COMMENTS ON OIL FIELD INVASION OF HATFIELD BACKGROUNDER, APRIL 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP07C00121R000700820001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 14, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/08/20:
CIA-RDPO7C00121R000700820001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/08/20:
CIA-RDPO7C00121R000700820001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDPO7C00121R000700820001-2
SECRET
14 May 1980
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Comments on "Oil Field Invasion" of Hatfield
Backgrounder, April 1980
1. At this point, it is not possible to assay the
precise mixture of motives that led the Soviets to invade
Afghanistan. Preservation of a Soviet-dominated, Marxist
regime in Kabul probably was the dominant one, however. It
is less clear that Soviet fear of encirclement, or of the
spread of the Moslem revolt to Soviet Central Asia were
major considerations, although they may have been factored
in by the Soviet leadership. Also, as the Hatfield
Backgrounder suggests, chaotic conditions in Iran--
exacerbated by the hostage crisis--may have made the
Afghanistan invasion look more attractive to the Soviets.
2. We agree with the Hatfield Backgrounder that the
most direct strategic route to the Iranian oil fields leads
from the Soviet Transcaucasus Military District down through
northwestern Iran. The route through Afghanistan is far
longer, presents greater logistical difficulties, and would
require much more regrouping of forces than would the attack
through northwestern Iran.
3. We estimate that, if the Soviets decided on an
invasion of Iran to capture the oilfields, Tehran, and key
terrain on the Persian Gulf, they probably would assemble a
force of at least 20 divisions. A force this size could be
drawn from the central and southern regions of the USSR
without seriously affecting Soviet forces presently assumed
to be designated for use against NATO or the PRC.
4. The Soviets' lodgment in Afghanistan may not lead
directly to Iranian oil but it does bring them a strategic
gain of great importance. From Afghanistan, they are in a
position to threaten the flanks of both Iran and Pakistan--
and India, through Pakistan. In this sense, and in the
sense that from bases in Afghanistan Soviet airpower can
more easily reach the Persian Gulf, the Soviets have come
closer to realizing their ancient goal of dominating the
region.
SR M 80-10071
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDPO7C00121R000700820001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20:
CIA-RDPO7C00121R000700820001-2
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OPA/USSR-EE
Please provide comments on the attached
typescript memo by COB,. 15 May.
Attachment
Chief
Theater Forces Division, OSR
13 May 1980
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20:
CIA-RDPO7C00121R000700820001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20:
CIA-RDPO7C00121R000700820001-2
NIEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, RAD
Please provide comments on the attached
typescript memo by COB, 15 May.
Attachment
Chief
Theater Forces Division, OSR
??
25X1
13 May 1980
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20:
CIA-RDPO7C00121R000700820001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/08/20: DATE
CIA-RDPO7C00121R000700820001-2 y 80
TO:
OSR
25X1
ROOM NO.
3G00
REMARKS:
BUILDING
Sen. Nunn would like our 25X1
assessment of the "Oil Field Invasion"
section of this article from the Hatfield
Newsletter. Nothing lengthy;a few sente
ces on its plausibility would be fine. Yo
probably will want to coordinate with
OPA.
Thanks,
25X1
CSS
eo-,Q4
c8v-rvg.-1,?. (k,
26X1
25X1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for 25X1
!Release 2012/08/20:
CIA-RDPO7C00121R000700820001-2 (47)
FROM:
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDPO7C00121R0_00Z0,282,240c10:2
? The Soviets suffered one of dicated that anv ..._ int:0 1,- 4:4
Jsult in an escalation?
nuclear war. Such a war vvould wave a
wasteland of industrial civilization
Nor is this lack of convent .st
forces, and the attendant dange., of
nuclear war in the region, likely to he
significantly altered even after deploy-
ment of the Rapid Deployment Force
(RDF) by 1985. The conventional man-
power needed for a sustained defense
of Persian Gulf oil could easily require
many times the troop strength
available in the RDF.
Any promise to defend the Per-
sian Gulf region from attack is a
military illusion. In order to defend this
illusion, tie first-use of tactical nuclear
weapons, and the uncertainty that br-
ings for civilized life, will almost cer-
tainly be required. The 31% of our oil
imports that come through the Persian
Gulf represents some 8% of our total
energy consumption. There is no
natural resource precious enough to
this country, particularly a resource
that can be placed with alternatives
and conservation, to justify the
cataclysmic price that will ultimately
be paid for any attempted nuclear
"defense" of the Persian Gulf under
the Carter Doctrine.
