAY AT 11 A.M. SO MUCH FOR
ANTECEDENCE.
4. THE MEETING ITSELF WENT ALONG WITH TYPICAL HUNGARIAN PROTOCOL
ROUTINE. I ARRIVED A FEW MINUTES BEFORE 11 A.M. IN FRONT OF PARTY HO
WHERE I WAS GREETED BY THE MILITARY GUARDS AND A SPECIAL SECRETARY.I
WAS TAKEN UP TO MR. KADAR'S LARGE SUITE OF OFFICES ON THE FIRST FLOOR
AND ASKED TO WAIT. WITHIN SECONDS MR. KADAR EMERGED AND USHERED ME
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INCOMING
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PERSONALLY INTO HIS INNER RECEPTION ROOM.WHICH IS ALSO HIS WORKING
OFFICE. WE WERE SEATED (AS ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION) FACE TO FACE ON
OPPOSITE SIDES OF A LONG TABLE--ALOE. WHEN,jJ~E.SEGREZAWL..WAS-~ID7-...~...
FAST ENOUGH TO LEAVE THE ROOM, MR. KADAR URGED HIS MORE SPEEDY DEPAR-
TURE WITH A_WAVE OF HIS HAND.
PART I.
T
PART, AFTER THE USUAL AMENITIES, KADAR ENTITLED, "LET'S GET AC-
QUAINTED." ON HIS PART, AND THIS IS SEEMINGLY HIS USUAL WAY. HE BEGA
N
TALKING ABOUT HIS VERY HUMBLE ORIGINS AND HIS MOTHER, WHO BORE HIM OU
T
OF WEDLOCK AND WAS NEVER MARRIED. HE NEVER MENTIONED HIS FATHER. HE
EXPLAINED HOW HIS MOTHER WHO WAS A SIMPLE DOMESTIC WORKER, HAD TO GIVE
HIM UP TO A CHILDLESS PEASANT FAMILY WHO, FOR REMUNERATION, RAISED HI
M.
HE DID MENTION THAT WHEN HE WAS SIX YEARS OLD, HIS MOTHER DECIDED THAT
HE SHOULD NOT BECOME A PEASANT AND, CONSEOUENLTY, SHOULD ATTEND BETTE
R
SCHOOLS IN BUDAPEST. SHE TOOK HIM TO BUDAPEST WHERE HE LIVED WITH
ANOTHER COUPLE. HIS FIRST "FOSTER PARENTS" WERE VERY UNHAPPY ABOUT
HIS DEPARTURE BECAUSE THEY HAD GROWN VERY FOND OF HIM AND, INDEED, HA
D
TREATED HIM AS IF HE WERE THEIR OWN. HE MENTIONED VERY HAPPILY THAT
FROM THE AGE OF SIX UNTIL HE WAS 14, HE WENT BACK TO THEM DURING HIS
SUMMER VACATIONS. FROM THE AGE OF SIX ONWARDS, HE EARNED MONEY FOR
HIMSELF AS A "PORK GUARDIAN" (IN HUNGARIAN - "KONDAS SEGED"). HE
WENT TO ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AND THE POLGARI ISKOLA, THE SIMPLEST
OBLIGATORY SECONDARY SCHOOL. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT AT THE BEGINNIN
G
OF THE CONVERSATION HIS SECRETARY BROUGHT IN TWO WHISKEYS, WHICH HE
FELT WAS THE APPROPRIATE REFRESHMENT FOR THE TIME OF DAY AND ON WHICH
HE SIPPED VERY SPARINGLY. INDEED, AT THE VERY END OF THE CONVERSATIO
N.
OVER AN HOUR AND A HALF LATER, HIS GLASS WAS STILL ABOUT ONE-THIRD
FULL. HE ALSO ASKED PERMISSION TO SMOKE AFTER HAVING OFFERED ME A
CIGARETTE AND REALIZING THAT I WAS A NON-SMOKER. WHEN I MENTIONED
THAT MY WIFE DOES THE SMOKING IN MY HOME. HE SAID THAT WAS FUNNY BE-
CAUSE IT WAS CONTRARY TO COMMON PRACTICE. AT MY SUGGESTION. HE AGREE
D
THAT HE HAS TRIED TO STOP SMOKING, BUT JUST CAN'T SEEM TO BREAK THE
HABIT. IN AN EFFORT TO CUT DOWN, HE PUTS HIS LIGHTER IN ONE POCKET
AND HIS CIGARETTES IN ANOTHER SO THAT WHEN HE NEXT WANTS A CIGARETTE
HE HAS TO LOOK HARDER FOR THEM.
6. MR. KADAR WENT ON TO SAY THAT AFTER HE FINISHED SECONDARY SCHOOL
AT AGE 14, HE BECAME AN APPRENTICE TO A STEEL MAMJFACTURING MASTER.
UNFORTUNATELY, FROM THAT POINT ON HE WAS NEVER ABLE TO RETURN TO HIS
FOSTER PARENT'S HOME AND TO THE VILLAGE OF HIS EARLY CHILDHOOD BE-
CAUSE AT THAT TIME APPRENTICE WORKERS DID NOT RECEIVE ANY VACATION.
