THE MAJOR POWERS AND THE SOUTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R001001150003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

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Central
a
Intelligence I
E ,w
The Major Powers and the
Southwest Indian Ocean Islands:
Prospects for Change
National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
N!E 30/70-82
April 1985
Copy 3 6 3
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
N I E 30/70-82
THE MAJOR POWERS AND THE
SOUTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS:
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
Information available as of 3 April 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum to
Holders, which was approved by the National
Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5
Introduction ....................................................................................... 5
External Interests in the Islands ....................................................... 5
The USSR and Its Allies ............................................................... 5
Recent Soviet Activities .................................................................... 6
East European Activities .................................................................. 7
Cuba's Role ........................................................................................ 7
North Korean Influence ................................................................... 7
Libyan Meddling .............................................................................. 8
The West ........................................................................................... 8
US Dimension ................................................................................... 8
French Interests ................................................................................ 9
The British Role ................................................................................ 10
Other Arab States .............................................................................. 10
The Africans ...................................................................................... 10
The Asians ......................................................................................... 11
Domestic Political and Economic Pressures ................................... 11
Madagascar .................................................................................... 11
Seychelles ....................................................................................... 12
Mauritius ....................................................................................... 12
Comoros ......................................................................................... 13
Prospects for Regional Cooperation ................................................ 14
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace ........................................................ 14
Indian Ocean Commission ........................................................... 14
Implications for the United States ................................................... 14
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Since the publication of NIE 30/70-82, The Major Powers and the
Southwest Indian Ocean Islands, the USSR's regional interests in the
island nations of Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius, and Comoros have
remained relatively constant. Moscow seeks improved naval and air
access and facilities, supports leftist policies and leaders, and encourages
local opposition to the expansion of Western military activity-most
notably the buildup on Diego Garcia. We believe that, in the near term,
the Soviets will continue to see the island nations as targets of
opportunity, but of low priority to Moscow's overall global interests. As
such, the area is likely to remain one of low-level but steady competi-
tion for influence between East and West.
Moscow's primary instrument for maintaining and expanding its
influence in the region is its willingness to provide military equipment
and training to local armed forces and security services. Moscow also
seeks political influence by appealing to the radical pretensions of leftist
leaders-particularly in Madagascar and Seychelles-and highlighting
the evils of "Western imperialism" and "capitalist exploitations." In
Madagascar the Soviets have pursued their traditional tactic of support-
ing a Marxist-Leninist party to increase their influence.
The USSR, however, faces a number of serious liabilities that
constrain its ability to gain greater influence. First and foremost, even
ideologically sympathetic leaders are disappointed in the amount of
economic aid provided by Moscow. Moreover, during the two-year
period of this Estimate, Soviet military capability in the region will
remain well behind that of the West. These factors-coupled with the
considerable logistic difficulties-almost certainly will limit the willing-
ness and ability of Moscow to intervene directly in island conflicts.
Although relations have cooled during the past two years, Mada-
gascar is likely to remain a prime target for Soviet activity in the region.
Moscow will continue to use security assistance to maintain influence
with Antananarivo and limit the impact of Ratsiraka's economically
inspired "turn to the West," while continuing to press for naval access to
facilities at the port of Antsiranana (Diego Suarez). Likewise in
Seychelles, Moscow's willingness to play to the security fears of leftist
President Rene will continue to give the USSR considerable leverage.
Prospects for increased Soviet influence in Mauritius and Comoros are
considerably less, and both countries are likely to continue keeping the
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Soviet Union at arm's length. In Mozambique, the recent unprecedent-
ed visit of two Soviet IL-38 antisubmarine warfare aircraft-shortly
after a Soviet warship, tanker, and two other Soviet vessels made the lat-
est in a longstanding series of port calls at Maputo-suggests that
Maputo may have expanded further Soviet military access, albeit to an
as-yet-undetermined degree.
Efforts by other hostile powers to expand their influence in the
region. have met with only limited success in recent years. East
European and Cuban roles have remained fundamentally unchanged
during the last two years, and continue to be constrained by the small
scale and low technical level of their aid efforts. Libyan influence has
waned since 1982, when Tripoli was aggressively active in Mauritian
domestic affairs and enjoyed promising relations with Seychelles and
Madagascar. Qadhafi is not well positioned to gain a firmer foothold in
the near term unless he improves on his now-well-established track
record in the region of not coming through as expected on aid offers.
North Korea has made a bid for expanded regional influence since
1982. P'yongyang has stepped up economic and security assistance to
Madagascar and now provides some 150 to 180 military personnel to
Seychelles. While North Korea is likely to attempt to take advantage of
these new inroads, distance and cost probably would hinder further
sizable increases in the North Korean presence in the area.
Western interests in the Indian Ocean island states continue to be
driven in part by continuing tensions in the Persian Gulf, the Horn of
Africa, and southern Africa. The US military presence at Diego Garcia
and the US tracking station in Seychelles will remain Washington's most
important equities in the region. Both France's and the United King-
dom's strategic interests in the region closely parallel those of the United
States, but budgetary constraints will tend to circumscribe their roles.
How to respond to deteriorating economic conditions will remain a
dominant domestic political issue for all island leaders. Prospects for
significant economic recovery throughout the region remain poor, and
are unlikely to improve in the near term. Although the regimes in
Seychelles, Comoros, and Madagascar ultimately are vulnerable to
coups, we do not expect sharp ideological breaks and anticipate that
trends of recent years will hold. In particular, we believe leftist leaders,
such as Malagasy President Ratsiraka and Seychelles President Rene,
will continue to balance their search for greater Western economic
assistance against their reliance on security assistance from the USSR
and its surrogates. The outlook for improved regional cooperation in the
next several years or for significant movement on achieving an Indian
Ocean Zone of Peace-both rhetorical foreign policy goals of island
leaders-will remain dim.
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US relations with the island governments are not likely to change
dramatically over the near term. The United States can expect to be en-
gaged constantly in countering and fending off Soviet criticisms of the
West's interference in the affairs of the region-particularly with
regard to Diego Garcia-and the "unwillingness" of the West to support
the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. While Washington's failure to meet
the islands' economic expectations could impose strains on relations, the
lack of alternatives for aid from other sources should place limits on ex-
pressions of discontent. The United States is unlikely to gain increased
air and naval access to the islands, but this will not seriously damage US
interests as long as the Soviets-as we believe will be the case-also fail
to.achieve any exclusive military access over the next two years. Given
the US presence on Diego Garcia and limited military access agree-
ments with Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Oman, military access to the
islands is not critical to the US strategic position in the region.
