HEROIN TRAFFICKING: THE SYRIAN CONNECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
E~~~~eN Directorate of
?II i.a?ung~.aea,e,
I J
(--C) 6~ 6 2 ,
id
-Top Seeret
G18 5-100460
February 1985
Copy 304
Heroin Trafficking:
The Syrian Connection
Project number
7 I W M J K
Page numbers
Total number of copies y___
Dissem Date IS 0 O C
EXtra conies JC) -33V
Record Ctr
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
National Security
Information
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
Directorate of To Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Heroin Trafficking:
The Syrian Connection
This paper was prepared by
ffice of Global Issues. It was coordinated
with-the Directorate of Operations, CIA, and the
Department of State.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Terrorism /Narcotics Analysis
Division, OGI,
Top Secret
GI 85-10046C
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
Heroin Trafficking:
The Syrian Connection
Key Judgments Syria has changed from a secondary staging area for drugs moving from
Information available Southwest Asia and the Middle East to Europe and the United States to an
as of 1 February 1985 important trafficking and processing center. We judge that Syrians are
was used in this report.
more involved than ever in narcotics trafficking, that drug moguls now
operate extensive distribution networks, and that Syrians are refining
heroin. Aggressive narcotics control in Europe and turbulence in the
Middle East prompted Syrians to expand their narcotics operations, and
the persistence of these conditions is likely to encourage continued
narcotics trafficking and processing in Syria.
We judge that the current level of trade could not be sustained without sig-
nificant involvement of Syrian officials.
implicates various high-level govern-
ment officials and senior military officers. Some Syrian-supported terrorist
groups have also been implicated-at least marginally-in narcotics
trafficking.
We believe the Syrian Government is unlikely to crack down on narcotics
traffickers. Drug law enforcement takes a backseat to other more impor-
tant military, defense, and internal security matters, and the government
has shown no inclination to publicize and lead a stringent antinarcotics
campaign. Corrupt military officers have little incentive to curtail an
activity that provides personal wealth and also relieves the Syrian Govern-
ment of some of the financial burden of supporting terrorist groups. Even if
Syria were to emphasize narcotics control, trafficking would be difficult to
suppress because smuggling has long been tolerated by Syrian society.
25X1
25X1
25X1
The Syrian connection will probably continue to grow as a heroin source
for the United States and Europe, and the increased drug activity will pose
serious enforcement problems for both. With little or no practical leverage
over the Syrian Government, interdiction will be the only way of reducing
heroin imports.
iii Top Secret
GI 85-10046C
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
Syria's Expanded Role: The Evidence
Distribution
Processing
Smuggling Routes and Methods
Government and Military Involvement
Terrorist Involvement
Prospects for Narcotics Control
Outlook
25X1
LDAI
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
Syrian Heroin Connection
To Europe th otr. h
duly.+ria
Egypt
T*AMMAN
Israel
Tel Aviv-Yafo.?
/ Jordan
(
F3 (,LI ?daryj
Sudan
BAGHDAD
Iraq
Saudi Arabia
Ira n
Bahrain MANAMA
Qatar
DDHA
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
Heroin Trafficking:
The Syrian Connection
Introduction
Syria, once just a transit zone or staging area for
narcotics bound for Europe, is rapidly becoming a
major player in the world narcotics arena (see figure
1). Syria has long attracted all kinds of smuggling
with its mountainous topography, porous borders,
location astride traditional Middle East smuggling
and trade routes, commercial and family links to
neighboring countries, and a government and society
indifferent to the problem. In this kind of environ-
ment, Syrian smugglers were well placed to move into
narcotics trafficking.
recent disruptions in established Middle
Trq icking. Most of the evidence of increased Syrian
trafficking comes from Europe, where
authorities are arresting more
Syrian traffickers and identifying Syria more often as
the source of seized heroin:
? According to State and DEA sources, French au-
thorities believe Syrian networks are moving more
heroin into France, causing heroin seizures to rise
from 83 kilograms in 1982 to 170 kilograms in
1983. DEA sources confirm that Syrian nationals
have set up operations near Paris and that Syrian
organizations are moving heroin into France.
East trafficking patterns have enabled these ambi-
tious smugglers to move into the world's most profit-
able crime:
? Syrians reportedly assumed control over Lebanese
trafficking networks when the civil war in Lebanon
limited travel and traditional smuggling routes to
Europe.
? Evidence of Syrian drug distribution networks be-
gan to appear in Europe after authorities there
closed down many of the mafia-controlled traffick-
ing and heroin processing operations.
? Reports of Syrian heroin laboratories became more
frequent after the Turkish Government stepped up
narcotics enforcement and cracked down on heroin
processing centers.
Syria's Expanded Role: The Evidence
(Syria is more than just a
transit zone. Statistics on heroin seizures, intelligence,
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and State
Department reporting strongly suggest that Syrians
are now heavily involved in trafficking drugs to
Europe and the United States; that Syrian smugglers
are developing more sophisticated organizations capa-
ble of distributing and marketing drugs; and that at
least some of the heroin distributed is refined within
Syria (see figure 2).
