NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300890002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 27, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04: CIA-RDP05SO2029R000300890002-5
Directorate of
Intelligence
Tt
Top vv Sc c~
Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
27 February 1987
Copy 19 8
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Near East and
South Asia Review 25X1
Israel's longstanding, strong ties to South Africa have become the
subject of an increasingly bitter domestic debate because of
heightened US and international condemnation of apartheid and
mounting pressure to restrict strategic trade with Pretoria. Most
Israeli policymakers advocate a wait-and-see policy.
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The Afghan resistance has mounted prolonged sieges against some
regime garrisons-primarily in eastern Afghanistan-with limited
success. The insurgent sieges have seldom caused significant
casualties or damage, and relatively few aircraft have been shot
down even though most garrisons depend heavily on air resupply.
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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views.
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February l987
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Israel: Debating Relations
With South Africa
Israel's longstanding, strong ties to South Africa have
become the subject of an increasingly bitter domestic
debate because of heightened US and international
condemnation of apartheid and mounting pressure to
restrict strategic trade with Pretoria. Some Israelis
argue that ties should be cut back now to avoid
growing friction with Washington and key West
European states. Most Israeli policymakers, however,
advocate a wait-and-see policy, arguing that calls for
cutting ties to Pretoria are premature.
Nevertheless, Israeli leaders are acutely sensitive to
US concerns and are particularly interested in a US
study to be presented to Congress about the
international arms trade with South Africa. The
Israeli Foreign Ministry is particularly worried that
the study will single out Israel as a major sanction
violator, and this could lead to growing friction in its
relations with Washington.
The Internal Debate
An increasingly bitter debate has emerged within
Israel over its policy toward South Africa. Foreign
Ministry Director General Yossi Beilin has become
the leading advocate of a broad reduction in Israel's
ties to Pretoria. Beilin is concerned about the US
report and its possibly negative impact on US-Israeli
ties. He also argues that Israel has a moral obligation
to demonstrate its repugnance to apartheid. He
believes Israel should significantly reduce ties now
before US pressure forces a major policy shift.
Beilin, however, has been unable to garner enough
support to implement this strategy-largely because
of opposition from Israeli military leaders. Tellingly,
he failed to prevent Israel's Tourism Minister
Avraham Sharir from traveling to South Africa in
early February on a mission to increase tourist links
between the two countries. In late January, Beilin
admitted to US Embassy officials that he could not
muster the necessary political support to overturn
current Israeli policy toward Pretoria. Israeli
proponents of close ties to South Africa argue that
lucrative economic benefits and concern for the well-
being of the Jewish community there militate against
a cutback in the relationship.
The US Embassy in Tel Aviv reports that Prime
Minister Shamir, Foreign Minister Peres, and
Defense Minister Rabin-who was instrumental in
establishing the close security links that now exist
between Tel Aviv and Pretoria-recently decided to
leave relations largely intact. Peres told US officials
that Israel was searching for ways to extricate itself
from past commitments and other ties. He admitted,
however, that change would not be easy to agree
upon, and specific actions would be difficult to
implement. The recent veto of proposed UN sanctions
against South Africa by the United States and the
United Kingdom may have bolstered Israel's decision
not to take unilateral action soon.
Nevertheless, Shamir, Peres, and Rabin believe Israel
should take its cue from the United States and other
Western democracies. They probably recognize that
mounting US and international pressure against
South Africa leaves Tel Aviv no choice but to put
distance between itself and Pretoria.
Longstanding Lucrative Ties
Israeli-South African ties have grown over the past
generation to such an extent that they form a complex
economic, military, and cultural network. South
Africa's 120,000-strong Jewish community, often
Top Secret
NESA NESAR 87-006C
21 February
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cited by Israeli leaders as the cornerstone of their
desire to maintain strong ties to Pretoria, invest
heavily-and tax free-in Israel.
Defense Minister Rabin probably sees Israel's
relationship with South Africa as securing an
important market for defense-related products. He
forged a strong military assistance relationship with
Pretoria shortly after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
Israeli sales to South Africa in the mid-1970s were
extensive, including patrol boats, missiles, drones, and
large quantities of small arms and ammunition.
