NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300820002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 29, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of 4 A,. Top Seeret
intelligence
Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
29 August 1986
Top Secret
NE.SA NE.SAR Rh-02OCX
August
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Near East and
South Asia Review
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The growth in political and economic ties between Libya and Sudan
since the fall of President Nimeiri in April 1985 has been erratic,
hampered by Libya's irrational behavior in Sudan and Khartoum's
misgivings about Libya. However, as long as Khartoum faces civil
war and economic depression, the Libyan connection will be
attractive.
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Egypt is an increasingly significant drug-consuming country and an
important transit point for narcotics moving west from the Golden
Triangle and Golden Crescent. Although Egypt's antinarcotics
effort has had only limited success in its first year, Cairo probably
remains committed to an aggressive antidrug program.
Combat activity remained at fairly high levels through July as
Soviet and Afghan regime forces continued to mount large
operations east of Kunduz and in the Shekhabad area between
Kabul and Ghazni. Urban fighting continued heavy in Herat and
Kabul with an increase in resistance-initiated activity noted.
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views.
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NESA NESAR 86-020CX
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Libyan Aid to Sudan:
Now You See It
The growth in political and economic ties between
Libya and Sudan since the fall of President Nimeiri in
April 1985 has been erratic, hampered by Libya's
irrational behavior in Sudan and Khartoum's
misgivings about Libya. Nevertheless, as other
foreign aid donors have become increasingly reluctant
to support Sudan, due in part to the Sudanese
Government's foot-dragging in dealing with its
economic problems, Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi
has continued to look for means to attract Libyan
assistance.
Although Libya supplied Sudan with a large amount
of aid, much more has been promised than given.
Food. Following the coup in 1985, Libya quickly
promised large amounts of food to the drought-
stricken western provinces of Sudan. Large quantities
of sorghum, powdered milk, wheat, and other goods
were sent to the Darfur and Kordofan regions for
distribution. The Libyans were initially welcomed as
providers of aid to drought victims. Libya insisted on
distributing the food directly to the people, raising
fears in Khartoum that the Libyans would win the
loyalty of the population of the western provinces.
These fears proved largely unfounded.
Military Assistance. Food, the initial focus, soon gave
way to military assistance as the government faced an
expanding insurgency in the south and was in
desperate need of military supplies. Military
assistance, by far the largest portion of Libyan aid, is
also the category with the most unfulfilled promises.
Oil. Libya has been supplying oil to Sudan gratis
since the fall of Nimeiri. At least 300,000 metric tons,
worth approximately $60 million, have arrived in
Sudan since April 1985. Libya recently informed
Sudan, however, that it will no longer supply oil free
of charge. The US Embassy in Khartoum reports
Sudan is asking the Libyans to seek compensation
from the resources of Sudanese nationals working in 25X1
Libya-taking a share of their savings before the 25X1
money is transferred to Sudan. 25X1
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Other Aid. Most of what had been promised has not
been delivered. Promised items include agricultural
goods, medical supplies, student exchange programs,
and agreements to share technical expertise in the
Libyan Aims
Libya's involvement in Chad is one of the main
reasons Tripoli is courting Sudan so aggressively and
focusing on western Sudan. Since November 1985,
Libya has supported a large contingent of troops and
other personnel in Sudan's western province of
Darfur, claiming it needs the approximately 250 large
trucks, 54 smaller vehicles, and approximately 1,000
to 1,500 Libyans (mostly military and aid personnel)
to guard the food aid being brought in. Sudanese
officials have not been permitted to inspect the
contents of the vehicles. The trucks are suspected of
carrying military equipment for the Chadian rebels.
Another incentive for Libya lies in the possibility of
influencing both foreign and domestic Sudanese
policy. Sudanese officials have stated that they voted
according to Libyan demands at last year's
Organization of African Trade Unity conference
because Libya paid their conference dues and
provided other support.
to the Umma Party in the hope that, if
Sadiq a -Mahdi and his party won, he would steer
Sudan away from its close ties to Egypt and perhaps
move closer to Libya. In Tripoli's view, Libyan
support may also deter Sadiq al-Mahdi from taking a
strong stand against Libyan meddling in Khartoum as
well as in the western provinces. Libyan cultural
centers, for example, are being started to spread
Qadhafi's revolutionary doctrines in Sudan.
Sudan's Strategy
Insurgent successes in southern Sudan initially drove
the Transitional Military Council to seek military aid
from any source. Libya was the most generous.
Fearing a coup attempt because of the extremely low
morale in the Army,
the Council brought Libya in as a short-
term answer to the problem. A positive effect was seen
immediately as Libya began supplying needed
equipment and ammunition to the Army.
without coming under Libya's control.
Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi almost certainly sees
ties to Libya as an aid to controlling the southern
insurgency, but he also may be turning to Libya to
shift Sudanese foreign policy toward nonalignment.
Conscious that he may be charged with surrendering
to Libyan pressure, the Prime Minister will argue to
Western aid donors that the recent departure of
Libyan personnel from western Sudan proves that he
can use the Libyan connection to Sudan's advantage
Outlook
Khartoum probably hopes to maintain and even
expand trade relations with Libya. Numerous trade
agreements have been signed between the two
countries. Libya, though suspect in its promises,
probably will continue to deliver some oil and military
equipment. With limited export markets for its
products, Sudan is always open to new opportunities
to sell or barter its goods
The recent departure of the large contingent of
Libyans may have eased the anti-Libyan tensions in
Sudan that have become stronger because of Libya's
actions in the west and toward Sudan's foreign
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community. As long as Khartoum is mired in civil war
and deep economic depression, the Libyan connection
will most likely be attractive to the Sudanese
Government. If other donors continue to limit their
aid commitments to Khartoum, the opportunity for
Libya to expand its influence within Sudan will grow.
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Egypt:
Facing the Drug Threat
Egypt is an increasingly significant drug-consuming
country and an important transit point for narcotics
moving west from the Golden Triangle and Golden
Crescent
gyptian domestic drug use is tra itiona
endemic, and increasing, according to Egyptian
antinarcotics program officials. Their estimates-
probably conservative-suggest that more than 1
million Egyptians regularly use hashish (derived from
cannabis), and another 500,000 are regular users of
opium, usually taken in hot tea. Although both of
these products are probably grown in adequate
amounts locally to satisfy domestic demand, Cairo
notes a rising urban abuser population that is buying
increasing amounts of imported refined narcotics and
amphetamines.
Egypt has an active antinarcotics program, utilizing
sophisticated drug interdiction techniques, severe
penalties for drug abuse, and advanced training
abroad for antinarcotics officials. Nevertheless
estimate that at
least 300 tons of hashish and 12 tons of opium were
smuggled into Egypt in 1985. Est' natesF_
this summer suggest that in 1986
opium cultivation has increased slightly, heroin use is
only minimally down over last year, and for the first
time cocaine abuse is increasing at a measurable rate.
Fighting Drugs' Debilitating Influences
Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak began restricting
drug trafficking last fall to reduce the debilitating
influence of the growing narcotics trade on the
national economy and state security.
The responsibility for Egypt's antidrug effort is split
between two powerful ministries, Interior and 25X1
Defense. Interior's Antinarcotics General 25X6
Administration ostensibly has responsibility for
coordinating the overall program and a specific
mandate for enforcing antinarcotics laws in the urban
areas of the country. The Ministry of Defense directs
more than 17,000 men divided between the Coast
Guard and Border Guard and has the primary
responsibility for interdiction on the high seas and on
Egypt's borders.
The two programs are in direct competition for scarce
monetary and personnel resources. Efforts to create a
national narcotics coordinating body earlier this year
were apparently sabotaged by the Interior and
Defense Ministers, both of whom believed they would
lose personal prestige and bureaucratic power if their
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antidrug duties were b r the control of '25X1
higher body. rou ht u 25X6 25X1
We believe Mubarak-who has received disturbing
reports from Egyptian security officials-fears that
domestic dissident groups and antiregime elements
rely on narcotics trafficking for significant financial
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In our judgment, Cairo fears that drug traffickers are
creating dangerous international ties and are growing
increasingly autonomous. By transshipping large
amounts of drugs from heroin- and hashish-producing
regions elsewhere in the Middle East to consumers in
the West, traffickers have forged strong links to
criminal groups outside the country. The large
amounts of money involved in this trade and the
widespread foreign connections necessary to handle
illegal drugs have put local Egyptian traffickers in
contact with international terrorist organizations,
syndicated crime, and, ironically, Islamic
Harsh Measures Against Drug Traffickers
Cairo is attempting to break drug trafficker-criminal
networks with a multifaceted program of better
narcotics interdiction, stricter enforcement, stringent
punishment for narcotics traffickers and abusers, and
a national public awareness effort. Beginning last
October, according to US Embassy officials in Cairo,
Egypt began a well-publicized national antinarcotics
campaign that has involved the national media and
the major political opposition groups. Last spring,
Mubarak announced plans for a national narcotics
coordination council, which has yet to be instituted.