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PEOPLE'S
S E a% YEMEN ARAB
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not necessarily authoritative.
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A rabian
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DISCUSSION
Introduction
1. Since the publication of NIE 30/70-82, The
Major Powers and the Southwest Indian Ocean
Islands, Moscow has continued to seek improved
military access, support leftist change in the island
nations, and encourage local opposition to the expan-
sion of Western military activity-most notably the
buildup on Diego Garcia. In our judgment, the trends
noted in the earlier Estimate remain valid, and we
believe the area will remain one of relatively low-level
East-West competition for influence. While Moscow
continues to view the southwest Indian Ocean as a
target of opportunity, we believe the region remains a
relatively low priority in Moscow's overall global
interests. Recent efforts to increase Soviet influence,
even among the left-leaning regimes in Madagascar
and Seychelles, have met with only mixed success.
Moscow's failure to provide significant economic
assistance to the financially beleaguered regimes re-
mains the major impediment to greater Soviet lever-
age. Domestically, the island nations-whether left or
right leaning-are likely to face difficult economic
times ahead and remain vulnerable to political
instability.
The USSR and Its Allies
2. The Soviet Union's regional interests in the south-
west Indian Ocean continue to be driven by a combi-
nation of military, political, and economic consider-
ations that include strengthening Moscow's ties with
leftist island states and limiting Western influence and
access in the region. Moscow's primary instrument for
maintaining and expanding its influence in the region
remains the provision of military equipment and
training to local armed forces and security services.
Moscow uses its military assistance programs to culti-
vate national leaders fearful of internal and external
threats, to build ties with key military leaders, and to
promote dependence of national forces on the USSR
for support and spare parts. In addition, Moscow's
influence reportedly is strong in the Congress Party for
Malagasy Independence, a leftist partner in Madagas-
car's ruling alliance since the mid-1970s.
3. Moscow has continued in recent years to seek
access to air and naval support facilities in the
islands-Seychelles and Madagascar-and also in
nearby Mozambique. The Soviets see such access as
improving their ability to sustain naval forces in these
distant areas as a counter to Western military presence
in the region and to collect intelligence against the
West. Moreover, access would provide the USSR with
a presence ashore and a measure of domestic leverage
in the host countries. All of the island nations in the
region, however, continue to resist Moscow's requests
for naval and air facilities. Most notably, Malagasy
President Ratsiraka continues to refuse the Soviets
naval access to Antsiranana (Diego Suarez) in northern
Madagascar.
4. Overall, Moscow's military capabilities in the
southwest Indian Ocean remain relatively limited
despite the continued presence of the Soviet Indian
Ocean Naval Squadron (SOVINDRON), still concen-
trated in the Arabian Sea. Moreover, for the period of
this Estimate, these capabilities are likely to remain
well behind those of the West, although Soviet assets
there can be reinforced within a week. The Soviet
squadron-which has remained fairly constant in size
since 1982-nonetheless helps Moscow's image as a
global power and serves to "show the flag" in support
of such domestically threatened Soviet-backed leaders
as President Rene in Seychelles. Moreover, even the
routine presence of this small force helps shape region-
al perceptions of the continuity and legitimacy of the
Soviet presence in the area. It also could, should
Moscow so decide, give the Soviets the capability to
put a limited number of its forces ashore-200 to 300
naval infantry troops-in support of pro-Soviet lead-
ers. Moscow repeatedly has demonstrated its support
for the Rene regime with ship visits at the time of
perceived threats. We believe that the Soviets are
prepared to use their military assets to intimidate
opponents of their client regimes up to, but probably
not including, actual combat.
5. Moscow also continues to court island govern-
ments by providing small amounts of economic and
technical assistance and promoting educational and
cultural programs in the islands. Scholarships for study
in the USSR, for example, are used at relatively low
cost to the USSR to build long-term ties with future
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island leaders. Overall, however, the Soviet Union's
small economic involvement in the islands plays a
distinctly secondary role to military and political
concerns.
6. We anticipate few major changes in the near
term in Moscow's tactics and strategies for gaining
influence among the island nations. Moscow most
likely will continue to appeal to the radical pretensions
of leftist leaders in Madagascar and Seychelles by
highlighting "Western imperialism" and "capitalist
exploitations." At the same time, the USSR also will
probably seek to contrast favorably its own supposed
desire for an "Indian Ocean Zone of Peace" (IOZP)
with US naval activity at Diego Garcia. As in the past,
Moscow will rely on friendship societies and items
planted in the press to get its message to a wider
audience.
7. Moscow, however, will continue to face a num-
ber of serious liabilities that will limit its ability to gain
greater influence. First and foremost, even leaders
inclined by ideology to look to Moscow will probably
continue to be disappointed in the amount of aid
provided by the USSR. While relatively small amounts
of new assistance have the potential to lead to dispro-
portionate gains if targeted at particularly vulnerable
leaders, the magnitude of the economic problems in
these nations is such that the long-term impact of such
assistance is likely to be limited. Seychelles, for exam-
ple, is unlikely to break its dependence on tourism and
Western aid as long as prospects for Soviet aid remain
poor.
8. Finally, longstanding ties to Western nations of
history, culture, religion, and economics-although
becoming less important in some nations-will work
against Moscow. Local residents often see the Soviets
as highhanded outsiders with little legitimate interest
in the islands. The treatment of island students in the
USSR also has received unfavorable public attention.
Island leaders-whatever their ideological predilec-
tions-are well aware of these sentiments and are
likely to attempt to limit, or at least to play down,
their relations with the Soviets.
Recent Soviet Activities
9. Madagascar. Madagascar remains a prime tar-
get for Soviet activity in the region, although relations
between Moscow and Antananarivo have cooled some-
what during the past two years. Nevertheless, the
Soviets remain President Ratsiraka's major supplier of
military hardware, and have delivered nearly $124
million in military equipment since 1976. Soviet mili-
tary advisers-now numbering 70 to 100, down from a
high of over 300 in 1980-provide maintenance and
training on much of the equipment. A total of 35
Malagasy military personnel reportedly went to the
Soviet Union for training in 1984.
10. Moscow has used both the carrot and the stick
to express its dissatisfaction with Ratsiraka's rap-
prochement with the West, particularly with the
United States. On the one hand, Moscow provided a
grant of $10 million worth of military equipment last
November. At roughly the same time, and probably
when Moscow became aware of Ratsiraka's intention
to dismantle the high-frequency direction-finding
(HF/DF) sites, Moscow grounded the VTA An-12/
CUB transport aircraft which provides vital logistic
support to Ratsiraka's regime. The threat of this action
gave new impetus to the President's longstanding
request to the United States for a C-130/Hercules
aircraft.