HE HAD TO WORK ALL YEAR ROUND. HE EXPLAINED THAT SEVERAL TIMES HE
HAS BEEN ASKED TO WRITE HIS MEMOIRES OF HIS CHILDHOOD AND HIS EDUCA-
TION. AND, IN PARTICULAR, HIS REASONS FOR BECOMING A COMMUNIST. HIS
ANSWER TO THIS, BESIDES INDICATING THAT HE ONCE DID WRITE A FEW PAGES
ON THE SUBJECT. WAS THAT HE DID NOT BECOME A COMMUNIST BECAUSE HE
JOINED THE UNION MOVEMENT, WHICH HE DID VERY EARLY --
AS SOON AS HE WAS ACCEPTED AS AN ASSISTANT WORKER AT THE AGE OF 16,
'AFTER TWO YEARS OF APPRENTICESHIP. THIS WAS ALSO THE YEAR OF THE
START OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CRISIS, PARTICULARLY FELT IN HUNGARY,
SO AFTER A FEW MONTHS AS AN ASSISTANT. HE WAS LAID OFF ALONG WITH
MANY OTHERS.HE INSISTED THAT HE NEVER WAS VERY INTERESTED IN IDEOLOGY
THEN OR IN HIS LATER YEARS, BUT WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH FINDING AN
ACCEPTABLE STANDARD OF LIVING FOR HIMSELF. BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF
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HIS FELLOW WORKERS. THIS STATEMENT PRETTY WELL UNDERSCORES WHAT I
PERCEIVE TO BE HIS EVALUATION OF HIMSELF: HE CONSIDERED HIMSELF VERY
CAPABLE AND TALENTED AT A YOUNG AGE AND EMBUED WITH LEADERSHIP ABILI-
TIES. HE STRESSED THAT HE WANTED TO DO HIS PART IN RECTIFYING THE
MISERABLE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE PEASANTS AND WORKING CLASS, BUT HE
WANTED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WITHOUT HURTING HIS FELLOW WORKERS. THIS
PRETTY WELL ILLUMINATES HIS STATE OF MIND AT THE TIME, AND I THINK IT
EXPLAINS HIS WHOLE CAREER IN SOME RESPECTS. HE OFTEN RETURNED TO SI-
MILAR STATEMENTS DURING OUR LENGTHY CONVERSATION.
7. KADAR TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT THE DIFFICULT DEPRESSION YEARS AND
THE ODD JOBS HE WAS FORCED TO TAKE JUST TO SURVIVE. DURING OUR ENTIR
E
CONVERSATION HE WAS VERY ANIMATED, USING STRONG BODY LANGUAGE. I SAW
NONE OF THE FREQUENT "MASKS" WHICH HAD APPEARED ON HIS FACE AND FROZE
N
HIM FOR SEVERAL MINUTES DURING OUR MEETING WITH HAMMER AND CHANDLER.
8. AFTER DESCRIBING THE MISERABLE AND ALMOST TRAGIC CONDITION OF
THE HUNGARIAN WORKER DURING THE LATE TWENTIES,HE CAME BACK TO THE REA
SONS FOR HIS BECOMING A COMMUNIST. THERE WERE MEETINGS AND VARIOUS
SPEAKERS WHO EXHORTED THE WORKERS TO IMPROVE THEIR WAY OF LIFE. HE
EVEN CITED SOME SLOGANS.WHICH. FRANKLY, I EVEN REMEMBER VERY WELL FRO
M
MY OWN CHILDHOOD. ONE OF THESE WAS "MUNKAT KENYERET," WHICH MEANS
"WORK AND BREAD." AT THAT POINT, I RECALLED HOW JUSTIFIED AND SAD
THESE DEMONSTRATIONS APPEARED TO ME AT THE TIME, ALTHOUGH I WAS THREE
YEARS YOUNGER THAN KADAR WHO WAS OUT IN THE STREETS. HE MENTIONED TH
E
FACT THAT THESE SPEAKERS, AS WELL AS MAHY OF THE TRADE UNIONS, WERE
INFILTRATED BY THE COMMUNISTS AND ONE OF THESE COMMUNIST AGITATORS
APPROACHED HIM AND SUGGESTED HE COME TO SOME OTHER MEETINGS WHERE HE
WAS ULTIMATELY ASKED TO JOIN THE PARTY'S YOUTH ORGANIZATION, WHICH
HE DID. HE DIDN'T LAST LONG BECAUSE AFTER FIVE WEEKS HE WAS CAUGHT
BY THE POLICE. HE WAS IN AND OUT OF JAILS UNTIL HE FINALLY HAD TO
GO UNDERGROUND.
9. EVIDENTLY SKIPPING AHEAD QUITE A BIT, HE BEGAN TALKING ABOUT
HIS EXPERIENCES DURING THE WAR, LEAVING OUT _FIVE._ZQ.$IiVQN YEAR5__
DURING THE THIRTIES. HE WENT UNDERGROUND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
AND TRIED TO STAY HIDDEN FOR THE DURATION, NOT VERY SUCCESSFULLY AT
TIMES. MEANWHILE, HE HAD ADVANCED QUITE A BIT WITHIN THE COMMUNIST
ORGANIZATION AND BECAME ONE OF THE IMPORTANT PARTY SECRETARIES DURING
THE WAR YEARS, A FACT THAT WAS ALSO KNOWN TO THE THEN HDRTHY REGIME,
SO THEY WERE REALLY LOOKING AFTER HIM.
