SHAYKH FADLALLAH DISCUSSES RELIGIOUS STIFE, FOREIGN INTERVENTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05-01507R000100050009-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: December 8, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

~/Q p Declassif d and Approved ForiRelease 2012/03/16: CIA-RDP05-01507R000100050009-1 4V*-0
WS-NEA-85-015
31 JANUARY 1985
SHAYKH FADLALLAH DISCUSSES RELIGIOUS STRIFE, FOREIGN INTERVENTION
London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 87, 8 Dec 84 pp 23-2244F/DLC
/Interview with Shayk Muhammad Husayn Fadlalla , Shi'ite leader, by Amal
Yusuf: "Shaykh Fadlal h to AL-TADAMU : Al-Asad Supports al-Naqurah Negotia-
tions To Give Lebanon Chance To Try Its Luck With Israel"; date and place not
specified/
/Text/ Beirut--Since Hizballah /God's Party/ announced it was responsible for
blowing up the barracks of the U.S. Marines and the French paratroopers in
Beirut's suburbs last year, the world press has focused its lights on Shaykh
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah on the grounds that he is this party's chairman and
spiritual leader even though Shyakh Fadlallah has denied this in more than one
interview, though he admits that he knows the party chairman and has a connec-
tion with its leadership.
One of the qualities of thE_s_cholarly shaykh is that he is one of the most
enthusiastic Shi'ite advocates of renouncing sectarian jingoism an of strength-
ening the bond of Islamic unity. He has biting criticism against the excesses
that occur in Beirut and that affect some of its Sunni inhabitants.
AL-TADAMUN has had the following interview with Shaykh Fadlallah:
/Question/ You have visited Damascus and met with Syrian President Hafiz
al-Asad. What has he told you regarding Lebanon's future?
/Answer/ The fact is that I did not discuss this issue with him directly or
in detail. But I talked with him about the Israeli position in Lebanon,
including the Israeli occupation and domination, and the political and economic
situation in Lebanon which is embodied in the political alliances that are
entrenching their relations with the sects and with some of the country's
political establishments. In my discussion with the president, I focused on
our past rejection of the 17 May 1983 accord and our rejection o t e curren
negotiations on the group s a they represent a form of recognition o the
Israeli presence In e anon through t Fie security arrangements. rest ent
-
I sae on
al-Mad was in total harmony wit what
this
issue. We also discussed
the need to establish balance between the Muslims
and
Christians to avert
any
political flaw in Lebanon because we believe that
the
sectarian domination
existing in Lebanon can create for us problems similar to/ the problem that
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a 40
situation in al-Kharrub as a time bomb with which it will try to rekindle the
sectarian war once again in this region which lies on the borders of the
southern region.
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has existed in the past 10 years and which has claimed many victims. Therefore,
we believe that the presence of a balanced regime in this country will make
all the citizens feel that the regime belongs to them and not to any single
faction and that there is no discrimination at the level of services. This
will realize for Lebanon stability and the continuation of this coexistence
between the Muslims and the Christians.
President Hafiz al-Asad emphaiszed this point in a fundamental manner. I also
felt his strong interest in preventing a security eruption, especially in
Beirut. I-asked him to intervene with all his strength to stop some factions
that try to detonate the Lebanese arena, especially Beirut, in order to under-
line political or propaganda positions. We noticed in the discussion with the
president that he is interested in the future of Lebanon on the basis that
Lebanon constitutes an important position for Syria, especially in terms of
Syria's security and policy.
/Question/ Did President al-Asad express understanding toward your rejection
of the negotiations despite Syria's position of obvious support for them?
/Answer/ It seems from the president's statements that his support for the
negotiations is in harmony with the position of Lebanon, which has wished to
try its luck with Israel. This support is not based on the belief that these
negotiations are the only means through which positive results can be achieved
on the issue of liberating the south.