11. Ratsiraka-whatever his dependence on Mos-
cow for security help-continues to turn down all
Soviet requests for naval access to facilities at Antsir-
anana (Diego Suarez). However, he apparently is
allowing the USSR to operate a communications facili-
ty at Andrakaka airfield, and he permitted the East
Germans and Soviets to set up three Soviet-supplied
Full House direction-finding sites on the island in
1983. Ratsiraka responded to US pressure and entice-
ments and dismantled all three sites by early 1985.
The highly portable equipment, however, remains in
Madagascar and could be quickly reassembled.
12. Seychelles. Moscow continues to exercise con-
siderable influence with the leftist government of
President Rene. At present, the Soviets maintain the
largest diplomatic mission in Victoria and provide
most of the military hardware and training for the
Seychelles Army. Since 1978, the USSR has delivered
almost $15 million in military assistance, nearly 60
percent of the foreign military aid received by Sey-
chelles. Soviet naval units periodically visit the port of
Victoria and, on five occasions since 1982, Soviet naval
ships have appeared in Seychelles waters during peri-
ods of domestic tension. Since early 1983, Soviet VTA
transports periodically have stopped over at Seychelles
for refueling en route to Mozambique and Angola, and
the Soviets recently have requested similar access for
combat and reconnaissance aircraft.
13. Moscow also appears to be slowly building an
infrastructure in Seychelles that could eventually sup-
port Soviet military forces, such as the coastal radar
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14. Mauritius. Moscow's optimism that the election
of the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) in 1982
would give the Soviets greater access has thus far
proved to be unfounded. The resignation of leftist
members-including Marxist Paul Berenger, who has
close relations with the Soviets-from Prime Minister
Jugnauth's cabinet in 1983 and Jugnauth's break with
the MMM have further curbed Soviet opportunities.
With a new, more moderate cabinet in place following
the 1983 elections, Jugnauth has moved to limit Soviet-
Mauritian ties, canceling an earlier agreement to
accept Soviet patrol boats and advisers. At the same
time, Jugnauth has actively stepped up requests for
increased Western economic aid.
15. Although the Soviet Union does not have any
military assistance agreements with Mauritius-and is
unlikely to develop any in the near future-Moscow
does have some limited access. The Soviet Navy still
makes occasional calls to Port Louis, and the USSR
continues to enjoy a 1970 Fisheries Agreement that
allows it to use harbor facilities and aircraft landing
rights to support Moscow's trawlers.
16. Comoros. Over the last two years Moscow has
sought to improve relations with President Abdallah's
government, but Comoros remains a low priority for
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Ambassador to Seychelles
is accredited to Comoros, and has made four visits to
the islands since February 1983. The Comoran Gov-
ernment responded to Moscow's overtures in late 1984
by accepting 13 scholarship offers, but so far has
refused Soviet offers to construct a fish processing
plant and to fill Comoran POL storage tanks. Given
President Abdallah's overwhelming dependence on
French and conservative Middle Eastern economic
aid, he is likely to remain wary of Soviet largess and to
resist Moscow's overtures for closer relations.
17. Mozambique. The recent unprecedented visit
to Mozambique by two Soviet IL-38 antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) aircraft has raised the possibility that
the Machel government may have expanded further
Soviet military access. Shortly before, a Soviet warship,
a tanker, and two other Soviet vessels had called at
Maputo, the latest in a longstanding pattern of ship
visits. President Machel already has said he is expect-
ing increased deliveries of Soviet arms to combat the
growing insurgency, and expanded access to airfield
and port facilities could be the price Moscow is
demanding Maputo pay. Faced with an ongoing do-
mestic insurgency and strong Soviet pressure, Machel
could reluctantly conclude he has no choice but to pay
the price. If future deliveries include aircraft or other
sophisticated equipment, more Soviet Bloc advisers
probably will be required for training and main-
tenance.
East European Activities
18. East European nations have shown no recent
inclination to take a more activist role in the region.
The East Germans and Romanians, however, continue
to give small amounts of economic and military aid to
Madagascar and some economic aid to Seychelles. Any
East European influence remains limited in Mauritius
and nonexistent in Comoros.
Cuba's Role
19. Cuban influence in the region has remained
fundamentally unchanged during the last two years.
Havana continues to see the island states in the larger
"Third World context" and is likely to continue
pressing for support for Cuba's positions in nonaligned
forums while maintaining limited contact with leftist
parties and opposition groups in the area. Havana, for
example, continues its nonmilitary technical assistance
to Seychelles and Madagascar, but has no influence in
Comoros or Mauritius. The Cubans now have some 15
to 29 technicians advising Seychelles Government
ministries and providing medical aid. In Madagascar,
their presence remains extremely modest, limited to a
few agricultural and medical technicians.
20. Any efforts by Havana to expand its influence
among the island states will continue to be constrained
by the small scale and low technical level of its aid.
Moreover, Cuban aid has proved expensive for the
host governments, which must bear the costs of the
Cuban advisers. Language barriers also hamper Cuban
activities, as do perceptions among some southwest
Indian Ocean leaders that the Cubans are merely
doing Moscow's bidding.
North Korean Influence
21. North Korea since 1982 has made a bid for
expanded regional influence. In Madagascar-where
North Korea has been active since the late 1970s-
P'yongyang has increased economic and military as-
sistance. Economic aid has included road constry,ction,
the building of an ammunition factory, and agricultur-
al improvement projects. The North Koreans also
stepped up security assistance by providing aircraft on
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loan and giving, gratis, infantry and artillery weapons
and patrol boats valued at $15 million. In Seychelles,
North Koreans function as advisers to the Seychelles
military, train and augment the presidential guard,
and provide airport security. In April 1983, 56 advisers
arrived in country, and in March 1985 the number
had increased to between 150 and 180.
22. While we expect North Korea will attempt to
take advantage of its new inroads, future moves are
likely to be constrained by their limited overall capa-
bilities. Distance and cost will be likely to hinder any
significant increase in the North Korean presence in
the area. Moreover, P'yongyang's primary motivation
for involvement in the region is global competition
with Seoul. Once it has attained an advantageous
diplomatic presence in a given country, it has little
incentive to expand its activities there.