10. AFTER HUNGARY'S COLLAPSE IN 1945, RAKOSI RETURNED AND KADAR
JOINED THE RAKOSI REGIME ORGANIZING THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF HUNGARY
HF MADE A TYPICALLY KADAR-TYPE DETOUR AT THIS POINT, GOING ON TO TELL
ME AT GREAT LENGTH THAT HE HAD NEVER BEEN IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THA
T
HE WAS NEVER INDOCTRINATED INTO SOVIET COMMUNISM. HE WAS OFFERED A
TRIP IN THE THIRTIES, AS WELL AS SCHOOLING, WHICH HE REFUSED. WHEN
QUESTIONED AS TO HIS REASONS FOR REFUSING, HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS A
HUNGARIAN PEASANT AND WORKER AND WANTED TO STAY IN HUNGARY TO DETERMI
NE
WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE. FOR THAT HE DIDN'T FEEL HE NEEDED SOVIET
SCHOOLING. HE WAS AGAIN INVITED IN THE LATE FORTIES FOR ONE OR TWO
TRIPS, WHICH HE MADE, AND SOMETIME DURING 1950 OR 1951 HE WAS PERSUAD
ED ..,..~....",ra~~
TO GO TO A HIGH PARTY SCHOOL IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HE REQUESTED
PERMISSION FOR THIS FROM RAKOSI. RAKOSI REFUSED, INDICATING THAT THE
RE
WAS TOO MUCH TO BE DONE AT HOME AND NO TIMEFOR SCHOOLING. AS A CON-
SEQUENCE, KADAR NEVER REALLYENTERED THE SOVIET "SYSTEM." NEVER HAVING
ANY FORMAL STUDY IN THE SOVIET UNION. Hi-.Ia_D8Y1D11,;;LY.EL12EME4_+16PAGUD
OF THIS MAJOR-DIFFERENCE.: BETWEEN a1ND-.ALL,.JHE. PTtiER. OLD EtOL? HEVIKS, MO
Pf%KlGIr% AMTIA
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ST
OF WHOM SPENT._SUBSTANT.IAL TIME IN THE SOVIET UNION AND WERE DEFINITEL
11. THE CONVERSATION THEN RETURNED TO HIS PROBLEMS WITH RAKOSI AND T
HE
PARANOIA OF THE FIFTIES. HE MADE SEVERAL PECULIAR REMARKS:(1) ADORES
S-
ING THE ONE-PARTY SYSTEM, HE CONDEMNED THE ELIMINATION OF ALL NON-
COMMUNIST PARTIES--AS UNNECESSARY AND ABSOLUTEL`Y'-'!W QNG.IN THE LONG
'Ru_ _ `1S ~12OVEN_BY '53-'56. ~,(2)'"WHEN EVERYBODY WAS LOOKING EVERYWHE
RE -.. -
FOR AN ENEMY OR SPY AND COULDN'T FIND ANY, OF COURSE THE ONLY PLACE
LEFT TO LOOK WAS THE PARTY." WHICH RESULTED IN THE FAMOUS (OR INFAMOU
S)
PUBLIC CONDEMNATIONS--HE WAS AFFECTED AS WE
LIMDIS
HE DWELT VERY SLIGHTLY ON THE EVENTS OF 1956 AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WIT
H
ANDROPOV. HE DIDN'T MENTION MIKOYEN OR HOW HE GOT HIS ASSIGNMENT.
INSTEAD HE WENT INTO GREAT LENGTHS TO EXPLAIN HIS MOTIVATION, WHICH
WAS TO ULTIMATELY PRESERVE A DECENT WAY OF LIFE FOR THE HUNGARIAN
WORKER AND PEASANT, WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, COULD HAVE BEEN LOST BY TH
E
EXCESSIVE AND MUCH-TO-POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE EVENTS IN 1956.
INDEED, HE REMARKED THAT FROM 1953 ON. THE WHOLE COUNTRY WAS IN
TURMOIL, AND IT WAS EVIDENT TO HIM THAT UNLESS A VERY STRONG LEADERSH
IP
KEPT THINGS IN BOUNDS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, BROUGHT THINGS TO ACCEPTABLE
LIBERATED CONDITIONS BUT STILL WITHIN THE SOVIET FRAMEWORK, A
DISASTER WOULD RESULT, AND IT DID.
12. HAVING BROUGHT HIS LIFE STORY TO THE POINT WHERE HE BECAME FIRST
PARTY SECRETARY, HE STOPPED AND BEGAN TO QUESTION ME. BEFORE I COME
TO THIS. HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT IT WAS AMAZING TO ME THAT
HE NEVER DUPLICATED ANYTHING WHICH HE TOLD US (BUT OBVIOUSLY ADDRESSE
D
TO ME) DURING THE MEETING WITH HAMMER AND CHANDLER. I CAN'T IMAGINE
THAT HIS MEMORY IS THAT GOOD, BUT THE FACT IS THAT THERE WAS NO REPE-
TITION OF WHAT HE TOLD US ON THAT OCCASION. EVERYTHING HE TOLD ME AT
THIS TIME WAS NEW.
