TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000200240002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 7, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of t
Terrorism Review
Secret
GI TR 85-020
7 October 1985
Copy 5 3 1
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Secret
1 Focus: Soviet Responses to Hostage Situations
5 Highlights
Libya Hedges Its Bets in Sudan
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19 Uruguay: The Return of the Tupamaros
21 The French Caribbean Departments: Proindependence Terrorism
31 Chronology of Terrorism-1985
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This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence.
Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other
agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor 25X1
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Focus Soviet Responses to Hostage Situations
Information is sparse on how the USSR or its close allies deal with hostage
situations because the number of recorded incidents is low and the government-
controlled media in these countries rarely divulge details of what does occur.
Examinations of the limited number of case studies available indicate that the
response varies with the circumstances of the incident. The Soviets and their
friends tend to apply a pure "no-negotiations" line when challenged on their own
turf, although they will show indulgence toward those with whose political and
ideological goals they sympathize. When dealing with a situation where
geographical constraints make action impossible, the Soviets have demonstrated a
willingness to negotiate and make political concessions.
In situations where the Soviets or their Bloc allies have access to the hostage
takers, the favored tactic has been a quick frontal assault with little attempt to
negotiate or to minimize casualties, regardless of the nationality of the hostages:
? In February 1979, a small group of gunmen, whose identity has never been
clearly established, seized American Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs
on a Kabul street and took him to a nearby hotel. They then barricaded
themselves inside one of the rooms. Soviet officials quickly arrived at the scene
and appeared to take charge. It soon became clear that, instead of an attempt at
negotiations, storming the room was to be the first option. Despite the strong
urgings of an American Embassy officer to show restraint, Afghan police
charged the room. Ambassador Dubs and all of the gunmen were killed in the
subsequent shootout.
? In November 1983, a group of eight persons hijacked an Aeroflot flight between
Tbilisi and Batumi and demanded to be flown to Turkey. The pilot instead
landed the plane in Tbilisi. Several hours later, Soviet security forces stormed
the plane. All of the hijackers were killed or captured and as many as seven of
the passengers also died. In an interesting sidelight, present Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze, then the party boss for Georgia, reportedly went to the
airport to take charge of the crisis.
in 1981 near Timosoara, a
group of dissidents attacked a police station and seized a bus carrying about a
dozen passengers. They then demanded an airplane and safe passage out of
Romania. The bus was stopped at a roadblock on its way to a nearby airport.
After the hijackers shot the driver, Romanian security forces opened up with
automatic weapons, killing the hijackers and all of the hostages.
Secret
GI TR 85-020
7 October 1985
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International Terrorist Incidents
Against the Soviets,
1979-85
21 33 18 7
12 17 7 115
10 16 5
2 3 2 38
4 5 1 1
2 13
Where the hostage takers have been accessible but ideologically compatible, force
has been avoided:
? In March 1981, a Pakistani airliner flying to Peshawar was hijacked and
diverted to Kabul. The hijackers, members of the Pakistani Al-Zulfikar terrorist
group, killed a Pakistani diplomat who was aboard. During the several days the
plane remained in Kabul, a number of Al-Zulfikar members were released from
Pakistani jails. Afterwards, the hijackers were allowed safe passage to Syria and
several were later seen in Kabul. No attempt was made to storm the plane in
Kabul. Such restraint on the part of the Afghans and their Soviet "advisers" was
probably due to the close relationship between Al-Zulfikar and Afghan
intelligence.
When geographical constraints make the hostage takers inaccessible, a surprising
willingness to negotiate and make political concessions has been demonstrated:
? In 1983 a large group of Czechoslovak technicians and their families were
captured by UNITA guerrillas in Angola. The hostages were held in remote
areas and frequently moved. To obtain their release, the Czechoslovak
Government was forced to deal with UNITA as if it were a sovereign
.government. A UNITA delegation was given "royal" treatment in Prague and
the Czechoslovak deputy foreign minister later went to Angola to finalize an
agreement. The hostages were then released. While one can be sure that dealing
with UNITA as an equal caused Prague a great deal of grief, it did not stand in
the way of a pragmatic solution.
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? In 1983 the antigovernment organization RENAMO in Mozambique seized a
group of 26 Soviet technicians north of Maputo. The Soviets, in cooperation with
Mozambican forces, reportedly made a number of attempts to locate the site at
which the technicians were being held, preparatory to a rescue attempt.
Eventually, several of the hostages were either rescued or escaped,
But RENAMO claims the Soviets were forced to
negotiate, and that talks were held in Europe between the two parties on a
number of subjects, including the release of the remaining hostages. The Soviets
have never acknowledged that such negotiations took place.
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Highlights
by the Israelis in August.
Israel Retaliates for Terrorist Attacks
Israel's stated policy of retaliating for terrorist attacks led to an unprecedented
attack by Israeli jets against PLO headquarters in Tunisia on 1 October. Initial
casualty reports said that some 50 persons were killed or wounded and the
headquarters building severely damaged. This attack came less than a week after
an incident in Larnaca, Cyprus, on 25 September. Two Palestinians and a Briton
seized control of a yacht in the harbor and killed three Israeli citizens on board
before surrendering to police. The gunmen, reportedly linked to the Fatah wing of
the PLO, had demanded the release of Fatah members who were captured at sea
The Israeli action comes after a monthlong period during which Israeli
Government officials have expressed serious concern about a PLO buildup in
Jordan and repeatedly threatened that they would not allow Palestinian terrorist
operations emanating from Jordan to go unanswered. The strike in Tunis may be
intended to carry a message to Jordan's King Hussein that he is vulnerable to
Israeli action should he not effectively curtail Palestinian operations from Jordan.
American Hostage Released Unharmed
On 14 September the Rev. Benjamin Weir was freed by his abductors in Beirut; he
had been kidnaped on 8 May 1984. At a press conference on 18 September, Weir
stated that he had been held in solitary confinement for more than a year and
confirmed that at least four of the other six American hostages were still alive. He
reiterated his captors' demand for the release of Shia terrorists held in Kuwait and
cited their new threat to kidnap other US citizens or execute those they already
wounded on 19 July, seriously impairing the state's case.
Ten Members of FP-25 Escape From Prison
Ten alleged members of the Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) escaped from
prison on 21 September. Their escape could cause a second delay in the trial of
other FP-25 defendants and could lead to a resurgence of attacks against state
witnesses. Three of the escapees are believed to be operational members of the
group and one is a Popular Unity Front (FUP) candidate in the upcoming
parliamentary elections. This is the second such escape this year-the first took
place in March 1985-and it represents a further blow to the government's efforts
to control terrorism. A key prosecution witness against the group was mortally
5 Secret
GI TR 85-020
7 October 1985
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Prima Linea Comeback Thwarted
Italian police thwarted a planned return to terrorist activity by members of the
leftist terrorist group Prima Linea when they arrested nine members last July.
the group planned to rob an armored car in the
Red Brigades' members in Naples-possibly to coordinate the robbery.
Naples area to obtain funds for terrorist operations. Prima Linea was one of the
most violent terrorist groups in Italy in the late 1970s, but has been inactive since
1982. In June, several Prima Linea leaders met with
or disaffected members of the military probably were responsible.
an economic fair in Tripoli, destroying a warehouse. Libyan leader Mu'ammar
Qadhafi reportedly was scheduled to attend the fair. Security measures-
including nightly manhunts and car searches-have been increased in Tripoli since
the incident. No one has claimed responsibility for the explosion, but Libyan exiles
a car bomb exploded on 14 September near the site of
while on his way to Panama City.