Libyan Meddling
23. Libyan influence in the island states has waned
since 1982, when Tripoli was aggressively active in
Mauritian domestic affairs and enjoyed promising
relations with Seychelles and Madagascar. Nor, given
Tripoli's now firmly established track record of reneg-
ing on aid offers, is Qadhafi well positioned to exert a
significant regional influence. Mauritius, for example,
expelled all Libyan diplomats in January 1984 in
response to clear Libyan meddling. Likewise, repeated
Libyan promises of economic assistance to Seychelles
have remained unfulfilled, and Tripoli recently re-
duced its diplomatic presence in Victoria. Madagas-
car's President Ratsiraka also publicly castigated Libya
at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in
late 1984 and has virtually severed bilateral relations
over the Western Sahara issue.
most importantly at Diego Garcia. The US military
facilities at Diego Garcia have expanded rapidly from
the communications station and support airfield estab-
lished in the early 1970s. International conflicts, the
need to protect vital petroleum sources and supply
routes, and Soviet activities in south and southwest
Asia have upgraded the importance of the base, and it
now provides important logistic support for US units
operating in the Indian Ocean area.
26. US naval ships regularly make calls at Port
Louis, Mauritius, and have resumed infrequent visits
to Victoria, Seychelles, since the Rene regime relaxed
regulations effectively banning US port calls. Mada-
gascar's President Ratsiraka continues his general poli-
cy of denying access to any non-Indian Ocean naval
power, but permitted two US naval repair ship visits in
1984-85 to provide assistance after devastating storms
struck the island. The British territory of Diego Garcia
in the Chagos Archipelago is the base for US naval P-3
reconnaissance aircraft that conduct routine patrols of
the area.
27. The United States maintains an Air Force satel-
lite tracking station in Seychelles under a lease agree-
ment that expires in 1990. The tracking station is one
of a global network of stations used to track, com-
mand, and control US space satellites. It also supports
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in
space shuttle flights. Because of its geographic posi-
tion, the continued operation of the facility remains
desirable, even after similar facilities are brought on
line in Diego Garcia and the United Kingdom in 1989.
President Rene has asked the United States to consider
increased annual payments for renewing the lease, but
he is aware that the new sites, if necessary, could be
used to perform tasks now handled by the Seychelles
site.
The West
24. Western interests in the Indian Ocean island
states continue to be driven in part by continuing
tensions in the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and
southern Africa. In many respects, Western interests
are the obverse of Moscow's, seeking to retain Western
access while checking opportunities for an expanded
Soviet influence and military presence. As in the past,
US, British, and French interests are similar. Although
the United States has only limited political and eco-
nomic influence in the region, the continuing need of
the beleaguered islands for economic assistance does
give Washington some leverage.
US Dimension
25. The United States continues to maintain a
significant but limited military presence in the region,
28. Madagascar. US-Malagasy relations have
shown some improvement in recent years as President
Ratsiraka seeks expanded US economic aid. Ratsiraka
is particularly desperate for help in repairing the
country's infrastructure, which has badly deteriorated
under years of misguided socialist policies. In addition,
Ratsiraka also is cultivating US military assistance, and
pressed Washington late last year for a C-130 transport
aircraft and coastal radar units to help meet security
needs. Despite the now-familiar "turn to the West,"
however, Ratsiraka appears neither willing nor able to
dispense with Moscow's assistance in maintaining his
Soviet-trained and -equipped military.
29. Ratsiraka clearly hopes his willingness to deal
with both superpowers will encourage each to give
more aid, although he can draw little encouragement
from the USSR's and Eastern Europe's negligible
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JtLKt I
economic credits and grants to Madagascar since 1975.
Nevertheless, Ratsiraka is likely to continue to pursue
an independent foreign policy, supporting many Third
World causes also embraced by the USSR. At the same
time, he will regard any accommodations of Western
positions as major concessions for which he deserves
compensation.
30. Seychelles. The annual rental fee and indirect
income from the USAF tracking station, combined
with President Rene's domestic need to avoid being
seen as overly committed to the Soviets, continue to
give the United States limited influence in Seychelles.
The tracking station, for example, accounts for about 7
percent of Seychelles's gross domestic product. More-
over, the state of US-Seychelles relations also affects
tourism-the main foreign exchange earner-which
caters almost exclusively to the Western market.
31. As in Madagascar, however, there are clear
limits on Rene's willingness and ability to improve
relations with the West. Rene's dependence on Soviet/
North Korean security support is unlikely to decrease
as long as he is convinced that the West is trying to
undermine his rule. In particular, the continuing
presence of North Korean security personnel, includ-
ing presidential guards, will circumscribe efforts to
improve relations between Victoria and Washington.
32. Mauritius. US political and economic leverage
in Mauritius stems in large measure from the US role as
a major importer of Mauritian sugar and textiles. US
assistance programs, although relatively modest, also
have a disproportionate impact, given Mauritius's small
population. The imposition of a quota on imports of
Mauritian sugar in 1982 and recent negotiations on
restrictions on the importation of Mauritian textiles,
however, have become politically sensitive issues be-
cause of Mauritian interest in expanding its US export
market. The Jugnauth regime views US willingness to
purchase more Mauritian goods as a reasonable re-
sponse to its moderate policy stances since mid-1983.
US failure to meet Mauritian requests for favorable
trade agreements could result in heightened tensions
over the issue of Diego Garcia, among others.
33. Mauritius's attempt to follow a genuinely non-
aligned policy often has limited its responsiveness to
US concerns. On the key issue of Diego Garcia,
however, most Mauritian officials appear to have
acquiesced to the US presence, in part because of US
willingness to utilize Mauritian laborers on the island.
While British and Mauritian officials have resolved the
question of compensation for the displaced inhabitants
of Diego Garcia, future problems could arise if Mauri-
tians-with leftist support-choose to press their
claims against the United States.
34. Comoros. The United States and other Western
powers have, and are likely to continue to have,
considerably more political and economic clout in
Comoros than Eastern Bloc rivals. President Abdallah,
however, will continue to express disappointment over
present levels of US economic aid, arguing that-in
contrast to his left-leaning neighbors-his pro-Western
stance is not being rewarded. In this light, his accept-
ance of a small Soviet scholarship offer may be an
effort to pressure the United States, and the West in
general, to be more forthcoming. On balance, how-
ever, he is unlikely to jeopardize the scheduled open-
ing of a US embassy in Moroni in 1985. Moreover, he
also probably hopes he can pressure Washington to
intercede with Paris in support of his claims to
Mayotte-an island in the Comoros chain adminis-
tered by France.
