MOSCOW'S REACTION TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S 1 OCTOBER TV ADDRESS ON THE ISSUE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA HAS BEEN RELATIVELY RESTRAINED AND BALANCED.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T01849R000200090045-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: October 3, 1979
• Content Type: MISC

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USSR - CUBA - U, S.
FBIS TRENDS
3 OCTOBER 1979
Moscow's reaction to President Carter's 1 October TV
address on the issue of Soviet combat troops in Cuba
has been relatively restrained and balanced. In the
only substantial treatment thus far, a TASS account
issued on the 2d was predictably critical of the
military measures the President announced but went to
some length to play up his appeal in behalf of SALT II.
This treatment contrasts with the sharper reaction to
the President's remarks on the troop issue in Queens
the previous week, which had drawn the first Soviet
criticism of the President personally since the issue
arose. An authoritative assessmer:t of the current
state of Soviet-U.S. relations may be forthcoming when
Brezhnev makes his scheduled speech in East Germany
this weekend.
Havana wasted little time in issuing its own direct
indictment in a GRANMA editorial on the 3d which
criticized the speech as contradictory and ambiguous.
Ticking off the military measures announced by the
President, GRANMA assailed the presence of U.S. forces
in Guantanamo in traditional rhetoric, mentioning
without comment Washington press reports that the
United States will soon deploy 1,500 Marines to the
base "as part of the Caribbean maneuvers." GRANMA saw
the maneuvers and other measures as an attempt to
intimidate the "revolutionary" countries in the
Caribbean and Central America. It branded his state-
ments on the Soviet troop presence as half-truths, in
effect shutting the door President Castro had left ajar
a few days earlier when he had said the President
could extricate himself from the situation by "telling
the truth." Apparently stung by the President's
remarks in Queens, Castro had broken his silence on
the issue in two interviews with American newsmen in
which he refused to "lower" himself by explaining Cuba's
military installations and regretted having to conclude
that President Carter had "not been honest."
MOSCOW REACTS TO PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS ON USSR TROOPS IN CUBA
Following brief initial reports on President Carter's address, Moscow
issued its only substantial account in a Washington-datelined TASS
report on the 2d that was disseminated to both domestic and foreign
audiences. The TASS account balanced criticism of the President for
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3 OCTOBER 1979
endorsement of his appeal for nuclear arms control and specifically
ratification of SALT II. Moscow's guarded approach was reflected
in remarks by Brezhnev to visiting Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis
on the 2d. After stressing the importance of European efforts
toward achieving detente, according to TASS, Brezhnev took note
of recent developments "causing grave alarm" that made imperative
further efforts by all states to promote detente and arms control.
The TASS account of the President's address carefully skirted
sensitive issues such as increased surveillance of Soviet activity
in Cuba, the 1962 understanding, and recent Soviet assurances,
while taking note of those military measures--a permanent Caribbean
task force, increased military maneuvers, and an enhanced rapid
deployment capability--of the type Moscow normally exploits to
denigrate U.S. policies.
TASS went to some length to replay the President's appeal on SALT II.
Thus, after citing the President as saying the Soviet troop issue
is no reason for a return to the cold war, TASS quoted the passage
from the early part of the speech on the U.S.-Soviet relationship and
the two countries' shared interests in nuclear arms control, and it
juxtaposed to this his call in the concluding section for ratifica-
tion of SALT II. The account ended by citing the President's remarks
on the dangers of playing politics with these basic issues of national
security and arms control.
TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT Less than a week before the President's
speech, Moscow had sharply attacked him
personally for his remarks on Cuba and the Soviet Union at a town
meeting in Queens on 25 September. Moscow previously had carefully
refrained from associating the President by name with the "campaign"
over the Soviet troop issue and had ignored his 7 September statement
in which the President said the "status quo is not acceptable."
The strong criticism came on the 27th--the day Secretary Vance and
Foreign Minister Gromyko held their second meeting in New York--
in back-to-back items: a widely broadcast commentary by TASS
political observer Goncharov and a TASS dispatch from New York,
published in PRAVDA the next day.
