LETTER TO JESSE HELMS FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001101470002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 2, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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Central IntdI nee AF y
NtistinVor.ac20505
The Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
The President has asked me to respond to your letters of
April 25, 1985 and October 2, 1985. I am impressed with the
candor of the answers that have been prepared and hope that you
will find them useful and persuasive. (C)
The President came into office deeply disturbed by the
dangerous weakening of intelligence capabilities during the 1970s
and concerned that too often assessments of Soviet objectives and
military programs were insufficiently rigorous. (S)
The Administration has devoted high priority and sizable
resources to the rebuilding of the Intelligence Community. From
the outset, I took as one of my principal priorities the
improvement of the quality of analysis. Many far-reaching steps
to that end have been taken in the last five years, ranging from
a reorganization of the analytical component to more rigorous
evaluation of analysts and monitoring of their performance,
detailed review of analysts' drafts by senior managers and
experts outside CIA, much greater emphasis on highlighting
minority or controversial points of view, and a premium on close
contact with those in think tanks, universities and business with
contrary views or who question conventional wisdom. (S)
I believe that improvements in intelligence collection
combined with dramatic and sometimes drastic measures to improve
analysis have in fact significantly improved the quality of
intelligence now available to the Administration compared to when
the President assumed office. The President and the National
Security Council members have been briefed regularly on Soviet
strategic force developments by Intelligence Community officers
and have found the assessments tough-minded, realistic and very
professional. Similarly, the Intelligence Community's
contribution to the Administration's deliberations on Soviet non-
compliance with arms control and analysis of the Soviet approach
to arms control have been impressive. In short, the President
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DECL OADR
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has more direct knowledge than many of his predecessors of CIA's
and the Intelligence Community's work on the Soviet Union and has
been deeply impressed by the improvement in the last several
years. He is proud of the role the Administration and the
Congress has played in this improvement. (S)
As you will see from the answers to your questions, you have
been given incorrect information on a number of points. While
during the 1960s and early 1970s the Intelligence Community
underestimated the prospective future size of Soviet strategic
offensive forces and in the mid-70s CIA underestimated Soviet
defense expenditures, the Community correctly forecast many
developments relating to Soviet strategic weapons. More to the
point of your concerns about CIA, I would particularly draw your
attention to the listing on pp. 4-5 of the many instances where
CIA was out in front of the Intelligence Community in recognizing
the growing Soviet strategic threat.
While I consider it a high priority to continue improving
the strength of our counterintelligence capabilities, the need
for which recent events has clearly illustrated, I am disturbed
by the inferences in your letter of disloyalty at CIA. I have
seen no evidence to support charges that past analysis has been
affected by pro-Soviet bias or by penetrations. Moreover, we
have devoted unprecedented efforts and resources to examine
possibilities for Soviet deception. When there were errors in
the past, I believe they were due to shortcomings in leadership
at various levels of CIA, lack of resources and the attitudes of
policymakers -- including the nature of their questions and
tasking. Suggestions that past shortcomings were due to a pro-
Soviet bias or worse are unjustified and unwarranted. All
Americans can and should be proud of the extraordinary loyalty
and dedication of the men and women of CIA. (S)
Sincerely,
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Enclosures:
As Stated
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aaLo nci
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR 2 OCTOBER 1985-.LETTER
FROM SENATOR HELMS
Question 1: Why does the CIA produce single-source analysis of
Soviet and Communist Chinese open publications such as is
done by Foreign Broadcast Information Service?
Answer: FBIS from its inception, when it successfully
applied propaganda analysis techniques to Nazi broadcasts, has
engaged in the systematic analysis of totalitarian government
propaganda organs, particularly Soviet and Chinese media. The
premise underlying its methodology is that such media are highly
controlled, purposive, and sensitive political instruments.
