NORTH KOREA: SEEKING CHINA'S WESTERN TECHNOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S02113R000100370001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 3, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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' I I
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
03 October 1988
North Korea: Seeking China's Western Technology
Summary
North Korea is working hard to modernize its defense industry and
acquire advanced weapons to counter force improvements in the South.
As in the past, Pyongyang needs its Communist allies for help Moscow
has been the most responsive, but given past Sino-North Korean military
cooperation, the similarities between military inventories in both countries,
and the economic advantages to the North of upgrading existing
equipment with new technology, we believe Beijing is also of key
significance for Pyongyang. China's steady military modernization, using
infusions of Western military technology, has increasingly given it the
capability to offer assistance to the North Koreans--perhaps in part to
offset growing Soviet influence.
even marginal Chinese help could be important. Although Beij
ing
This memorandum was prepared by I Office of East Asian Analysis with
contributions from analysts in the China Division. Information available as of 03 October
1988 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Security and Technology Issues, Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
Copy ' of 65
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probably will refrain from offering sophisticated COCOM-controlled
technology that could provoke a strong reaction from the United States, it
may be less inhibited in transfering noncontrolled technology acquired
from other Western sources.
The North's Search for Military Assistance
Over the years, P'yongyang has received important military assistance from its
allies. Since the mid-1980s it has turned to them for help in modernizing its forces.
Moscow has been the major benefactor; in May 25X1
1985 the Soviets resumed deliveries of major weapons systems to the North--the first
since 1973. Moscow initially provided older technology to improve air defenses,
including a regiment of MIG-23 interceptors--presumably to compensate for US F-16s
ordered by Seoul--and SA-3 and improved SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs),
deployed around P'yongyang. Deliveries of SA-5 long-range SAMs followed, and with
the arrival of SU-25 ground attack fighters in late 1987, the Soviets began delivering
equipment that augments the offensive striking power of the North's ground forces. In
June 1988 the Soviets provided some of their most advanced weaponry, delivering 12
MIG-29s--a formidable fighter that became operational in the USSR only four years ago.
North Korea also has sought technical assistance for its military modernization
effort and here again the Soviets have responded. P'yongyang signed a scientific
cooperation accord with Moscow in October 1985 and concluded a new agreement in
1987. Also in 1987, North Korea signed a science and technology (S&T) agreement with
Bulgaria, according to press reports. The accords will facilitate scientific exchanges, but
P'yongyang may try to use them to gain access to sophisticated Western military
know-how and equipment its allies already have gathered
China was a key supplier of weapons and related technology to North Korea in
the 1960s and 1970s, but it appears to have been less helpful in the 1980s. In fact,
Beijing's assistance may have peaked early in the decade. 25X1
China also helped the North establish a jet fighter factory.
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the consequences of Beijing providing even marginal help,l
makes Chinese aid a critical issue
Beijing may have a larger role than we have heretofore credited in the North's ongoing
military modernization. Most obvious, the two nations remain allies, with a history of
military cooperation dating to the Korean war. Moreover, North Korea--in this area in
particular--has few places to turn to obtain equipment that matches its own or
technology that might be available on the low-budget terms P'yongyang can afford.
From North Korea's vantage, we believe China is an attractive source of military
technology for other reasons as well. Since the 1970s,
China has amassed a substantial inventory of Western military equipment and
production technology, including complete weapon production factories, technical
information to upgrade the capabilities of current weapon systems, and technology that
has both military and civilian applications China has applied this stock
of weapons, production equipment, and know-how to improving a military inventory that
is similar to the North's--providing P'yongyang with obvious incentives to gain access
to these Chinese investments as a cost effective way to upgrade military capabilities as
well as extend the life of older weapon systems.
North in fact sees China as a promising source of technical assistance for militar
The.North Korean press also is playing up closer Chinese-North Korean technological
ties--one obvious sign of the North's priorities. The North Korean media reported last
December that P'yongyang and Beijing had plans to sign a long-range S&T accord. If
consummated, the pact would fit an emerging pattern of North Korean agreements with
Communist allies who operate successful technology acquistion programs.2
2 The delay may turn on what P'yongyang hopes for and what Beiiing is willing to give.
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What Might North Korea want from China?
we believe real military needs would turn P'yongyang toward China for help. The North
is investing its own scarce resources heavily in expanding and improving the military
and in supporting the defense industry, and there are a range of areas in which the
Chinese could provide important aid:
? On the ground, the Chinese have made improvements in armor and mechanized
forces that could boost P' on an 's capabilities.
