MILITARY THOUGHT: THE INFLUENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF A FRONT, BY GENERAL OF THE ARMY V. KURASOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1960
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2 VI
USSR
MILITARY "1`l`~-,UGHT. "T= = Influence of
Ifiaclar P;: son the I'rx ,ciples of the
In.
Offensive Opw: ations of a x'ront", by
50X1-HUM
General of thf Army V. Ki. ~sov
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
The Influenc, cif Nuclear Weapons on the Principles of the Offensive
Operations of a Front
by
General of the Army V. Kurasov
he rapid devekPment of the socialist economy and
that our nat o le nce
and technology testify more eloquently than any words successfully creating the material-technical foundation for Communism
and at the same time is increasing its defensive capability.
The Soviet Armed Forces, while undergoing reduction in numbers,
axe being et:.-.'.p" -:cc ii:-re avd more with nuclear weapons and other
means of modern military technology. A ,yew type of armed force has
been created- -missile troops of strategic designation. The equippin
will
of all types of armed forces with nuclear weapons in quantity that
ensure their mass use in operations immeasurably increases ou their
views
combat on the oftmoder i All warfare and the methods of waging it.
on the nature ature
History offers many examples of how the development of armament
and technology has given rise to great changes in views on warfare and
in military art, but the revolution in the field which is occurring at the
present time, mainly on account of the development of nuclear weapons
and the possibility of their mass use, cannot be compared with changes of the past. The radical modern changes in viewsbo w nth the
and in military art have the nature of a headlong gallop, a
gradual development of military art, signifies elimination of
a number of old tenets and their replacement by new
By their own combat capabilities, nuclear, and especially are the nuclear/
missile, weapons under conditions of their mass use
-2-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
means of armed combat, and have a. decisive influence on the cot. ret of
operation of all types of armed forces. Moreover, these weapon::: have
altered the combat capabilities of even identical types of armed forces.
One cannot now, for example, imagine the nature of offensive opera-
tions of a front and the means of conducting them without an analysis
of the possible influence on their of strikes of nuclear weapons of
strategic designation and 'various types of armed forces participetcnl
in these operations. Thus, during and as a result of strikes by
nuclear weapons of strategic designation, as we can well imagine.
nuclear superiority over the enemy can be won, his economic power
can be undermined, and the destruction of the strategic groupings of
his ground troops, air forces, and navy can be attained.
It remains co be said that such nuclear strikes will as a rule be
inflicted on enemy objectives located in the strategic depth. There-
fore, despite the views stated in the article by Colonel-General A. I.
Gastilovich, 1 the destruction of enemy objectives in his tactical and
? operational zones is the goal of the offensive troops of a front and
above all of their nuclear weapons, and not the target for nuclear
strikes of strategic designation. Of course, one cannot completely
exclude cases where such strikes of strategic designation may be
delivered against enemy objectives in his operational depth. Ho a-ever,
these cases will not be typical, owing to the fact that such use of
strategic nuclear weapons contradicts their designation and does not
completely exploit all of their combat capabilities.
Success of these powerful strategic nuclear strikes, especia:
if they precede the beginning of an offensive operation of a front,
will undoubtedly ensure favorable conditions for the conduct of the
operation with a comparatively small expenditure of nuclear weapons
of the front. Under other conditions, when nuclear weapons of stra-
tegic designation are not employed in the area of the offensive of a
front, the successful attainment of the goal of the offensive will re-
quire the use of a greater number of the nuclear weapons of the
front.
1S cial Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita Thought'
,
First sue, OUT
-3-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
?
?
nuclear weapons.