Mysterious Terrorist Group Surfaces
An obscure group known only as "F-8" apparently was responsible for the death of
Hugo Spadafora, the former Minister of Health under Gen. Omar Torrijos.
Spadafora's headless corpse was found in Costa Rica on 15 September with the
acronym "F-8 Terrorist" carved in its back. According to press reports, Spadafora
was seeking permanent political exile in Costa Rica because of death threats he
received from the Panamanian military after criticizing Defense Forces
Commander Gen. Manuel Noriega. Spadafora's relatives said that he had been
detained at the Costa Rica-Panama border by members of the Defense Forces
Defense Forces of being responsible for the F-8's crimes.
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The F-8 group also claimed responsibility for the kidnaping on 21 August of Dr.
Mario Zuniga, one of the leaders of the political opposition group Coordinating
Board for National Civilianization (COCINA). Several days after the kidnaping,
Marcos Alarcon, another COCINA leader, received death threats from F-8
indicating he would be its next victim. Many opposition groups have accused the
Colombian guerrillas of the 19th
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of April Movement M-191) are planning to set up bases in Brazil near the
Colombian border. the M- 19 may have decided to
intensify its guerrilla actions in the southeastern border area near Leticia. It is
apparently searching for safehavens beyond the reach of Colombian authorities.
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the Ecuadorean terrorist group Alfaro Vive, Carajo.
M-19 Behind Attack on Ecuadorean Embassy
The Colombian guerrilla group 19th of April Movement (M- 19) claimed
responsibility for the bombing and shooting attack on the Ecuadorean Embassy in
Bogota on 11 September. The group said the attack was in retaliation for the
deaths of two imprisoned M-19 guerrillas during an abortive attempt to rescue
them in Guayaquil. The two had been arrested for their part in the kidnaping and
the slaying of an Ecuadorean banker, apparently a joint operation of the M-19 and
main police station in Ludhiana injured three persons.
Terrorist Attacks Mar Punjab Elections
Sikh extremists attempted unsuccessfully to derail state elections, held in Punjab
on 25 September, in which the moderate Akali Dal Party scored an apparent
landslide. They continued their recent campaign of violence there with several
minor terrorist attacks leading up to the election, including:
? On 23 September a boobytrapped transistor radio bomb killed three Hindus and
wounded another. The device was similar to those detonated by Sikh extremists
in New Delhi and other cities last May that killed more than 80 persons.
? Later the same day, seven more bombs exploded in four Punjab districts, killing
three children and injuring an adult.
? Also on 23 September, a party worker for Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's
Congress (I) Party was wounded in the leg after an election rally near the town of
Sangrur.
? On 24 September, two Congress (I) campaign organizers died after eating some
poisoned Sikh holy bread.
? Later that same day, two bombs placed in lunch boxes in a market and in the
hundreds of suspected terrorists in the two days prior to the voting.
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Secret
Libya Hedges Its
Bets in Sudan
ignore.
Since the coup in Sudan on 6 April, Libya has
employed both diplomatic and covert methods to
influence events there. Libyan weapons and money
smuggling, intelligence collection, and covert action
have gone hand in hand with legitimate aid programs,
diplomatic initiatives, and propagandizing. This two-
track policy is likely to continue as long as the
operating environment in Sudan remains hospitable.
We believe Libya will refrain in the near term from
using terrorism to pursue its goals unless Sudanese-
Libyan relations sharply deteriorate or a Sudanese
domestic political crisis arises that is too opportune to
Libya's Subversive/Terrorist Infrastructure
Libya has devoted considerable resources to the
establishment of a covert infrastructure in Sudan:
? Tripoli helped set up Sudanese Revolutionary
Committees, providing funding and weapons and
placed Libyan-trained personnel at the helm.
? Tripoli staffed the People's Bureau, Libyan Arab
Airlines facilities, and political liaison groups with
known terrorists (see inset).
terrorist operations.
The establishment of the Revolutionary Committees
is likely to have the greatest impact. The Committees,
modeled on the internal Libyan system, are led by
Sudanese who opposed the Nimeiri regime and forged
strong ties to Tripoli. Their early goals were to recruit
supporters from the government and the military, to
collect intelligence, and to prepare and execute
oon after their founding, the
Revolutionary Committees moved quickly to establish
a headquarters and operations center, distributed
thousands of Green Books-Qadhafi's vision for a
greater Pan-Arab nation-and surveilled Sudanese
military and US and Egyptian diplomatic facilities.
Early Successes
The new government's recognition of Libya shortly
after the coup gave Tripoli the foothold it needed. The
Sudanese decision appeared to be based primarily on
domestic considerations. Most important, the
Transitional Military Council hoped to entice Tripoli
into shutting off aid to the southern rebels, the
Sudanese People's Liberation Army. In addition, the
new regime viewed relations with Libya as a
repudiation of the detested Nimeiri regime. By
removing sources of irritation along its northwestern
and southern borders, the Council hoped to buy time
to deal with its domestic problems.
Libya benefited in several ways from these early
policy decisions. The release of a large number of
political prisoners-designed to mollify domestic
opponents of Nimeiri-included convicted terrorists
with known ties to Tripoli. Of greater import was the
Council's abolition of the Sudanese Security
Organization. The new regime jailed officers of the
old Security Organization-considered corrupt and
tainted by association with Nimeiri-including those
experienced in countering Libyan subversive activity.
This left only an understaffed and poorly trained
security force to contend with the threat just when
Libya was pouring men and money into the country.
In addition, the Council decided to reduce support for
the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, an
opposition group Qadhafi believes threatens his
regime.
Limiting Factors
The Libyans, however, committed several errors in
the early days. Both Qadhafi and his deputy Jallud
misgauged their audience during official visits to
Khartoum. Their criticism of Egypt, talk of
unification, and artless promotion of the
Revolutionary Committees as a form of government
offended many Sudanese. Libya-steadily pouring
more people into Khartoum-was also indiscreet in its
subversive activity. When the government became
aware in mid-June of alleged Libyan involvement in
terrorist plotting against high-level Sudanese-and
Secret
GI TR 85-020
7 October 1985
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Major Libyan and Sudanese
Figures Involved in
Libyan Operations in Sudan
Muhammad `Ali Nayil
Unpredictable and dangerous chief of liaison with the
Sudanese Revolutionary Committees since his May
1985 arrival in Khartoum ... alienated Sudanese
Government officials with his{
disregard of protocol and has defied
persona non grata action ... previously assigned to
recruit and train young Sudanese for anti-Nimeiri
terrorist operations ... during mid-1970s was a
civilian intelligence "special operative" targeting
Libyan exiles for assassination ... tried and found
guilty in 1975 by Tunisian Government for
attempting to assassinate the then Prime Minister ...
later released.
Juma Muhammad Fazzani
Secretary, Khartoum People's Bureau, since May
1985... wields little influence... leftist ... former
newspaper editor ... Ambassador to Tunisia before
his arrival in Sudan.
