SOVIET BLOC PROPOSALS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY: A RESUME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03-02194R000200670001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 22, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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xi$OVI T LOP V POSALS ON EUHUPEAN CURJTY: A RESUME
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CONFIDENTIAL
No. 1583/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 June 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
Soviet Bloc Proposals on European Security: A Resume
Summary
For more than a decade, the Soviet
Union has put forth or supported European se-
curity proposals designed above all to stall
Western plans to increase the military strength
of West Germany (FRG). The record reveals that
efforts to emphasize Soviet strength have often
accompanied Moscow's attempts to engender Western
support for negotiations.
* Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.
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1. This combination of promise and threat was
manifested as early as 1954, when the Paris agreements
to rearm West Germany under NATO were being ratified in
the West. While calling for talks on European security
and holding out the prospect of fruitful negotiations,
the Soviets in November 1954 convened a conference of
bloc states in Moscow which warned the West that ratifi-
cation of the Paris agreements would be countered by
joint military organization in the East. The Moscow
meeting foreshadowed the formation of the Warsaw Pact
in May 1955.
2. In 1955, amidst a massive Soviet propaganda
campaign against the stationing of US atomic weapons in
the FRG, Foreign Minister Molotov, at a Big Four foreign
ministers' conference in Geneva, suggested the creation
of a "zone of limitation and inspection of armaments in
Europe." The zone was to include the territory of West
and East Germany and "the states bordering on them, or
at least certain ones of them."
3. As Soviet propaganda continued to stress the
dangers to West Europe of the deployment of nuclear
weapons in Germany, the Warsaw Pact's Political Consulta-
tive Committee held a meeting in January 1956. The com-
mittee called for a big-power agreement to exclude nuclear
weapons from the equipment of any armies stationed in Ger-
many, including West and East German as well as other
forces.
4. The idea was reiterated by Khrushchev at the
20th party congress in February 1956, and was incorpo-
rated into the comprehensive Soviet plan presented to
the UN Disarmament Subcommittee on 27 March,1956.. This
plan was Moscow's first formal proposal to prohibit nu-
clear weapons and atomic military units in a European
zone.l/
5. The banning of mass destruction weapons in
Germany was raised again a year later, in a ?gviet - East
German communique issued in January of 1957._/ In the
same month, President Eisenhower in his budget message
? 1/ It provided for limitation and inspection of armaments
in Germany and unnamed "adjacent states." The banning of
nuclear weapons in both parts of Germany was suggested by
Moscow as a partial, interim measure to be concluded pend-
ing agreement on the entire plan.
2/ It stated that "the disarmament problem can be partially
resolved by establishing a restricted armaments zone in
Europe comprising both parts of Germany."
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mentioned the imminent extension of a nuclear capability
to NATO and non-NATO countries by means of special US
"atomic units." This prompted a round of threatening
notes from Moscow to NATO countries warning them not to
permit US atomic weapons on their soil.
6. In March of 1957, the Soviets sent to the UN
Disarmament Subcommittee a plan almost identical with
the one they had proposed the year before.3/ In this
plan, Moscow introduced a general provision prohibiting
nuclear weapons on foreign soil. Neither the 1957 Soviet
plan nor its earlier versions, however, gave details on
the implementation of a nuclear weapons ban in a zone of
limitation, nor were they explicit on the question of the
production of nuclear weapons in the proposed zone.
7. The first explicit suggestion for outlawing
the production of nuclear weapons in a European zone (in
this instance both parts of Germany) came in a speech by
East German leader Walter Ulbricht in April 1957 (see
Annex I). The proposal was formally endorsed by the
USSR in notes to West Germany later in April and again
early in September 1957. Late in September, Moscow
presented to the UN General Assembly a memorandum calling
for a ban on placing nuclear weapons "at the disposal of
any other states or commands of military blocs."
8. Until the Rapacki Plan was put forward at the
UN is October 1957, the proposals for establishing an
atom-free zone had made specific mention only of West
and East Germany. The Soviets agreed to the Rapacki pro-
posal for a zone to include both Germanies, Poland and
Czechoslovakia, and to the principle of controls and in-
spection within the zone. They did not actively support
the plan until December, however, and did not expect it
to be accepted by the West. Khrushchev was convinced
that Bonn would never agree to it, but thought it could
be made more attractive to the West--and thus more effec-
tive in stalling a nuclear build-up in West Europe--if it
were expanded to include other countries. Some friction
3/ It also provided for a "zone of limitation" in Europe
encompassing the territory of "both parts of Germany and
that of states adjoining them." Within such a zone "the
stationing of atomic military formations or any form of
atomic or hydrogen weapons" would be prohibited and joint
inspection "of the armed forces and armaments of the
states parties to the agreement" would be instituted.