Close and rigorous examination of changes and anomalies in the
behavior of these instruments over the years has yielded
significant insights into the policies and politics of the
countries involved. The kind of rigorous scrutiny of the media
that is required is a full-time, specialized occupation, and the
insights derived from it provide corroborative evidence for use
in all-source analysis.
Directorate of Intelligence analysts use in their all-source
work the same open-source data available to FBIS media
analysts. They find it helpful to have comprehensive coverage
and analysis of the open-source material gathered in one place
and well organized for them. They weigh the results of FBIS
analysis against their own translations and interpretations of
the same data and against other, classified data.
Question 2: Is there an internal CIA review process to identify
possible pro-Soviet bias in published unclassified or
classified analytical products?
Answer: There has been in recent years an intensive
internal review process with a view to overall improvement of
CIA's analytical process as well as to weed out analyst bias of
any variety. First, every piece of finished intelligence
intended for readers outside of CIA is reviewed by an analyst's
branch chief, division chief and office director. Moreover, all
drafts are reviewed by the Deputy Director for Intelligence
before being released for publication. Beyond this review, there
has been a high priority placed in recent years on having draft
papers reviewed by outside experts wherever possible, and
particularly those who have a different view from CIA's or who
are likely to be critical to ensure that all points of view have
been considered.
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a?r+vnu.
Finally, at the beginning of 1985, the Deputy Director for
Intelligence created a Military Advisory Panel comprised of
outside experts with the purpose of subjecting CIA's work on
military/strategic issues to the sternest possible test of
realism, and criticism.
This Panel
not only me nth t analys three ly a ter exam ping a draft
paper but also sends its comments directly to the DDI to inform
his review of the paper.
In addition, national estimates on strategic matters are
prepared by the entire Intelligence Community, are often reviewed
by outside specialists and are evaluated in draft by the
Director's Senior Review Panel, which always includes at least
one senior retired military officer.
In sum, in recent years, CIA has developed the most
intensive internal review process in its history designed to
ensure the most realistic, objective and high quality assessments
possible, as well as to weed out analyst or other individual
bias.
Question 3: Was the attached article mentioned above screened to
detect its possible pro-Soviet bias? If not, why not? If
so, why was it published under the official imprimatur of
the CIA?
Answer: The review of Professor Godson's book in Studies in
Intelligence was reviewed by that publication's board of editors
prior to publication. For nearly 30 years, Studies in
Intelligence has provided a forum for members of the Intelligence
Community to offer personal views, historical retrospectives, and
address controversial issues. In the past it has served at times
as the only vehicle for the expression of minority or
controversial points of view.
The cover of the document states that "All opinions
expressed in the Studies are those of the authors. They do not
necessarily represent the official views of the Central
Intelligence Agency or any other component of the Intelligence
Community." Many in the Agency disagreed with the book review
you have cited; some felt that it was also too personal.
In sum, the book review was the
personal opinion of a wr ter w o does not prepare finished
intelligence for the policy community and it did not represent
the view of CIA as an institution.
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Question 4: Is there a possible pro-Soviet bias in many CIA
products over the past 20 years??
Question 7: Could a possible pro-Soviet bias have played a role
in the prolonged and worsening CIA under-estimates of Soviet
strategic forces in the 19609 and 1970s?
Question 13: Has the CIA consistently under-estimated Soviet
global objectives and misunderstood Soviet arms control
objectives?
Answer: The question of "CIA" underestimates of Soviet
strategic forces in the 60's and 70's and what biases and
misunderstandings were involved is a mixture of fact and
fiction. It is imperative to remember, for example, that these
estimates were not the estimates of CIA alone but of the entire
American Intelligence Community including the Defense
Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the
intelligence organizations of the Military Services (although
individual services from time to time disagreed on specific
weapon systems. The NIEs of the 1960s did, in fact, consistently
underestimate the prospective future size of Soviet strategic
offensive forces. In retrospect, these underestimates appear to
have reflected a mistaken belief that the Soviets would limit
their deployments to avoid triggering further expansion of US
offensive forces. The estimators failed to appreciate the depth
of Soviet determination to overcome weaknesses that contributed
to their humiliation in the Cuban missile crisis. They failed to
realize that Europe and Asia affected Soviet planning for ICBMs,
a number of which were deployed as Eurasian as well as
intercontinental targeting options. They failed to appreciate
adequately, particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
Soviet belief that they had an opportunity to acquire strategic
superiority over the United States and their determination to
achieve it. Finally, the estimators probably overcompensated for
the gross overestimates in the 1950s and early 1960s -- the
bomber and missile gaps.