Sa'd Masud
Second-in-command to liaison chief Nayil ... in
1977 was a member of Libyan leader Mu `ammar
Qadhafi s personal bodyguard unit ... has been
linked to spring 1984 bombings in London and
Manchester.
`Umar Sudani
Favors replacing older leaders of the Sudanese
Revolutionary Committees, such as Abdallah
Zakariya, with younger Sudanese revolutionaries ...
advocates infiltration of Egypt by Sudanese
Revolutionary Committee members... monitors
Libyan exile activity in Sudan ... was expelled from
Britain following April 1984 shooting of a
policewoman and, in April 1985, from Belgium for
suspected involvement in the shooting of a Libyan
exile in Bonn.
Muhammad Ati
Libyan Arab Airlines representative ... reports
directly to liaison chief Nayil ... uses daily visits to
Khartoum airport to recruit officials able to provide
assistance in moving material, including contraband,
through the airport.
Abdallah Zakariya
Nominal chairman of the Sudanese Revolutionary
Committees (SRC) ... longtime opposition figure ...
based in Libya from the mid-1970s until April 1985
coup ... formerly described as brilliant and
possessing good leadership qualities,
. regarded by Libyans and
many SRC members as a liability to the organization
... in June, SRC members and Libyans stripped him
of his SRC operational authority.
Salah Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa
General Coordinator for the Committees ... assumed
operational authority of Committees from Abdallah
Zakariya in June 1985... former head of Revo-
lutionary Committees office in Tripoli, Libya ...
received military and sabotage training in Libyar-
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against the Egyptian and US missions-it decided to
expel Libyans who lacked proper documentation and
to refuse entry to those arriving without visas.
Top Sudanese officials claim to be concerned about
the Libyan threat. In late July, the Council responded
to evidence of Libyan-promoted bombing and
assassination plots by approving the arrest and
deportation of the most dangerous Libyans, although
these orders have not yet been implemented. The
Council has also moved to counter Libyan activity by
forming a new security organization that obtained the
records and some of the equipment of the old security
search incoming aircraft for weapons, propaganda,
and subversive materials. The government has not yet
searched aid convoys, but may choose to do so now
that it has received reports of weapons being
smuggled in among those shipments. Khartoum has
also resumed contact with the anti-Qadhafi National
Foundation for the Salvation of Libya,
Differences among Libya's supporters in Sudan on the
utility of using terrorism has also impeded Libyan
efforts to increase Tripoli's influence. Some feared
that the use of terrorist violence would result in
expulsions and endanger their progress, while others
believed it would hasten the establishment of a pro-
Libyan regime. Leadership problems in the
Revolutionary Committees compounded strains
between the Libyans and Sudanese members. The
debauchery and corruption of Abdallah Zakariya, a
well-known longtime dissident with strong ties to
Libya (see inset), offended many Committee members
and resulted in efforts to remove him as head of the
Revolutionary Committees or confine him to a
figurehead role.
Remedial Policymaking
As their fortunes showed signs of fading, key Libyans
and Sudanese Revolutionary Committee members
traveled to Tripoli in July for an extended series of
policy meetings. the
Committee members had been surprised by the cold
reception they received from the Sudanese people. As
a result of this meeting, Tripoli apparently established 25X1
new goals and tactics and redefined the role of the
Committees:
? Revolutionary Committees were no longer to be
involved in terrorist planning. Instead, they were to
establish links with legitimate Sudanese
organizations and tout the virtues of the Committee
system and the Libyan revolution through
countrywide seminars.
? Revolutionary Committee members were to broaden
their base of support among Sudanese. They were to
forge links with unions, political parties and other
popularly based organizations, and recruit members
of the middle class. Contact with the masses was to
be a high priority. Committee members were to
emphasize Sudanese nationalism, in order to
overcome the Committee's image of the Committees
as Libyan puppets. While Zakariya was to remain
the nominal head of the Committees, he was to turn
over actual control to a less controversial figure.
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? Libya was to locate its covert activity within 2bAl
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within the Committees. Front companies would
supply operational funds and serve as sites for dead
drops, meetings, and recruiting. Transportation
companies would smuggle military equipment and
agricultural projects would serve as cover for
training pro-Libyan Sudanese.
Outlook
Libya's campaign to insinuate itself into the Sudanese
political process has benefited from the changes made
at the July meeting. Divorcing the Committees from
terrorist activity has calmed the Council's budding
security concerns. Indeed the Committees have since
joined the left-of-center alliance of political parties
and unions known as "The Gathering" and a
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officials. The security environment has remained
relatively permissive, and several front companies
already have been established as part of the
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subversive infrastructure. If Khartoum grants
Tripoli's request to establish an additional official
mission, a Cultural Center, and a JANA news agency
office, each organization would provide more berths
for Libyan subversives. Countrywide seminars and
links with domestic interest groups will also enable
Libya and the Revolutionary Committees to broaden
their base of support and popularize their ideas. The
Committees have already become a significant factor:
US Embassy in Khartoum reports that 3,000
Sudanese consider themselves members.
The possibility that Libya will resort to terrorism in
the near to medium term cannot be excluded,
however. Although diplomatic progress has
discouraged its use to date, contingency planning is
likely to continue, awaiting only a policy decision.
Tripoli could be compelled to turn to terrorist activity
if the reviving security service-eventually expected
to absorb 80 percent of the resources of the old
organization-appears to threaten Libya's position. If
evidence of Libyan subversion were to accumulate to
the point where the Council felt impelled to close
some facilities and order mass expulsions, Tripoli
could turn to terrorism as its only recourse.
Libya might also turn to terrorism in the event of a
domestic Sudanese political crisis. The assassination
of key individuals or bombings of important
installations would further heighten disorder,
providing an excuse for a Libyan-backed coup, which
would restore calm. Alternatively, Libya may exploit
controversial issues to stir up anti-US or anti-
Egyptian feeling and then take advantage of that
sentiment by staging terrorist attacks against the
personnel or facilities of those countries. For example,
if Egypt were to refuse a Sudanese request to
extradite Nimeiri, Libya would likely launch a critical
press campaign to set the stage for anti-Egyptian
attacks. Similarly, the upcoming trial of a former
high-level official could result in a public airing of US
involvement in the airlift of Falasha Jews to Israel.
Libya would likely exploit any resulting anti-US
sentiment by sponsoring terrorist operations.
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South Africa: The ANC's Role
in the Recent Unrest
The African National Congress (ANC), which has
operated from exile since the mid-1960s, has shifted
its tactics in recent months in an apparent effort to
intensify unrest, shake white confidence, and make
itself a leading force in the antigovernment protests. It
has had little influence over the black unrest that
began last year but has begun to adopt some new
tactics. Despite its recent call for violence in white
areas, however, the group is not yet prepared to
commit itself to a campaign of indiscriminate attacks
on whites because of fear of South African retaliation.
The ANC has generally avoided inflicting casualties
on white civilians, even though many nonwhites
approved of the ANC car bombing of the South
African Air Force Headquarters in 1983; 19 people
died and 219 were injured in that incident, including
many white civilians.
Following a conference in Zambia in June, however,
ANC Acting President Oliver Tambo said that the
group would not try to prevent white civilian
casualties when it attacks government targets and
that it would begin attacking off-duty white security
personnel. There is no evidence so far that these new
directives have influenced ANC operations.
