THE 1969 HARVEST IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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Secre it
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
intelligence Memorandum
The 1969 Harvest In Communist China
W
DocbIdii~li SERCop Y
e~1 NCH
D0 NAT DESTROY
~eeFe+t-
ER IM 70-1
January 1970
Copy No.
43
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WARNING
'I'bis docutrtcttt contains in~ormatiun alfcctinl.; the national
defense of the United States, within the nnearninl; of Title
18, scctiow. 711:3 and 791, of the. US Code, its antcuclctl.
Its transmission or rowclatiou of its contents to or re-
ceipt by au unruttborinccl person is prohibits d by law.
I,POUP I
o-wit
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Incelligence
January 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The 1969 Harvest In r-omn1unist China
Introduction
This memorandum reviews the factory; which
affected food production in 1969 and summarizes
the trends in Chinese food consumption and trade
in foodstuffs. Evidence on food consumption for
1969 is available only for the first half of the
year and reflects primarily production in 1968.
Conclusions about production for the full year
1969 are preliminary and are based, for the most
part, on reports on' weather and other growing
conditions.
Grain Production in 1969
1. The total harvest of grain in Communist
China in 1969 was apparently higher than the
mediocre level of 1968; whether this year's
harvest reached the level of the excellent 1967
harvest remains unclear. On the one hand, both
the 1968 and 1969 harvests were favored by only
average weather conditions, while weather in 1967
was unusually good. On the other hand, supplies
of chemical fertilizer were higher in 1969 than
in eithar 1967 or 1968. The effects of those two
variables -- weather and chemical fertilizer --
on crop production in communist China are diffi-
cult to quantify, and the precise relationship
between the harvest of 1969 and that of 1967
Note: This memorandum vas produced eoZeZy by CIA.
It was prepared by the Gffice of Economic Research.
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cannot be clarified at this time. Chinese Communist
claims for the grain harvest in 1969 suggest, how-
~,sver, that Peking does not consider this year's
grain harvest to have equaled that of 1967. In
1967 the regime claimed that "grain had registered
a considerable increase" over 1966, which had been
an "all-time high" harvest. In 1968, no mention
of total grain production was made at all, and the
claim simply stated that "another excellent harvest"
had been achieved. Fcr 1969 the regime has claimed
only that "total grain output this year was higher
than that of last year," giving no indication of
attaining a new peak level.
The Early Harvest
2 ? The harvest of
early
grains is estimated
to have been no better
than
the early harvest of
1968.
Unusually cold,
damp,
and cloudy weather
in many areas of the country seriously affected
the growing conditions for winter wheat, mis-
cellaneous winter grains, potatoes, and early
rice, which represent most of the early harvest.
Although growing conditions for the early harvest
were less favorable than in 1968, the increased
availability of chemical fertilizers and other
inputs apparently prevented any serious decline
in yields.
The Late Harvest
3. The more important late (autumn grain)
harvest, which normally accounts for about two-
thirds of annual grain output, was somewhat more
successful, chiefly because of improved weather
conditions in the fall months.
4. During this past summer, autumn-harvested
crops in much of Central and East China were sub-
jected to intense storm activity which produced
major flooding in the Yangtze Valley. The area
involved and the intensity of precipitation was
much greater than in 1968, when flooding was
reported in the same general area. This storm
activity later moved into North and Northwest
China producing heavy and prolonged precipitation
over much of the Hai River Valley of North China
and caused some waterlogging at low elevations.
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Although typhoons struck areas of South China
during July and August, they did not seriously
affect crops in these areas. Szechwan Province,
a major grain-producing area, and much of North-
east China were beset by drought conditions during
the spring and summer months.
5. Weather conditions subsequently improved
throughout much of the affected areas with the
exception of Northeast China, portions of Central
and East China, and Szechwan Province. In these
latter areas, the harvest appears to have been
below average.
6. The improvement in weather conditions
during the fall months in most areas of the country
probably was the main factor in raising autumn
grain output sufficiently to offset the below-
average early grain harvest. The increased sup-
plies of chemical fertilizer available throughout
the year, however, and continued regime tolerance
of private agricultural activity also contributed
to the improvement in total grain output in 1969.
7. Domestic output of chemical fertilizer
began to recover from the effects of the Cultural
Revolution in the last half of 1968, and produc-
tion in 1969 may have been as much as 20% above
the 4.5 to 5.0 million tons produced in 1968.
Contracts for the import of large quantities of
chemical fertilizer from the Free World also
continued. Scheduled deliveries during the
1969/70 fertilizer year are close to the record
high level of 4.3 million tons of nitrogenous
fertilizer ordered in 1968. There appear to
have been fewer problems in the distribution of
fertilizer in 1969, and most of the fertilizer
available probably reached farms in time for
effective application.
8. While there were no great problems in
agricultural production in 1969, there is growing
evidence that the regime is concerned about its
ability to procure and distribute agricultural
products. In an unusual article in the December
1969 Red Flag, peasants were exhorted to "take
the needs of the state into account" and to "sell
more surplus grain to the state and fulfill and
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overfulfill quotas of grain deliveries and sales
to the state." Similar exhortations and complaints
that the peasants were holding back grain due to
the state and increasing their own consumption
have also been noted in the provincial press. The
full effects of the continuing movement of millions
of urban dwellers into the ruraj areas remain to
be seen. However, the current difficulty in state
procurement of grain may be in part a reflection
of the increased consumption requirements generated
by the arrival of these newcomers in rural areas.
