AFGHANISTAN: THE WAR AGAINST THE GARRISONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000600810001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 5, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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sr
SUBJECT: Afghanistan: The War Against the Garrisons
NESA M 87-20015
1 - Ron Lorton (State)
1 - George Harris (INR)
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
5 February 1987
AFGHANISTAN: THE WAR AGAINST THE GARRISONS
Summary
The Afghan resistance has mounted prolonged sieges against
some Afghan army garrisons--primarily in eastern
Afghanistan--with limited success. The garrisons range in size
from several hundred to three thousand troops, have fortified
artillery and infantry positions and are protected by extensive
minefields. Typically, resistance forces--numbering between 500
and 2,000 insurgents--attempt to isolate the post from ground and
aerial resupply. The insurgents mount artillery and mortar
attacks, with occasional assaults against outlying outposts. The
insurgent sieges have seldom caused significant casualties or
damage and relatively few aircraft have been shot down even
though most garrisons are heavily dependent on air resupply.
Barikowt: The Typical Insurgent Siege
The nearly three year old blockade of the Afghan regiment-size garrison
at Barikowt in Konarha Province is an example of a prolonged insurgent
siege
is garrisoned at Barikowt
in une aeep, narrow Konar Valley near the Pakistan border. The garrison
was established in the early 1980's, probably in an effort to block several
South Asian Analysis
This memorandum was prepared byl Office of Near Eastern and
South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and should be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division. Office of Near Eastern and
NESA M 87-20015
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insurgent infiltration routes from Pakistan into Konarha Province.
Insurgents--mostly from the Hezbi.-Islami (Gulbuddin) group--quickly
surrounded the pgst and pressure on Barikowt has prompted periodic
strenuous Soviet and Afghan efforts to prevent the garrison's destruction.
Because the insurgent siege has effectively cut off roads leading to the
post, the regiment almost always is supplied by air. In the spring of
1985, a multi-regimental Soviet and Afghan force swept up the Konar Valley
and briefly lifted the siege, but the post was again cut off as soon as the
Soviets and Afghans withdrew. Activity around Barikowt picked up in late
1986, when insurgents captured five of Barikowt's nine outlying outposts in
heavy fighting. Some 400 regime reinforcements brought in by air from
Asadabad and Kabul and extensive Soviet and Afghan tactical air support
blunted resistance pressure, however.
Pluses and Minuses
In our view, the siege of Barikowt points up the advantages and
disadvantages to the resistance of such tactics. On the plus side, the
resistance has been able to keep the garrison bottled up and prevent it
from blocking insurgent supply lines. Kabul--which clearly wants to keep
the garrison open if only to avoid the humiliation of a retreat--is forced
to devote considerable resources to resupply and reinforce the post.
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To maintain the siege, however, the resistance uses significant amounts
of manpower which might be employed more productively in other areas or in
activities such as convoy attacks. In addition, substantial amounts of
ammunition are consumed in attacks which probably cause few casualties or
damage.
A more aggressive prosecution of sieges involving direct attacks aimed
at capturing large posts would provide political and military pay-offs for
the insurgents, but serious risks are involved. Capture of a major regime
post such as Barikowt or Khowst would be a major boost to insurgent morale
and would provide a significant public relations victory. Direct attacks
on the garrisons would, however, probably result in high casualties because
of the extensive minefields and superior firepower of regime garrisons.
Even if the guerrillas were able to seize a regime garrison, we
believe--and there is considerable evidence that resistance military
leaders share this view--that any attempt to hold the captured posts would
be a serious mistake, allowing the Soviets to maximize their firepower
advantage and cause high insurgent casualties.
Masood's Approach
Masood's assault on the Farkhar garrison last August, involved a much
more thorough approach and was carried out rapidly.
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The garrison was overrun in a few days. Insurgent forces
quickly abandoned the post after capturing large amounts of military
equipment and supplies. The speed of the nighttime assault, the absence
of Soviet advisers at Farkhar, and an inflexible regime command and control
structure prevented air support from aiding the garrison.
Impact of Air Defense Weapons
We believe air defense equipment currently used by insurgents around
major besieged garrisons makes resupply difficult. but not impossible.
Despite extensive air defense around Barikowt,
nand terrain favoring the guerrilla gunners, the insurgents were not
a o choke off the arrison
The acquisition of improved air defense equipment--especially advanced
surface-to-air missiles--by insurgents engaged in a siege would enable them
to tighten their grip on garrisons and make resupply efforts more costly.
Sophisticated surface-to-air missiles enable the resistance to retain its
mobility and give them the capability to engage aircraft.
To date,
acquired Stingers primarily around major airfields and air corridors.
Outlook
Insurgent successes against Farkhar and Nahrin as well as numerous
recent successful assaults against battalion-size Afghan posts in
Nangarhar, Paktia, and Qandahar Provinces suggests that parts of the
resistance may be moving away from prolonged sieges toward attacks aimed at
quickly overrunning smaller posts, seizing equipment and withdrawing.
These efforts offer the highest payoff for the guerrillas, in our view,
enabling them most easily to demonstrate the weaknesses of the Afghan army,
replenish their stocks with captured equipment, reduce regime threats to
base camps and supply routes, and boost resistance morale.
Insurgent forces have successfully assaulted Afghan border
battalions--which usually number 100-250 men--at posts in Nangarhar and
Qandahar provinces and there are numerous similar targets throughout
northern Afghanistan--especially in Takhar and Badakhshan Provinces. Most
of these posts are isolated in mountainous terrain, at least partly
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dependent on aerial resupply, and vulnerable to insurgent pressure. These
units include the border battalions located throughout the eastern,
southern, and western borders as well as several Afghan army garrisons in
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