The Syrian president believes that Israel is trying to manipulate numerous
political circumstances to achieve political and security gains. We believe
that Israel is trying to play the game of acceptance of peace and of calling
for peace and negotiations in order to underline its image as a peaceful state
in world public opinion. It puts obstalces in the path of peace while trying
to insinuate that the others block peace so that it may emerge before the world
as the victimized country fearing for its security. It thus makes an advance
political step toward its future schemes.
/Question/ You met with Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban, the head of the Unification
Movement, during the visit he made to Beirut. At the time, reports were leaked
to the effect that disagreement in viewpoints surfaced when the issue of
establishing a grouping encompassing all the Islamic movements in the Lebanese
arena was discussed. Is what was leaked at the time true?
/Answer/ The truth is that there is no disagreement in viewpoints on the idea
of projecting Islam to the people the way they feel it should be projected.
Islam is not just a sectarian box like the other sectarian boxes. Rather,
Islam repesents an intellectual method of life which the others can discuss
the way they discuss the other intellectual methods that comprise lines of
action, lines of legislation and lines of movement in life. In this respect,
there is no disagreement whatsoever between us. There is disagreement on some
of the means or some of the isntruments to crystallize the idea. I believe
that there are objective conditions that prevent transforming Lebanon into an
Islamic country. One of these conditions is the conviction of the people who
live in this country regarding this method because no people can be ruled by
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force and no idea can be imposed on them coercively. We believe that the way
to achieve results is persuasion with all means, as the Marxist thought and
others do. The advocate of an idea must not project directly his idea in
arenas that need preparation. It is essential that the minds of the Muslims
and the Christians be open to this thought. Let us being with dialogue on it
because Islam is living in a climate of fanaticism and of sectarianism and
oneupmanship, exactly as Christianity used to do. I feel that there will be
no problem when the dialogue begins and when the Muslims and the Christians
realize that there is more than one issue on which they meet at the moral
level. At the level of the Islamic movements, there is a degree of unity on
the ground in more than one aspect., As for unity in the acknowledged technical
sense, i.e. political unity, its prerequisites and conditions do not exist yet.
/Question/ Was Shaykh Sha'ban's visit for the purpose of forming an Islamic
front?
/Answer/ No, it was a visit to Beirut to explore the atmosphere because he
had heard that there was disagreement between the Sunna and the Shi'a which
could develop into a difficult case. However, he found out that these are
mere rumors. It is true that there are sensitivities and problems but they
have not reached the point of danger yet. Sectarianism is a reality but for
this reality to turn into a complex, then this is serious. Islam is like the
other concepts. We notice, for example, that Marxism in China is understood
differently and that some of its characteristics are different from Marxism
in the Soviet Union. Some of the characteristics of Marxism in Europe differ
from those of Marxism in the Soviet Union.
The difference of sects is not a problem. The problem lies in exploiting
sectarianism to erect barriers between the Muslims so that we may separate
them from each other psychologically, politically and socially. In a lecture
I delivered at the al-Magasid Association, I called for mixed socieites, i.e.
for marriages between the Sunni and the Shi'i so that they may discover the
spheres of agreement between them. The /current/ situation has not emanated
from the presence of sectarian differences but from the exploitation of
sectarianism by some political leaders to achieve their aspiration to divide
the people. Sectarian rancors did not exist in the past. Sunni Muslims are
present in al-Silm Quarter and in Burj al-Barajinah and the Shi'ites are
present in Beirut and the two sides coexist without any problem. But the
political game has sought to create in society a problem of Sunni and Shi'i.
So how does it go about creating it?
After 6 February and as a: result of the armed Shi'ite presence, through the
Amal Movement and through, Hizballah, and of the armed Druze presence, the
Sunna began to feel weak, considering that they have no armed organization,
because of the flaw in the balance. Since then, this imbalance has been
manipulated.
/Question/ There is a general impression that you are the spiritual leader of
Hizballah, despite your denial and your statement that there is no organizational
relationship that binds you to this party?
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/Answer/ From the outset, I have not worked and I will not work with anybody
in an organizational form. However, this impression emanates from the fact
that most of the youth, not only the youth in Hizballah and in the Amal Move-
ment but also the unafiliated youth, have grown up with my lectures and have
been influenced by the atmosphere I create. If I were operating orgnization-
ally, why would I deny it?
