CUBA: SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T01849R000100030037-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: September 26, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIAIAPPR 221-78
INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL
CUBA:
SOVIET MILITARY ACT1IVITIES(U)
75
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National Security Information
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Intelligence
Appraisal
SOVIET
MILITARY
ACTIVITIES (U)
This is a Department of Defense publication produced by the
Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Directorate for Production
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CUBA: SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES (U)
Summary
(S SPOKE/NOFORN) The Soviets' operation of the Torrens electronics
facility, arms deliveries to Havana, and naval deployments to Cuba demon-
strate the USSR's interest in Cuba as well as in the Western Hemisphere.
Since the latter half of 1977, there have been alleged Soviet ground forces
in the country, unidentified construction near Cienfuegos, and an increase
in the number of Soviet pilots in Cuba. While these activities may cause
concern over the Soviet military presence in Cuba, they do not seem at the
present time to constitute a direct challenge to US interests.
Discussion
(S/NOFORN) Through its relations with Cuba, the USSR has established a
foothold in the Western Hemisphere, a forward listening post for Soviet
intelligence, and a base for Soviet naval and air deployments. About 2,000
Soviet military personnel in Cuba are believed to be advisers, instructors,
and technicians providing continuous support to the Cuban Armed Forces.
Some 200 Soviet advisers are assigned to the Ministry of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces. It is quite likely that most of the remaining Soviet military
personnel are associated with complex weapons systems, such as surface-
to-air missiles, MIG aircraft, and the STYX missiles. In addition to the
military personnel, there are an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 Soviet civilian
technicians in Cuba.
Lourdes Military Headquarters
(S/NOFORN) Lourdes Military Headquarters at Torrens, nine miles south-
southwest of Havana, is in charge of the 2,000-man Soviet military mission
in Cuba. It is also the site of a large, Soviet-operated electronics facility
that provides the USSR with excellent access to the US electronics
environment.
(TS UMBRA) The SIGINT facility at Torrens is administered by the Main
Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet General Staff. GRU SIGINT
assets at the site, evidently supplemented by a Soviet-tailored Cuban
SIGINT operation, most likely provide the USSR with information on US
forces and support strategic warning. Additionally, the Torrens complex
has the capability to track and collect telemetry from either Soviet or US
satellites, and has long-range, high-frequency communications to the South
Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and most of Africa. Electronics targeting has been
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directed against the National Emergency Airborne Command Post, Stra-
tegic Air Command (SAC) reconnaissance, SAC-North American Air
Defense exercises, CINCLANT communications, and US naval and airborne
activities in the Atlantic. Additionally, installations as far away as the
Philippines, Alaska, and West Germany have been targets.
(TS RUFF) The equipment at Torrens includes an SDR-2 BAR BRICK
electronic countermeasures (ECM) collector, BOX BRICK ECM collector,
two FIX-24 direction finders, a modified FIX-24 direction finder, two five-
meter mobile antennas, two SQUARE PAIR radars, an END TRAY radar, a
12-meter ORBITA, a seven-meter MARS satellite associated antenna, and
an additional probable telemetry antenna.
Soviet Ground Forces
(S SPOKE) Limited SIGINT from July 1977 to September 1978 suggests
that Soviet military units of undetermined size were involved on six oc-
casions in small-scale training in Cuba. There is no collateral information
or PHOTINT available that would further explain the activity. These six
suspected exercises involved the following possible units:
--On 21 Jul 77, two units conducted various tank maneuvers.
-- A motorized rifle unit and a tank unit were involved in a field
training exercise on 6 Sep 77.
-- On 28 Feb 78, a motorized rifle company and three platoons
staged an exercise.
-- Three motorized infantry companies and a tank company par-
ticipated in tactical training activity on 14 Mar 78.
-- On 17 Aug 78, a motorized rifle unit conducted a field training
exercise.
--On 12 Sep 78, unidentified elements were active.
(S SPOKE) There are several possible explanations for these exercises.
Since the Soviet electronics facility at Torrens requires a large number of
security personnel, some of them may have been participating in periodic
proficiency training. It is also possible that specially trained Soviet in-
structors were demonstrating new equipment. Soviet troops could also
have been acquiring semitropical training or evaluating the performance of
weapons, materiel, and equipment in this type of environment. Soviet
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advisers, on the other hand, may have been working with undetected Cuban
units. In view of Cuban-Soviet cooperation in Africa, it is also possible
that the Soviets were conducting exercises to familiarize themselves with
Cuban operation procedures.
