CHINA-INDIA BORDER TENSIONS: ORIGINS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 29, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
I I
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 January 1987
China-India Border Tensions: Origins and Prospects
Summary
Beijing's establishment of a forward base on Wangdung Ridge last
summer--in response to what the Chinese perceived as an Indian military
buildup on the disputed border--has precipitated the first significant
military tension between China and India in 10 years. Although no fighting
has occurred, in November relations deteriorated
Tensions have 25X1
probably eased since mid-November, but Chinese and Indian outposts are
still within 1 kilometer of each other, and the danger of isolated skirmishes
remains. Largely in keeping with earlier conversions in the northeast,
India's Parliament passed legislation in December altering the status of
Arunachal Pradesh from a Union territory to full statehood. If no
diplomatic solution is found by this spring to assuage Chinese concerns
that New Delhi is attempting to impose its own border demarcation by
force and legislation, Beijing will probably back up its demarches wit"
larger show of force, raising the prospects for a military confrontation.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East A i 25X1
Analysis, 25X1
IDffice of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information available as of 29 25X1
January 1987 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may
be directed to the Chief, International Security Branch, China Division, OEA, 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
The latest Sino-Indian imbroglio dates from the Chinese establishment of a
permanent infantry outpost on Wanaduna Ridge in disputed territory earlier last
Indian troop deployments over the past year and military flights encroaching on the line
of actual control (LAC), established by Beijing after the 1962 war (see appendix on "A
Question of Lines" for further information).
bases and six new a ipads
? Since 1983,
the Indians have constructed three new
The Indian Government countered the Chinese move by strengthening its forces
deployed near the disputed area. Indian officials also briefed the Indian press just prior
to the seventh round of border talks on the alleged 8-kilometer Chinese incursion into
discussed competing claims in this eastern sector. A stalemate immediatel
The Chinese outpost is probably also intended to show Beijing's irritation with
what it perceived as Indian intransigence at the negotiating table. At the sixth round of
border talks in November 1985, Chinese and Indian negotiators for the first time
some movement at the seventh round of talks in July, but no progress was reported.
eijing may have calculated that a show of military strength last June would lead to
New Delhi's plans to declare Arunachal Pradesh a full-fledged state of
India--actually accomplished in December 1986--may have further influenced Beijing's
decision. China probably perceives such legislation declaring the disputed eastern
territory an inalienable part of India as weakening China's bargaining position. The
establishment of the outpost, therefore, reemphasized Beijing's claim prior to the Indian
The fielding of S-70C helicopters--commercial versions of the US Army's Black Hawk
troop transport--and French Super Puma helicopters in Tibet may have provided the
Chinese military the means to create a permanent forward base. Before the delivery
in 1985 of the Black Hawks and Super Pumas, year-round supply for these isolated
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
The Border Heats Up In November
We believe Beijing sees the border dispute as a purely bilateral issue. The
sequence of events is such that we think it unlikely that China manufactured the
incident to introduce greater strains into Indian-Soviet relations. We have no evidence
that new Soviet overtures to China affected Beijing's calculations and, indeed, the
Wangdung outpost was created well in advance of Gorbachev's new initiatives on China.
Similariv, have no evidence that China established the post at Pakistan's behest. F_
India Soft Pedals Dispute
New Delhi refused to accept Beijing's November diplomatic demarches, but
suggested that both sides could avoid such unfortunate military confrontations by
renewing their efforts to negotiate a settlement of their territorial disputes. Indian
Government officials have answered opposition politicians' questions in Parliament with
the same refusal to accent Chinese claims and conciliatory statements about the future
New Delhi almost certainly wants to avoid a major deterioration in relations with
China that would leave it exposed just as India is trying to balance relations with the
superpowers and Moscow is approaching Beijing. Rajiv Gandhi has made an effort to
assure the Indian public that New Delhi will protect India's interests at the same time he
has left the door open to substantive negotiations. On 19 December Gandhi reiterated
New Delhi's hardline stance that China must return the Indian territory occupied by
Beijing, and stated that a final settlement of the border dispute depends on Chinese
withdrawal. He added, however, that border problems should not interfere with efforts
to improve relations in other areas.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
History of the Formal Negotiations
China and India began border negotiations in December 1981. No
progress was made during the first four rounds of negotiations because the two
sides tabled incompatible approaches. India advocated sector-by-sector
negotiations, while China suggested a territorial swap--India could have title to
the eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh) if China kept the western sector (Aksai
Chin). At the fifth round in 1984, Beijing acquiesced to India's demand for
sector-by-sector discussions on the condition that the final agreement be
comprehensive. This opened the way for the first substantive negotiations. F_
At the sixth round of talks in November 1985, China surprised India with
a proposal that New Delhi make territorial concessions in the eastern boundary
sector, raising a formidable obstacle to progress. Previous Chinese statements
on a package border settlement had suggested essentially a swap of territory
that would confirm the British-drawn McMahon Line alignment in the east in
exchange for Indian recognition of Chinese claims (and control) in Aksai Chin.