,cleSr?that the Soviets were willing trU
take full advantage of this singular
concentration of global interest in
events in Tehran.
Oil Field Invasion
The most serious explanation of
Soviet motives rests in the belief that
the invasion was merely the first step
in an effort to secure the oil fields of
the Middle East, a warm water port in
the Persian Gulf, or both. It is this
danger that largely promoted the
military commitment made under the
Carter Doctrine. But this view of
Soviet intentions ignores some impor-
tant factors. The contention that
Afghanistan was a stepping stone to
the oil fields of Iran, for example, ig-
nores fundamental facts.
The most direct method of secur-
ing Persian Gulf oil would be a Soviet
assault down from its present
southern border with Iran. By the
route, Soviet troops and tanks would
not have to traverse the high mountain
ranges standing between Iran and
Afghanistan. In addition, if the Soviets
were to take over certain oil fields in
the Middle East to "strangle" the
West and help supply their own allies,
they would have to secure and defend
indefinitely 1/4 million square miles of
sea lanes, desert, and air space, as
well as thousands of miles of pipelines
from internal and external attack. The
military demands for an operation of
this size would be far beyond the
capabilities of any country - or group
of countries - on earth. Any constant
military operation of this stature would
also drain resources from other
military theaters around the world,
thus increasing instability in other vital
regions of the globe, such as Europe or
Korea.
Soviet Losses
It now seems clear that the
Soviets have made a profound
mistake in invading Afghanistan.
Consider the Soviet losses:
? Major Soviet military forces are
in its history in an
overwhelming vote in the
United Nations to condemn
the Soviets' action in
Afghanistan.
' This is only a limited list.
Afghanistan is not the Soviet Union's
"Vietnam" in a military sense. The
U.S. lost over 55,000 lives, 303,000
casualties and $150-200 billion in a
decade-long effort to win a war that
was 10,000 miles from its shores.
Afghanistan, by contrast, is a Soviet
border state in which the serious pro-
blems of supply and a well-equipped
indigenous army do not exist. The
Soviets have suffered - and are likely
to continue to suffer - serious military
setbacks in Afghanistan. However,
these failures cannot hope to match
the conflagration that was Vietnam.
Afghanistan may well be
however, the political "Vietnam" of
the Soviet Union. Following the inva-
sion, the loss of Soviet prestige
throughout the world, even among na-
tions which have traditionally defend-
ed their actions, was dramatic and in-
disputable.
Nuclear Weapons: The
Threshold of World War
The greatest danger of the Carter
Doctrine lies in its dependency on
nuclear weapons.
There are no major indigenous ar-
mies in the Persian Gulf-Southwest
Asia region. This is an historically uni-
que circumstance in areas of the world
where substantial U.S.-Soviet com-
petition has occurred. During the past
30 years of the Cold War, U.S. and
Soviet interests have been largely
fought with the aid of proxy armies
with major conventional strength.
When conflict arose between
Israel and Arab nations in the Middle
East, the war was waged with Soviet
vs. U.S. weapons. The Israeli victories
were seen by many defense
specialists as not just a victory for that
nation, but also a triumph of U.S.
military technology over that of the
Soviets. In Europe and Southeast Asia
and elswehere throughout the Cold
-6-
? ?1
Options: The
Roads Not Taken
The projected five-year, $1 trillion
in military spending sanctified by the
Carter Doctrine will most probably ag-
gravate, not solve, the problems that
confront us. It is an exercise in self-
delusion to believe that increases in
U.S. weaponry - no matter how large-
or crescendos of talk - no matter how
tough - could have prevented the
Soviets from their actions in
Afghanistan. The U.S. enjoyed a vir-
tual nuclear monopoly in 1956 and un-
questioned strategic superiority in
1968. Yet this clear advantage did not
have a noticeable effect on the Soviet
military action against Hungary and
Czechoslovakia in those years. The
forces likely to drive the Soviets out of
Afghanistan are across-the-board
economic sanctions and a growing
".4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDPO7C00121R000700820001-2