~r~lgE.~, thE? fr~zr..?.
du. ~n our rnand-staff x' J able to deliver
it 11
Not tOO long ago
t a,.div id'J', l targets
having a limited amougainst the '~most imp -rta t,
nuclear strikes only while a substaf`tial portinn on of of other
her
and ets a ivies of the enem toed to be de .troy`ec uy' carrier of
targets and And if t is eU died that, pr~.r.tic all : the only
weapons And if it is r. ; ict often did not reach
insunt
nuclear weapons at that ' an was aircraft, '
e car! more fully unclersdoneectionxwiehthe
the target, then on period. front. the
effectiveness of nuclear strikes of that operations of a
ons in offensive rouping& and ob-
lir,iited use of nuclear wc',-1'
possibility of simultaneo ~}' destruction of enemy
of their operational formation was
troop
jectives in the entire dep Therefore,
hh the c.,, the ive
ded during our exercises at that time.
preclu ast, was
offensive) carried vu which the enemy had the d
as in the p resistance , during
o-ircoming of enemy ons from the rear an w opportunity to maneuver
e g and o Via
?ihis of str forces
the flanks for the crew
limited use still had ciont;
Thus, nuclear wet:, ins u~df. thedstru tu'ie and conduct of of-
not introduced nsioi'Yt~-e fro-i?
fensive operation
opera-
Only of these weapons in op
Only now, with tit mass emp y
of various delivery vehicles;, mainly missiles, is
dons with the use nuclear strikes against l m a that complete
lete
r ale to deliver surprise
_ of enEx7}' ot--~:-ives and ~r~.k~,ieve the1x-assu d with the
operation
destruction. . Without e gerasing, it can be assume
successful mass use of nuclear w ~~ ? of in an offensive
clear,
of the front, not less than 60 the entire opposing enemy
will be destroyed with th these weapons. This is why ing nuclear,
weapons have now become decisive
grouping nuclear/missile,
and especially and above all in the attainment of
in the destruction of the enemy roupingswhile
nuclear superiority over him The attainment of such superiority
will significantly quicken the destruction of enmy~lgroU have an
superiority the enemy will way
in the absence of this h the mass use of his
opportunity to disrupt our offensive throng
-4-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 r_fV1 ui inn
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
Only now in connee tton yr:tit rh cif vc.. op merit of nuclear, and
principally nuclear/r;massil vve;- f -- -, al l: t O '1:' ,2ncct Gr With
the possib.lity of their mass. S ri =.c i c h n n tY re
and conduct of offensive and other operations taking piaoe.
u examine several more sfxf f iyt. insta?i: s= ~ of the influ,ure
of ,... c:e ;?f apons on some of th s
of the front in the initial period of a 'hiii
Thj o is of an offensive opc.-atioc C-1 it. ;rf~=Alt, es is general:.-
known, determine its concept and se_c as in the pa ;t,
are: the destruction of the basic enemy grot.tfJm ts, the swift de _?.. p-
ment of the offensive, the seizure of his territory and specific c: a-
tional-strategic objectives. However, the essence and nature of
these goals have changed considerably. While, in the~past the bass
of the enemy's grouping of troops consisted of his infantry and tank
large units, now nuclear weapons; as the principle and decisive
means of combat., have b=ecome thf? b: sit;
Studying the development of nuclear weapons of operational-
tactical dcsign t.ion in the armies of the probable enemy and above
all in the US tirmy, we come across a great. number of types of
nuclear weapons, of TNT equi ;-a onts and of delivery aircraft.
Quite recently, up to 10 types erial atomic bombs with 19 various
TNT equivalents (from 2 to 300 ,:lotorr:) could have been noted in
the US Army. Seventeen different types of delivery aircraft
supported the use of these bombss.
At the present time the arsenal of nuclear/missile weapons of
operational-tactical designation in the US Army consists of only five
types of guided missiles and free rockets: "Honest John", "Little
John", "Lacrosse", "Corporal", and "Redstone" with nine different
TNT equivalents (from 1 to 3800 kilotons), and two types of cruise
missiles: "Matador" and "Regulus" with five TNT equivalents
(from 1 to 100 kilotons).
-5-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
50X1-HUM
Furthermore., it should be noted that the probable enemy has at his
disposal artillery pieces with calibers of 203 and 208 /iic - 2807 mm
with nuclear shells (from 1 to 45 kilotons).