The call for tougher enforcement was supported by an
announcement that anyone in possession of even a
modest amount of heroin or hashish would face the
well, according to US Embassy accounts
death penalty. Recently, US-style laws regarding
seizure of assets and property have been introduced as
A prime feature of Cairo's antinarcotics initiative has
been a new willingness to cooperate with international
efforts to apprehend and prosecute drug traffickers. A
top spokesman for the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, for
example, told visiting US officials earlier this year
that the antinarcotics campaign is a model for
bilateral cooperation and an example of "symmetry of
goals" between the two countries. The spokesman
noted that Cairo's support for an international
convention against narcotics was virtually identical to
the US stand on the issue, and that Egypt was
grateful for US backing in its effort to be a candidate
for a seat on the UN Commission for Narcotic Drugs.
Egypt has used antinarcotics cooperation as an opener
Egyptian Interior Minister Maj. Gen. Zaki Badr-
who has major responsibility for the national
antinarcotics program-told the Cairo press in June
that Egypt and Italy would explore ways to cooperate
in reducing drug traffic between the two countries
and would devise a system to share strategic
antinarcotics information. We believe Cairo is
committed to these cooperative efforts and values the
opportunity to appear as an equal player in
international events as much as the contribution they
make in reducing drug trafficking in the region.
Pulling in the Mullahs:
An Islamic Response to Drugs
We believe Mubarak is sensitive to opposition charges
that his administration is too secular and
insufficiently committed to basic Islamic goals, and
he has turned to the government's antinarcotics
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program as a convenient means to boost his Muslim
credentials. Mubarak's initial media appearances
emphasized the immorality of drug use, tied narcotics
to the corrupting influences of the West, and
identified abusers as being under the effect of "new
wealth." Major papers carried editorials lauding the
government for its new initiative, singled out
Mubarak as the prime mover behind the program,
and highlighted colorful accounts of an imam leading
an enraged crowd of Cairenes in an attack on a local
drug dealer.
According to press accounts, Mubarak has been
successful in finding respected Egyptian legal scholars
to support his Islamic approach to the antinarcotics
campaign. Within a month of the announcement of
the program last fall, Cairo dailies carried large
numbers of articles by leading Muslim judges from
around the country endorsing the need to hang
traffickers, citing justifications from Koranic
commentaries. Cairo's largest daily, al-Ahram, ran a
weeklong series of items last October summarizing
studies done for the World Health Organization by
leading Egyptian doctors and theologians on using the
influence of the mosque in preventing and treating
drug abuse.
Outlook and Opportunities for the United States
Although Cairo is well into the first year of its
aggressive antinarcotics effort, there are signs that the
program has flaws Mubarak may be unable-or
unwilling-to remedy:
? Corruption is endemic in the Egyptian bureaucracy.
For drug traffickers to move the volume of narcotics
through the country that Cairo has claimed, dealers
must pay officials at each level, yet this problem is
not addressed in the current offensive.
? Although at least 28 traffickers have been sentenced
to death, none has been executed. This, and the fact
that most of the condemned are foreigners rather
than Egyptian nationals, may suggest that Cairo is
unwilling to follow through on promises of thorough
investigations and severe punishments. 25X1
Nevertheless, Egypt is publicly committed to
eradicating drug abuse and trafficking and therefore
is a potentially valuable partner for cooperative US
antinarcotics programs in the region. Although
President Mubarak's personal commitment to
antidrug efforts may be tempered by his need to avoid
antagonizing politically important segments of 25X1
society, leading Egyptian officials have told US
representatives that Mubarak values US involvement
in the country's antinarcotics efforts and the
opportunity it affords him to demonstrate publicly
its overall foreign policy strategy. 25X1
keep antinarcotics cooperation as a rominent art of
Washington's support for his government
Although Egypt's antinarcotics effort has had only
limited success in its first year, Cairo probably
remains committed to an aggressive antidrug
program. We believe Mubarak receives enough
political benefit from the generally popular program
to maintain his identification with the effort, at least
for the foreseeable future. Cairo will, in our
judgment, continue to seek opportunities to publicize
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Afghanistan in July
Combat activity remained at fairly high levels
through July as Soviet and Afghan regime forces
continued to mount large operations east of Kunduz
and in the Shekhabad area between Kabul and
Ghazni. Soviet and Afghan regime forces tightened
their grip around Qandahar by establishing over a
dozen new posts around the city. Urban fighting
continued heavy in Herat and Kabul with an increase
in resistance-initiated activity noted. Afghan Army
manpower and equipment problems show no signs of
being solved in the near future, and the regime
initiated a special revolutionary tribunal that
sentenced prominent insurgent leaders to death for
"crimes against the government."
is p ase was a major logistic operation designed to
reinforce and resupply regime garrisons that were
critically low on food, fuel, and ammunition,
according to satellite photography
the garrisons in
Kunduz and Badakhshan Provinces were "starving"
suffering food shortages and can no longer depend on
local food supplies because Soviet retaliatory bombing
has ruined agricultural production in Kunduz
Province
Regime Tightens Its Grip on Qandahar
Soviet and Afghan regime forces tightened their hold
on Qandahar during July after the completion of a
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over a dozen major mountaintop 25X1
outposts manne by Soviet and Afghan regime forces
have been established northwest, west, south, and
southeast of Qandahar City, which now is encircled
by over 60 security outposts. These posts have slowed
insurgent infiltration to a trickle, have made it
difficult for the insurgents to receive material and
financial support from within the city, and have
placed a major obstacle in the path of important
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insurgent supply routes. 25X1
The insurgent supply system originating in Qandahar
also has taken a beating recently.