In the 1970s, particularly after the SALT I agreement, the
track record of American Intelligence also was mixed. The
Intelligence Community underestimated the pace of Soviet
submarine construction. CIA also underestimated the Soviet
defense expenditures.
It is also important to realize, however, that during this
same period, the NIEs correctly forecast continued Soviet
development of strategic defensive systems and overestimated the
success the USSR would have in developing its ballistic missile
defenses, advanced low altitude capable fighters and airborne
warning control systems. During the 1960s and 19709, Community
estimates of qualitative developments in Soviet strategic weapons
were often accurate, although there were overestimates and
underestimates on specific issues.
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In sum, CIA and the rest of the US Intelligence Community
underestimated Soviet ICBM and SLBM deployments in the 1960s and
early 1970s. However, in contrast to conventional wisdom, CIA
and the rest of the Community accurately forecast a number of
'strategic offensive developments during that same period, as well
as accurately forecast Soviet intentions with respect to
strategic defense. Estimates of major weapons deployments over
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ssunr.-r
the last several years have been accurate or have, on occasion,
been over-estimated.
Estimates of Soviet strategic forces since 1973 have given
greater. attention to Soviet strategic objectives is well as
technical developments.
-- As early as the 1973 estimate, Soviet Strategic Arms
Programs and Detente: What Are they Up To?, the
Community stated "We believe the Soviet leadership is
currently pursuing a strategic policy it regards as
simultaneously prudent and opportunistic. Aimed at
assuring no less than a continued maintenance of
comprehensive equality with the United States while at
the same time seeking the advantage of some degree of
strategic advantage if US behavior permits. The Soviets
probably believe that unilateral restraints imposed on
the United States by its internal problems and skillful
Soviet diplomacy offer some prospects that a military
advantage can be acquired."
-- In 1975-76, the Community concluded that the Soviets
were seeking a strategic posture which had some visible
and politically useful advantages over the US and would
give the USSR better capabilities than the US to fight
and survive a nuclear war.
A CIA publication in 1981 stated that "For more than two
decades, the USSR has been engaged in a major buildup of
its forces .... Among the many factors underlying this
buildup, the most basic is the attitude of Soviet
leaders that military might is a necessary and effective
instrument of policy in an inherently unstable world.
This attitude has been embodied in and reinforced by an
ambitious military doctrine that calls for forces
structured to fight and win future conflicts."
The Community stated in 1984 that "The Soviet leaders
are likely to remain attached to expanding their
military and international power .... They are not
ready for a form of detente that foreswears expansion of
their power.
Finally, in a 1985 assessment the Community stated
"Moscow will not agree to arms control steps that would
seriously detract from the key elements of Soviet
nuclear strategy/eounterforce strikes against enemy
nuclear forces and damage limitation .... Soviets will
look to arms control to help slow down US technological
development, particularly in areas where they believe
themselves to be in a long term technological
disadvantage."
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Question 5: Is there any evidence of the influence of possible
pro-Soviet penetrations, moles or bias in the preparation,
analysis and dissemination of intelligence products on the
Soviet Union over the past 20 years?
Question 6: Has any important intelligence analysis or evidence
related to the Soviet Union ever been withheld or suppressed
within or by CIA? Did any of this intelligence evidence or
analysis reveal Soviet deception? What is the
counterintelligence significance of the suppression of
intelligence on Soviet deception?