But Overall Trade Still Strong
Despite this evidence of decreased interaction,
Israeli-South African commercial ties remain strong.
Israel continues to import South African coal,
aluminum, steel, copper, diamonds, textiles, and
agricultural equipment.
Perhaps even more important, Israeli assistance and
technology have been crucial to South Africa's
success in developing and modifying a number of
weapon systems. Israeli-supplied technology-
unavailable from other sources-enabled South
Africa to modernize its fleet of Chieftain tanks and to
upgrade its Mirage fighter aircraft.
These exports are equally important for Israel. Rapid
growth in recent years has forced Israel's defense
industries to seek outside markets. The Israel Defense
Forces no longer purchase enough goods to keep the
defense sector profitable. In addition, the National
Unity government's austerity program has provided
less money for research and development, causing the
defense firms to look elsewhere for funding. Few
markets are available to Israeli products-
particularly major defense-related items-and states
like South Africa, willing to do business with Tel
Aviv, are highly valued. South African firms also are
ideal partners for joint ventures. They often have
better financial backing than their Israeli
counterparts, meet Israel's unsually stringent security
requirements, and are considered by Israel to be
technologically capable.
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security. Recent reductions in Israeli travel to South 25X1
Africa and fewer contacts in military trade suggest
that Israel has begun implementing both strategies.
South African technicians and scientists probably are
gaining expertise in avionics and aircraft manufacture
by participating in Israel's Lavi fighter program,
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The debate within Israel is likely to continue to be
dominated by military-industrial proponents of the
relationship, who by far outnumber foreign affairs
experts like Beilin who want to reduce ties. Until Tel
Aviv's South Africa connection begins to detract from
other important Israeli interests-such as relations
with the United States and Western Europe or arms
sales-Israel is unlikely to change its policies
significantly.
Prospects
Tel Aviv almost certainly will attempt to preserve
existing economic and military links by reducing the
visibility of these ties and by improving already tight
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Afghanistan: The War
Against the Garrisons
The Afghan resistance has mounted prolonged sieges
against some regime garrisons-primarily in eastern
Afghanistan-with limited success. The garrisons
range in size from several hundred to 3,000 troops,
have fortified artillery and infantry positions, and are
protected by extensive minefields. Typically,
resistance forces-numbering between 500 and 2,000
insurgents-attempt to isolate the post from ground
and aerial resupply. The insurgents mount artillery
and mortar attacks, with occasional assaults against
isolated outposts. The insurgent sieges have seldom
caused significant casualties or damage, and
relatively few aircraft have been shot down even
though most garrisons depend heavily on air resupply.
Barikowt: A Typical Insurgent Siege
The nearly three-year-old blockade of the regime
garrison at Barikowt in Konarha Province is typical of
a prolonged insurgent siege. The 55th Infantry
Regiment-with about 500 troops-subordinate to
the 9th Infantry Division is garrisoned at Barikowt in
the deep, narrow Konar Valley near the Pakistani
border, The garrison
was esta is e in e ear y T9NUs, probably to block
insurgent infiltration routes from Pakistan.
Insurgents-mostly from the Hezbi-Islami
(Gulbuddin) group-quickly surrounded the post,
and pressure on
Barikowt has prompted periodic strenous Soviet and
regime efforts to prevent the garrison's destruction.
Pluses and Minuses
In our view, the siege of Barikowt points up the
advantages and disadvantages to the resistance of
such tactics. On the plus side, the resistance has kept
the garrison bottled up and prevented it from blocking
insurgent supply lines. Kabul, which clearly wants to
keep the garrison open if only to avoid the humiliation
of a retreat, is forced to devote considerable resources
to resupply and reinforce the post.
To maintain the siege, the resistance uses significant
amounts of manpower that might be employed more
productively in other areas or in activities such as
convoy attacks. In addition, substantial amounts of
ammunition are consumed in attacks that probably 25X1
cause few casualties or damage. 25X1
cause high insurgent casualties.