? Indian Foreign Ministry officials charged that the Chinese changed the
rules by proposing mutual concessions as the basis for sector-by-sector
negotiations.
? Chinese officials maintain that as long as India refuses to make
concessions in the east the Chinese will concede nothing in the west.
The seventh round in July 1986 saw no progress because of the establishment
and discovery of the Chinese outpost at Wangdung.
Chronology of Border Talks
First Round
December 1981
Beijing
Second Round
May 1982
New Delhi
Third Round
29 January--
Beijing
2 February 1983
Fourth Round
October 1983
New Delhi
Fifth Round
September 1984
Beijing
Sixth Round
November 1985
New Delhi
Seventh Round
July 1986
Beijing
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
In the immediate area under dispute, Indian forces have the upper hand. More
than eight permanent Indian camps house perhaps 3,000 Indian soldiers. These camps
are near the southernmost Chinese positions, consisting of 300 Chinese soldiers on
Wangdung Ridge and a base camp nearby. Comparative troop levels in the region also
favor India, with major elements of one Indian mountain division--15,000 troops--based
north of Tawang less than 30 kilometers from Wangdung Ridge, and positioned to block
a Chinese breakthrough. Indian commanders near the disputed area have moved
aoaressively since last June to establish and maintain tactical superiority.
four additional Indian mountain divisions--including four artillery
brigades--are positioned in the Northea 'thin 300 kilometers of Wangdung. These g`7
total more than 36,000 troops.
In contrast, Chinese reinforcements available in Tibet probably number fewer than
20,000 troops, organized into two infantry brigades, two border defense regiments, and
one artillery regiment within 300 kilometers of Wangdung Ridge. The bulk of these
forces could probably be deployed for combat near Wangdung Ridge within 30 days.
Both Chinese and Indian local troops are well trained and acclimatized to high-altitude
Despite similarities between events of the past six months and those that
preceded the 1962 Sino-Indian war, fundamental differences exist . Indian
border policy and hawkish official statements before the 1962 clash belied
actual preparations to defend the border. New Delhi apparently believed that its
good relations with Beijing--India championed China's admission to the United
Nations following the Korean war--would restrain China from using force. Thus,
while India's Prime Minister Nehru sought to assuage public opinion by
promising to "defend the border to the last man and the last bullet," fewer than
2,000 troops were based near Wangdung Ridge. After an Indian battalion
crossed the Chinese line of control, two Chinese divisions (20,000 troops)
achieved a breakthrough in the Wangdung area, they advanced the 200
kilometers to the Brahmaputra Valley almost unopposed.
Other marked differences between the two episodes are the more limited
scope of the present dispute, and the absence of regional tensions that
contributed to the 1962 border war. The Chinese attacks of 1962 were also
directed at the disputed boundary along the Aksai Chin region some 1,000
kilometers northwest of Wangdung Ridge. At present, there are no indications
of increased tensions near Aksai Chin. Moreover, the 1962 clash occurred
against the backdrop of the 1959 Tibet uprising--put down by Chinese
troops--which raised the specter of a militarily resurgent China on India's
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
Beijing's primary strategic advantage is its ability to commit large numbers of
troops without significantly degrading security along China's other borders. As many as
60,000 troops could be dispatched to the disputed area within 60 days, probably from
the 13th Group Army based near the city of Chengdu. Reinforcements could be
dispatched even more quickly if Beijing committed elements of the 15th Airborne Army,
an elite light infantry force well suited to mountain warfare. With 93 main force infantry
divisions and 24 artillery brigades, as many as 20 Chinese infantry divisions and seven
artillery brigades--almost 300,000 troops--could be available against India within the
first six months of a conflict and still leave the bulk of its four million troops in place
along the Soviet and Vietnamese frontiers. Long resupply lines, however, would
constrain the length of time Beijing could support such large numbers of forces at this
against the always tense Pakistani border.