13. TO KADAR'S QUERY IF HE COULD ASK ME SOME PERSONAL QUESTIONS. I
REPLIED, "WHY NOT?" HIS FIRST QUESTION WAS TO ASK ME NOW I CAME INTO
GOVERNMENT SERVICE. I TOLD HIM THAT THISIS THE SECOND TIME IN MY LIF
E
THAT I BECAME INTERESTED IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDEED, IT HAPPENED
22 YEARS EARLIER. BUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME WERE SUCH THAT
THE JOB OFFERED TO ME WAS REALLY NOT ACCEPTABLE: IT IMPLIED TREMEN-
DOUS RESPONSIBILITY, WITH PRACTICALLY NO CONTROLOR VOICE IN THE
ORGANIZATION FOR WHICH I WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE. SO I DECIDED. HE THEN
ON TO ASK WHETHER I HAD PROPOSED MYSELF AS A POTENTIAL AMBASSADOR
TO HUNGARY. OF COURSE, I RESPONDED NEGATIVELY BECAUSE IT WAS ONE OF
THE GREATEST SURPRISES OF MY LIFE WHEN I WAS OFFERED THIS JOB. I ALS
0
EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT EVER SINCE RETIRING FROM ACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF MY
GROUP OF COMPANIES, I FELT THAT I SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC SER-
VICE, BUT BASICALLY I HOPE' TO FIND A PLACE IN THE FOREIGN TRADE AND
FINANCIAL AREA AS A NEGOTIATOR OR COUNSELOR OR SOMETHING OF THAT
NATURE. THE IDEA OF BECOMING AMBASSADOR TO HUNGARY (WHICH I FIRST
HEARD ABOUT EARLY IN 1983) WAS A COMPLETELY NEW ONE AND A DIFFICULT
ONE FOR ME. DIFFICULT BECAUSE I REALIZED IMMEDIATELY THE DANGERS
AND THE EXPOSURE IT REPRESENTED, BUT I ALSO REALIZED ITWAS THE EX-
PRESSION OF A DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE THAT COULDN'T BE REFUSED.
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14. THE CONVERSATION WENT ON REGARDING MY ROLE AS AMBASSADOR HERE.
HE WENT INTO GREAT DETAIL TO EXPLAIN THAT WHEN THE AGREEMENT WAS RE-
QUESTED THEY WERE QUITE PERPLEXED. THEY LIKED THE IDEA, BUT AT THE
SAME TIME THEY WONDERED HOW AND WHY. SINCE THEY COULDN'T LEARN
ANYTHING WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT I WAS A MAJOR REPUBLICAN ACTIVIST
OR CONTRIBUTOR, THEY WERE EVEN MORE PERPLEXED. BUT THEY GAVE THEIR
AGREEMENT SINCE THEY COULDN'T FIND ANY REASON TO WITHHOLD IT. HE
WENT ON TO PRAISE MY FIFTEEN MONTHS OF WORK HERE. NOTING THAT IN HIS
OPINION AND THAT OF OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WITH WHOM I HAVE WORK-
ED, I AM A VERY FAIR AND UNUSUALLY ACTIVE AMBASSADOR WHO IS AWARE OF
HIS HOST COUNTRY'S INTERESTS AND AFFAIRS, BUT PROTECTS HIS OWN COUN-
TRY'S INTERESTS AS WELL. HE REPEATED THIS SENTIMENT IN VARIOUS FORMS
AND WANTED ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS VERY MUCH APPRECIATED AND THAT
NE WANTED TO THANK ME PERSONALLY FOR IT.
15. KADAR THEN BROUGHT UP THE HAVASI VISIT, INDICATING THEY WERE
REALLY AMAZED AT THE EXTENT AND DEPTH OF THE VISIT. HE JOKINGLY
MENTIONED THAT HE WAS ABSOLUTELY DELUGED WITH REPORTS, GESTURING
WITH HIS HANDS AROUND A LARGE. IMAGINARY PACKAGE IN FRONT OF HIM.
HE INDICATED THAT SEEMINGLY HAVASI VISITED JUST ABOUT EVERYONE IN THE
UNITED STATES WHO CAN BE CONSIDERED IMPORTANT. HE WENT ON TO SAY THA
T
THIS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT AND NECESSARY VISIT FOR HUNGARY AND THE U.S
16. AT THIS POINT, KADAR OPENED UP THE SECOND PART OF THE CONVERSA-
TION, WHICH WAS DEVOTED TO THE HISTORY OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONS. I
WANT TO MENTION, HOWEVER, BEFORE GOING ON TO THE SECOND PART, THAT
KADAR PROMPTED ME TO GO INTO RECIPROCAL REMINISCENCES REGARDING MY
YOUTH IN HUNGARY AND DUR RESPECTIVE EXPERIENCES AND FEELINGS AT THAT
TIME TOWARDS THE THEN REGIME AND OUR STANDARD OF LIVING. TOWARD THE
END OF THIS EXCHANGE, HE SWITCHED BACK AGAINTO MY BECOMING AMBASSADOR
AND SAID THAT WHAT REALLY AMAZED THEM WAS THAT SOMEONE OF MY STATURE,
COMING FROM A WELL-KNOWN AND RESPECTED HUNGARIAN FAMILY, HAVING
ATTAINED A GENERALLY RESPECTED POSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, WOULD
COME TO HUNGARY AS AMBASSADOR. I REPLIED THAT THIS WAS THE PROOF THA
T
OUR GOVERNMENT WAS REALLY SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN IMPROVING AND BUILD
ING UP OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, OBVIOUSLY LOOKING FOR SOMEONE WHO
COULD MAKE MORE OF A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THIS EFFORT THAN THE
AVERAGE FOREIGN SERVICE PERSON.