Soviet Pilots
(S SPOKE) In December 1977, the number of Soviet pilots operating in
Cuba significantly increased to 24. Previously, about three Soviet pilots
operated there, presumably in a liaison capacity. The current contingent
has been involved in normal operational activities, including airfield and
zonal training, ground-controlled intercept, navigational training penetra-
tion exercises, and mock combat. No Soviet pilots have been noted par-
ticipating in the air intercept of foreign aircraft that have violated Cuban
airspace. They have probably been precluded from such activities in order
to prevent the possibility of an international incident.
(S SPOKE) The Cuban Air Force has 191 operational MIG-15/FAGOTS,
MIG-17/FRESCOs, MIG-21/FISHBEDs, and MIG-23/FLOGGERs, but only
about 135 fighter pilots. The Soviet pilots are believed to have been sent
to Cuba to maintain the operational strength of the Cuban Air Force and to
provide filler personnel for the Cuban pilots in Ethiopia. The Soviets are
flying Cuban planes from the island's regular operating bases and are
operating within the administrative structure of Cuban squadrons. While
the number of Soviets and their aircraft assignments have changed slightly
each month, the number of Soviet pilots in Cuba flying the FRESCOs and
FISHBEDs has generally corresponded to that of Cubans flying these
aircraft in Ethiopia.
(S SPOKE) A previous augmentation took place during the first half of
1976. At that time, 20 Soviet pilots were assigned to Cuba when the first
contingent of Cuban pilots was sent to Angola. Eventually, the Cuban Air
Force was able to get its own replacements, and the Soviets returned home.
The only significant difference in assignments of Soviets to Cuba in the last
three years is that in 1976 the ground controllers were Soviets and this year
they have been Cubans who speak Russian.
(S SPOKE) Although the Soviet pilots in Cuba have routinely flown the
FRESCO and FISHBED, two pilots were detected in early June flying the
newly delivered FLOGGER. Since then, the Cubans have been the sole
pilots of this aircraft. The number of Soviet pilots operating in Cuba
increased early this year, but began to decline in May; there were 38 in
April and 28 in August. Since no Cuban pilots are believed to have returned
from Ethiopia, Soviet pilot activity in Cuba will probably continue. Unless
additional Cuban pilots are assigned overseas, however, the number of
Soviet pilots in Cuba should not increase significantly.
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Naval and Air Deployments to Cuba
(S/NOFORN) The USSR has continued to conduct naval and naval air
deployments to Cuba. In the past year, there have been three naval de-
ployments and a total of 19 since they were begun in 1969. The 17th de-
ployment, which took place between December 1977 and January 1978,
involved two destroyers, a conventionally powered attack submarine, and an
oiler. In addition to port visits to Havana and Cienfuegos, the task group
made two operational transits of the Gulf of Mexico and conducted an
antisubmarine warfare exercise.
(S/NOFORN) The 18th deployment was in Cuban waters from March to May
1978. The task group was composed of a guided-missile destroyer, a
minesweeper, and a replenishment oiler. The Soviets made an operational
transit of the Gulf of Mexico and conducted an antiair warfare exercise with
the Cubans.
(S/NOFORN) The 19th deployment, comprised of a guided-missile
destroyer, two guided-missile frigates, a conventionally powered attack
submarine and a replenishment oiler,arrived in Havana harbor on 16 Sep 78.
(U) Since the deployments began, 10 operational transits have been into the
Gulf of Mexico to demonstrate the Soviet capability to carry out operations
in waters contiguous to the US, to monitor US reaction to the Soviet
presence, and to respond to US naval operations in the Black Sea. The
deployments to Cuba afford the Soviets open-ocean training opportunities
and demonstrate their support of the Castro government and interest in
Latin America. Additionally, the USSR may believe that through these
operations the West will become less sensitive to the Soviet naval presence
in the area.
(C/NOFORN) Since 1970, there have been 45 deployments of Soviet BEAR
Ds to Cuba. These aircraft operate in pairs and the deployments have often
been associated with NATO and Soviet exercises, the transit of Soviet or US
ships, and increased international tensions, such as the Angolan Civil War
and the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict.
(C/NOFORN) Between 1970 and 1974, the number of BEAR D deployments
to Cuba fluctuated between two and four each year; this number increased
to five in 1975, six in 1976, nine last year, and nine thus far in 1978.