? On aircraft, the North is working hard to upgrade its firstline fighter
force--mostly F-7s, China's version of the Soviet MIG-21. China's Western
equipment would provide immediate benefits.
? At sea, North Korea is already asking the Chinese for help to upgrade naval
? In its defense industries, Beijing has much technology Pyongyang could use to
upgrade its expanding plants. China's foreign acquisition of dual-use technology
has focused on sophisticated items such as computers, telecommunications,
instrumentation, machine tools, aerospace production equipment and components,
microelectronics, and complex chemicals. In addition to advanced equipment, the
North probably would be interested in specialized military know-how.
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As Moscow delivers newer weapon systems to P'yongyang, the Chinese may see
several potential benefits in providing more assistance to the North Koreans. We believe,
they are concerned about losing their traditionally preeminent political influence in
P'yongyang as well as their role as the North's principal arms supplier, inclining Beijing
to view transfers of military-related technology as one way to maintain--or perhaps
regain--influence with North Korea's leaders. Like apparent motives in Moscow for
providing new hardware, Beijing's transfer of some technology also might serve to
mollify P'yongyang in the face of growing Chinese overtures to Seoul. Finally,
we believe Beijing may view such arrangements as partial
compensation for P'yongyang's value as an intermediary in politically sensitive Chinese
arms sales. Technology transfers would be one way of retaining such middleman
services.
Against these benefits, we expect Beijing would weigh the potential fallout if
Western suppliers detected a diversion of sensitive. military technology. The Chinese
have assured the United States they would not transfer restricted technology, and
Beijing has strong incentives to keep its word. Even so, we believe the Chinese might
consider the transfer of non-US origin technology. While proof that Beijing had
transferred US weapon technology to North Korea could lead Washington to tighten its
controls on technology sales to China, the transfer of sophisticated military technology
Beijing had acquired from other sources might not entail the same apprehension.
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Types of Technology China Could Transfer
China possesses a wide variety of military-related technology developed
indigenously that it would be legally free to transfer, such as Silkworm missiles,
F-8 aircraft, and perhaps turbines or nozzles for use in SCUD missiles. Defense
technology acquired abroad, however, may or may not carry explicit caveats
that specify how the technology is to be used or under what conditions, if any,
it can be transfered to third countries.
On balance, we believe the Chinese would not be averse to transfering some
sensitive technology to North Korea. We doubt Beijing would offer sophisticated
COCOM-controlled technology that could bring a strong reaction from the United States.
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NORTH KOREA: SEEKING CHINA'S WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
DISTRIBUTION:
SENIOR POLICYMAKERS
COPY 1 MICHAEL ARMACOST, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, RM
7240,
COPY 2 DONALD GREGG, ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY, RM 298,
COPY 3 WILLIAM CLARK, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 6205,
COPY 4 HARRY DUNLOP, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS, RM 5313,
COPY 5 ROBERT SUETTINGER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR EAST ASIA
AND PACIFIC, RM 8840,
COPY 6 BILL NEWCOMB, INR/EC/CER, RM 8442,
COPY 7 JOHN MERRILL, INR/EAP, RM 8840,
COPY 8 MARK FITZPATRICK, EAP/K, RM 5313,
COPY 9 PETER ITO, PM/ISP, RM 7424,
COPY 10 JAMES A. KELLY, SPECIAL ASST TO THE PRESIDENT & SR. DIR. FOR
ASIAN AFFAIRS, RM 493,
COPY
COPY
COPY
COPY
11 DR. KARL JACKSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 4E817,
12 RADM TIMOTHY W. WRIGHT, DIRECTOR, EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION,
INT'L SECURITY AFFAIRS, RM 4C839,
13 WALLACE KNOWLES, OASD/1SA/EAPR, RM 4C840,
14 LTC JOE FLANTZ, HQDA (DAMI/F11/NORTHEAST ASIA). RM 2A474
COPY 17 COL. STEVEN DELP, DB-2D, RM C2951,
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AGENCY, RM 4B714,
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COPY 21 NEAL MARCOT, FOREIGN INTELL & SECURITY BR., ITAC/AIA, RM 6S1200,,
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COPY 38 CHIEF, OEA/NEA/DIVISION, RM 6P37,
COPY 39 CHIEF, OEA/CHINA DIVISION, RM 6N25,
COPY 40 CHIEF, OEA/SEA DIVISION, RM 6S47,
COPY 41 CHIEF, OEA/PRODUCTION, RM 6N07,
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