In early September, an unprecedented ANC
radiobroadcast urged nonwhites to shift the violence
to white areas. Two days later, groups of nonwhites
attacked houses in white residential areas in western
and eastern Cape Province, the first such attacks
during the current unrest.
Playing Catchup
For the most part, the ANC has been trying to catch
up with the new black militancy during the past year
of violence in the townships. Because its activities and
policies have lagged behind internal developments, the
ANC has failed to take full advantage of world media
attention on South Africa.
Attacks against nonwhite "collaborators" appear to
have started spontaneously last September. Four
African National Congress Relations
With Regional Countries
Angola
Some 4,000 guerrillas in camps in central and
northeastern Angola ... military headquarters and
political office in Luanda.
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Botswana
Does not permit ANC military activity, but has been
Lesotho
Important recruiting center . .
lackluster efforts against group.
Mozambique
ANC military activities circumscribed since signing
of nonaggression pact with Pretoria last year ...
some guerrillas probably operate clandestinely.
Swaziland
Crackdown on group has persisted since signing of
security pact with Pretoria in 1982... group
continues to operate clandestinely.
Tanzania
Took in many guerrillas expelled from Mozambique
last year ... ANC has political office and camps and
runs college.
Zambia
ANC political headquarters in Lusaka ... several
small camps ... hosted recent ANC conference.
political figures frequently visit.
Zimbabwe
Refuses to allow attacks from its territory ... ANC
Secret
GI TR 85-020
7 October 1985
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African National Congress Relations With Regional Countries
The ANC at a Glance
History: Black reformists establish group in
1912; young black nationalist members spear-
head adoption of civil disobedience program in
1949; government bans group in 1960 following
Sharpeville incident; military wing-"Spear of
the Nation"-formed in 1961, launches
campaign of sabotage bombings; mass arrests
in 1963-65 cripple leadership and force group
into exile; military wing recruits thousands of
young blacks fleeing country during 1976-77
Soweto riots and renews campaign in late
1970s.
Structure and strength: 30-member National
Executive Committee oversees political and
military wings. Political wing, headquartered in
Lusaka, Zambia, has several hundred members;
military wing, headquartered in Luanda,
Angola, consists of 4,000 to 5,000 guerrillas,
most in Angola.
Angola Some 4,000 guerrillas in camps in central and
northeastern Angola ... military headquarters and
political office in Luanda.
Botswana Does not permit ANC military activity but
has not been able to prevent clandestine buildup in last
year.
Lesotho important recruiting center ... clandestine
military presence ... Pretoria unhappy with Maseru's
lackluster efforts against group.
Mozambique ANC military activities circumscribed
since nonaggression pact with Pretoria signed last
year ... some guerrillas probably operate clandestinely.
Swaziland Crackdown on group has persisted since
security pact signed with Pretoria in 1982 ... group
continues to operate clandestinely.
Tanzania Took in many guerrillas expelled from
Mozambique last year... ANC has political office and
camps and runs college.
Zambia ANC political headquarters in Lusaka ...
several small camps ... hosted recent ANC conference.
Zimbabwe Refuses to allow attacks from its
territory ... ANC political figures frequently visit.
Support: Soviet Bloc supplies almost all military
training and equipment and provides limited
funding; most financial and nonmilitary support
comes from Scandinavian states, OAU, and
UN.
Orientation: Mildly socialist political goals
outlined in 1955 "Freedom Charter"; long
history of ties to the South African Communist
Party (SACP); pro-Soviet Communists,
including some whites, well represented in
ANC leadership and exert considerable
influence; majority of rank and file composed of
nonideologues, anti-Communist nationalists,
and moderate socialists; no evidence that ANC
President Mandela, jailed since 1962, is
Communist, although he worked closely with
the SACP before his arrest.
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months later, Tambo announced that the group was
going to begin targeting collaborators.
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NC officials admit the
group has organized only a small percentage of the
attacks on collaborators in recent months.
From mid-September 1984 through last February, the
group had staged only two bombings against
government targets, well below its average since 1981
of about three operations per month. Bombings
increased again around the June anniversary of the
Soweto riots of 1976, but none occurred during the
first two months under the state of emergency
declared on 20 July.
Late last month, the dry spell ended when the ANC
bombed three supermarkets in Durban, causing little
damage and no casualties. An ANC official told the
press that the attacks were intended to show support
for an ongoing black consumer boycott of white stores
in the area. The bombings probably were timed to
steal local news headlines from Chief Buthelezi-
head of the powerful Zulu organization Inkatha-
who is strongly opposed to the ANC and was
scheduled to deliver a major speech the next day at a
Zulu rally in Durban.
Holding Back
Despite the new policy, ANC officials stated publicly
in September that they were not planning a campaign
of bombings aimed at white civilians.
Tambo
recently rejected a plan proposed by militant elements
in the ANC calling for attacks against whites in the
Johannesburg area. Recent ANC broadcasts have
also returned to their usual rhetoric, and there has
been only one additional attack in a white residential
area
Communist members of the ANC, a white minority,
reportedly have joined with Tambo and other cautious
veterans in the ANC leadership in restraining young
black nationalists in the rank and file who are eager to
engage in random terrorism against whites. ANC
chief military planner Joe Slovo-a white
History
Black reformists establish group in 1912; young
black nationalist members spearhead adoption of
civil disobedience program in 1949; government bans
group in 1960 followingSharpeville incident; military
wing-'Spear of the Nation "formed in 1961,
launches campaign of sabotage bombings; mass
arrests in 1963-65 cripple leadership and force group
into exile; military wing recruits thousands of young
blacks fleeing country during 1976-77 Soweto riots
and renews campaign in late 1970s.
Structure and Strength
Thirty-member National Executive Committee
oversees political and military wings. Political wing,
headquartered in Lusaka, Zambia, has several
hundred members; military wing, headquartered in
Luanda, Angola, consists of 4,000 to 5,000 guerrillas,
most in Angola.
Support
Soviet Bloc supplies almost all military training and
equipment and provides limited funding; most
financial and nonmilitary support comes from
Scandinavian states, OAU, and United Nations.
Orientation
Mildly socialist political goals outlined in 1955
`Freedom Charter"; long history of ties to the South
African Communist Party (SACP); pro-Soviet
Communists, including some whites, well represented
in ANC leadership and exert considerable influence;
majority of rank and file composed of nonideologues,
anti-Communist nationalists, and moderate
socialists; no evidence that ANC President Mandela,
jailed since 1962, is Communist, although he worked
closely with the SACP before his arrest.
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Age 67 ... Acting President since 1967... National
Executive Committee member ... in exile since 1960
... a realist who understands the ANC's dependence
on Communist aid, but who sometimes resents having
his authority undercut by Communists ... has
become more militant in recent years ... strongly
critical of US regional policy ... does not have the
influence of imprisoned ANC head Nelson Mandela.
Age 59 ... chief military planner ... only white on
National Executive Committee ... in exile since 1963
... member of South African Communist Party ...
son of Lithuanian immigrants ... lawyer.
Age 60 ... Secretary General since 1969... National
Executive Committee member ... in exile since 1964
... member of South African Communist Party ...
acts primarily as a spokesman and as main contact
with Bloc countries ... declining influence.
Age 42 ... Director, Department of Information and
Publicity since 1983... National Executive
Committee member ... in exile since mid-1970s ...
suspected member of South African Communist
Party ... son of Govan Mbeki, an imprisoned ANC
and South African Communist Party leader ...
extremely militant.