I operate in the general Islamic arena, trying to criticize, warn and intervene
in some cases, whether in Amal, in Hizballah or in the other parties. I
operate not only at the level of Lebanon and the Islamic arena. I also have
relations with Muslim students in Europe, India and the United States.
/Question/ What about your recent meeting with representatives of the Lebanese
Communist Party?
/Answer/ The meeting was held at their request to talk to me about some nega-
tive acts committed by a number of faithful who work in the arena against the
Lebanese Communist Party. The dialogue was frank. I expressed some observations
on their method of work and we talked about some common problems in the arena
and about some issues that may be viewed as common, even if temporarily.
/Question/ Some accuse you of violence and radicalism and others describe you
as a flexible man who is in favor of dialogue. What is your comment?
/Answer/ I am not a radical. I am a committed man and a man of thou ht.
Radicalism is for a man to exceed natural and civi ized means in an attempt to
crystallize a thought. I believe in the prophet's words "God is gentle and
loves gentleness and He gives in gentleness what He does not give in violence."
I believe that man must win friends-over to his thought and his causes. This
can only be done with persuasion, not with pressure. We do not believe in
violence as a principle and we liken violence to?a surgery. But it is not
natural for one to wish somebody peace when this somebody is directing a
bullet at his heart or trying to crush him.
/Question/ You have strongly criticized the loss of security in Beirut. Are
there practical steps to solve this problem?
/Answer/ We have tried to pressure the parties we can pressure. I believe
that the loss of security is subject to the premeditated political scheme and
the scheme for sedition in Lebanon. Nobody can solve it. 'I:t is difficult to
talk about solving the problem of West Beirut in isolation from the problem of
Lebanon as a whole. The loss of security is not a normal condtion generated
by the Lebanese sedition but a condition emanating from a political decision
made by those who created the Lebanese sedition.
/Question/ You call for boycotting the United States when Lebanon is a con-
suming country. Can Lebanon respond to this call under this circumstance?
/Answer/ The fact is that I have not called for a total boycott of the United
States because Lebanon cannot boycott the major powers that have the industry.
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I call for boycotting the United States economically. Instead of shouting a
fhousan times ea to erica,'- let us stop smoking American cigarettes.
Instead of importing American goods, let us import European goods. It is true
that Europe agrees with the United States but the United States is now the
biggest and strongest ally of Israel. My purpose behind the boycott is to
develop a popular condition, i.e. to have the people express their rejection
of all the forces that put pressure on them by boycotting these forces where
it hurts them because our /present/ method of confrontation is villification,
vituperation or the blowing up of embassies. I believe that this may create
a negative morale condition in the United States or elsewhere. But boycotting
the United States economically causes it greater harm.
/Question/ You have mentioned recently that the international red lines
obstruct any movement to solve the Lebanese crisis. What do you mean by the
red lines?
/Answer/ From my watching the developments of international politics, I have
noticed that the Lebanese sedition was born on the peripheries of the Palestinian
problem. Consequently, this crisis is intended to be a pressuring card within
the framework of the Palestinian problem. We have also noticed that the
Lebanese sedition did not end with the departure of the Palestinians, as a
military and a political force, from Beirut. This is why several cards continue
to be held by the international camps which can play their cards in Lebanon.
For example, one of the issues existing at the Israeli and international levels
is the issue of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. We do not expect this
occupation to end quickly. The reason is that Israel does not want to stay in
Lebanon. It recognizes Lebanon's international borders but it is occupying
the south so that it may be a pressuring card for absorbing and then annexing r/
the West Bank and Gaza to Israel. As for the United States, the initiative it
has presented needs the Lebanese card in order to exert pressure on Syria so
as to involve it in the U.S. solution. Thus, we find that Lebanon is an arena
that is still likely to touch off more than one issue in the interest of the
U.S. and Israeli solutions. I believe that the Israelis and Americans will
not let go of any card that achieves for them strategic or tactical political,
gains. The security plan and the negotiations are not the other face of the
solution because the solution is being concocted behind the scenes. The plan
and the negotiations are only intended to preoccupy the people and to make
them imagine that something will be achieved so that the people may not reach
the phase of fatal despair that motivates them to destroy the equations.