Goncharov complained that President Carter's remarks contained
"unfounded and crude attacks" on Cuban policy and a "demand in an
ultimatum-like tone" that the status quo be changed. Noting that
the President at the same time expressed the intention to keep U.S.
troops and military bases in "close proximity" to Soviet borders,
Goncharev characterized this approach as "unlawful" and "inconsistent."
The even more caustic TASS account of the President's remarks
complained that he "resorted to a number of rude and tactless
sortie-" against Cuba and warned his audience "in a threatening tone"
that the United States could take some action to change the situation.
TASS added briefly that after all "these fabrications, attacks, and
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3 OCTOBER 1979
threats" the President, in a later speech, called on the Senate to
ratify the SALT II treaty and not play politics with the nuclear
arsenal.
The criticism was echoed the following day, when TASS Director General
Losev, in an English-language broadcast, said the President's
language "sounded like an ultimatum." But by the 29th, after the
announcement of the upcoming television. address, Moscow shifted
attention away from the President and began publiciz:,*ng remarks and
views of Vice President Mondale, Senator Byrd, George Ball, and
various groups decrying any linkage between the Cuban problem and
SALT ratification. PRAVDA's weekly international review on the
30th suggested Soviet cooperativeness--on SALT--and rigidity--on
Cuba: The Soviet Union has never refused to take into consideration
the national interests of its partners for negotiations, PRAVDA
said, and Soviet policy in detente and curbing the arms race is
based on principles of "reciprocity, observance of equal security
of the sides, and consideration of their legitimate interests."
However, it cautioned, "attempts at dictating" norms of inter-
national conduct to the USSR on the plea of the principle of
reciprocity are "obviously without prospect."
HAVANA ASSAILS PRESIDENT FOR "HALF-TRUTHS,' "INCONSISTENCIES"
A stinging response to the President was issued by the Cuban party
daily GRANMA in an editorial on the 3d, broadcast in full by Havana
radio in view of "the importance of the article." GRANMA said that
while the President had "pulled back cautiously" from his previous
statements on the length of time the military installation has
existed in Cuba, he failed to make the "pertinent conclusions" and
resorted to "half-truths which are also falsehoods." The editorial
called the President's statements "profoundly contradictory": on
the one hand, he affirms that the current problem does not warrant
a return to the cold war, but on the other hand, he adopts cold
war measures. GRANMA contrasted the President's "dramatic" appeal
for the ratification of SALT II--which the paper said had been
jeopardized by President Carter himself--with the military measures
outlined in his 1 October speech, saying these measures constituted
"a policy of blackmail., pressure, and threats of power in open
antagonism of world peace."
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The initial Cuban reaction came in a short PRENSA LATINA report--
four hours before Moscow's first mention of the speech--which
highlighted the President's "admission" that the Soviet "training
center" poses no threat to the United States. Subsequently,
Cuban media have provided fairly detailed accounts of the President's
remarks relating to Cuba. GRANMA, as reported by Havana's
international service on the 2d, noted that the President "reported
on his talks with the Soviet Government"--an aspect ignored by
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FBIS TRENDS
3 OCTOBER 1979
TASS--and cited him as saying the Soviet "replies" were "significant"
but that several measures would be taken. Like GRANMA, Havana's
domestic service enumerated the measures, and both reports noted
the President's remark that the controversy does not justify a
return to the cold war and cited him as urging the Senate to ratify
the SALT II treaty.
CASTRO INTERVIEWS Prompted by President Carter's remarks in
Queens, in which he called Cuba "in effect a
puppet" of the Soviet Union, President Fidel Castro responded sharply
in a press conference on the 28th followed by an interview with CBS'
Dan Rather on. the 30th--his first public statements on the Soviet
troop issue. Havana's domestic service on the 30th carried a recording
of the press conference, and the interview with Rather was televised
for Cuban viewers on 1 October.