17. THE CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO THE PROBLEMS OF HUNGARIAN-
AMERICAN RELATIONS. HE DIDN'T DEVELOP THIS IN ANY DETAIL BUT HE
DISCUSSED THE GOOD BEGINNING, WHICH FADED AWAY WITH THE MINDSZENTY
SITUATION AND REMAINED AT A LOW EBB FOR TOO LONG. AS SOON AS THERE
WAS A SIGN THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS INTERESTED IN IMPROVING RELA-
TIONS, "WE DID EVERYTHING AND PAID EVERYTHING IT COST TO GET THESE
RELATIONS BACK ON A NORMAL FOOTING." THEY PAID EVERY PENNY OF EVERY
DEBT. WHATEVER THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REQUIRED, TO BE ABLE TO BE CON
SIDERED AS ACCEPTABLE PARTNERS. AND FROM THERE ON EVERYTHING BECAME
SLOWLY, BUT SUCCESSIVELY, MORE NORMAL. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY WERE PER-
FECTLY HAPPY TO BUILD UP PERSONAL EXCHANGES. HE MENTIONED WITH PLEA-
SURE AND APPRECIATION THE VISIT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, MAKING A GRI-
MACE AND REFERRING WITH A TWINKLE IN HIS EYE TO THE STEP IN THE WRONG
DIRECTION OF THE VIENNA SPEECH, THE "DIFFERENTIATION." HE WENT ON
TO SAY THAT IT WAS A WONDERFUL THING THAT HAVASI RECEIVED SUCH
A WARM RECEPTION FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT, BUT HE INDICATED THAT EVEN
THE HAVASI VISIT, WITH ALL ITS AMERICAN SUCCESS OR BECAUSE OF IT,
IS NOT SOMETHING WHICH IS NATURALLY CONSIDERED POSITIVE BY EVERYONE
IN HUNGARY. HE FURTHER EXPLAINED THAT, IN HIS OPINION, THERE IS
STILL A VERY STRONG PART OF THE POPULATION._PARTICULARLY THE--LOWER
LABOR.-GROUPS AND THE OLDER PARTY-ELEMENTS,.-WHO .CONSID.E$ EVERYTHING
COMING FROM THE WEST .WITH GREATSUSPICION AND ALSO LOOK AT EVERY
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MAJOR PARTY LEADER WHO INDULGES IN SUBSTANTIAL CONTACT WITH THE WEST,
PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE SAME SUSPICION. IN RESPONSE
TO MY REMARK THAT I REALLY HAD HOPED THAT THESE ELEMENTS OF THE COLD
WAR WERE LONG GONE, HE REPLIED THAT HISTORICALLY THEY ARE GONE BUT
THAT PEOPLE'S BASIC IDEALS AND BELIEFS DON'T CHANGE EASILY,
PARTICULARLY WHEN THEY ARE SET IN A SPECIFIC DOGMATIC PATTERN.
18. FROM THE ABOVE CONVERSATION, IT WAS EASY TO SEE WHERE HE
WAS DIRECTING THE CONVERSATION--TO TALK ABOUT A POTENTIAL VISIT OF
PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ. BEFORE GETTING TO IT, HOW-
EVER, HE DETOURED AND REFERREDTO THE__ERROR ABOUT THE ADELMAN/SHULTZ
VISIT. HE TOOK THE POSITIVE SIDE, PRAISING AND THANKING ME, AS HE
DID SEVERAL TIMES THROUGH OTHER EMISSARIES, JANOS NAGY AND HAVASI
BEING THE LATEST OF THESE. HE AGAIN TOLD ME THAT HE REALLY APPRE-
CIATED THE FACT THAT I ASSUMED THE BLAME AND EXONERATED ALL OF HIS
PEOPLE, ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVES THAT AT LEAST A 50-50 SHARING OF THE
BLAME WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE APPROPRIATE, PROBABLY LEANING MORE
HEAVILY TOWARD THE HUNGARIAN SIDE. HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE WHOLE
AFFAIR IS AMAZINGLY COMPLETE. INDEED. HE DIVINED WHAT HAPPENED IN
THE SAME WAY I DID WHEN JANOS NAGY SPRUNG THE QUESTION ON ME. "WHEN
IS SHULTZ COMING? WE ARE WAITING FOR HIM." I FOUND IT REMARKABLE
THAT KADAR SHOULD KNOW SO MUCH, BUT IT ALSO CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS
A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR HIM. (I WAS TOLD BY OTHER SOURCES THAT THE
MATTER WENT ALL THE WAY UP TO GROMYKO AND THEN THEY HAD TO GO BACK
TO GROMYKO TO EXPLAIN THE ERROR.)
19. KADAR WAS OBVIOUSLY ANXIOUS TO HEAR MORE OF THE IDEA OF A
REAGAN VISIT. I TOLD HIM THAT I REALLY HADN'T THE FAINTEST IDEA
WHERE IT STARTED, BUT IF I WOULD HAVE TO FIND A LOGICAL SOURCE.