Oproregime militia leader Ismatullah has
been recruiting men in the past few weeks to secure a
70-kilometer stretch of highway east of Qandahar on
the Qandahar-Qalat highway, which will further
disrupt already tenuous supply routes. Soviet and
Afghan regime forces launched a major sweep and
mining operation near the Pakistani border and closed
an imnortant resistance sunnlv route-
linsurgent
groups are moving from vehicles to camels to avoid
interdiction, but this mode of transport will add to the
time and expense of insurgent logistics in the area.
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Heavy Urban Fighting Continues
Fighting in the Kabul area increased in the last month
as US Embassy sources reported daily occurrences of
unexplained explosions, gunfire, and outgoing
artillery fire. The US Embassy reports insurgents
launched a two-hour coordinated rocket and small-
arms attack against the Soviet Embassy and its
environs on 16 July, demonstrating the resistance's
ability to occasionally put even the most secure
facilities under military pressure. Resistance rocket
attacks against Soviet installations at Khair Khana
and Darulaman continued into late July and early
August, according to the US Embassy. US Embassy
sources indicate insurgent forces recently overran five
or six Soviet and Afghan regime posts in the Paghman
area, resulting in strenuous counterefforts to dislodge
the resistance.
Heavy fighting continued in Herat through most of
July as major elements of a Soviet motorized rifle
division and local regime units reinforced by units
outside the province attempted to clear the city of
insurgents. Soviet and Afghan regime forces
apparently had secured the city by the fourth week in
July when Soviet units were noted returning to
garrison and Afghan party chief Najibullah visited
Increased Insurgent Activity
An increase in insurgent-initiated activity was noted
during July with a larger number of convoy ambushes
and facility attacks noted.
Afghan Army Manpower and Equipment
Problems Continue
Despite tough new draft laws and increased regime
efforts at conscription, the Army has made no
progress in resolving its serious manpower shortage.
The problem may be insoluble. The US Embassy
reports that armed conscription teams have patrolled
Kabul since the mid-June draft decree to round up
every available young man. The new recruitment
regulations are designed to provide 19,500 men for
three new infantry divisions to be formed by October
1986, These manpower
goals, however, are excessively optimistic, and
Najibullah, in a speech to the regime women's
organization, admitted that the callup is "not working
well," and that dissensions are continuing.
The Army continued to have equipment problems
during the past month. Air Force pilots are refusing to
fly SU-22 aircraft because there have been several
crashes that they believe are the result of faulty
design. Although the problem probably is the result of
a lack of pilot experience, the incident illustrates the
lack of confidence regime pilots have for Soviet
Tried in Absentia
The latest development in Najibullah's get-tough
policy toward the insurgency is the convening of a
special revolutionary tribunal that has tried in
absentia and sentenced to death several prominent
insurgent commanders, including Ahmad Shah
Masood, Ismail Khan, and Jalaluddin Haqqani. For
months the regime has tried in vain to secure a cease-
fire with Masood, and this latest action may be
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designed not only to force these insurgents to consider
a cease-fire but also to intimidate other insurgent
commanders to seek an accommodation with the
regime.
Outlook
Soviet and Afghan regime forces probably will
maintain their siege of Qandahar City, making it
increasingly difficult, but not impossible, for the
insurgents to conduct operations there. Most Soviet
and Afghan operations nationwide will continue to be
small, local operations, but the pattern of large
operations launched about every month and using
airborne troops and a heavy emphasis on artillery
probably will continue. Regime attempts to solve the
Army's manpower problem probably are doomed to
failure.
The resistance almost certainly will not enjoy the
unrestricted freedom of movement and administrative
control in Qandahar City that they have had in the
past, although Qandahar will continue to be the scene
of heavy fighting for the foreseeable future. Although
the resistance has not scored dramatic victories over
the past month, the current pattern of steady,
unending, guerrilla pressure will continue to
undermine regime efforts to control the country.
Insurgent logistics will continue to be problematic,
especially for those supplies originating from the
Qandahar area, with deliveries of supplies taking
longer and costine more as-, . is seek to avoid
interdiction.
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