French Interests
35. The southwest Indian Ocean region plays an
important role in France's strategic considerations.
Paris seeks to ensure the security of shipping routes
through which a large percentage of its energy supply
passes, maintain the security of French citizens and
territories in the area, promote French economic
interests, and maintain its position as a power with the
36. Paris's ability to influence events in the region
continues to flow largely from France's continuing
military presence and economic ties to the region.
French bases and ground forces in the Indian Ocean
area-particularly those on the French islands of
Reunion and Mayotte, and the recently reinforced
French garrison at Djibouti-generally remain un-
matched by any nonlittoral nation. Moreover, while
budgetary constraints may force Paris to reduce some-
what its military presence and civilian assistance, we
believe Paris will not seriously draw down its military
commitments to the region.
37. France's apprehensions about its position in its
territories of Reunion and Mayotte probably have
been heightened by recent events in New Caledonia,
where native separatists and European settlers have
fought openly over the issue of independence. There is
little overt evidence so far, however, of widespread
support for independence in the two islands. The
principal challenge for Paris will continue to come
from Comoran claims of sovereignty over Mayotte.
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France probably will maintain its substantial military
and economic aid to Abdallah's regime in an effort to
prevent further deterioration in Franco-Comoran
relations.
38. France also will be anxious in the near term
about its credibility with regional francophone
states-particularly Madagascar and Comoros-in the
wake of reported disaffection among Africans over
Mitterrand's withdrawal of French forces from Chad.
Paris probably will attempt to reassure regional leaders
of its willingness to continue economic and security
assistance.
The British Role
39. After decades of declining influence, the
Thatcher government in recent years has moved to
reassert a British presence in the Indian Ocean area.
Nevertheless, London's regional leverage and interest
in the region still lags behind that of Paris, even in
former British colonies such as Mauritius and Sey-
chelles. London has only negligible interest and influ-
ence in Madagascar and Comoros. Moreover, budget
constraints will preclude any extensive financial or
political commitments significantly beyond current
levels. More likely, London will continue to rely on
small, targeted aid programs, military advisers, and a
limited military presence in the area.
40. While London can still claim some influence in
Mauritius, relations have declined under the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Jugnauth. Over the last year,
however, the United Kingdom has increased economic
aid and kept a few military advisers on the island to
instruct a Mauritian mobile security unit in an effort
to promote trade links and secure at least minimal
political influence.
41. London stills administers the largely uninhabit-
ed Chagos Archipelago-which includes Diego Garcia,
leased to the United States in 1966-under the rubric
of the British Indian Ocean Territories. For their part,
Mauritian officials continue to claim they were forced
to cede Diego Garcia to London without adequate
compensation in return for Mauritian independence
and British economic aid. While the British usually
ignore such complaints and regard them as govern-
ment attempts to undercut voter support for the
leftwing MMM, the issue will remain an irritant-and
potential trouble spot-in Anglo-Mauritian relations.
Probably of greater concern to London than Mauritian
complaints are the increased questioning of US and
UK activities and requests to visit Diego Garcia by
Members of Parliament and journalists. From the
government's perspective, increased publicity can only
draw attention to a politically nettlesome issue.
42. Despite London's role as a principal aid donor
and one of President Rene's few Western interlocutors,
British ties with Victoria have deteriorated in recent
years, in part because of anti-Rene exile activity in the
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, like the United
States, was effectively denied naval access to Victoria
for several years, and Rene's distrust of the West led
him to cancel plans to accept British military aid.
While sharing US concern about Rene's dealings with
the Soviet Bloc, the British do not believe the West is
in a strong position to counter such contacts effective-
ly. While London sees Rene as an unstable leader
capable of acting unpredictably against British inter-
ests, it probably hopes Seychelles's severe economic
problems will continue to limit the ability of the
Soviets to gain a stronger foothold in Victoria.
Other Arab States
43. The more moderate Arab countries near the
Indian Ocean region continue to show only slight
interest in the island states. Saudi Arabia-in its role as
a protector of Islam-has provided small amounts of
financial assistance to Mauritius and Comoros. For its
part, Algeria is providing limited economic aid to
Madagascar, which has supported the Polisario in the
OAU and other international forums.
The Africans
44. Mainland African nations-facing pressing eco-
nomic and political problems of their own-have only
minimal ties with the islands. South Africa is making
efforts to improve relations with its island neighbors,
but most island leaders are reluctant to establish overt
political links with the white minority government.
South Africa's comparative economic strength, how-
ever, remains a potentially powerful weapon for gain-
ing influence in the region. Pretoria successfully en-
couraged Mauritius to open a trade mission in South
Africa in recent months, has discrete economic and
other ties with Comoros, and has conducted tentative
negotiations with Seychelles on a broad range of
economic and security topics.
45. Kenya-after South Africa-is the islands' larg-
est trading partner, but economic ties have not been
translated to close political links. President Rene's
belief, for example, that former Kenya Home and
Constitutional Affairs Minister Charles Njonjo was
involved in the 1981 coup attempt against his regime
soured bilateral relations. Njonjo's fall in 1984 has
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somewhat mitigated Rene's fears of a Kenyan-
supported coup.
46. The last contingent of Tanzanian troops-sent
to help Rene in the wake of the 1981 coup attempt-
was withdrawn in August 1984. Financially strapped
Dar es Salaam had long been anxious to rid itself of the
burden and had extended the troops' stay only at
Rene's direct request.
47. Despite Mozambique's proximity to the islands
and similarities of ideological views with Madagascar
and Seychelles, Maputo's preoccupation with its own
insurgency has hindered-and will continue to hinder-
the development of closer ties. Although Mozambique
has largely ignored its Comoran neighbor, Maputo
recently has been concerned by allegations that arms
for Mozambican insurgents are being funneled
through Comoros. Machel also may have some influ-
ence with the politically like-minded Seychelles Presi-
dent Rene.
The Asians
48. China continues to provide limited economic
and technical assistance in an effort to counter Soviet
influence. For example, Beijing continues to cultivate
friendly relations with Mauritius-which has a small
but influential Chinese minority-despite friction over
Prime Minister Jugnauth's recent decision to permit
the opening of a Taiwanese commercial mission in
Port Louis.
49. The southwest Indian Ocean region is of impor-
tance to Japan, if only because of Tokyo's involvement
in international shipping. Japan ranks as an important
donor of economic and technical assistance, especially
to Madagascar and Mauritius.