As is evident from the aforementioned data, the most modern
and powerful nuclear/missile weaponss in the armies of the probable
enemy have not yet become his principle and decisive means of combat.
It looks more as if the enemy's aviation still fulfills this role, in spite
of its increased vulnerability to antiaircraft missiles. This should
be kept in mind However, this situation requires further study.
As regards the possible number of enemy infantry and tank large
units in his troop grouping, able to resist the front, considerable
changes have also taken place here. Comparatively recently, under
conditions of limited use of nuclear weapons, it was considered that in
a front offensive area with a width of 300-400 kilometers, and basing
the average operational density of troops at 15 kilometers per division,
the enemy could have up to 20-27 infantry and tank divisions. Because
of the mass use of nuclear weapons, these divisions can now sue-
cessfully advance and conduct combat operations in areas with a
width of up to 20 :rilometers, and such an enemy grouping will
undoubtedly be smaller. For example, in a front offensive area with
a width of 4S0 kilometers, it will have in all only 13 to 15 infantry
and tank divisions. Such a quantitative reduction of groupings is a
direct consequence of the unusually increased fire power and troop
maneuverability, and also of the requirement for their maximum
protection from destruction by nuclear weapons.
Together with this, the dispersal of enemy groupings in area has
grown even more Now it is impossible to imagine compact groupings
with a continuous front of even one or two enemy divisions, to say
nothing of several of his armies, since such groupings would im-
mediately be subjected to nuclear strikes and destroyed.
Under modern conditions, not armies, but often individual enemy
divisions,not creating a continuous front; will conduct an engagement
in a particular area, while others of his divisions on the flanks and
-6-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
in the rear of this area execute a m.i~.t er with the aim of ws i c COiiu itiOns l cY os the landings,
forces operas ic?xfi are the suddenness and rapidity off
also the az;ressiveness and resoluteness of the pperations
during the ex ?'',~tion of the combs-, tasks. However, for the reinforce-
ment of of*ra =.cnal airborne forces it will sometimes be necessary
to increase forces through the transfer by air of motorized
rifle units ar, ,rEe units .
The motorize a rifle and tank troops of a front, in coor inatk n
with missile troops, aviation, and airborne forces, by
maneuvering and by not becoming engaged in protracted fightingai zones,
with the enemy, can quickly overrun his tactical and opera,
swiftly react: the area of the combat operations of the tactical and
operational e'rborne forces, accomplish the immediate task of the front,
and continue.'=develop the offensive tto the accomplishment of the
goal of the operation. Artillery, and above all rocket artillery,
fw?::~4
destroys and re`,?tralizes the enemy's nuclear installations, his
weapons, and his personnel. In the course of the offensive, the
artillery destroys and neutralizes newly discovered targets, ob-
jectives, and revived centers enemy resistance.
The epee-2. of the troop advance, especially on the axis of the
main strike, must be not less than 100 kilometers per calendar
day.
Aviation?, in coordination with the missile, airborne, anground
troops of the front, destroys and neutralizes enemy nuclear weapons
and troops, against whom missile strikes and and covers the attacking
small-sized)
troops, destroying newly discovered (mainly
t ets
-18-
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105 R000403520001-2
It is obvious that such a method of conducting, an offensive operation
of a front. in which all the combat capabilities of the attacking troops
are. used to the maximum, significantly hastens the destruction of the
enemy and the attainment of the goal of the operation. However, it
should be emphasized that this method of conducting an offensive can
be successfully carried out only wii.h the mass use of nuclear weapons,
and even then only when the enemy troop groupings and objectives
marked for destruction, are well reconnoitered and their coordinates
precisely determined. Therefore, the method of the simultaneous
destruction of the enemy to the entire depth of his operational forn
tion can be used most often at the beginning of an offensive operation.