In rejecting the U.S. charges, Castro asserted that Soviet military
"personnel" were in Cuba to train Cuban troops, that what the United
States called a "brigade" was "in fact a training center," and that
there had been "absolutely no change" in this "facility," which
he said had been established following the Cuban missile crisis in
October 1962 in conformance with U.S.-Soviet agreements. Castro
stressed, however, that since Cuba was not bound by the 1962
U.S.-Soviet understandings, he felt no obligation to justify the
Soviet presence in Cuba or to explain Cuba's military facilities
or defense to the United States. As usual, Castro pointed to the
U.S. base at Guantanamo to support his argument that the United
States has "no legal or moral right" to question any Soviet military
presence in Cuba.
While Havana in the past had generally avoided direct criticism of
President Carter, Castro labeled as "dishonest, insincere, and
immoral" what he termed attempts by the President to portray Cuba
and the Soviet Union as taking "some new and irresponsible steps"
to change the status quo. He called it "inconceivable" that
President Carter--"unlike previous U.S. presidents from Kennedy to
Ford"--could have been unaware of the existence of the "training
center." Despite his criticism, Castro portrayed President Carter
as a victim of "bad information" and suggested that the President
could extricate himself from the situation by "telling the truth."
Like Moscow, Castro contended that the issue had been contrived
in an effort to discredit Cuba during the nonalined summit conference
in Havana last month. And in what amounted to a reverse linkage,
Castro also suggested that the Carter Administration was now trying
to use the SALT II treaty to "make demands on Cuba."
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3 OCTOBER 1979
LIMITED PRC REACTION TO PRESIDENTS SPEECH ON USSR BRIGADE
Chinese attention to the President's address has thus far been
limited to brief, straightforward reports on the speech's main
points and on steps taken to increase the U.S. troop presence at
Guantanamo. With an eye toward SALT II treaty ratification
prospects, XINHUA on 3 October briefly summarized both favorable
and unfavorable Senate reaction to the speech.
Beijing had given considerable play to the Soviet brigade issue
prior to the President's address, portraying the unit's presence
in Cuba as a clear Soviet challenge to U.S. interests and depicting
the Administration as vacillating in the face of Soviet intransi-
gence on the issue. Chinese treatment of this issue has paralleled
that of previous instances of what Beijing has characterized as
weak Administration responses to Soviet tests of American resolve,
most notably over the neutron bomb deployment issue and over
conclusion of the SALT II treaty itself.
Initial Chinese comment, carried in RENMIN RIBAO on 4 September,
had suggested that the Administration, beset with domestic economic
difficulties and concerned about the SALT II debate in the Senate,
was adopting a "low-key" approach toward a new "test" of the
Administration's firmness in dealing with Moscow. Subsequently,
a XINHUA commentary on 16 September characterized talks between
Secretary Vance and Soviet Ambassador Dobryinin as a facesaving
device for the Administration to evade the consequences of its
earlier statements on the unacceptability of the brigade's presence
in Cuba. Shortly before the President's address, XINHUA on the
28th reported that Secretary Vance's talks with Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko had produced no sign of Soviet flexibility on the
issue, but noted that the President had pledged to change the
status quo on the issue; XINHUA predicted, in a separate dispatch,
that the success of the President's efforts to promote ratification
of the SALT II treaty would depend on his subsequent handling of
the Soviet brigade affair.
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3 OCTOBER 1979
USSR-CHINA
MOSCOW MARKS PRC ANNIVERSARY IN STANDARD FASHION
With the delegations to the Sino-Soviet political
negotiations having opened "preliminary" meetings,
Moscow's guarded approach to the prospect of
better relations was reflected in its observance
of the PRC's 30th anniversary on 1 October. The
Soviet greeting message and other formalities
accorded with established practice in recent years,
and Soviet commentary on the occasion followed
standard lines in recalling the importance of
Sino-Soviet cooperation in earlier days while
deploring changes in Chinese policies since the
late 1950's.
Following the format used over the past decade, Moscow sent a
state-to-state greeting message, which contained expressions of
goodwill toward the "Chinese people" and reaffirmations of Soviet
intent to pursue improved bilateral relations on the basis of
the principles of peaceful coexistence. Typically, in enumerating
those principles, the message included nonuse of force, an element
that is not a part of Beijing's standard version and has been a
subject of contention in recent years.