50. The new Rajiv Gandhi government gives no
indication of abandoning Indian efforts to eliminate
all nonlittoral military presence in the Indian Ocean
and establish Indian political and naval supremacy in
the region. In the past, Indian governments have
supported the proposed Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
concept and have encouraged Mauritius to press sover-
eignty claims to the Chagos Archipelago.
51. Indian influence will remain strongest in Mauri-
tius, where it is enhanced by traditionally close ties
with the majority Hindu population. Indian leaders
have carefully cultivated Prime Minister Jugnauth
since his election in 1982 with political support and
offers of economic assistance to counter Mauritius's
growing commercial relations with South Africa.
Domestic Political and Economic Pressures
Madagascar
52. President Ratsiraka remains the single domi-
nant force in Malagasy politics, and easily defeated a
single opponent in November 1982 to win a second
seven-year term in office. His official political opposi-
tion remains confined within the seven-party National
Front umbrella organization, lacks islandwide support,
and poses no serious threat to his regime. As recently
53. In recent years, Madagascar's growing econom-
ic problems, coupled with Ratsiraka's recognition of
his dependence on Western economic support, have
prompted the traditionally left-leaning President to
begin moving away from his socialist orientation.
Madagascar, for example, is plagued by poorly orga-
nized agricultural parastatals that reduce production
incentives for cropgrowers and have forced the regime
to rely increasingly on imported rice. Growing food
imports have been a major contributor to severe hard
currency shortages.
54. Evidence now suggests that Ratsiraka-for eco-
nomic necessity if not philosophic commitment-is
bent on working toward less government control of the
economy. Nevertheless, we foresee little significant
economic progress over the next two years. Inadequate
food distribution networks-especially if coupled with
poor weather-will continue to contribute to poten-
tially serious food shortages, particularly in rural areas.
Ratsiraka has little alternative but to look to the West
for continued food imports and vital economic assis-
tance if he hopes to deter outbreaks of economically
inspired violence that have brought down earlier
Malagasy governments.
55. Ratsiraka probably hopes his balancing act be-
tween the West and the USSR will bring him Western
economic aid without souring too badly his military
relations with Moscow. He recently agreed, for exam-
ple, to US demarches to dismantle the Soviet high-
frequency direction-finding (HF/DF) network, which
was emplaced in mid-1983. Ratsiraka claimed he was
unaware that the network, consisting of at least three
sites and a central communications facility, would
have the capability when fully operational to monitor
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56. We believe it is unlikely that Ratsiraka will
abandon his Soviet military benefactors, and his con-
tinuing concerns over the potential for civil unrest
stemming from economic dissatisfaction or ethnic
rivalries leave the door ajar for the Soviets. Despite the
apparent setback on the HF/DF sites, the USSR
recently offered, and Madagascar accepted, additional
military equipment and associated training by 25
Soviet military advisers, who would augment the
approximately 70 military advisers already in the
country. Ratsiraka, however, is unlikely to reciprocate
Soviet military generosity by granting Moscow access
to air and naval facilities as long as he believes his
more nonaligned posture will garner further Western
economic aid. The December appointments of pro-
West Malagasy military officers to key command
positions also suggest that Ratsiraka now is attempting
to circumscribe Soviet activities, particularly within
the Air Force, and limit Soviet influence in the
military.
Seychelles
57. Despite his landslide victory in the one-candi-
date 1984 presidential election, Rene's domestic stand-
ing has fallen since 1982. Moreover, the Army mutiny
in 1982 and subsequent events have thrown into
question the reliability and loyalty of his security
forces. Power struggles among factions in the cabinet
are disrupting policymaking, the country's sole party
has become ineffective in rallying support for social-
ism, and the declining economic situation is undermin-
ing popular support for the regime. Furthermore, the
aborted coup attempt in September 1984 focused
Rene's attention on popular dissatisfaction with the
Soviet presence and underscored his concern over the
vulnerability of his regime. Rene also is troubled by
growing criticism from the influential Catholic
Church for his pro-Soviet policies and checkered
human rights record.
58. Rene has become increasingly preoccupied with
ensuring the security of his regime. The Soviets recent-
ly installed a communications network, and Moscow
continues to provide military equipment and associat-
ed training by military advisers-five to 10 as of
March 1985. Rene also has accelerated efforts to
establish a large, North Korean-trained civilian militia
to help deter internal opposition.
59. Moscow's ability to gain even greater influence
in Seychelles is constrained, however, by the country's
economic dependence on tourism and Western eco-
nomic aid. Rene thus far has resisted pressure from
more radical government ministers to remove the US
tracking station, and he already has indicated to US
Embassy officials that he wants to renew the lease
beyond the 1990 expiration date. Rene clearly sees the
station's continued presence-as well as his refusal not
to allow foreign military bases on Seychelles soil-as
public symbols of his commitment to a nonaligned
policy. To date, Rene has allowed periodic naval visits
and landing rights for military transport aircraft.
While he has heretofore refused permission for the
transit of combat and reconnaissance aircraft, we do
not discount the possibility that Rene could bow to
Soviet pressure. He currently is considering such a
request.
60. Prospects for economic improvement in Sey-
chelles remain poor. Despite attempts to diversify the
economy and promote self-sufficiency in foodstuffs,
Seychelles must import virtually all commodities, and
the growing current account deficit is becoming a
serious problem for the regime. Significant economic
growth will be difficult to sustain over the next few
years, especially since a series of uncompensated
nationalizations and the growth of the cumbersome
parastatal infrastructure have alarmed Western inves-
tors. Moreover, there are now signs that government
interference in the local economy is generating domes-
tic resentment.
61. The government of Prime Minister Jugnauth is
confronted by a vexing array of political problems.
Nine months after its June 1982 electoral victory, the
leftist Mauritian Militant Movement government col-
lapsed as a consequence of the power struggle between
Jugnauth and then Finance Minister Berenger,
founder and leader of the MMM. Jugnauth formed his
Militant Socialist Movement and established a three-
party coalition that in turn decisively defeated the
MMM in the August 1983 elections.
62. Over the longer term, Jugnauth's inability to
reduce longstanding communal tensions among the
diverse Mauritian ethnic groups could undermine
popular support for his predominately Hindu- and
Creole-backed governing coalition. Competition with-
in the coalition among ethnic factions headed by
Jugnauth's key advisers and internecine personality
clashes already have adversely affected the govern-
ment's ability to formulate coherent policy strategies,
particularly on economic issues. Complicating matters,
the MMM has played on communal differences and
perceived economic discrimination against minority
ethnic groups in an effort to gain support for its
socialist platform, which already enjoys wide support
from trade unions and the working class.
