IRAN AT THE GATES OF AL BASRAH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000600780001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 30, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
30 January 1987
Iran at the Gates of Al Basrah
Summary
Iran's breach of Iraqi defenses east of Al
Basrah has developed into one of the most serious
military threats to Iraq since 1982. Surprise and
Iraqi military mistakes have allowed Iran to gain
positions which significantly increase the danger
to Iraq's second largest city in the event of
sustained Iranian attacks. Iran might be ready to
cross the Shatt al Arab and advance on Al Basrah as
early as the middle of February.
Iraq probably has only about an even chance of
containing new Iranian operations that cross the
Shatt. From the southern shore of the river, Iran
could threaten Al Basrah from three directions, cut
off Iraqi military supplies from Kuwait, or isolate
Iraqi units near Al Faw.
Aggressive Iraqi ground attacks to regain lost
territory and intensive air raids on enemy
logistics and supply lines would reduce the Iranian
threat. We believe, however, that Baghdad probably
will take defensive measures--build fortifications,
deploy more men to the area, and launch minor
This paper was prepared by'~
Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysi
the Persian Gulf
comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
NESA M 87 _20012C
Copy of 3
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raids--to try to prevent Iranian advances. Even if
the Iranians are contained, their current positions
still pose a major threat to Baghdad's defense of
Shia dominated southeastern Iraq.
Iranian troops have advanced to within 13 kilometers of the center of Al Basrah,
Iraq's second largest city, as a result of their attack that began on 8 January. They
now occupy about 100 square kilometers in the Shia dominated southeastern part of
the country and threaten important roads and rail lines that carry military equipment
and consumer goods from Kuwait's ports through Al Basrah to the rest of Iraq.
Iranian front lines run from the lower part of Fish
Lake to the northern shore of the Shatt al-Arab river and include Bawarin and
Tuwailah Island and part of Fayyaz Island.
The Karbala V Battle
Surprise and the skillful, but ruthless use of troops helped Iran develop the
Karbala operation from a relatively small scale attack to an important battle that
Tehran quickly exploited its early gains by sending in more men and at
least 100 armored vehicles over the causeways to expand its bridgehead. It
maximized its infantry advantage by infiltrating men into the dense palm groves
along the Shatt al-Arab, where Iraq's mechanized forces were at a disadvantage. By
continuing to attack, Iran kept Iraqi units off balance and rendered their
counterattacks ineffective. Throughout the battle, Tehran has been willing to accept
high casualties to seize and hold areas.
Intensive fighting between 9 and 21 January, when the Iranian advance was
halted, inflicted heavy losses on both sides. We estimate Iran has had between
35,000 and 45,000 killed and wounded, mostly from Iraqi artillery and air attacks. Iraq
probably has suffered at least 15,000 casualties and lost about 100 armored vehicles
and at least 10 aircraft. Many of Iraq's losses have been from elite Republican Guard
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Iran's Military Options
We believe the gains from Karbala V have put Tehran in a position where
another major operation might enable Iran to seize all or part of Al Basrah. Another
main assault probably would begin with Iranian units crossing the Shatt in an effort
to seize a bridgehead on the southern shore of the river. They would then be able to
attack Al Basrah from three directions--from the south along the southern shore,
from the southeast up Fayyaz Island, and from the east along the northern shore of
the Shatt. These approaches would support each other and outflank Iraqi defenses
by moving through palm groves or urban areas that favor Iran's infantry.
A less likely option for Iran would be to cross the Shatt and, with the Iranian
troops in Al Faw, attack Iraqi forces in VII Corps. This operation would attempt to
trap and threaten to capture or destroy over 150,000 Iraqi troops. Iran also would
then be in a strong position to, capture the port of Umm Qasr and stop Iraqi naval
access to the Persian Gulf. By occupying territory on Kuwait's border, Iranian troops
could also cut the flow of supplies to Iraq from Kuwaiti ports and pressure Kuwait to
reduce its support for Baghdad.
A third option--less ambitious and less risky--for Tehran also would include
crossing the Shatt, but would be limited to cutting the two roads to Al Faw. By
hindering supplies to VII Corps, Iran could force Baghdad to withdraw from the area
or risk that VII Corps would be weakened and eventually destroyed. From positions
south of the Shatt, Iran also might threaten to cut or hinder the passage of supplies
from Kuwait.
Iraqi Defenses....
Baghdad's forces on the northern shore of the Shatt are formidable, although
they suffer from weaknesses Iran could exploit. We estimate that Iraq has about
50,000 troops, 1,000 armored vehicles, and 500 artillery pieces east of Al Basrah
between the city and the Iranian positions. Iraqi engineers have begun to improve
fortifications along a canal that runs from Fish Lake south to the Shatt. Such
defenses, however, might be bypassed by Iranian attacks farther north on the
western edge of Fish Lake. Moreover, the Iraqis have not cleared areas in the palm
groves or deployed sufficient infantry in them to stop Iranian infiltration.
Iraq has made some efforts to strengthen its weak defenses on Fayyaz Island
and the southern shore of the Shatt.
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Iran-Iraq -- Iranian Offensive Options
Ahvez
Al I 0 5 Miles
main map s A-^ peis,an
1. Attack on Al Basrah.
2. Attack on VII Corps.
3. Attack to cut or capture
roads.