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reportedly developed between the USSR and Poland over
this point. Moscow decided early in 1958 to advocate an
extension of Rapacki's nuclear-free zone to include Italy,
Yugoslavia, Belgium, and a large part of France.
9. Moscow's advocacy of expanding the plan was
accompanied, however, by heavy-handed hints that the USSR
intended to match any Western moves by equipping East
European forces with new weapons. The Soviets offered
to agree to an atom-free zone as a step independent of
other kinds of demilitarization, but did so in combina-
tion with a series of increasingly explicit threats to
retaliate within the Warsaw Pact for any nuclear build-
up in the FRG. Thus Moscow's support for the Rapacki
proposal again was aimed at delaying Western plans for
West Germany by raising pressure within the Western
alliance for another try at a settlement with the Soviets.
10. A revised version of the original plan, de
signed to meet Western objections, was offered by Rapacki
on 4 November 1958 (see Annex II).
L1. The Rapacki Plan then lay largely dormant
untiL September 1960 when it was revived by party boss
Gomulka before the UN. An expanded and more detailed ver-
sion of the plan was then presented formally at the 17-
nation disarmament conference in Geneva on 28 March 1962
as an integral part of Soviet disarmament proposals.
12. Disappointed at the fate of the Rapacki plan,
and possibly alarmed at some evidence of Soviet approaches
to West Germany in the fall of 1963, Polish party boss
Gomulka unveiled his own version of the Polish disarma-
ment proposals in a speech on 28 December 1963. The
"Gomulka Plan" was formally presented to the Western
powers in a Polish memorandum of 29 February 1964 (see
Annex III).
13. I lexchanges
between Poland and the West concerning the several Polish
initiatives, the Poles have sought to meet a major Western
objection by stressing that their proposals do
not require Western recognition of East Germany. Although
both the Rapacki and the Gomulka plans include East Ger-
many in the proposed disarmament zone, neither plan
specifically calls for East Germany to be party to all
negotiations.
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14. This factor appears to have been one of the
main issues of contention between the Poles, the East
Germans, and the USSR. In January 1964, a few days fol-
lowing Gomulka's unveiling of his plan, Khrushchev--
probably at East German prodding--spoke of,a similar
Soviet proposal which took due cognizance of the Pankow
regime, and reiterated the concept of three German
entities: East and West Germany, and West Berlin.
15. Apparently to supplement the Polish partial
disarmament proposals at a time when these were not ac-
tively pushed, Foreign Minister Rapacki proposed a
general East-West conference on Europeansecurity during
a speech to the UN on 12 December 1964.1/
16. Soviet propaganda has continued to mention
European security, but Moscow has been content merely
to express its willingness to discuss any proposals
that might be forthcoming. The idea of convening a con-
ference on the subject was revived in general terms by
the Soviets this spring, but they did not specify clearly
when or among whom such a conference should be held.
Brezhnev raised the idea in his address at the 23rd
party congress in March. Reference to some kind of sum-
mit gathering on European security was also made by
Foreign Minister Gromyko during his trip to Rome in April.
17. Brezhnev's 31 May address at the Czech party
congress and Premier Kosygin's 8 June election speech con-
tain references to European security but with no specific
proposals and no _call' for a conference. Kosygin said
in a 17 June speech in Helsinki that Moscow wants an
all-European conference.
18. Kosygin observed that "a stable system of
security in Europe cannot be created without the inter-
ests of the Soviet Union being taken into account."
Brezhnev called for the replacement of military alliances
with the peaceful cooperation of all states, and alluded
4/ The Polish proposal envisaged the participation of
The US in any such conference. Subsequent Soviet and
East European support for the Polish idea omitted refer-
ences to US participation. The Poles have continued
to indicate, however, that the exclusion of the
US would be unrealistic. They have also largely sought
to keep the proposal from becoming a mere propaganda
issue, and have indirectly indicated that preliminary
talks on a non-governmental level between East and West
could be held prior to any formal conference.