I MIGHT POINT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT WHO WAS OBVIOUSLY VERY IMPRESSED
WITH HIS LONG CONVE ATION WITH MR. HAVASI. I HOPED TO CUT
HIS SPECULATION SHORT WITH THIS AND TO PUT A POSITIVE BONUS ON THE
HAVASI VISIT AT THE SAME TIME. HE SEEMED TO AGREE WITH THIS POSSI-
BILITY, BUT I REITERATED THAT THIS WAS STRICTLY SPECULATION ON MY PAR
T.
HE THEN ASKED IF WE CAN SEE THIS POTENTIAL VISIT AS THEY DO, WHICH IS
AS FOLLOWS: THEY COULDN'T THINK OF ANYTHING MORE IMPORTANT OR BENE-
FICIAL TO HUNGARY, AND HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS HOW SUCH A VISIT WOULD
REALLY ELEVATE HUNGARY IN WESTERN EYES. WHERE POLAND WAS AFTER THE
NIXON .VISIT. BUT HE FEELS THAT IT IS JUST NOW TOOU-EOR441FK"ARY.__
TO PLAY SUCH A LARGE ROLE. HE THEN WENT ON, LAUGHINGLY, TO SAY
THAT HE HAD MANY VERY GREAT PEOPLE TO CONVERSE WITH AND THE GREATEST
WERE ALWAYS THE ONES WHO SAID NEVER APPEAR ON THE FRONT PAGES OF A
NEWSPAPER--THEN YOU CAN DO WHAT YOU REALLY WANT TO DO, SUCCESSFULLY.
THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD HAVE BEEN SPLASHED ACROSS FRONT
PAGES AROUND THE WORLD AND THAT, jS. NQT..GODD _FOR_ HUNGARY TODAY. I
AGREED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN FRONT-PAGE NEWS, BUT ONLY FOR_A DAY,
AND ONLY VERY FEW PEOPLE WHO HAVE REASON TO WOULD HAVE REMEMBERED
IT AFTER THAT. BUT HE INDICATED THAT CERTAIN PEOPLE WHO HAVE
NEGATIVE REASONS FOR DOING SO WOULD HAVE DEFINITELY REMEMBERED IT.
20. THIS EXCHANGE WAS PRETTY TYPICAL OF THE RATHER INTIMATE TONE OF
OUR CONVERSATION WHICH DEVELOPED ALMOST IMPERCEPTIBLY AS THE CON-
VERSATION WENT FORWARD. KADAR MENTIONED THAT BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICUL
TIES THE COUNTRY IS FACING IN ITS ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTATION AND
DEVELOPMENT. AND THE STRONG LIBERALIZATION PROCESS IN uIVING BACK
TO THE ENTERPRISES PRACTICALLY ALL MANAGERIAL POWER, AND THE CRI-
TICISM FROM DOGMATIC CIRCLES TOWARDS IT, THEY DECIDED THR~ E E 9QL1QtjS
AGO TO.KEEP ?THE FOREIGN-POLICY-EFFORTS OF PUNGARY ON A MORE MODEST
SCALE THAN IN 1984.- HE MADE SOME VAGUE REFERENCES TO THE GENERAL
EAST-WEST TENSION BECOMING MORE MANAGEABLE, BUT ALSO GIVING TO UNDER-
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STAND THAT THE PROOF HAS TO BE THERE BEFORE IT WILL REALLY BE BELIEVE
D.
THIS IS THE OTHER REASON WHY THEY WANT TO PLAY IT NOW. HE INDICATED
ALSO THAT THEY HAVE SO MANY PREVIOUS ENGAGEMENTS FOR WESTERN VISITS,
THAT IT WOULD BE HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE TO GO BEYOND THAT FOR A GOOD PAR
T
OF THIS YEAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE INDICATED THAT MR. SHULTZ'S VISI
T
WAS PROMISED TO THEM AND THEY ACCEPTED IT. AND THEY-DO HOPE IT WILL
MATERIALIZE SOMETIME DURING 1985.
21. WITH A TWIST OF THE CONVERSATION, HE TALKED ABOUT HOW HIS DIS-
CUSSION WITH SOVIET LEADERS GENERALLY WAS ON AN OVERALL POLITICAL
LEVEL AND NEVER ON SPECIFIC WORKING OR PROFESSIONAL LEVELS. HE
OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO UNDERSCORE HIS VERY CLOSE CONNECTION AND FRE-
QUENT MEETINGS WITH ANDROPOV AND, PROBABLY AS A COUNTERBALANCE, THE
RELATIVELY LITTLE CONTACT HE HAS HAD WITH CHERNENKO. HE MENTIONED
SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH BREZHNEV AND MENTIONED THAT DURING ANDROPOV'S
FUNCTIONS WHICH FOLLOWED HIS AMBASSADORSHIP TO HUNGARY, HE MET
HIM QUITE OFTEN--PRACTICALLY EVERYTIME HE WAS IN THE SOVIET UNION;
PARTICULARLY WHEN ANDROPOV WAS HEAD OF THE KGB HE CONTINUED TO SEE
HIM, TALKING ONLY ABOUT GENERAL POLITICS, NEVER BUSINESS. WITH
BREZHNEV IT WAS SOMEWHAT SIMILAR. HIS CONTACTS WERE NEVER SPECIFIC.