Under other conditions, when the enemy groupings and objectives are
insufficiently reconnoitered, and when the launching of a simultaneous
strike against them to their entire depth does not appear possible, the
front offensive will be conducted by means of the successive destruction
of enemy groupings and objectives in accordance with their discovery
and the precise determination of their coordinates. Such a method of
conducting an, offensive naturally cannot ensure the most complete
utilization of all the firing, striking, and maneuvering capabilities of
the attacking troops and it permits the enemy to maneuver in his depth
with the aim of delaying and disrupting our offensive. Most commonly,
the goal of the offensive front operation will be attained as a result of
a combination of the methods of simultaneous and successive destruction
of the enemy, with the first of these methods having the decisive role.
It should be emphasized that these methods of conducting an of-
fensive front operation may be successfully employed for the imple-
mentation of any concept of the operation,
The grouping of troops in the offensive operations of the front
consists not only of their operational makeup but also must provide
for various procedures of the large units and units--marching,
approach march, and combat. At present one cannot conceive of
a front grouping solely in terms of the formation of the individual
armies of which it is composed, without those formations of large units
and units which, properly speaking, accomplish the operation.
-19-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 r_fV1 ui inn
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
A troop grouping of a front and of armies, depend ig up m 1.10.
tasks, can be varied, but must always and to the greatest extent pu-
sible, ensure the successful execution of these tasks. W. ,lo the
immediate task of the front is car_ led out through the launching of
a simultaneous strike against the enemy in the entire depth of hip
operational formation, the front troops must strive to execute th =l
task in one grouping. As a rule, in such a grouping the front trc_zi,:>_
will be formed into one echelon; following which the ncce;.c:_ - -'
reserves must be provided. It is impossible that in the coarse
the execution of the immediate task of the front, the situation
require changes in the grouping of the troops, but in this there
should be no large-scale regroupings of troops.
The rapid and complete destruction of the enemy to the entire: depth
of the immediate task of a front must ensure to the grouping of trE::Y=ps
a continuous and swift advance right up to the execution of the subse-
q uent task.
When the immediate task of a front is to be carried ct thr r_= > .
the delivery of successive strikes against the enemy, and his complete
destruction requires more prolonged and intensive combat, the most
advisable grouping of a front may be formation into two echelons
In this case the second echelon of the front is usually committed
to battle at the beginning of the execution of the subsefxuent task of
the front.
The most important place in the modern grouping of a front is
held by missile troops and delivery aircraft for nuclear weapons
Therefore the creation of a front grouping must begin with the
determination of the siting areas for missile large units and units,
and also for the airfields of delivery aircraft, and only after this
can the assembly and departure areas of other front troops be laid
out. Nothing must reveal the siting areas of missile troops or the
airfields of nuclear delivery aircraft.
The departure areas of airborne troops must be occupied
immediately before the beginning of airborne operations.
50X1-HUM
I'I
?
-20-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
50X1-HUM
the scope and nature of the offensive operations of a front.
As regards tank and motorized rif'ir large units, in the into=rest
of achieving concealment of thc offs nsrvt . they can pass through t.i;c:
departure areas without stopping, or else occupy them for the minimum
time necessary for the deployment of artillery in firing position`,, the
inspection of equipment, and the refueling of tanks and vehicles.
The security of a front troop grouping from enemy nuclear strikes,
as is generally known, is largely ensured by its dispersal. However,
even in a dispersed state, troops must not be located for a prolonged
time in the same areas. In this connection; now to a greater degree
than previously, emergency areas, firing positions, and airfields
must be provided, and also the arrangements for the concealed move-
ment of the troops must be more carefully worked out. At the same
time, the importance of counterintelligence in the areas of troop
disposition, especially of missile troops, and on the routes of their
movement has increased.