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Communist-is the leading opponent of terrorist
actions against white civilians
The reluctance to target white civilians probably
stems mainly from a fear of the likely South African
response: intensified attacks against ANC members
throughout southern Africa. In addition, the group
probably would lose the financial support it depends
on from the Scandinavian countries-Sweden in
particular-if it were to wage a bloody terrorist
campaign.
Outlook
In response to the recent ANC broadcasts and
bombings, South Africa probably will strike at ANC
outposts in Zambia, Lesotho, or Botswana. Pretoria
has warned these states that the presence of ANC
members within their borders is unacceptable. The
strong international reaction to the raid against the
ANC in Botswana in June will not deter Pretoria
from mounting further strikes.
Nonetheless, it appears inevitable that at some time
the ANC will begin bombing attacks in white civilian
areas. The catalyst for the order might be
spontaneous attacks by young blacks on white homes
and businesses or, conversely, a sudden lull in the
unorganized violence. It may come unbidden with the
rise of young militants within the ANC, which 2bAl
probably will be a gradual process, but one that is
consistent with the leadership's view that the
prolongation and spread of violence in South Africa is
serving the ANC's purposes.
A sustained pattern of attacks against white
civilians-whether spontaneous or conducted by the
ANC-would strengthen the resolve of many whites,
while others would flee the country. For most of the 3
million Afrikaners, who make up about 60 percent of
the white population, racial civil war has become a
dread but not daunting possibility; they have no other
homeland, and they will stand and fight. Many of the
800,000 English-speaking white South African
nationals holding British passports, however, might
choose to emigrate if the security situation were to
deteriorate rapidly.
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Uruguay: The Return of
the Tupamaros
The far left Movement for National Liberation,
generally known as the Tupamaros, has been
reorganizing since jailed members were freed by a
presidential amnesty shortly after Uruguay returned
to civilian rule in March. Some Tupamaros say they
now intend to pursue their goals within the framework
of the country's newly restored democratic political
system, but,
others remain committed to a return to guerrilla
violence. Although they currently appear too weak in
numbers and organization to mount a major threat to
law and order, the Tupamaros could gain wider
backing if the new government is unable to halt
Uruguay's continuing economic decline. A resurgence
of Tupamaro violence could eventually lead the armed
forces to intervene again in the political arena.
Factionalism
Differences between those Tupamaros who for now
want to work within Uruguay's political system and
those who advocate early resumption of the armed
struggle are impeding efforts to reinvigorate the
movement.
members of two minor factions favor resuming the
armed struggle as soon as possible
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Background
The Tupamaros, named for an 18th-century Inca
rebel, emerged as an urban guerrilla organization in
the 1960s. Their activities progressed from bank
robberies, purportedly for the benefit of the poor, to
kidnapings and murders designed to undermine the
democratic political system and pave the way for
creation of a radically socialist society. By the early
1970s, the Tupamaros' strength had reached between
300 and 1,000 with an additional 2,000 to 5,000
collaborators, according to open sources. When the
civilian government proved unable to combat the
movement, the armed forces assumed power in 1973
and cracked down harshly. Most of the Tupamaros
were either killed, jailed, or driven into exile.
Shortly after civilian rule was restored in Ma
nesty to
1985, President Julio Sanguinetti granted am
Uruguay's approximately 300 political prison
S
including some 80 Tupamaros, according to U
Embassy reporting. Since then, members of the
movement have been holding meetings, planning
strategy, and trying to recruit new adherents. The
new government's police intelligence unit has been
surveilling the activities of key Tupamaros,
the majority of
Tupamaro factions believes the movement should join
the leftist Broad Front coalition, one of Uruguay's
three main political parties.
while they were in prison many Tupamaros
came under the influence of the pro-Soviet
Communist Party, which participates in the Broad
Organizational and Recruiting Efforts
Top Tupamaro leader Raul Sendic and other ranking
cadre have taken a number of steps to rebuild the
movement. Shortly after their release from prison,
Secret
GI TR 85-020
7 October 1985
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they called on members to organize committees in
neighborhoods and workplaces and to begin preparing
for a Tupamaro "national convention" later this year.
A number of organizational and planning meetings
have already taken place,
Some of the emphasis
evidently has been on economic issues. According to
press deporting, the movement is calling for
renunciation of Uruguay's foreign debt, as advocated
by Cuba's Fidel Castro for all Latin American debtor
countries; nationalization of the banking system; and
expropriation of large landholdings.
The Tupamaros have also launched a recruiting
campaign, aimed primarily at younger people residing
in the interior of the country.
Tupamaro leaders believe that
discontent over Uruguay's economic troubles-
particularly over continuing inflation-is creating
opportunities for recruitment in a number of interior
areas.
Uruguayan
military officers are disturbed by the reemergence of
the Tupamaros, whom they regard as subversives.
moreover,
some officers fear the Tupamaros will take violent
action against selected military personnel for human
rights abuses committed when the armed forces were
in power. Sendic has said that he will seek prosecution
and punishment of all officers who were involved in
the military regime's antisubversive campaign,
Outlook
Even if the radical position were to be adopted, the
Tupamaros, in our judgment, currently lack sufficient
popular support to challenge the government's
maintenance of political control. We also believe that
the factions favoring an early return to the armed
struggle lack the capability to do so any time soon.
Over the longer term, however, if Sanguinetti fails to
improve Uruguay's economic situation, we expect the
Tupamaros will gain wider support, become more
unified, and engage increasingly in the kinds of
violent activities that disrupted Uruguay's political
and civil liberties in the 1970s. If the civilian
government proves unable to deal effectively with a
growing Tupamaro threat, the military could be
tempted to seize power again.
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Military leaders have generally supported Uruguay's
transition to civilian rule, and they do not appear
inclined to take any independent action soon against
either the Tupamaros or the Sanguinetti government
itself. This could change, however, in the event of a
resurgence of Tupamaro violence. The Army
Commander, General Medina, has stated publicly
that, while the military has no intention of staging
another takeover, neither will it permit the forces of
democracy to be overwhelmed by "enemies of the
state."
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The French Caribbean Departments:
Proindependence Terrorism
French Caribbean separatists, after 20 years of
unsuccessful and sometimes violent, proindependence
activities, are demonstrating a broader approach that
portends a more active and militant independence
movement. Separatist violence in France's Pacific
territory of New Caledonia last fall and France's
willingness in its wake to support independence there,
appear to have inspired separatists in Martinique,
Guadeloupe, and French Guiana, according to the US
Consul General. Since then, French Caribbean
separatists have increased their use of violence, tried
to strengthen their organizations, and attempted to
attract more popular support in order to increase
pressure on the Mitterrand government. Their more
sophisticated approach was underscored by the
success of recent protests in Guadeloupe, where
separatists exploited the island's racial tensions and
high unemployment rate to mobilize proindependence
sentiment. The separatists may also be trying to
improve their capabilities through closer ties to Libya.
So far, senior French officials have said publicly that
France will not compromise with the Caribbean
independence groups.