In contrast, India's ability to reinforce forces in the northeast is limited. A
5,000-man parachute brigade could be dispatched immediately, and three mountain
divisions--45,000 combat troops--in other northeastern territories could reinforce the
divisions closest to the border within a month. As many as six additional infantry
divisions--75,000 troops--stationed in central and southern India could be deployed to
the northeast. Many Indian troops--especially in the northeast--are committed to
internal security duties, and the vast majority of India's million-man Army is committed
Indian supply lines are a potentially important weakness because there are no
roads linking Tawang to Wangdung Ridge--a one-week march. Indian supplies,
reinforcements, and medical evacuations are largely limited to helicopter airlift and
airdrops, which, while adequate thus far, will be severely restricted by the onset of
winter weather.3 The Chinese have a good local road network, which was a decisive
advantage during the September-November 1962 border clash, and a road-served
garrison less than three miles from Wangdung. During winter months, however, heavy
snowfall is likely to severely restrict ground arteries and limit both sides to
clear-weather aerial resupply. Efforts by either side to move substantial reinforcements
during a widened confrontation would probably be constrained by existing supply
networks, which consist of long transportation routes and limited air transport
The air balance favors India, but is unlikely to be very important outsid
Chinese or Indian troops sent to reinforce mountain forces would require a prolonged
acclimatization period--as much as six weeks--to fight or maneuver effectively at
high altitudes. The Indian garrison at Tawang, for example, is 3,000 meters--almost
10,000 feet--above sea level, and much of the terrain surrounding Wangdung Ridge is
more than 5,000 meters (16,000 feet) above sea level.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
Flight operations of Chinese and Indian aircraft would be largely limited to
clear-weather, daylight missions, and neither side is likely to enjoy overall air
superiority. The primary impact of air operations probably would be the disruption of
fragile Chinese and Indian supply lines, constricting the flow of men and materiel to
China's Southwestern Theater Commander
Commander of Chengdu Military Region since June 1985, Fu Quanyou is
not the kind of officer who backs away from a fight. One of four new military
region commanders appointed during the 1985 reorganization of China's armed
forces, Fu oversees the military region responsible for maintaining China's
limited but sustained military pressure against the Vietnamese. As commander
of the 1st Army in early 1985, he apparently won Beijing's admiration when his
troops conducted some of the fiercest and bloodiest battles with the
Vietnamese since the 1979 war. Fu visited forward dnits near the
Indian border last July, ostensibly for the PLA anniversary.
Indian Commanders in the Northeast
Lieutenant General Jitendra Kumar Puri has been General Officer in
Command, Eastern Command, since January 1986. He appears to have had a
competent, though not particularly outstanding, career--having served on a
brigade staff in the northeast during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, headed a
division support command in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, and taught at the
Defense Services Staff College during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
Prospects
In our judgment, the chances for hostilities in the near term have lessened
slightly, although the danger remains that isolated skirmishes could erupt and quickly
involve most of the forces near Wangdung. Barring a spontaneous outbreak of fighting,
we believe weather conditions will impede major reinforcement of current forces until
late April or May. We believe both sides are inclined to limit military activities to
improving the present bivouac sites.
In the less likely event that hostilities were to erupt soon, fighting would probably
slowly escalate from shooting incidents involving at first only small-arms fire. In our
judgment, infantry skirmishes would be severely limited by the mountainous terrain and
the likelihood of heavy snowfall in the next few weeks. We believe further combat
would probably be drawn out and indecisive, consisting largely of artillery duels.
Extensive Indian preparations, numerical superiority, and ability to base artillery on
tactical high ground would probably ensure that Indian forces could capture Wangdung
Ridge if the fighting escalated. It is possible that fighting on this scale would shock
both sides into ceasing military provocations and result in a return to border talks.
However, Beijing might be compelled to respond to an Indian victory at Wangdung Ridge
by committing the 52nd and 53rd Infantry Brigades--the only readily available
In the Spring
If the current stalemate persists and no diplomatic progress is made by spring,
we believe Beijing will probably back up its demarches with a buildup of forces and
more aggressive patrolling of the LAC. We believe the Chinese might also deploy
fighter aircraft to Tibet to counter possible future Indian air incursions. By calling in the
Indian Ambassador to Beijing in December and January for a third and fourth demarche,
the Chinese may be laving the diplomatic foundation for a more aggressive border
policy this spring.
In our judgment, China sees New Delhi's decision to declare Arunachal Pradesh a
state despite the current border confrontation as the latest in a list of unresolved
grievances. Beijing probably views Indian recalcitrance as a challenge to China's
regional stature. As demonstrated by China's ongoing military pressure against
Vietnam," Beijing is willing to use border skirmishes to emphasize political points.
Chinese troops are unlikely to take the offensive on Wangdung Ridge, however, until
they enjoy a better tactical situation against the Indians
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
Several factors restrain the prospects for large-scale Chinese actions at
Wangdung. Beijing is probably unwilling to sidetrack its economic and military
modernization programs with a major military confrontation against India. Although
Beijing's campaign of military pressure against Vietnam demonstrates a willingness to
use force, Chinese leaders are almost certainly aware that a confrontation with New
Delhi would be a vastly more risky venture. Beijing's perceptions of Indo-Soviet and
Indo-US relations, and New Delhi's prominence in the Nonaligned Movement would
complicate China's calculations of the fallout of military actions
Despite their current tactical superiority in the immediate area, we believe the
Indians are not likely to press their advantage against Chinese forces this spring except
in response to an attack. Indian forces probably will, however, be alert to any Chinese
tactical movements that would allow them to regain control of the Wangdung Ridge or a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
comparable piece of territory. New Delhi probably would prefer to return to border talks
holding the ground it held before June
We expect New Delhi to press Beijing to forgo further military moves in the
disputed area and to schedule the eighth round of bilateral talks. The Indians are also
likely to call public attention to any progress the two sides make in strengthening
economic and cultural relations to reintroduce some positive momentum before a
resumption of the prickly border talks. New Delhi will closely watch the border talks
between Beijing and Moscow scheduled for next month for any signs that the two sides
could improve relations sufficiently to lead to a diminution of Soviet support to India.