But skill consists not only of the creation of the most advanta-
geous grouping of troops in a depairtu-e position, even though this is
very important, but also of maintaining its advantages during the
course of the entire offensive, taking into consideration that an
enemy employing nuclear weapons can at any moment suddenly intro-
duce large, unfavorable changes in the front troop grouping if
appropriate measures are not taken by our side. The continuous
maintenance of a favorable grouping of the attacking troops can be
achieved through the timely delivery of sudden and crushing nuclear
strikes against the enemy, thus exerting great influence pn the course
of the offensive, and also through the skilful maneuvering of the
attacking troops. But such means of maintaining an advantageous
situation and the superiority of our grouping will provide the neces-
sary effect only if the command and staff of the front,in their
planning and direction of the offensive operation, prudently determine
the most favorable grouping of troops not only in the departure posi-
tion but also during the crucial moments of the offensive, and also
toward the end of the first and each of the subsequent days of operation.
Let us examine the problem of the influence of nuclear weapons on
-21-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
The width of a front offensive zone It is known that under conditions
of the mass use of nuclear weapons, the number of large units of ground
troops in the composition of a front is reduced and their operational
density considerably diminishes. In connection with this, the width of
the front offensive zone now will ordinarily be determined by the
established operational density of the troops, which in its turn will
depend on the amount of nuclear ammunition alloted to the front.
Under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, this density
will scarcely be higher than 20 kilometers per division. With such an
operational density of the troops of a front, an offensive zone 300 km
wide, e. g. , may have 15 division, besides the necessary reserves.
But if there are 20 divisions in the composition of a front, then for the
same operational density of troops the width of the zone of its offensive
will be 400 kilometers.
Thus, depending on the quantity of nuclear weapons alloted for
the operation, the number of divisions in the composition of a front
the established operational density of troops, the width of a front
offensive Zone may now vary within the limits of 300 to 600 kilometers.
? A further increase in the width of a front offensive zone may cause
considerable complications in the control of the troops. In determining.
the width of a front offensive zone, the relative strength of forces and
weapons should not be forgotten and, even more, the enemy should not
be permitted an overall superiority of them. Together with this, it
is necessary to take into consideration that in the development of an
offensive the front zone will widen, and toward the end of the operation
its width may have grown approximately one and one-half times.
The depth of a front offensive operation is usually determined
by the goal of the operation and by those installations and areas which
are to be taken. Under the conditions of the mass use of nuclear
weapons, including those of strategic designation, an offensive
operation of a front in the initial period of a war can be carried out
to a depth up to 800 kilometers and more, since at this depth the
enemy's groupings and his most important installations can be
destroyed as a result of nuclear strikes. Under conditions where
a front does not have at its disposal the capability of delivering mass
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
?
nuclear strikcs at such a diEtance tht depth of its offensive operations
will, of course be lE.cs
The rates of advance O o s can be varied and they depend
U ~:~c t _ r~~?
upon the extent of destructiO : of the enemy and also on the preparation
of the attacking troops for rapid negotiation of natural and artificial
obstacles and obstructio:;S ic: the terrain Under conditions of the
mass use of nuclear wcapo k and the increased mobility of troops,
their advance at a rate of 100- kilometers and more in a calendar day
is quite possible Howe "er , in order to realize such rates of advance
of the troops, it is recesnar tv inflict such destruction on the enemy
t:iat he would be deprived o the capability of offering serious resistance
to the attacking troops or of creating radioactive contamination of the
terrain in the zones of the offensive. Under other conditions, chiefly
with a lesser degree of enemy destruction, the rates of advance of the
Aront troops naturally cannot be as high.
The duration of offensive operations of a front at the highest
indices of their scope may reach 8 to 10 calendar days. With lower
indices of scope of the offensive operations of a front, their duration
will be considerably greater.
Thus, under the influence of the mass use of nuclear weapons and
the incr :: sed mobility of troops, not only have the indices of the scope
of the a L.nsive operations of a front changed,,but also their natu-i'2.