Strategies and Tactics
The inability of separatists since the 1960s to achieve
independence through the political process has
fostered the establishment of numerous clandestine
terrorist groups. These groups have remained small,
however. The US Consul General in Martinique
reports that only about 50 separatists have used
violent tactics and that Guadeloupe groups tend to
have overlapping memberships. Most
proindependence terrorist bombings of French official
and commercial property have occurred in
Guadeloupe. Moreover, according to the Consul
General, 80 percent of the citizens of the French
Caribbean oppose independence, although many favor
increased local autonomy. All these factors have
meant that proindependence activities in the
Caribbean departments until a few years ago posed
little threat to security.
In 1983, however, a series of 17 coordinated bombings
in all three departments and in Paris by the newly
formed Revolutionary Caribbean Alliance (ARC)
suggested that radical separatists had developed a
more sophisticated organizational network. The ARC
has conducted more spectacular operations than
earlier separatist groups and over the past two years
has shifted from bombing unoccupied government
property to targeting tourist facilities. Local officials
believe that the ARC has been responsible for over 60
bombings that have left seven dead, numerous
injured, and caused extensive property damage,
mainly in Guadeloupe.
Luc Reinette, the leader of both ARC and its political
arm, the Movement for the Independence of
Guadeloupe (MPGI), had been active even before
establishing the ARC; he is said to be responsible for
a wave of bombings in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Paris responded last year by substantially increasing
counterterrorist forces in the Caribbean departments,
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activists, but isolated terrorist incidents have
continued. According to the US Consul General, local
officials believe that other separatist groups
increasingly are adopting violent tactics. For example,
although the Guadeloupe Communist Party publicly
opposes independence, the US Consul General reports
that members of that party's youth arm support
terrorist tactics, and
nearly all independence groups in the
Caribbean now contain some radicals who advocate
violence. The ARC has drawn members from all these
groups. In the past year, two Martinique
independence groups, the Martinique Independence
Movement and the Socialist Revolutionary Group,
have been linked to separatist violence. A small
extremist group in French Guiana, the Anti-Colonial
Secret
GI TR 85-020
7 October 1985
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French Overseas Departments in the Caribbean Area
Puerto
Rico British Virgin
(U.S.) -Islands
(U.K.) Anguilla
Virgin Islands (U.K.)
4U. S.)
St. Christopher and
and Nevis ? CBarbuda
Montserrat
(U.K.)
Basse-Terre
Caribbean
Sea
Martinique
Fort-de-Freese` (France)
0St. Lucia
St. Vincent and 916
Barbados
the Grenadines
Tobago
Guadeloupe
"(France)
(9Dominica
D
Grenada
Brazil
North
Atlantic
Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritat
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and Anti-Imperialist Guianese Nationalists Party
(PANGA), espouses militancy, and an official of the
Union of Guianese Workers recently commented
publicly that "violence could not be excluded from the
struggle to end French rule." The US Consul General
reports that many terrorists lead double lives as
respectable middle-class professionals who publicly
condemn violence but covertly promote it-a factor
that has complicated the ability of French officials to
identify those responsible for bombings.
'after the
crackdown on the ARC, the youth wing of the
Popular Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe
(UPLG) emerged as the main subversive group in the
area. Although it is willing to use violence, it relies
less on terrorist tactics than the ARC did. UPLG
leaders appear to be concentrating on trying to build
popular support at home and abroad.
they are trying to unify
independence groups in the French Caribbean and to
improve relations with members of the Guadeloupe
are also concentrating on cultivating support among
youth and workers hurt by Guadeloupe's depressed
economy and the 3-percent unemployment rate. The
US Consul General reports that local officials believe
some labor strikes in Guadeloupe and Martinique in
recent months were instigated by the UPLG and
other separatists.
Libyan Meddling
We believe that the increasing militancy of the
separatists has fueled Libyan leader Qadhafi's recent
interest in contacting proindependence radicals in the
French Caribbean departments.
Tripoli, with the help of
leftists from Dominica and St. Lucia, has focused
primarily on developing ties to the UPLG. In our
judgment, Qadhafi hopes to exploit the separatist
movement in order to further his own objectives of
undermining US and French interests worldwide.
Tripoli wants to promote unity among
the separatist groups, broaden their domestic support,
and improve their capabilities for militant action.
among French separatist groups
French Caribbean
Suriname, and Tripoli in recent months. ~
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conference of independence groups from French
territories in Guadeloupe. The Libyans have also
agreed to finance the establishment of secretariats for
the various independence groups in Paris and
Outlook
The growth of ties between Libya and French
Caribbean separatists and the comprehensive strategy
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initiated by the UPLG portend the development of a 25X1
more active and sophisticated independence
movement. We believe that the UPLG's recent efforts
to broaden popular support and promote
proindependence unity may encourage Tripoli to
increase its assistance. Libyan funding and training
would improve the separatists' organization and
amplify their capabilities for violence.
independence groups from French territories in the
Caribbean and the Pacific are planning to intensify
their campaign of violence over the next few years.
Although we believe the radical minority among the
separatists will attempt more terrorism, UPLG and
other separatist leaders will remain cautious about
being associated with such incidents to avoid
jeopardizing their public relations effort. We believe
the separatists instead probably will increasingly
adopt confrontational tactics, such as demonstrations,
and stimulate greater labor unrest in the coming
months.
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18-19 February
28-29 May
23 June
A Chronology of Terrorist Activity
in the French Caribbean Departments
Two bombs damage Public Treasury and Maritime Affairs buildings in Point-a-
Pitre, Guadeloupe; no casualties. No one claimed responsibility, but 500 kilograms
of explosives were stolen from the Central Depository for Explosives on the same
day.
Seventeen bombs extensively damage several governmental and private properties
in all three departments and in Paris; one person killed. The Caribbean
Revolutionary Alliance (ARC), a previously unknown group, claimed
responsibility. This represented the first coordinated attack in all three
departments.
Four bombs damage Air France offices and a monument in Paris; no casualties.
The ARC claimed responsibility and demanded Paris release Guadeloupe political
prisoners.
Bomb damages supermarket in Basse-Terre; second device defused in Gosier,
Guadeloupe; arsonists damage supermarket in Point-a-Pitre. There were no
casualties. The ARC claimed responsibility.
7 August Four bombs damage Department of Public Works in Schoelcher, Martinique; no
casualties. The ARC claimed responsibility.
Bomb damages US Consul General's office in Martinique; no casualties. The
ARC stated that the attack was in retaliation for the US intervention in Grenada
in October.
14 November Six bombs damage governmental and private properties in Point-a-Pitre and
Basse-Terre, Guadeloupe; 23 people hurt. The ARC did not claim responsibility
but did announce the beginning of an armed struggle against France and its local
supporters. This represented the first bombings that caused indiscriminate
casualties.
Car bomb explodes in Marie Galante, Guadeloupe; no casualties. The ARC
claimed responsibility.
Two bombs disarmed near car of subprefect of Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe, and a
military vehicle. No claims were made.
23-24 December Bomb damages government building in Fort-de-France; another destroys television
relay station in Grand Riviere, Martinique. No casualties were reported and no
claims were made.
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20 January Bomb dismantled at Telecommunications Center in Guadeloupe. No group
claimed credit.
2-4 February Two bombs explode, three others disarmed at commercial buildings in St.
Francois, Gosier, and Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe; five people injured, including two
tourists. The ARC claimed responsibility, abandoning its former policy of avoiding
attacks that endangered lives; these were its first attacks on tourist facilities and
the local economy.