Answer: Because of retirements and other departures, we are
not in a position today to speak definitively to the question of
whether important analysis or evidence relating to the USSR has
"ever" been withheld or suppressed within or by CIA. At the same
time, we know that on a few occasions in the early-to-mid 1970s,
senior policy officials requested -- and the Agency acquiesced
in -- the withholding of certain highly sensitive information
related to arms control from our routine intelligence
publications for periods ranging from several hours to several
months. This information was not withheld from intelligence
analysts involved in arms control monitoring. Whether the
information concerned was made available through other means to
senior policy officials outside of the White House at that time
is not known to us.
At no time since 1981, and we believe in the period
immediately before that, has the Agency withheld from any member
of the National Security Council any important intelligence
analysis or evidence relating to the Soviet Union.
Over the years there have been repeated instances in which
the dissemination of documents has been severely restricted due
to the extreme sensitivity of the source material. Particularly
as the problem of leaks and other misuse of intelligence has
steadily worsened, there is a perceived growing need on the part
of senior intelligence officials increasingly to restict the
dissemination of sensitive intelligence information. There are
occasions in which only the principals of the National Security
Council have received sensitive intelligence information.
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In addition, over the years there have been delays in the
dissemination of intelligence, including some assessments dealing
with possible Soviet deception, because of the need to
corroborate evidence, to refine the analysis, or on a few
oecasipns because the analysis was particularly controversial.
In virtually every case, this information eventually was
disseminated, if only on a limited basis.
There have been no examples of which we are aware in recent
years of the suppression of intelligence on Soviet deception.
Indeed, the establishment of various organizations throughout the
principal intelligence agencies of the Community has created a
strong institutional framework aimed at surfacing such
information, attracting the greatest possible attention to it on
the part of analysts in both the policy and intelligence
communities, and in encouraging debate and discussion.
Question 8a: We have recent reports that the CIA: has further
down-graded Soviet Backfire bomber range estimates? Are
these recent reports correct? Are they best explained by an
under-estimative analytical bias, a possible pro-Soviet
bias, bureaucratic incompetence,?or all of the above?
Answer: The statement is incorrect. CIA estimates of the
performance of the Backfire have remained essentially unchanged
since 1976. Data analyzed subsequent to 1976 have supported this
estimate.
DIA and FTD, however, have recently downgraded their
estimates of Backfire performance. Approximately a month ago
they announced the results of a reanalysis, based on new data,
which now conforms well with CIA's original analysis.
Question 8b: CIA is negatively reassessing evidence of Soviet
Biological and Chemical Warfare arms control violations?
Answer: These "recent reports" are incorrect. CIA has
never negatively reassessed the evidence bearing on Soviet
Biological and Chemical warfare violations. A recent review of
such evidence by US intelligence fully supported the original
Intelligence Community judgments bearing on Soviet violations
through the use of CBW agents.
At the same time, in response to US efforts to publicize the
Soviet use of CBW agents, there have recently been fewer reports
of such usage in Afghanistan and Laos.
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Queston Be: CIA is denying and down-playing evidence of Soviet
Camouflage, Concealment and Deception (Maskirovka)?
Answer: This recent report is incorrect. To the contrary,
Soviet efforts at camouflage, concealment and deception are
receiving ever greater attention by CIA and the Community. While
Intelligence Community work on deception began in recent years
with a conference at the Pentagon in 1972 and the first
interagency paper on this subject since the late 1950s was
prepared in 1975 (and updated at the end of 1978), the fact is
that work on Soviet CC&D was not given a strong institutional
base until the 1980s.
In the last five years, however, the Intelligence Community
has taken a number of steps further to improve its ability to
detect and understand the Soviet intelligence denial and
deception activity. This effort began with the establishment in
DIA, CIA and NSA several years ago of dedicated organizations
.with the sole objective of investi atin Soviet denial and
deception activity.