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63. Jugnauth also must contend with Mauritius's
sagging economy. The sugar industry, which generally
accounts for two-thirds of foreign exchange earnings,
has suffered from poor weather conditions and reduc-
tions in sugar export quotas under the International
Sugar Organization. In response, the regime is at-
tempting to diversify the economy and has embarked
on an aggressive campaign abroad to secure greater
foreign aid-the principal source of government reve-
nue-and promote investment. The government also
has undertaken politically difficult measures pre-
scribed by international financial institutions to adjust
the economy and balance the budget. In an effort to
alleviate record unemployment-now close to 50 per-
cent for young males under 25-the government is
sending laborers abroad to work in Middle Eastern
states.
64. By and large, Jugnauth's government has adopt-
ed policies which accommodate US interests in the
region despite longstanding Mauritian resentment over
US acquisition of Diego Garcia. The Prime Minister
has softened his rhetoric on the proposed Indian
Ocean Zone of Peace concept and allowed naval ships
from nonlittoral countries to call at Port Louis. Al-
though he publicly advocates the return of Mauritian
sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago-including
Diego Garcia-he has soft-pedaled those claims in the
interest of maintaining good relations with the United
States. Failure to resolve problems with the United
States over bilateral trade, however, will put the
government under greater pressure from leftist opposi-
tion elements and Jugnauth's own ministers to adopt a
less accommodating stance toward US regional
interests.
65. Already-cool relations with Moscow are unlike-
ly to warm significantly in the near term. Soviet
attempts to gain influence in Mauritius have met with
little success, in part because of the regime's longstand-
ing political and economic ties to India and, to a lesser
extent, the West. Soviet efforts are further hampered
by Jugnauth's suspicions about potential Soviet support
for leftist elements in the government. Prospects for
improving Soviet-Mauritian relations could occur,
however, if the governing alliance fragments before its
mandate is up in 1988 and the MMM comes to power.
Even an MMM government probably would not tilt
radically in favor of Moscow, if only for economic
reasons. It is more likely that such a government
would gradually limit ties to the West and build on
existing relations with Communist and nonaligned
states.
Comoros
66. President Abdallah was elected to a second six-
year term in September 1984. Comorans seem to
prefer his benign, authoritarian regime to that of the
repressive Ali Soileh, whom Abdallah deposed in a
mercenary-backed coup in 1978. Reporting indicates,
however, that disputes among rival ministers are erod-
ing government unity and, over the longer term, could
erode the regime's stability. The President's poor
health reportedly also has already spawned political
maneuvering among potential successors. A recently
uncovered coup plot by 12 members of the presiden-
tial guard underscores the fragility of his regime. We
believe that, if he does not clearly establish a successor,
constitutional provisions for succession might well be
ignored, with uncertain prospects for pro-Western
moderates in any ensuing power struggle.
67. Comoros remains one of the world's least devel-
oped countries, and is heavily dependent on foreign
economic development assistance-provided largely
by France-to cover chronic current account deficits.
Economic prospects appear bleak. Abdallah looks to
the moderate Arab states and West European donors
for increased economic aid.
68. Given current political and economic realities,
Abdallah is unlikely to deviate significantly from the
moderate political course he has charted over the past
six years. His commitment to integrate French-admin-
istered Mayotte into Comoros is his most pressing
foreign policy concern and has long strained otherwise
good relations with France, but he cannot afford to
jeopardize relations with his leading bilateral aid
donor over the issue.
69. Nevertheless, faced with growing domestic crit-
icism of his failure to expedite the island's return,
Abdallah could be tempted to respond favorably to
Soviet offers of assistance for his campaign. The
Soviets may have been encouraged by his recent
acceptance of a small scholarship offer, although he
continues to rebuff most Soviet overtures. On balance,
we believe he is unlikely to accept substantial Soviet
offers of economic and military assistance, both for
ideological reasons and for fear of jeopardizing assist-
ance from France and the United States.
70. External opposition to Abdallah is small, frag-
mented, and has little internal support. Nevertheless,
without French assistance the Comoran security forces
probably would be unable to protect the regime
against a well-organized attack. In an effort to deter
external coup plotting, Abdallah undoubtedly will
continue to press the West-particularly the United
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States and France-to accept his longstanding offer to
establish military facilities on the islands.
Prospects for Regional Cooperation
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
71. Island governments continue to endorse the
concept of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace which calls
for the removal of the great powers' naval forces and
military facilities. Beyond mere rhetoric, we foresee
little concrete progress on the IOZP in the next several
years, and continuing divisions over tactics alone
probably will preclude effective joint action. More-
over, given Moscow's commitments in Afghanistan,
moderate island leaders probably see the US presence
at Diego Garcia as a counter to the continuing threat
of Soviet expansionism.
Indian Ocean Commission
72. Mauritius, Madagascar, and Seychelles estab-
lished the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) in Decem-
ber 1982 following the election of the MMM govern-
ment in Mauritius. The Commission was designed to
foster economic cooperation, although Mauritian ardor
has dimmed since the advent of the second Jugnauth
government in 1983. The IOC, however, did add
Comoros as its fourth member in early 1985, and has
granted provisional membership to Reunion. Any
future impact on regional issues will be seriously
limited by the political differences among members
and by institutional and budgetary constraints.
Implications for the United States
73. US relations with the island governments are
not likely to change dramatically over the near term.
All of the islands harbor hopes of garnering additional
US economic support, and have modified policies to
some degree to achieve this end. The failure of
Washington's aid levels to meet the islands' economic
expectations could impose some strains, but the lack of
alternatives for aid from other sources should place
limits on expressions of discontent. The United States
is unlikely to gain increased air and naval access to the
islands, but this will not seriously damage US interests
as long as the Soviets also fail to achieve any exclusive
military access.
74. Given the US presence on Diego Garcia and
limited military access agreements with Somalia,
Kenya, Djibouti, and Oman, military access to the
islands is not critical to the US strategic position in the
region. With the exception of the tracking station
established in Seychelles under a lease agreement that
expires in 1990, military access to the islands is limited
to an occasional ship visit or P-3 maritime patrol
aircraft stopover. In most cases, the number of visits
the United States conducts is less than the number the
host government has indicated that it would be will-
ing-and anxious, due to economic benefits-to ac-
cept. Nevertheless, the loss of even limited US access
would be interpreted by the Soviets as a victory for
Moscow.