Now the troop advance, as a rule, will be carried out in wide zones,
on separate and disconnected axes, by the method of simultaneous
and successive destruction of the enemy. The advance of the troops
will develop at high rates in order to penetrate swiftly and rapidly
into the operational-strategic rear of the enemy. However, on account
of the perfectly natural tendency of the enemy, by extensive use of
nuclear weapons, to accomplish his tasks also by means of an advance,
the most frequent type of combat operation of troops in modern of-
fensive operations will be the meeting battle and meeting engagement.
The high degree of maneuver in a modern offensive operation
almost completely preclude the penetration of the enemy's defenses
in its pant meaning, since His defenses will not have the continuous
-23-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 .znw.i UIJM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
fron's and ft,cc high do r. i y which thty formerly had
While;up to now, this Article has discussed tic, ovr .'u}1 in. l en
of nuclear weapons on t h( principles of offensive opcrat:!is of s?.
front, we would now like to emphasize its speck 1 chara,,, A-isti ?s_
the radioactive contamirf ' .on of the_tc Train. it should a i ways be'
taken into cons ide rat i::): that troop pc. r sonnc.l operatinl_. c. tern;Ar,
contaminated by racii-o.=;. t .,c substanc , can be disahi ' a
of radiation sickness.
It is known that this casualty factor is most insidto':: ; sln T i'
does not have any apparent external symptoms and can lx: detectf-L
only with dosimetric instruments. The greatest radioactive contr :r i '
nation of the terrain endangers troop operations, and of.-( urs with
nuclear surface bursts. Radioactive contamination of the terrain
in areas of nuclear air bursts and in the path of movement of a radio
active cloud is considerably less and is less dangerous to troop
operations.
it also should be kept in mind that the fallout of radioactive dusi,
and consequently, the level of radiation on the contaminated terrain,
will vary. As regards the duration of radioactive contamination, if
at ground zero it is lethal for a considerable period of time, the
levels of radiation in the path of the cloud graciuali diminish and
cease to be letha.l.
It is obvious that as a rule nuclear surface bursts will be employed
against troops and installations located in the operational depth. ur&
favorable operational and meteorological conditions. Wherever
these conditions are favorable for the attacking troops of a front,
they naturally preclude the possibility of a nc:ty nuclear surface
bursts and, conversely, wherever the front troops, because of
operational and meteorological conditicas, cannot employ nuclear
surface bursts, they will be advantageous for the enemy. Hence, it
can be assumed that during the course of an operation up to 25 percent
of all nuclear warheads of both sides can be employed with surface
bursts.
50X1
-24-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
50X1-HUM
Let us suppose that in the zone of the immediate task of a front,
equal to 120,000 square kilometers, troth sides, for the fulfillment
of their combat tasks, use up to 200 different nuclear warheads, or
half the total supply allotted to the operation, of which 25 percent,
or 50 nuclear warheads, involve surface bursts. and each example,
25 nuclear warheads have a yield of 10 kilotons
remaining 25 of 100 kilotons, then in the general area of radioactive-
contaminated terrain, equal to approximately 60, 000 square kilo-
meters, almost 9, 000 square kilometers of terrain will be con-
taminated with dangerous levels of radiation from 50 roentgens and
higher, Furthermore, it should be taken into account that with the
mass use of nuclear warheads overlapping of the zones of radioactive-
contaminated terrain and the creation of dangerous levels of radiation
will inevitably occur, where the single. bursts would not have been
dangerous.
Even from this estimate the great significance of the casualty
factor which arises as a result of the radioactive contamination of
? the terrain, and its influence on the course of the operation, are
evident: However, it should be taken into consideration that the
data of this estimate are more likely too low than too high; since in
reality in the zone of the immediate task of a front both sides can
employ' more nuclear warheads with surface bursts and with a more
powerful charge. Furthermore, in the present estimate no account
has been taken of the fact that the zones of radioactive contamination
can be especia.~1 designed to follow water and other natural boundaries,
and to cross the axis of the troop offensive with the task of delaying
the enemy or stopping his offensive. It should be kept in mind that the
zones of radioactive contamination are not distributed- uniformly
throughout the whole of the zone of the front offensive, but as a rumz
will be created on the axis of the main and other strikes and will
reach the greatest extent and the most dangerous levels of radiation
there. In short; radioactive contamination of terrain has become
a most important factor of operational-strategic significance.