Commentary on the anniversary, including articles in PRAVDA,
IZVESTIYA, and the academic quarterly PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST, has
essentially adhered to the line taken in recent years. Thus, a
1 October PRAVDA article, by I. Lebedev, played up the Soviet role
in the Chinese revolution and the early development of the PRC and
deplored the sharp turn in Chinese policies in the late 50's when
Mao Zedong's nationalistic faction set out on a great-power,
"hegemonistic" course hostile to the Soviet Union. The article
recited a series of Soviet proposals over 15 years for improving
bilateral relations, proposals to which Beijing's response has
been "invariably negative." The article concluded by noting the
opening of negotiations in Moscow, but it made the outcome
contingent on a change in the Chinese approach.
Moscow has taken only tentative note of the changes in Chinese
policies being adopted by the post-Mao leadership, though these
changes to a large extent mean the repudiation of many of the
Maoist policies that Moscow has castigated. Thus, PRAVDA observed
that it "is now starting to be said in China" that 20 years have
been wasted in the country's development because of Maoist policies,
but the article offered no suggestion that this reassessment
might augur a more propitious setting for Sino-Soviet relations.
This issue was addressed in an editorial article in the latest
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FRIS TRENDS
3 OCTOBER 1979
issue of PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST (No. 3, signed to press
31 August), an academic journal where a more forthcoming Soviet
assessment of Chinese developments might be signaled. The
article acknowledged that Mao's successors had shifted the
focus of internal policy from ideological revivalism to economic
development, but it complained that this shift was still sub-
ordinate to "militarist" and "hegemonistic" foreign policy goals
and hence inconsistent with China's genuine interests. Moreover,
the article stressed that the new leaders had made no change in
the anti-Soviet, militaristic course established by Mao.
Consequently, the "international progressive community" has no
doubt that present-day China is a "dangerous instigator of world
war."
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3 OCTOBER 1979
KOREA-VIETNAM-CHINA
CHINESE TROUBLES WITH DPRK. SRV REFLECTED ON ANNIVERSARY
The PRC 30th anniversary on 1 October has provided a
measure of Beijing's troubles with its Asian communist
neighbors. As`ro be expected, the event received only
the barest min observance by Hanoi, which
reciprocated Bei'ng's move a year ago by removing
party ties from its greeting message. Pyongyang's
treatment of the anniversary, while correct in form,
reflected the curre\t cooling trend that may derive
from differences of 4ttitude toward the U.S. presence
in East Asia.
PYONGYANG There have been no clear indications of what issues
may underlie the six-month-long cooling trend in
DPRK-PRC relations, but the question of U.S. troops in Korea appears
to be a source of contention. Last month the Chinese editorial on
DPRK national day failed to cal for the withdrawal of U.S. forces.*
The 1 October NODONG SINMUN edit rial on PRC national day recalled
Chinese support for Korea but fai ed to claim Chinese backing for a
U.S. pullout, as editorials on this anniversary in 1977 and 1978
had done. And for the first time since 1973, NODONG SINMUN failed
to characterize Chinese backing as 4 source of encouragement or
inspiration to the Korean struggle.`
In line with this more subdued approach, the NODONG SINMUN editorial
seemed to play down China's overall itn ortance. Unlike editorials
on this anniversary in recent years, this time the editorial omitted
any reference to the importance of Korean-Chinese friendship for the
situation in Asia, and it failed to mak6 the usual claim that
Chinese successes encourage the "world p`eople." NODONG SINMUN may
even have been diminishing the significance of the Chinese revolution
by reviving a Kim 11-song quotation, last', used in an anniversary
editorial in 1971, which ranks the Chines revolution second in
significance behind the Great October Revc\lution.
Signs of apparent cooling in relations appeared throughout Pyongyang's
treatment of the anniversary, many of them similar to those that
appeared on the same occasion in 1977, whe Sino-Korean relations
also seemed troubled. The Korean leadershi turnout at the PRC
ambassador's reception in Pyongyang on 1 Oc ober was higher than
usual--appropriate for a decennial--but the rank of the Korean
speaker at the event, a Political Committee candidate member, was
below the norm. From 1970-78 full members illed that role, except
* See the TRENDS of 12 September 1979, pages 16-17.
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