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to "the many proposals (of the socialist states)
directed toward the strengthening of peace in Europe,"
which "as a' whole.....comprise a broad, practicable
program which should. be seriously discussed by states-
men in the West." Brezhnev also noted that "several
other European states" have ideas about strengthening
peace in Europe, ideas which include, according to Brezh-
nev, nonaggression pacts or exchanges of appropriate
declarations. Both he and Kosygin said that the USSR
has been giving "much attention" to the problem of
European security.
19. Over the past several years the Soviets also
have on many occasions raised the issue of a nonaggres-
sion pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The USSR
has sometimes broached the subject in the context of
European security and sometimes as a possible "partial"
disarmament measure which would facilitate agreement on
general and complete disarmament. During the negotia-
tions on the partial test ban treaty in the summer of
1963, the Soviets strongly urged agreement on a NATO -
Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty to accompany the partial
test ban agreement. Since that time the Soviets have not
pressed the issue, but a revival of the proposal cannot
be ruled out.
20. During his trip to Finland 13-18 June, Kosygin
said "the guaranteeing of peace in Europe is the business
of all European states," and noted that Moscow has taken
the initiative in calling for an all-European conference
to discuss questions concerning European security.
21. Moscow again has been pursuing dual tactics,
fostering the impression that it,is willing to engage in
fruitful talks on outstanding problems of European se-
curity, while threatening "appropriate countermeasures"
if Borin gains access to nuclear weapons. The issue of
West Germany's role in NATO nuclear affairs is of para-
mount concern to the Soviets. Moscow undoubtedly cal-
culates that disunity in the Western alliance can be
exploited in a manner that will produce pressure from
West Europe on Washington and Bonn to abandon plans for
an FRG nuclear role Lather than prejudice the prospect:
of detente with Russia.
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Ulbricht Speech of April 1957
In the wake of reports that Bonn might be moving
toward independent production, Ulbricht proposed:
(a) cessation of all propaganda and all
preparations for atomic war on German
territory;
(b) joint agreement of both German governments
on the outlawing of atomic bombs and on
reciprocal renunciation of the production
of atomic weapons; and
(c) joint agreement, or separate pledges, to
strive for a ban upon the stationing of
atomic guns and other atomic weapons on
German soil.
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Rapacki Plan of November 1958
The principal modification lay in a two-fold
staging of the original proposals:
(a) The first stage would involve in essence
a freezing of nuclear armaments in the
proposed zone. A ban would be introduced
on the production of nuclear weapons by the
states within the zone, and an obligation
would be undertaken by them to renounce
equipping with nuclear weapons those armies
which do not yet possess them and "building
the installations" for them. Appropriate
measures of control would be introduced.
(b) The second stage would be preceded by talks
on the appropriate reduction of conventional
forces. Such a reduction would be imple-
mented simultaneously with the complete de-
nuclearization of the zone, and again would
be accompanied by appropriate measures of
control.
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ANNEX I I I
Gomulka Plan of February 1964
(a) A freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear
armaments would be instituted in a zone
including "in principle" the territories
of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East and
West Germany, with the respective terri-
torial waters and air space. This zone
could be subsequently expanded through
the accession of "other European states."
(b) Appropriate supervision and safeguards
should be established, including control
by mixed commissions composed of repre-
sentatives of the Warsaw Pact and of NATO
on a parity basis.
(c) Parties whose armed forces stationed in
the zone have access to nuclear weapons
would hold periodic meetings to exchange
all information necessary to implement
their obligations under the nuclear freeze.
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Polish "Baltic Sea of Peace" Proposal of June 1957
The "Baltic Sea of Peace" proposal, originally
put forward in June 1957 by Poland, but probably of
Soviet origin, envisaged the conclusion of nonaggres-
sion treaties among the littoral states of the Baltic
Sea, and the closing of the sea to warships of other
powers. Possibly prompted by the 1957 NATO decision
to establish missile bases in Western Europe, the pro-
posal was accompanied by Soviet propaganda emphasizing
the danger such bases entailed for the Scandinavian
countries. Poland generally stressed the regional
aspects of the plan. The proposal has not been ac-
tively pushed since, and has degenerated into an
annual observance of the "Baltic Sea Days" designed
principally to propagandize East German - Polish -
Soviet solidarity in the area.
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