1985
3 January
Bomb destroys police car in Riviere-Salee; another destroys garage at golf course
in Les Trois Islets, Martinique. A third bomb damaged a supermarket in Fort-de-
France. No casualties were reported, and no group claimed responsibility.
Fifteen bombs damage government offices and three businesses in Basse-Terre and
Grande-Terre, Guadeloupe. There were no casualties, and no group claimed
credit.
Five bombs destroy police car, two private yachts, shop, and tennis club in
Guadeloupe; no casualties. No claims were received, but the bombings occurred on
the anniversary of the 1848 uprising that led to the abolition of slavery in
Martinique.
Four bombs in Basse-Terre and Point-a-Pitre explode prematurely, killing four
terrorists. At least three of those killed were members of the Popular Union for the
Liberation of Guadeloupe.
ARC letter threatens lives of Aime Cesaire, deputy mayor of Fort-de-France and
leader of People's Party of Martinque (PPM); Camille Darsieres, PPM member;
and Emile Maurice, president of General Council.
Three bombs damage several businesses; fourth destroys car of acting Procurator
General Bec in Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe. One person was injured. Bec was the
prosecutor in the case against Luc Reinette, reputed MPGI and ARC leader
arrested in November 1984 in connection with the bombing of a radio station a
year earlier.
Bomb destroys police motorcycle in Gosier; another device disarmed at shop in
Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe. On 11 January, Justice Nouvelle, a previously
unknown group, claimed responsibility for several recent bombings. The group
claimed to be acting in response to the police use of tear gas and armored cars in
December 1984 to disperse 3,000 to 4,000 demonstrators who were supporting
seven ARC terrorists then on trial.
12-13 January Firebomb destroys boat in Gosier harbor; two others burn autos in Abymes and St.
Anne, Guadeloupe. There were no casualties.
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5 February Home of French comedian Coluche destroyed by arson on Guadeloupe; no
casualties.
ARC terrorist leader Luc Reinette convicted, along with six other separatist
defendants, for bombings committed during 1983. Reinette received three separate
convictions for a total of 19 years.
23 February Firebomb damages discotheque in ('cosier, Guadeloupe; no casualties. There were
no claims of responsibility.
5 March
7 March
9 March
13 March
Six firebombs explode, one directed at offices of France-Antilles newspaper in
Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe; no casualties. Riposte Populaire, a previously unknown
group, claimed responsibility.
Firebombs destroy six cars; time bomb near police headquarters defused in Moule,
Guadeloupe. There were no casualties, and no group claimed responsibility.
Lucette Michaux-Chevry, President of Guadeloupean General Council, survives
assassination attempt. No group claimed responsibility.
Bomb damages police station in Gosier, injuring five persons. Another bomb
damaged a restaurant in Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe.
Bomb at restaurant in Point-a-Pitre, Guadeloupe, kills three (including one US
citizen), and injures nine (including three US citizens). The bomb was left by a
black Antillean couple, but no group claimed responsibility.
16 June ARC leader Luc Reinette and three others escape from prison in Guadeloupe.
Officials claimed his escape received "inside help."
24 June Gunman misses local magistrate investigating Reinette's escape from prison. This
was the first incident, terrorist or criminal, directed against a local magistrate.
Proindependence demonstrators in Guadeloupe mine at least four barricades
during protests over imprisonment of separatist leader. Gendarme vehicles and a
helicopter were hit by heavy caliber gunfire. One person was wounded.
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1 November 1981
1 November 1981
2 November 1917
3 November 1903
3 November 1918
3 November 1929
3 November 1978
4 November 1963
4 November 1979
4 November 1983
5 November 1605
6 November 1979
7 November 1917
9 November 1938
9 November 1974
10 November 1938
11 November 1957
The Terrorism Diary for November
event.
Below is a compendium of October dates of known or conceivable significance to
terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself
be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist
Algeria. Revolution Day.
Antigua and Barbuda. Independence Day.
Palestinians. Balfour Day (anniversary of declaration committing Britain to set up
a Jewish homeland in Palestine).
South Korea. Students Day (student protests against Japanese rule erupt in
Kwangju).
Dominica. Independence Day.
Iran. Exile of Ayatollah Khomeini to Turkey.
Iran-United States. Seizure of US Embassy by student radicals.
Ecuador. Founding of Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).
United Kingdom. Guy Fawkes Day (Catholic plot to bomb Parliament thwarted).
Morocco. Green March (anniversary of march by unarmed Moroccan citizens into
Spanish Sahara).
Communist world. Great October Socialist Revolution.
Germany. Reichskristallnacht "Crystal Night" (outbreak of anti-Jewish violence).
West Germany. Death of RAF terrorist Holger Meins from hunger strike.
Turkey. Death of Kemal Ataturk.
Colombia. Declaration of war on central government by People's Liberation Army
(EPL).
27 Secret
GI TR 85-020
7 October 1985
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11 November 1984
12 November 1918
13 November 1970
14 November 1935
15 November 1889
15 November 1983
17 November 1973
18 November 1918
18 November 1940
18 November 1955
19 November 1798
19 November 1968
20 November 1910
20 November 1936
20 November 1975
20 November 1983
20 November 1983
21 November 1949
21 November 1973
22 November 1943
22 November 1975
24 November 1965
24 November 1965
Mauritania. Coup that brought current regime to power.
Austria. Republic Day.
Syria. Hafez al-Asad assumes power.
Jordan. Birthday of King Hussein.
Brazil. Proclamation of the republic.
Cyprus. Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence.
Greece. Student uprising at Athens Polytechnic University. (Terrorist group "17
November Movement" takes its name from this incident.)
Latvia. National Day.
Oman. Birthday of Sultan Qabus Bin Said.
Morocco. Independence Day.
Ireland. Death of Wolfe Tone, first Irish revolutionary (annual nationalist
pilgrimage).
Mali. Liberation Day.
Mexico. Anniversary of the revolution overthrowing Diaz regime.
Spain. Death of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera (founder of the Falange).
Spain. Death of Gen. Francisco Franco and accession of King Juan Carlos.
Colombia. Passage of amnesty law and legalization of M-19 Movement.
Saudi Arabia. Occupation of Grand Mosque in Mecca by conservative Muslims
inspired by Iran.
Libya. Proclamation Day (UN resolution on Libyan independence).
Grenada. "Bloody Sunday" (deaths of New Jewel Movement members).
Lebanon. Independence Day.
Spain. Proclamation of Juan Carlos as king.
Kuwait. Amir Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah ascends to the throne.
Zaire. Revolution Day (anniversary of Second Congolese Republic).
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25 November 571
25 November 1973
25 November 1975
26 November 1924
26 November 1984
27 November
28 November 1821
28 November 1912
28 November 1936
28 November 1944
28 November 1958
28 November 1960
28 November 1966
28 November 1975
29 November 1945
29 November 1947
29 November 1947
30 November 1966
30 November 1967
30 November 1970
30 November 1975
Muslim world. Birth of the Prophet Mohammad.
Greece. Coup leading to end of military rule.
Suriname. Independence Day.
Mongolia. Founding of the republic.
United States-Iraq. Renewal of diplomatic relations.
Philippines. Birthday of slain opposition leader Benigno Aquino.
Panama. Independence from Spain.
Albania. Independence Day.
Lebanon. Founding of Phalange Party.