Agricultural Policies in 1969
9. Policies of the regime toward peasant
incentives during 1969 have also helped to maintain
agricultural productivity. Unfavorable crop pros-
pects in March 1969 apparently persuaded the regime
to reverse earlier policies which would have ex-
panded the scope of collective activity and
restricted private side-line activity. Neverthe-
less, the peasants are reported to be apprehensive
of the effect the continued influx of urban
dwellers will have on the distribution and culti-
vation of private plots.
10. The renewed emphasis on agriculture has
also been noted in recent editorials. Indications
are that the production of agricultural tools, spare
parts,~and other products by rural industries for
farmers will be increased. References to "Rural
Development Programs" have been emerging in many
provincial editorials since the publication of a
major Red Flag article in October 1969 advocating
such a program and stressing the need for industry
to orient itself to serve agriculture. The
reference to "Rural Development Programs" may be
a resurrection of the old "National Program for
Agricultural Development," first announced on
25 January 1956 and later revised in October 1957.
This program, known also as the "Twelve Year Agri-
cultural Plan for 1956-67," called for sharp
increases in grain yields on a regional basis and
placed the main emphasis for realizing these goals
on improved seed strains, double cropping, and
the development of small-scale irrigation and water
conservation schemes which could be carried out by
local authorities or the farmers themselves. There
is, however, some confusion among peasants as to
the meaning of these new policies, particularly
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since the degree to which present benefits will be
sacrificed in the interest of gaining long-run bene-
fits is not yet clear. The programs now emerging
often mention the year 1975 as the terminal date for
their completion. However, no detailed national
program has as yet been reported.
Current Trends in Food Consumption
11.. Incomplete data indicate that food supplies
through mid-1969 are sufficient in most areas of the
country to maintain per capita consumption at about
2,000 calories per day -- well aL,ove the austere
levels of 1961-62. Preliminary e.timates of the 1969
harvest suggest that this level can be maintained.
12. Sample consumption data also suggest that
there has been a very gradual decline in the per
capita availability of subsidiary foods in the two
years prior to mid-1969. This decline appears to
have been most pronounced in fats and oils, sugar,
pulses, seafood, meat, and dairy products. Although
the reasons for this decline are not entirely clear,
it seems probable that private production of many
of these foods -- which steadily increased in the
1960s -- has leveled off and can no longer provide
an increasing share of per capita intake.
13. in 1969, wheat imports continued to play an
important role in maintaining urban consumption
standards. In September, China negotiated a new
contract with Canada for the purchase of about 2.2
million tons of grain for delivery during the period
October 1969 through September 1970. Deliveries
under this contract in 1969 will bring China's total
grain imports in 1969 to about 5 million tons, com-
pared with 4.4 million tons in 1968, as shown in
the following tabulation:
Million
Million
Year Metric Tons
Year
Metric Tons
1961 5.5
1962 5.0
1963 5.5
1964 6.6
1965 5.9
1966
1967
1968
1969
5.6
4.2
4.4
5.0
a/
a. Preliminary.
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14. Some delays in grain shipments have been
experienced under the French contract which called
for delivery of 800,000 tons of wheat in 1969.
However, these shipments are expected to be com-
pletod by the end of February 1970.
15. Chinese grain imports are unlikely to decline
in 1970. In addition to the recent contract for
Canadian grain, in December 1969 China signed a
contract with Australia for 2.2 million tons of grain
to be delivered between January and September 1970.
World wheat stocks, currently estimated at about
75 million tons (excluding those of the United
States), are at record levels. Thus China faces a
favorable market for further purchases. New con-
tracts with Canada or Australia for delivery in the
fourth quarter of 1970 or new contracts with France
or Argentina could rais< Chinese imports in 1970 to
5 million tons.
16. China's exports of foodstuffs are largely
high-value items -- livestock products, rice, fruit,
and vegetables. Food exports go to Hong Kong, to
the overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia, and
to Japan and Western Europe.
17. Chinese net trade in foodstuffs has remained
moderately favorable; net exports in 1968 probably
were about $115 million, compared with $125 million
in 1967 and $85 million in 1966.* Prospects for 1969
indicate another favorable year, with a slight rise
over 1968 expected. Although exports to Japan appear
to have declined in 1969, they will probably be off-
set by increases to Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.
* Chinese Communist food exports and imports during
1966-68 are as foZZows:
MiZZion US$
Exports
595
505
525
Imports
510
380
410
Net exports
85
125
115
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Conclusions
18. Grain output in 1969 apparently increased
above the level of 1968; whether the harvest reached
the record level of 1967 is unclear. Weather con-
ditions in 1969 were not as good as those of 1967;
however, increased supplies of chemical fertilizer
were available in 1969. The effects of these two
variables on crops in China are difficult to
quantify and thus do not provide a basis for deter-
mining the precise relationship between the harvest
of 1969 and that of 1967. Chinese discussions of
the harvest results in the past three years, how-
ever, suggest that while the 1969 grain crop was
better than that of 1968, it probably did not reach
the 1967 level. This level of food output will
permit maintenance of per capita consumption at
about 2,000 calories per day, but will not provide
either improved levels of consumption or signifi-
cant increases in the availability of raw materials
for industry and export. Chinese imports of ferti-
lizer have continued at about the level of 1968
while the import of grain in 1969 showed a slight
rise. Imports of both grain and fertilizer are
expected to continue at these levels during 1970.
The regime continues to show concern over its
ability to procure and distribute agricultural
products. This may, in part, reflect the increased
consumption requirements generated by the thousands
of newcomers who have moved into the rural areas
during the year.
19. The emergence of an agricultural develop-
ment program patterned after one originally pro-
claimed in 1956-57 has been received with mixed
emotions in the countryside. This program appar-
ently asks the peasant for further sacrifies.
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