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
Figure 2
Opium Refining
Extraction (t0:1)
Crude morphine base
(No. I Heroin)
Conversion (I: 1)t~
Crude heroin base
(No. 2 Heroin)
Smoking heroin
(No. 3 Heroin)
Pure heroin
(No. 4 Heroin)
I part morphine is extracted coin t0 parts opium.
I part herion is converted troii I part murplune.
Similar signs of increased Syrian trafficking have
been registered in the United States. Before 1981,
there were apparently no arrests of Syrians trafficking
heroin into the United States. According to DEA
reporting, a total of 16 kilograms of Syrian heroin was
smuggled aboard the Royal Jordanian Airline (ALIA)
into the United States during the first six months of
1983, and a Syrian smuggling ring was responsible for
5 kilograms of Syrian heroin seized in May 1983 at
JFK International Airport
kilograms of nearly pure heroin in May 1984 in
Boston. The heroin in this seizure was reportedly
shipped from Damascus and had a street value of $12
million to $15 million.
increase of nearly 30 percent.
The Syrian Government also reports increased drug
seizures and arrests, even though its antinarcotics
efforts remained at the same low level. The quantities
of opium, morphine, and heroin seized within Syria
increased by more than 400 percent from 1981 to
1983. In 1983 Syrian officials investigated nearly
350 drug cases an increase of nearly 50 percent
from 1981--and arrested nearly 800 persons-an
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1X1
2tixI
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
four Syrian 25X1
brothers-Ghassan, Monzer, Haissam, and Mazen
al-Kassar-run a major league illicit arms and nar-
25X1
25X1
Rif`at has acquired a reputation for being corrupt
and, he is
believed to tolerate or even run smuggling and drug
trafficking operations. The Defense Companies are
responsible for defending Damascus, as well as
Hamah, Latakia, and Tartus-three acknowledged
smuggling and drug trafficking centers-and Rif`at
probably knows of the illicit activity in these cities.
According to press reporting, Rif`at also controls the
northern Lebanon truck routes over which drug con-
voys travel, and he allegedly is earning a sizable
income from charging smugglers and traffickers for
L 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
Circumstantial evidence also points to the existence of
large, well-organized Syrian drug smuggling rings.
Both State Department and DEA sources report that
Syrian networks are supplying a constant flow of
heroin directly to European and United States mar-
kets via numerous couriers carrying small amounts of
heroin. These couriers use sophisticated concealment
techniques and intricate smuggling routes. In our
judgment, such activities require the kind of planning,
resources, and connections found only in large organi-
zations. The apparent sophistication of these networks
is particularly evident in some of the safeguards
taken: several couriers handling the drug shipment
before it reaches its final destination; couriers dealing
only with known associates; elderly ladies serving as
couriers; and several couriers traveling on the sane
flight who are unwitting of each other.
Processing. Most successful trafficking groups soon
begin to refine their own heroin to increase profits.
The US Embassy in Damascus believes that Syrian
trafficking groups may have already reached this
more sophisticated stage of development
Heroin laboratories have been rumored in a number
of Syrian cities including Aleppo, Azaz, Hamah,
Latakia, and other locations in northwest Syria, as
well as in Damascus.
heroin without detection by authorities
The first two shipments, like the third, could have
ended up in Turkey. Because Turkish authorities are
enforcing antinarcotics laws vigorously and outlawing
the importation of these chemicals, we suspect north-
western Syria is becoming the likely destination. F_
We judge that Aleppo, a dynamic commercial and
industrial city located along traditional narcotics
smuggling routes in northwest Syria, is likely the
major center for heroin processing. It was here that
the first heroin laboratories were rumored and subse-
quently discovered. In 1984, Syrian authorities claim
they arrested several heroin refiners in Aleppo, al-
though they did not discover any laboratories. Aleppo
merchants, largely Kurds and Armenians, have long-
established commercial ties throughout the Middle
East, Europe, and the United States. The Kurdish and
Armenian communities also offer a bridge to a num-
ber of active underground organizations throughout
the Middle East and Europe. These ethnic, commu-
nal, and family ties provide the kind of secure and
reliable network needed to process and distribute
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
Smuggling Routes and Methods
Syrians can obtain the raw opium and morphine base
they need from the highly efficient traffic networks
moving drugs out of the Golden Crescent-producing
countries. Much of this opium originates in Afghani-
stan and Pakistan, transits Iran, and arrives by pack-
horse caravan over the mountains near the Iran, Iraq,
and Turkey triborder area. According to DEA
sources, narcotics also arrive in Syria by ship out of
the Iranian port of Chah Bahar. The US Embassy in
Damascus reports that opium and morphine also are
brought to Damascus from Tehran on commercial
aircraft.
According to DEA sources, Syrian traffickers rely on
numerous routes to move heroin into the European
and US markets. The Syrian ports of Latakia and
Tartus are the embarkation points for large ship-
ments. Small shipments, now more common, are
usually body carried or concealed in luggage on
commercial air flights out of the Damascus or Am-
man airports, transported by automobiles, or shipped
by ferry. Automobiles and Transport International
Routier (TIR) trucks generally cross the Balkan coun-
tries into Austria and then to the rest of Europe.' By
water, drugs depart Syria or Lebanon for various
Mediterranean ports, usually via Greece, Cyprus, or
Malta. Numerous air routes are available to the
United States and Europe.