Albania. Liberation Day.
Chad. Proclamation of the republic.
Mauritania. Independence Day.
Burundi. Proclamation of the republic.
Indonesia. Fretilin declares East Timor independent.
Yugoslavia. Republic Day.
Israel. Proclamation Day.
Palestinians. "International Day of Solidarity With the Palestinian People."
(anniversary of partition).
Barbados. Independence Day.
South Yemen. Independence Day.
South Yemen. Constitution promulgated.
Benin. National Day.
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21 August North Yemen: Grenade attack injures two at Soviet Embassy in Sanaa. No group
has claimed responsibility, but the government suspects Muslim fundamentalists.
4 September Zaire: Zairian dissident arrested for plotting to kill President Mobutu. The
suspect reportedly has admitted receiving terrorist training in Libya.
Chronology of Terrorism-1985
Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving
terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light
since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not
be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in
this publication are not included.
Saudi Arabia: Several Lebanese Shias arrested for smuggling weapons and
explosives into Tait the men had 25X1
crossed the border from North or South Yemen disguised as Saudi womenF---] 25X1
representative of the West German Government.
Western Sahara: Polisario releases two West Germans captured after it sank their
boat. The two, who had been held since 22 August, were returned to a
attack.
West Bank: Incendiary bomb damages police station near Nablus. The General
Command of the Palestinian Revolution Forces claimed responsibility for the
claimed went off in another transportation station later that same afternoon.
West Bank: Bomb explodes inside Israeli military transportation station in
Jerusalem, injuring demolitions expert. The General Command of the Palestinian
Revolution Forces took responsibility for that incident and for a second bomb it
10 September El Salvador: President Duarte's daughter, companion kidnaped on San Salvador
university campus. One security guard was killed and another mortally wounded.
The Pedro Pablo Castillo Front, a leftwing group formed in July, later claimed
responsibility)
31 Secret
GI TR 85-020
7 October 1985
25X1
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11 September West Germany: RAF safehouse discovered in Tuebingen. The apartment had been
used primarily by Red Army Faction members Barbara and Horst Meyer, as
recently as late July or early August. Documents found included papers pertaining
to a vehicle used in an attack on a financial messenger near Tuebingen in June.
Lebanon: Attempt to kidnap Portuguese Ambassador at Beiruts green line fails.
Units of the Lebanese Army foiled the attempt; the Ambassador and his wife were
unharmed.
Iran: Car bomb explodes in Tehran city park, injuring three. No group has
claimed responsibility. This was the ninth such explosion in Tehran this year
Chile: Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front creates widespread blackouts in central
region. An FPMR communique claimed that the blackouts were intended to
commemorate the 12th anniversary of the death of President Salvador Allende
and to protest the past 12 years of military rule under the Pinochet regime
has blamed unspecified oppositionists.
14 September Spain: Bomb explodes under police car in Vitoria, killing a policeman and
wounding another person. No group claimed responsibility for the incident, but the
Basque separatist group ETA is suspected.
El Salvador: Honduran Embassy in San Salvador struck by grenade hurled from
passing vehicle. There were no casualties and damage was minimal. The urban
leftwing group Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front claimed the attack was in
retaliation for a Honduran Army operation against the Colomoncagua refugee
camp in August.
Three crewmen and a passenger were injured and four railcars were damaged.
Sri Lanka: Three Sinhalese civilians reported killed near Trincomalee by 12
gunmen. Although no group has claimed credit for the attack, the killers probably
were Tamil separatist guerrillas.
15 September Denmark: Bombs explode outside two Jewish-owned shops in Copenhagen,
injuring 12. Police suspect local anti-Jewish groups-rather than Middle Eastern
groups-may be responsible.
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16 September Italy: Grenade attack on Rome sidewalk cafe injures 38 tourists, including nine
Americans. Police arrested a Palestinian in connection with the attack. On 19
September, the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM) claimed
credit; ROSM is believed to be a covername used by the Abu Nidal Group in
attacks on UK targets.
El Salvador: National Police capture five members of Clara Elizabeth Ramirez
Front in San Salvador. Police believe that evidence found at one of the suspect's
homes may link them to the murder of a military spokesman on a San Salvador
tennis court on 7 March and the assassination of Gen. Jose Medrano on 23 March.
17 September 25X6
Argentina: Bomb does extensive damage to Buenos Aires replica of Britain's "Big
Ben "clock tower. No group claimed responsibility, but anti-UK graffiti was found
at the scene. The attack came 24 hours before a meeting in Paris between
President Alfonsin and a UK opposition leader to discuss sovereignty over the
disputed Falkland Islands
18 September Greece: Jordanian publisher assassinated in Athens. Michel Nimri reportedly was
a personal friend of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and had recently published in his
magazine "Annaskra" details of an alleged plot to overthrow Syrian President
Assad. The Black September group, which opposes Arafat, claimed credit for the
murder the next day.
19 September Lebanon: Unidentified gunman assassinates Palestinian guerrilla Kamal Hussein
in Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp. This incident was the latest in a string of attacks
that have killed seven supporters of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and wounded
another.
Iran: Bomb in Tehran bus terminal kills one person, wounds 36. No group has yet
taken credit for the explosion, the third i i the capital in nine days.
20 September Peru: Sendero Luminoso blacks out Lima and neighboring cities. Dynamite
attacks against power pylons resulted in a 30-minute blackout in the city center,
but it took authorities longer to restore power to the surrounding areas
Peru: Naval airbase at El Callao attacked by truck bomb. The driver leaped from
the truck moments before it hit a wall at the entrance gate and exploded, seriously
wounding a Navy officer. No group has claimed credit, but two suspects were
apprehended at the scene.
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Western Sahara: Polisario guerrillas sink Spanish fishing boat, killing at least
two fishermen and capturing six others. The group has frequently attacked
Spanish fishing vessels, as well as ships from other countries.
21 September Spain: New group claims credit for bombs planted several months ago. "Andecha
Obrera" took responsibility for a bomb in Oviedo that damaged the former center
of the Asturian Employers' Federation and several cars. Police were able to defuse
the second bomb, which was planted at an employment office in Gijon.
Western Sahara: Polisario attacks Spanish patrol boat sent to search for survivors
of previous day's attack. This is the first time the group has attacked a Spanish
naval vessel.
France: Prime Minister acknowledges government role in sinking of "Rainbow
Warrior"protest ship in New Zealand. The Defense Minister and the chief of
France's external intelligence service resigned. Two French intelligence officers
are being held in New Zealand for the 10 July bomb attack that killed one
crewmember.
West Bank: Police defuse car bomb in Jerusalem neighborhood of Mea Sharim.
Fatah's Force 17 claimed responsibility for the abortive attack. F__~ 25X1
West Bank: Premature explosion kills Palestinian preparing bomb in Dehaishe
refugee camp near Bethlehem. No other casualties were reported
23 September West Germany: Bomb damages NATO pipeline near Limburg. No casualties were
reported, but 25,000 gallons of oil spilled from the ruptured pipe. No group has
claimed responsibility.
26 September Lebanon: Israeli Air Force bombs two Bekaa Valley terrorist bases belonging to
Abu Musa organization. The Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus claimed the strikes-
which reportedly caused material damage but no casualties-were not related to
the murder of the three Israelis in Cyprus the previous day.
25X1
25X6
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Secret
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