Fears of such a development could compel New Delhi to intensify both defensive
military preparations and diplomatic efforts to improve relations with Beijing. It is
possible that as the Indians become preoccupied with prospects for Sino-Soviet
raohement, New Delhi might ask Washington to assist on the diplomatic front
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
Appendix
A Question of Lines
The British attempted to demarcate the colonial borders of India with China and
Tibet in the early 1900s, but ultimately only added to the confusion. The British-drawn
McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border coincides in some areas
with the highest peaks and passes marking the watershed between major river systems
in India and Tibet. In the area of current dispute and some other areas, however, rivers
have their headwaters north of the boundary in southern Tibet, and a border following
the water divide would have placed some segments of the border as much as 50 miles
more northward. In the area of Wangdung, the British drew a straight line on a crude
map to keep control of defensible ground, and provided no detailed written description
At the 1914 Simla Conference, attended by representatives of Great Britain, China,
and Tibet, the McMahon Line was presented as the new boundary. Great Britain and
Tibet, the latter considered by the British to be politically autonomous at the time,
signed the agreement. The Chinese delegate only initialed the agreement, noting he
lacked the authority to commit China, which later repudiated it.
Beijing contends that the true border lies far to the south of the "illegal"
McMahon Line, approximately following the break between the foothills of the Himalayas
and the Brahmaputra Valley. This area encompasses much of the newly created Indian
state of Arunachal Pradesh. Since the 1962 war, in lieu of a border agreement, the
Chinese have recognized a line of actual control (LAC), which lies south of the
Wangdung Ridge and north of the British-drawn McMahon Line. In their unilateral
cease-fire of November 1962, the Chinese withdrew to positions 20 kilometers north of
the LAC and warned New Delhi not to try to reoccupy areas north of the LAC.
Not surprisingly, the major area where the Indian claims and the Chinese LAC
differ in the eastern sector lies in the zone where the Chinese set up their outpost this
summer. New Delhi argues that the true boundary line between India and China in the
current disputed area lies north of the Wangdung Ridge. Although Survey of India maps
published through 1959 showed the western extremity of the McMahon Line, where it
joins the Bhutan border, at the same latitude as that of the British-drawn boundary, the
Indian description of the McMahon Line that was given to Chinese officials in 1960 did
not correspond with the location of the line as shown on the Simla map. Instead, the
description placed the western extremity of the boundary about three miles north of the
earlier version. The discrepancy appears to be explained by the fact that Indian ground
and aerial surveys after 1959 provided New Delhi with more accurate information about
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3
CHINA-INDIA BORDER TENSIONS: ORIGINS AND PROSPECTS
White House and National Security Council
1 - Doug Paal, Senior Staff Member for China, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong, Room 493.
Department of State
1 - Howard Stoffer, EAP/CH, Room 4318.
1 - Eugene Martin, EAP/CH, Room 4318.
Department of Defense
1 - Lieutenant Colonel Eden Woon, Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
China Plans and Policy, FESA J-5, Room 2E973.
1 - Lieutenant Colonel Gary Weis, International Security Affairs,
Room 4C849.
Central Intelligence Agency
1 - D/DCI/DDCI Executive Staff, Room 7D60.
1 - DDI, Room 7E44.
1 - Senior Review Panel, Room 5G00.
1 - PDB Staff, Room 7F30.
1 - C/PES, Room 7F24.
1 - NIO/EA, Room 7E62.
1 - NIC/Analytical Group, Room 7E47.
1 - CPAS/ILS, Room 7G50.
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB, Room 7G07.
1 - C/DO/PPS, Room 3D01.
1 - C/NESA/SO/S, Room 6G17.
1 - C/EA/= Room 5E18.
1-
1 - D/UEA, Room 4F18.
1 - C/OEA/PROD, Room 4G48.
2 - C/OEA/CH, Room 4G32.
1 - C/OEA/CH/PA, Room 4G32.
1 - C/OEA/CH/TT, Room 4G32.
1 - C/OEA/CH/EA, Room 4G32.
5 - C/OEA/CH/IS, Room 4G32.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP04T00907R000200530001-3