A more aggressive prosecution of sieges involving
direct attacks aimed at capturing large posts would
provide political and military payoffs for the
insurgents, but serious risks are involved. Capture of a
major regime post such as Barikowt or Khowst would
be a major boost to insurgent morale and would
provide a significant public relations victory. Direct 25X1
attacks on the garrisons, however, would probably
result in high casualties because of the extensive
minefields and superior firepower of regime garrisons.
Even if the guerrillas could seize a garrison, we
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attempt to hold the captured post would be a serious
mistake, allowing the Soviets to use their control of 25X1
the air to maximize their firepower advantage and
efore the assault, resistance forces
performed reconnaissance and intelligence missions to
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NESA NESAR 87-006C
27 February 1987
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the following regime
garrisons are surrounded by the resistance:
? The 55th Infantry Regiment at Barikowt in
Konarha Province, manned by several hundred
regime troops, has been under heavy insurgent
pressure for three years. We believe it depends
totally on aerial resupply.
? The 25th Infantry Division at Khowst in Paktia
Province numbers from 3,500 to 7,000 troops and
also depends totally on aerial resupply. This unit is
frequently under insurgent attack.
Insurgent forces frequently initiate harassing
artillery and mortar attacks against several Soviet
and regime garrisons in the Panjsher Valley that also
depend to some extent on aerial resupply. These
garrisons are not under constant pressure. They
include:
? Regime Infantry Regiment at Peshghowr.
? Regime Infantry Unit at Tahana.
? Regime Infantry Regiment at Barak.
? Afghan Infantry Regiment at Bazarak.
? Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment at Rokha.
There are two isolated regime/Soviet garrison areas
? Several regime units in northern Paktia Province
are under constant pressure and depend mostly on
aerial resupply, although some truck convoys have
succeeded in reaching them. These units are the 8th
Border Brigade at Hesarke Pain, with
approximately 250 to 500 men, and the Ali Kheyl
garrison, containing two infantry regiments of the
12th Infantry Division from Gardeyz, with a
combined strength of about 750 to 1,000 troops.
identify the garrison's minefields and weak points.
Detailed planning preceded the operation, and the
insurgents received careful training. The garrison was
overrun in a few days. Insurgent forces quickly
abandoned the post after capturing large amounts of
military equipment and supplies. The speed of the
nighttime assault, the absence of Soviet advisers at
Farkhar, and the inflexible regime command and
control structure prevented air support from aiding
the garrison
Impact of Air Defense Weapons
We believe the air defense equipment now used by
insurgents around major besieged garrisons makes
resupply difficult but not impossible.
in the Hazarehjat area that,
appear to be surrounded and under
occasional insurgent pressure. They are:
? Chakhcharan Airfield in Ghowr Province, which
houses a reinforced motorized rifle battalion and a
battalion-size regime unit.
? Bamian Airfield in Bamian Province, which
contains two Soviet airborne companies and a
regime regiment.
The acquisition of improved air defense equipment-
especially advanced surface-to-air missiles-by
insurgents engaged in a siege would enable them to
tighten their grip on regime garrisons and make
resupply efforts more costly. Sophisticated surface-to-
air missiles enable the resistance to retain its mobility
and give it the capability to engage aircraft.
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Outlook
Insurgent successes against Farkhar and Nahrin as
well as numerous recent successful assaults against
battalion-size regime posts in Nangarhar, Paktia, and
Qandahar Provinces suggest that parts of the
resistance may be moving away from prolonged sieges
toward attacks aimed at quickly overrunning smaller
posts, seizing equipment, and withdrawing. These
efforts offer the highest payoff for the guerrillas, in
our view, enabling them most easily to demonstrate
the weaknesses of Kabul's army, replenish their stocks
with captured equipment, reduce regime threats to
insurgent base camps and supply routes, and boost
resistance morale.
Insurgent forces have successfully assaulted regime
border battalions-which usually number 100 to 250
men-at posts in Nangarhar and Qandahar
Provinces, and there are numerous similar targets
throughout northern Afghanistan, especially in
Takhar and Badakhshan Provinces. Most of these
posts are isolated in mountainous terrain, at least
partly dependent on aerial resupply, and vulnerable to
insurgent pressure. These units include the border
battalions located throughout the eastern, southern,
and western borders as well as several regime
garrisons in Badakhshan Province.
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