75. The level of US economic assistance will remain
the major focus of US-islands relations in the near
term. Left-leaning Madagascar and Seychelles are
likely to press Washington for more economic aid,
realizing that the USSR will not provide significant
amounts of economic assistance. The overwhelming
and longstanding dependence on the Soviet Union for
security assistance and military hardware, however,
makes it highly unlikely that either Rene or Ratsiraka
will feel politically secure enough to sever their ties to
Moscow. Moreover, moves either to the East or the
West are likely to be transitory and subject to sudden
change.
76. Over the next two years, Washington can expect
the Soviets to continue efforts to increase their influ-
ence at the expense of the United States and the West.
Criticism of the, Diego Garcia base, charges of US-
South African collusion, and allegations of Western
support for dissidents are likely to be major propagan-
da elements used by Moscow in an effort to play on
the already-existing fears of the leaders of the island
nations. Simultaneously, Moscow is likely to stress its
own ability to provide protection through military
assistance agreements and, when necessary, provide
overt demonstrations of Soviet support. Moscow's well-
documented failure to provide significant economic
assistance will continue to work against its ability to
develop stable patron-client relations with even left-
leaning leaders.
77. Three of the four governments covered in this
Estimate-those of Seychelles, Comoros, and Mada-
gascar-are based on personality rather than institu-
tional leadership and thus must be considered some-
what fragile. Although the current leaders appear
relatively secure, there are possibilities for coup at-
tempts in each of these states. Successor leaders might
well be more pro-Soviet in orientation, but we believe
that the need for economic assistance from the West
will constrain their actions so that important Western
interests will not be seriously jeopardized.
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ANNEX
Mauritius:
Selected Economic Indicators
Comoros:
Selected Economic Indicators
FY 1983/84 (US $)
P
073
1
Per capita GDP, 1982 (US $)
331
,
Per capita GD
,
Real GDP growth, FY 1983/84
1.2
1982
(percent)
1980/81
1983/84
(million US $)
July-June
July-June
(million US $)
(provisional)
Trade balance
-0.6
(million US $)
f
b
18.3
.o.
.
Exports,
Current account balance
-180
-28
b
f
-18.9
.
.o.
Imports,
Trade balance
-171
-21
Net services and transfers
-10.2
f.o.b.
Exports
362
363
,
Gross foreign exchange reserves, y
earend
8.2
Imports, f.o.b.
-533
-384
ed
b
bt
di
d
bl
l
49.3
urs
,
s
e
ic
pu
Externa
Net services and transfers
-9
-7
t
i
2.5
)
o (percen
Debt service rat
Gross foreign exchange reserves,
26.7
38.0
end-June
1979 a
t
di
(percent)
ners,
ng par
Major tra
External public debt, disbursed
494
541
4
63
France
.
Debt service ratio (percent)
9
18
1983 a
(percent)
Major trading partners,
Note: Sources: IMF Recent Economic Developments, November
1982
IMF 1982 Consultation, February 1983
United States 5.4
Note: Sources: IMF Recent Economic Developments, 31 August
1984
Dec IFS
IMF Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1984
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%FrRFT
Seychelles:
Selected Economic Indicators Selected Economic Indicators
2,027
Real GDP growth, 1982 (percent)
-0.5
1981
(million
US $)
1983
(million US $)
Current account balance
-22.8
-44.6
Trade balance
-64.9
-78.1
Exports, f.o.b.
4.1
2.8
Imports, f.o.b.
-69.0
-80.9
Net services and transfers
42.1
33.5
Gross foreign exchange reserves,
yearend
13.09
4.26
(October
1984)
External public debt, disbursed
24.8
(1980)
50.2 (1982)
Debt service ratio (percent)
0.6
(1980)
2.0 (1982)
Major trading partners, 1983 a
(percent)
United Kingdom
14.5
Italy
12.7
Per capita GDP, 1982 (US $)
306
Real GDP growth, 1984 (percent)
1.6
1981
million
(million
US $)
1984
(projected)
(million US $)
Current account balance
-362
-204
Trade balance
-179
-28
Exports, f.o.b.
332
328
Imports, f.o.b.
-511
-356
Net services and transfers
(official and private)
-183
-176
Gross foreign exchange reserves,
yearend
25.8
43.6
(September
1984)
External public debt, disbursed 1,572 2,200
Debt service ratio, after
rescheduling (percent)
Major trading partners, 1983 a
France
United States 10.5
Saudi Arabia 8.9
Japan 8.3
Note: Sources: Dec IFS (per capita GDP, foreign exchange reserves)
IMF Recent Economic Developments, 15 August
1983
IMF Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1984
Note: Sources: IMF Third Review of Standby Arrangement,
27 November 1984
IMF Recent Economic Developments,
25 September 1984
Dec IFS (foreign exchange reserves)
IMF Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1984
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USSR and Eastern Europe: Economic and Military Deliveries Million US $
to Selected African Countries
17
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Official Gross Disbursements Million US $ Cuba and North Korea: Number of persons
From Western Countries Economic and Military
to Selected African LDCs Technicians in Selected
African LDCs
France
United Kingdom
United States
France
38.4
58.1
60.9
153.8
89.7
United Kingdom
0.2
1.3
0.6
1.0
0.3
United States
3.0
-
12.0
15.0
10.0
Mauritius
44.4
52.5
86.0
59.9
54.6
Of which:
France
12.7
13.1
38.7
15.8
17.4
United Kingdom
5.5
6.2
5.8
2.9
2.0
United States
3.0
3.0
3.0
7.0
3.0
Seychelles
24.6
27.1
17.5
22.1
17.8
France
9.5
6.5
2.9
4.3
5.1
United Kingdom
10.2
11.4
8.0
6.2
4.8
United States
-
1.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
Seychelles - 5 30
Military technicians
Comoros - - -
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USSR and Eastern Europe:
Personnel Flows to/From
Selected African LDCs
Number of Persons Soviet Port Visits, 1982-84
Economic technicians
in LDCs
Madagascar
70
40
150
40
Military technicians
in LDCs
Madagascar
30
-
150
50
Academic students to
USSR and Eastern
Europe from LDCs
Madagascar
1,000
165
2,110
215
Mauritius
150
35
190
30
Seychelles
-
-
15
-
Seychelles (Port Victoria)
Combatants
Auxiliary
Submarines
0
0
0
Hydrographic
0
1
0
Madagascar
0
0
0
Hydrographic
1
1
0
Space events support ships
1
0
0
Mozambique
Submarines
Hydrographic
Comoros
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4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/09: CIA-RDP87T00495RO01001150003-0