(TOWARDS THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, HE NOTICED THAT I LOOKED AT
THE CLOCK AND ASKED IF I WAS LATE AND SHOULD WE END THE CONVERSATION.
I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT LATE AT ALL AND WAS VERY MUCH ENJOYING OUR
TALK. BUT I WAS AFRAID THAT I HAD OVERSTAYED MY WELCOME AND WAS TAKIN
G
UP TOO MUCH OF HIS TIME. HE SAID THE HE WOULD BE THE JUDGE OF HIS TI
ME
AND HE KNEW EXACTLY HOW TO USE IT AND WAS USING IT PROPERLY NOW. THE
CONVERSATION WENT ON FOR ANOTHER TWENTY MINUTES OR SO.)
22. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS AND COMMENTS. IN THE MIDST OF SOME OF
KADAR'S REMINISCENSES REGARDING SOME SOVIET LEADERS, HE INTERRUPTED
HIMSELF, SAYING WITH GREAT ANIMATION THAT HE WANTED TO TELL ME HOW
GLAD HE WAS THAT WE WERE HAVING THIS DISCUSSION. HE ASSURED ME THAT
WHENEVER THERE WAS A GOOD REASON FOR DOING SO, WE WOULD CONTINUE IT.
HE WANTED ME TO KNOW HOW MUCH THEY APPRECIATED MY GOOD DISPOSITION
TOWARDS THEM AND THE FAIRNESS WITH WHICH I REPRESENT MY OWN COUNTRY.
HE STAYED SEATED. LISTENING TO MY RESPONSE, ETC., AND, IN EFFECT,
PRACTICALLY FORCED ME TO STAND UP FIRST. ONLY AFTER THAT DID HE
ACCOMPANY ME ALL THE WAY OUT THROUGH THE THREE ROOMS TO THE ANTEROOM
TO SAY GOODBYE. AS I TURNED TO LEAVE, I HEARD HIM CALLING MY NAME AN
D
HE ASKED ME TO COME BACK FOR A SECOND. I DID, WND HE TURNED TO ME
AND THEN TO HIS SECRETARY, WHO WAS THERE TO ESCORT ME OUT, BUT WANTED
TO WITHDRAW. HE SAID, "NO, YOU STAY HERE," AND THEN TURNED TO ME
SAYING, "MR. AMBASSADOR, WE NORMALLY ISSUE A STATEMENT ABOUT SUCH A
VISIT AS OURS AND ITS GENERAL CONTENT. WOULD YOU PREFER WE DO SO, OR
NOT?" I COULD HEAR IN HIS VOICE THAT HE WOULD RATHER WE DIDN'T, SO I
INDICATED THAT UNLESS HE FELT THAT THERE WAS A GOOD REASON TO ISSUE
SUCH A STATEMENT, I WOULD BE PERFECTLY HAPPY NOT TO. HE IMMEDIATELY
REPLIED, "FINE, THEN WE WON'T. I HOPE TO SEE YOU SOON. GOODBYE."
THUS, THE VISIT WAS TERMINATED.
SALGO
r`nTICifl MMT Al
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PP RUEAIIB
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
STU4233
PP RUEHC
DE RUDKDA #2241/01 0801735
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 2114272 MAR 85
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2680
INFO RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 207
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 203
RUEHBS/USNATO BRUSSELS 827
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 233
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 222
RUDKRP/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 253
RUDKSA/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 201
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1276
RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 223
BT
CONF IDENTIAL BUDAPEST2241
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, HU
SUBJ: MORE ON THE IMPACT OF GORBACHEV'S SELECTION
2. SUMMARY: THE ATMOSPHERE HERE IS ONE OF.M MALLY CHARGE
poiIT1rei er~TUATI 1 ?un E PE TATIO, THE RECENT DEATH OF CHERNENKO,
THE END OF GERIATRIC SOVIET LEADERSHIP, AND THE ELECTION OF
GORBACHEV HAVE OBVIOUSLY HAD A PROFOUND INFLUENCE ON THE ATTITUDES
OF PARTY MEMBERS. EVERYONE IS PARTICI GUESSING GAME.
I BELIEVE THAT THE FENCE-SITTERS ARE ALL JUMPING OFF TO THE RIGHT
(KADAR) BECAUSE THEY EXPECT THE WOLVES (SOVIET IDEOLOGISTS) TO
BLEAT. SINCE I EXPECT ALL OUR MAIN POLITICAL CONTACTS AND SOURCES
OF INFORMATION TO GO INTO SECLUSION DURING THE PREPARATION AND
DURATION OF THE PARTY CONGRESS, IT SEEMS THAT A REVIEW OF ATTITUDES
HERE IS TIMELY. END OF SUMMARY.