(S/NOFORN) From mid-1973 until mid-1977, BEAR D aircraft conducted
periodic South Atlantic maritime reconnaissance missions out of Conakry,
Guinea. Since the Guinean Government denied the Soviets access for BEAR
D deployments in mir-1977, 3EARs deploying to Angola have used Cuba as a
stopover point. If the Angolan deployments are discounted, there were only
six BEAR D operations to Cuba in 1977 and five thus far this year.
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(S/NOFORN) While assigned to Cuba, BEAR D aircraft conduct reconnais-
sance over the Atlantic and along the US east coast. Most of these flights
involve routes over 100 nautical miles from shore; in April 1977, however,
BEAR Ds monitoring a US naval exercise flew within 75 nautical miles of
the coast of the Carolinas.
(C/NOFORN) A number of Soviet interests are served by the BEAR D
flights. While the aircraft are in the vicinity of Western naval ships, they
make possible crew and sensor operator training. In addition, they permit
observation and collection against Western ships and aircraft and to some
degree against shore facilities. They also test the response of Western
defense forces to the presence of Soviet aircraft.
Cienfuegos Construction
(TS RUFF) Since September 1977, construction activity has been under way
at Punta Movida, a small peninsula in the southeast area of Cienfuegos
Harbor. This remote part of the harbor is almost opposite the commercial
port. The two most prominent construction features are a 200-meter pier,
which was begun in December 1977, and extensive land clearing, most of
which has been done since 1 January.
(TS RUFF) The Punta Movida construction is about 750 meters southeast of
Cayo Alcatraz Island where, in 1970, the Soviets built an administration
building, two barracks, two messhalls, three support buildings, extensive
athletic and recreational facilities, and a small boat pier. It was first
thought that the new 200-meter pier at Punta Movida, along with the Cayo
Alcatraz complex, could provide an out-of-area support facility for visiting
Soviet naval combatants. As construction progressed, however, several
other uses have been considered. The Cubans may be building a depot for
weapons delivery and export, a refinery/POL storage facility, or a nuclear
powerplant.
(TS RUFF) Based on similar characteristics of the pier under construction
and the main pier serving the La Habana Petroleum Refinery and Storage
Area -- Cuba's largest refinery -- it is probable that a refinery/POL storage
facility is being built. Both piers have breasting platforms and a wide root
that narrows just beyond the shoreline. Recent photographs indicate that
the initial laying of pipe along the pier has begun. Although there is no
evidence that an associated tank farm is being constructed, the ap-
proximately 1.5 square kilometers of recently cleared area would provide
ample space for it. Additionally, the Cubans may construct the pier first in
order to use it for handling the equipment and materials needed to complete
the remainder of the facility.
(TS RUFF) The possible use of the facility as a refinery and for POL storage
would not preclude visiting Soviet naval combatants from occasionally
docking at the pier for short periods.
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Military Equipment Deliveries
(S/NOFORN) During the last three years, Cuba has received nearly $100
million worth of arms annually, and this year's figure may exceed that
amount. Total military aid to Cuba since 1960 is about $1.5 billion. Moscow
usually provides Havana with second-line military equipment, but the Cubans
have recently received some first-line weapons that have been in the Soviet
inventory for several years.
(TS RUFF) The shipment of FLOGGERs, apparently in May, was the most
significant delivery to date. Twelve crates were observed; six aircraft were
uncrated and five are thought to be probable ground-attack FLOGGER Fs
and one a FLOGGER C trainer. The Cubans already have FRESCOs and
FISHBEDs, which are ground-attack capable, but the FLOGGER F is
specifically designed for this mission and can therefore carry a greater
payload and has an increased combat radius. The addition of FLOGGERs has
modernized the Cuban forces, improved the military's sense of pro-
fessionalism, enabled the Cubans to perform better missions, and possibly
served as a reward for overseas military participation.
Outlook
(S SPOKE/NOFORN) The Soviet military presence in Cuba is not expected
to increase significantly in the near future. While arms deliveries to Havana
will probably continue at the current high level, the increasing proficiency
of the Cuban military will quite likely preclude a large increase in the
number of Soviet advisers. In addition, the level of Soviet aircraft de-
ployments to Cuba is not likely to increase and Soviet ground forces in the
country will not pose a threat to the US in the near future. (Recipients are
advised that decompartmentation o and derived information
is not authorized)
USN, DB-5D
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