Without constant prognosis of the radiation situation, continuous
study of it and reconnaissance of the probable zones and strips of
radioactive contamination, ~~aa~~of troops from these zones
measures for the immediate
-25-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
50X1-HUM
the success of offensive opera-
,,t;," cTOS$ing,
f g :. ItFC.c With this aim, a chart of the radiation
Sit ~_.: is o mos, ' , ke;~t co ; ntly in all staffs, especially in the opera -
ticn2 E sta fE 't g. i i,p,,; + nr:sers of troops and the commanding officers
of la i re Units' "I"d iii s obliged to know the radiation situation at
all times and to take c.c~ r:t of it in their decisions, orders, and
operations
Ne,gla=~C4 ,f these r >ments in a combat situation, or insuf-
'``" ay lead to unnecessary mass troop loss
"
T1C 2~'Ttt a ttL-Fttt)t!: t.'7~'I a
and to a deceleration of tt;. rates of their advance.
The withdrawal of troops from the zones of radioactive contamina-
tion ina-
tion prior to the beginnin of the operation may take place along
shortest axes oi. the ini;- ~.~tive of the commanding officers of large units
h
immediately aft(,;r the detection of of an offensive opermagtiothoug
nr as
such zones and strips during the course the a rule, will be carried out only on the dE~asTOrso{f to upsetmthe an of
order
the front troops or with his sanction in
the operation.
The methods of crossing through these zones are determined by
the axes, the dimension, and levels of radiation.
and are noatoo
not completely intersect the axis of the troop advance
extensive, then the most advisable method of crossing through them
re y be a detour not requiring a.great deal of time:
When the zones and strips of radioactive co ntd i tion inters ear intersect
them
the axes of the troop a?;vance, and bypassing
possible, crossing through such zones tand o~is strips must be radiat carried ion.
out by forcing them along routes with Under conditions where high levels of radiation dxistt on all probable that the
routes across the zone of contamination, until some abatement of
forward movement of troops be postponed they immediately
these levels, but with the impossiblit~ofodoing this of radioactive
f orce the zone with tanks. Crossing
-26-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
contamination must Ix carried out at increased speeds, with increased
distances between t~.l,iGles, subunits and units and with the best use of
means of individual protection.
In isolated cases, depending on the situation, continuous zones
of radioactive contarn:nation can be crossed by small units of troops
in helicopters.
Furthermore, one cannot but consider the necessity for complete
medical processing of the personnel of units and large units, and
also the decontamination of their armament, equipment, and trans-
port immediately after the troop crossing of zones and strips of
radioactive contamination. Even with the thorough preparation of
troops, medical processing and decontamination will require consi-
derable time. but as is known, an offensive penetration, especially
under modern conditions, cannot tolerate any interruption. There-
fore, the problem of the continuity of the offensive under modern
conditions acquires especially important significance. Its solution
depends mainly on the ability of the troops to cross the zones and
? strips of radioactive contamination rapidly and without great losses.
Furthermore; for a more complete solution of this problem, it is
necessary to envisage the swift maneuver of reserves from the:rear
to bypass the zones and strips-of radicact.ive contamination and sub-
sequently to emerge on the axis of the main and other strikes, fre-
quently in conjunction with the dropping of forward units on these
axes.
The views stated in this article are an attempt to examine briefly
the influence which is exerted by the mass use of nuclear weapons
(having due regard for other qualitative changes of troops) on some
of the principles of modern offensive operations of a front.
In a short article, naturally, not all the principles of offensive
operations could be examined. Therefore, such important questions
as the influence of nuclear weapons on the support of front troops and
on coordination, control, etc. , were not touched on in this article.
?
-27-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403520001-2
It should also be taken into cons,