3. JUST FOR THE RECORD, THE HUNGARIANS DID NOTICE THE SUDDEN
DEPARTURE OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION FROM THE U.S. ON SUNDAY AND A
SIMILAR DELEGATION'S DEPARTURE FROM YUGOSLAVIA, BOTH WITHOUT ANY
EXPLANATION. NEVERTHELESS, THEY WERE GIVEN THE OFFICIAL NOTICE
ONLY TEN MINUTES (1150 BUDAPEST TIME/1350 MOSCOW TIME) BEFORE RADIO
MOSCOW ANNOUNCED CHERNENKO'S DEATH. IN ONLY A FEW MINUTES, WE
HEARD THE FIRST HUNGARIAN JOKE ABOUT IT- "CHERNENKO'S GRE:.TEST
CONTRIBUTION TO HUNGARY'S POLITICAL LIF: WAS THE TIMING OF HIS DEATH
4. THE EVENTS WERE ANALYZED IMMEDIATELY. THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATIONS
TO THE THREE CONSECUTIVE SOVIET FUNERALS WERE IDENTICAL. THE FIRST
TWO WERE MET ON THEIR ARRIVAL BY GORBACHEV AND SMIRNOV; THE THIRD
DELEGATION WAS MET BY ROMANOV AND SMIRNOV. THE THREE CONDOLENCE
TELEGRAMS WERE ALL QUITE DIFFERENT. (IN THE CASE OF ANDROPOV, IT
CONFIDENTIAL
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NIO/EUR
INCOMING
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WAS VERY PERSONAL AND MEANINGFUL.) THE THREE CbNGRATULATORY TELEGRAM
S
WERE VERY WARM AND PERSONAL TO ANDROPOV, MEASURED AND POLITE TO
CHERNENKO (IN BOTH CASES WITH A LOT OF PERSONAL EULOGY), AND
QUITE NEW IN TONE TO GORBACHEV--IMPERSONAL, BUT WITH A LOT OF TALK
ABOUT THE GREAT SOVIET NATION AND ITS FUTURE, SEEMINGLY PROPERLY
REPRESENTING THE LEADING CIRCLE'S PRESENT ATTITUDE: "SO FAR, SO
GOOD; LET'S SEE WHAT COMES NEXT."
5. IN THE CIRCLES OF THE BORN-AGAIN SOCIALISTS (GOOD OLD COMMUNISTS
REBORN AND BAPTIZED WITH IDEAS EXTREMELY FAMILIAR TO OUR
WESTERN EARS), GORBACHEV REPRESENTS THE BEST HOPE FOR THE FUTURE.
THEY POINT TO THE FACT THAT HIS SPEECH SOME TWO AND HALF YEARS AGO
BEFORE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WAS PRACTICALLY NO DIFFERENT FROM THE
SPEECH HE GAVE AFTER HIS ELECTION TO GENERAL SECRETARY. THEY POINT
TO THE FACT THAT HE SPENT MANY TWO-WEEK STINTS IN MOST EUROPEAN AND
MANY OVERSEAS COUNTRIES, INCLUDING CANADA AND HUNGARY, AND THEY CLAIM
HE ALSO TOOK AT LEAST TWO I TO TRIPS TO HUNGARY. HIS OFFICIAL'
vASI DU ING
OUR U. .. ALONG WITH MANY OTHER INTERESTING COMMENTS
(REF. BUDAPEST 2064). THE HUNGARIANS HAVE PUT ON THEIR MOST
DISCREET CLOTHING BYHNOT SENDING HAVASI WITH THE DELEGATION AND
REMAINING EXTREMELY NEUTRAL. PERHAPS THE UNEXPECTED DEMISE OF
ANDROPOV TAUGHT THEM A LESSON.
5. THERE IS PRACTICALLY NO NEWS OR GOSSIP CIRCULATING ABOUT KADAP.'S
MEETING WITH GORBACHEV OR, IN GENERAL, ABOUT THE WARSAW PACT HEAD*.
OF STATES MEETING WITH HIM. it
6. CONCERNING THE UPCOMING PARTY CONGRESS, THE STRONG "I KNOW THAT"
GOSSIP ABOUT MAJOR CHANGES IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, POLITBURO AND
TOP RANDS HAS SUDDENLY SEEMED TO VANISH. HAVING HEARD SO MANY
VARIATIONS ABOUT MOSTLY THE SAME PERSONS (RISING STARS AND FALLING
COMETS), I HAD BEGUN TO WONDER WHETHER OR NOT MY OWN PERCEPTION AND
JUDGMENT WAS CORRECT. NOW, WITH THE VAHISHING CHORUSES,L
SOMEW+AT ~'^RE SECURE IN REITERATING MY EXPECTATIONS KADAR 'THE
FIRST eM N1v FV A TF TH RE ARE COSMETIC CHANGES IN HIS TI LE
eC PAEhrT? T.^r WTI 1 RC MTNTMAI CHANGES TN TuF FTSET n??kc'. FFW
01 D-TIMERS WT1 I PHAC nl1T nv LOSTIM WAIF DR THE OTHFD nF A LM I TITLE OR JOB- AND QUITE A FEW Y LING IRKS AND TECt+ CRATS WTL..'GET
A'F~OT IN THE DOOR, SOME BOTH FEET.
TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT FROM AMBASSADOR SALGO
7. I REPEAT, THESE ARE MY IDEAS BASED ON MY OWN OPINION POLL AND
STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY MY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTORS INVOLVED.
8. COMMENT: QUI VIVRA VERA. MORE ABOUT IT ON APRIL 2 (HOPEFULLY
I WILL REMAIN CREDIBLE AFTER APRIL FOOLS' DAY).
SALGO
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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