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L .An NIO for Foreign Denial and Intelligence 'Activities was
established in January 1984, followed a few months later by the
Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee -- the first DCI
level committee ever established to work on this problem.
A major initiative was the CIA-sponsored conference bringing
together government and non-government experts on Soviet
deception in August, 1984. The proceedings of that conference
will shortly be published on a classified basis. The Community
recently completed the first national intelligence estimate on
Soviet denial and deception, dealing with Soviet CC&D techniques
more exhaustively than ever before as well as their implications
for US security. The Intelligence Community also has established
a two-week training course for analysts to sensitize those
working on the Soviet Union to the scope and application of
Soviet deception activity. Most recently, CIA sponsored with
Community and outside participation, a major conference on an
element of deception, that is, disinformation.
In sum, in recent years the Community, with CIA and DIA in
the lead, has tackled the deception issue more intensively than
ever before in its history and has dedicated resources to the
examination of this problem that will significantly enhance our
knowledge and understanding of it.
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Question 9: Was John Paisley likely to have been a Soviet KGB
mole inside the CIA, who may have been assassinated by the
KGB in order to protect other CIA moles? What is the best
assessment of Paisley's full career and death? Have traces
of other CIA moles ever been detected?
Question 10: Are reports that CIA has regressed into continued
under-estimation of Soviet military spending correct?
Answer: These reports are incorrect. CIA estimates that
the cost of Soviet military activities in dollars were 35% higher
than US defense expenditures during the past decade. These
estimates, which have grown steadily, reflect the costs of
financing the deployment of a new generation of land and sea
based missiles, new bombers, the expansion and modernization of
air defenses, and the continuation of the heavy procurement of
land arms. We also estimate that the Soviets continue to make
substantial commitments of resources to military R&D
activities. Our estimates of the costs of Soviet space
activities show an annual rate of growth of over 15% since 1980.
The finished estimates are widely reviewed inside and
outside the Intelligence Community. The DCI's Military Economic
Advisory Panel, a panel of experts from academia and industry,
regularly reviews these estimates and reports on its findings
directly to the DCI. Two years ago the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board convened a special team of experts to
conduct a thorough study of all aspects of CIA's Soviet defense
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spending estimates. Neither of these review processes have
identified any systematic bias -- either up or down ---in the
estimate.
At, the same time, we have been trying in recent years to
persuade members of both the Executive and Legislative Branches
to use estimates of Soviet military spending with such greater
care. We have stressed repeatedly in testimony before the
Congress and in documents for policymakers that it is the
capability of Soviet forces that matters, not what it costs
them. We have emphasized that cost estimates have their greatest
value as an analytical tool measuring relative levels of emphasis
and overall burden over long periods of time. We have reminded
users that specific year expenditures are subject to error and
that the more current an estimate the greater the likely error.
In our most current work, we are endeavoring to make clear
the degree to which the level of Soviet expenditures overall for
defense depends to a large extent to what categories of effort
are included. The categories heretofore counted by CIA and DIA
have been purely military and account for some 14-17% of GNP. At
the same time, if one adds to that other expenditures such as the
cost of supporting their foreign wars. and clients, intelligence,
and other such activity there is no question but that the figures
would be higher.
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Question 14: Can at least five years of the 10 year 1980-1990
O.S. "window of vulnerability" be attributed to under-estimates
by CIA of Soviet ICBM accuracies?
Answer: The record of US Intelligence Community estimates
of Soviet ICBM accuracy is mixed.
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Although the Intelligence Community misjudged when the
Sovietb would test MIRVed ICBMs with a hard-target capability, it
overestimated the pace at which such systems would be deployed.
The Intelligence Community between 1976 and 1981 also
overestima the accuracies Soviet ICBMs would achieve in the
mid-1980x.
It is important to add that the growing vulnerability of the
US ICBM force to Soviet accuracy improvements was recognized
early in the 1970s, perhaps even earlier, and was a principal
reason for US interest in more survivable ICBMs.
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