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Ir i units have be o build defensive lines
across the width of Fayyaz. he are also building
new fortifications along the southern bank of the Shatt.
...and Options for Attack
Baghdad has the forces to launch major attacks that would stall the Iranian
operations and perhaps inflict a severe defeat on Tehran. Iraq would have to commit
large infantry forces and considerable equipment in a coordinated attack and be
willing to accept high losses. Intensive artillery and air attacks could first weaken
enemy defenses and prevent Iran from reinforcing its positions. A large armored
attack--with over a hundred armored vehicles attacking simultaneously against the
three kilometer western front of the salient--would drive eastward to the water
barrier. Massed infantry on foot would follow the armor and destroy or isolate
Iranian positions on the western shore of Fish Lake and in the palm groves. They
also would hold territory against Iranian counterattacks.
In less ambitious operations, Iraqi units might cross the Shatt and attack the
Iranians on Bawarin, Tuwailah, and Fayyaz Islands. Amphibious commando raids on
these islands would disrupt Iranian efforts to move westward and slow or prevent
them from crossing the Shatt. A larger Iraqi attack--with units from VII
Corps--might attack the lightly defended eastern ends of Tuwailah and Bawarin.
Such an operation would likely disrupt an attack on Basrah by threatening to cut
Iranian supply lines.
If Baghdad were unwilling to launch ground attacks, it still could reduce the
threat to Al Basrah by making better use of its firepower. Any Iranian advance on the
city will depend on Tehran's ability to mass supplies and troops near the front and
move them across the water barriers on bridges, causeways, or boats to the
frontlines. Iraqi artillery could destroy the bridges and boats and prevent their repair.
Iraqi aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles could launch effective strikes on vehicles
and supply dumps in the Iranian rear. Such attacks would not only reduce Iran's
ability to launch new attacks but would also undermine its defenses against Iraqi
Prospects For the Near Term
We believe Iraq is likely to remain on the defensive with its main effort aimed at
stopping more Iranian gains. Fear of losses probably will keep Baghdad from
launching effective counterattacks to regain lost territory east of Al Basrah. Such
fears probably also will prevent Iraq from using its air power to destroy relatively well
defended Iranian logistic targets. Instead, Baghdad will continue to use air and
artillery--including chemical weapons--on Iranian units near the front in the hope
that heavy casualties will deter Iran. Such attacks alone, however, are unlikely to be
enough to stop Iran from launching further attacks. We believe that, given time, Iraq
also will construct extensive fortifications opposite Iranian positions.
Despite Iraq's extensive forces and weaponry, we believe Baghdad Would have
only about an even chance of containing a major Iranian assault launched in the next
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Iran-Iraq
-- Iraqi Attack Options
'Massive Iraqi Counteratta k
Iraqi attacks across the
al Arab to recapture islan
..Iraqi raids on supply lines
artillery.
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month. In our view, a combination of factors could cause Iraqi defenses around Al
Basrah to collapse. Elite Iraqi units--critical to stopping Iranian attacks--have
suffered serious losses and would be less able to stop new assaults. Iraqi
fortifications in many areas are still weak and could be overwhelmed in a surprise
attack. A large-scale Iranian assault on a small front--possibly with limited chemical
weapons--could lead to a breach in Iraqi defenses. Mistakes by Iraqi commanders or
Baghdad's interference might lead to a major breakthrough that would allow Iran to
cut off a large number of Iraqi units. Low morale may cause some Iraqi units to
panic during an attack and begin a disorganized retreat.
Iran might be ready to cross the Shatt and advance on Al Basrah as early as the
middle of February. he Iranians have continued to
mass men and supplies east of the battle area. They also have gathered 1,300 small
boats near Ahvaz that probably would be used in an amphibious attack across the
In the next few weeks Iran will likely continue to probe Iraqi defenses while
building up more forces to prepare for a major effort to take Al Basrah. Small Iranian
attacks will keep the Iraqis off balance and hinder their efforts to build strong
defensive lines. Tehran also will continue to shell Al Basrah to disrupt civilian and
military activities there. Iranian units will build shelters and dig trenches in the
battle area to reduce losses from Iraqi air and artillery attacks.
Implications of Iran's Success
Even without the fall of Al Basrah, Iran's victory in Karbala V has damaged Iraqi
civilian and military morale. In the short term, the heavy casualties--especially
among elite units--will weaken Iraq's ability to defend against Iranian attacks
anywhere along the front. Failure to drive the Iranians from Iraqi territory and the
high losses are likely to increase civilian and military criticism of Baghdad's conduct
of the war. Despite his strong grip on power, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn may
face greater challenges from the ruling Ba'th Party and the military.
Iranian leaders will see their success as further proof that--despite economic
problems and military equipment shortages--Iran can eventually win the war. Victory
in Karbala V will improve Tehran's ability to continue the war over the long term by
shoring up civilian support for the clerical regime's war goals. We believe Iranian
leaders will try to use their military success.to pressure the Gulf states to reduce
their support for Baghdad or at least be more, accommodating toward Tehran.
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Distribution:
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3 - George S. Harris, State
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DI/NESA/PG (30Jan87)
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