Government and Military Involvement
Government or military involvement in narcotics can
take many forms-active promotion through logistic
' TIR is the internationally administered commercial commodity
transport system in use throughout Europe and the Middle East
or financial support, tacit acceptance by the govern-
ment, or participation by individuals in the govern-
ment, often as a result of drug-related graft.
status in the Syrian Government and its past involve-
ment in other forms of smuggling. The US Embassy
in Damascus reports that involvement of lower level
Syrian military personnel in drug graft is widespread.
We also conclude that the current level of narcotics
processing and trafficking in Syria could not be
sustained without participation by the military, pri-
marily because of its powerful role and privileged
? According to press and DEA sources, four of the
military's high-ranking and better known officers
have been involved in narcotics trafficking: Rif`at,
the president's brother, long the commander of the
Defense Companies, and recently appointed Vice
President for Security Affairs; Ali Haydar, Com-
mander of the elite Special Forces; Mustafa Talas,
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense;
and Shafiq Fayyad, Commander of the Third Ar-
mored Division.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
Top Secret
25X11
Embassy in Damascus has noted occasional comments
in the Syrian press stating that terrorist groups oper-
ating in Syria have turned to narcotics trafficking for
the funds needed to support their other objectives.
officials.
Prospects for Narcotics Control
The record shows that Syrian authorities have little
interest in limiting Syria's role as a major transit
point and supplier of drugs to international markets.
Although a signatory to several multilateral narcotics
conventions and agreements, Damascus has paid little
more than lipservice to their goals. In July 1983, for
example, Pan Arab Narcotics Bureau Director
Gharaibeh protested the lack of Syrian efforts to
control trafficking of heroin to Europe and the United
States. He also reported that the Bureau had uncon-
firmed information that the success of several Syrian
trafficking groups was a result of laxity by police
Damascus has shown similar disinterest in cracking
According to the Turkish press, an Iranian Kurd down on narcotics activity within its borders. Domes-
was arrested near the Syrian frontier in Turkey for tic drug laws have been enacted but are only occasion-
selling heroin to buy weapons for an Iranian under- ally enforced, and we believe the recent increase in
operations.
seizures is more a reflection of increased narcotics
activity than a commitment to combat drug traffick-
ing. Drug law enforcement takes a back seat to other
more important internal security matters, and the
government has shown no inclination to publicize and
lead a stringent antinarcotics campaign. The Antinar-
cotics Section of the Damascus Northern Division
Police and Syrian Customs, both responsible for drug
law enforcement, are inadequately funded, poorly
trained, and unable to coordinate enforcement
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
Syria recently suggested a willingness to improve its
drug control capability. Anti-Narcotics Director
Ahmad Hariri in January offered to cooperate more
closely with the United States Government in narcot-
ics control and expressed an interest in participating
in US-sponsored and -funded training programs, coor-
dinating cases, and exchanging information. We
doubt, however, that Damascus is ready to mobilize
its antinarcotics troops. Syria has rebuffed previous
offers of assistance from the United States and other
countries, and we have no indication of higher level
support within the Syrian Government for Hariri's
initiative.
Outlook
In the absence of strong government action-unlikely
under the current regime-the "Syrian Connection"
will probably continue to grow as a heroin source for
the United States and Europe. The newly established
Syrian trafficking groups, having experienced the
enormous profits from an integrated drug smuggling
effort, are likely to increase their activity. Their
source of raw material-opium-seems secure. Pro-
duction from Southwest Asia is on the rise, and we
believe Syrian traffickers will get their share of future
crops. Moreover, most trafficking groups, as they
mature, begin to use more sophisticated techniques
that make control more difficult. In the absence of a
domestic drug abuse problem, the Syrian Govern-
ment-faced with other more pressing domestic and
foreign policy concerns and hampered by drug-related
corruption-is not likely to move against the flow of
heroin any time soon. Narcotics trafficking is ex-
tremely lucrative and one way for Syrian-based ter-
rorists to finance their activities and reduce their
demands on the financially strapped Syrian Govern-
ment.
couriers and distributors that will be difficult for
enforcement authorities to penetrate. We expect
Western Europe, the more traditional market for
Middle East drugs, to remain the principal target for
Syrian heroin producers. Nevertheless, the strength of
the US dollar relative to European currency makes
trafficking to the United States more profitable, and
Syrian traffickers are likely to begin opening up more
and better channels to the US heroin market)
25X1
25X1
The increased drug activity by Syria will create
serious enforcement problems for the United States
and Europe. With little or no practical leverage over
the Syrian Government on narcotics control issues,
interdiction is the only way of stemming the tide of
heroin imports. Any interdiction effort will be ham-
pered by Syrian traffickers' reliance on large numbers
of couriers and direct contact with dealers. The large
community of Syrian expatriates living on both
continents provides an in-place network of potential
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8
't'op Secret
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP86T00586R000200160004-8