The cabinet is for manna ing, but no solvin the crisis and the negotiations
are not the means for the withdrawal. These neogitations are a sup -cia-r'
production covering the secret negotiations going on at more than one level.
/Question/ How do you assess the Soviet role in terms of support for the
Lebanese issue and the Middle East issues?
/Answer/ Insofar as the Soviets are concerned, we appreciate the general
slogans they raise for the liberation of peoples. But we believe that the role l/
of the Soviet Union as a superpower does not proceed in its support for the
people's causes from an intellectual basis. This means that the Soviet Union
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is prepared to lose on this account. Intellectual and principled positions
motivate one to sacrifice for his thought. The Soviet Union is not prepared
to sacrifice any of its positions or to make any political or military sacri-
fices for any people. The Soviets believe that their strength as a superpower
comes first and then follow the pople's causes, depending on how strongly these
causes are tied to the Soviet plan in this regard.
Naturally, the Soviet method of movement differs from that of the United States
because the Soviet system is different from the U.S. system. But the Soviet
system meets with the U.S. system in that it moves within the framework of the
game of interests which governs the position of the Soviets as a superpower.
The Soviet Union does not do the Arab countries or any other people a favor
when it supports them but rather achieves some gains for itself. We do not
agree with those who try to depict the Soviet Union as the savior of peoples l/
because the Soviet Union, like the United States, is a superpower. But the 1
Soviet tendencies are closer to those of the peoples and its policy is closer
to the policy of the peoples than is the U.S. policy.
it the Soviet movements have the background of the superpower moving for its
own interest. This is what we notice in the Soviet movement concerning the
Palestinian cause. The Soviet Union moves to a certain limit and in the manner
its interests permit so that it may not lose the Arab card or any of the cards
it holds in this regard.
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? IRS-NEA-85-O1b
JANUARY 1985
EFFORTS TO RESCUE AIRLINE INDUSTRY EXAMINED
/.
London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 87, 8 Dec 84 p.35
/Article by Ibrahim 'Awadah: "After Repeated Abortive Attempts, Cooperation
Agreement Between Two Airlines Subsidized by Government With 125 Million
Pounds"/
/Text/ Beirut--After prolonged negotiations throughout 2 full years, it was
recently ainounced that the first cooperation/ agreement of its kind has been
concluded between Middle East Airlines and )T.M.I. /Trans-Mediterranean Airlines/.
The agreement provides for setting up a holding company in which Middle East
Airlines owns 90 percent and T.M.I. 10 percent. This company will oversee
the air transport policy of the two co ~pnies and will draft the recommendations
needed to boost their activity, provided that each of the two said companies
maintain its complete independence insofar as personnel, pilots and acquired
operating lines are concerned.
Though this agreement, born afte
to postpone the idea of full me
it is considered an ordinary c,
has exceeded this concept to
capable, if not contained, q
before it is actually born
outset of 1985.
time financial and eco
political and securit
impact on the activi
causing both compan
Since the start of
million pounds (s
company's fleet
losses have
loss of a nu
hard labor, has come to declare or, at least,
ger between the two companies and even though
operation agreement between two companies, it
urn into an econopolitical problem which is
leading to the obstruction of this agreement
i.e. before it is put into implementation at the
two Lebanese airlines have been facing for a long
bmic problems emanating primarily from the troubled
conditions since 1975. These conditions have had their
y and operations of the Lebanese airlines industry,
es to incur vast direct and indirect losses and damage.
the war and up to date, Middle East has lost nearly 800
me losses resulting from the destruction of a part of the
nd other losses emanating from the decline of activity due
Beirut Airport for long periods of time). T.M.I. total
ounted to nearly 200 million pounds as a result of this company's
ber of its main lines and of the difficulty of operating from
Beirut Internationl Airport due to security reasons.
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