STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. ENDERS ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE APRIL 12, 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00135R000601040030-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: April 12, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

STATEMENT OF THOMAS 0. ENDERS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ~ICL \C4
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS G~e
BEFORE
THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
April 12, 1983
Since the Somoza government collapsed and the Sandinistas
came to power, U.S. policy toward Nicaragua has focussed on
attempting to convince Nicaragua to:
renounce support for insurgency in neighboring
countries;
abandon its pursuit of dominant military power in
Central America; and
come to terms with its own society through the
creation of democratic institutions.
In July 1979, the soon-to-be governing Junta of Nicaragua
pledged formally to the Organization of American States that
its goals were democratic and peaceful. The United States,
indeed the entire international community, accepted this pledge
and embarked on programs of peaceful reconstruction that
typically included substantial appropriations of assistance
outside annual budget processes.
As the months passed, however, it became increasingly
apparent that the Sandinistas saw themselves as the armed
vanguard of an isthmus-wide movement.
Nicaragua's new regular army, the Ejercito Popular
Sandinista (EPS), was founded in 1979. By the end of last
year, according to its commander, it had grown to be "four
times as big and eight times as strong" as Somoza's Guardia
Nacional.1 The EPS reached an estimated strength of 20,000,
backed up by militias and reserves 80,000 strong. During that
period Nicaragua received an estimated $125 million of military
equipment and supplies from the Soviet Union alone.2 It
obtained by far the heaviest tanks in Central America, heavy
artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, assault helicopters, rocket
launchers, and patrol boats. While military pilots and crews
trained in Bulgaria and other Eastern European locations,
airfields were prepared for advanced jet fighters. More
significant, large numbers of foreign military and security
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advisors were introduced. Currently no less than 2,000 Cubans,
50 Soviets, 35 East Germans, and 50 PLO and Libyan personnel
are estimated to be stationed in Nicaragua on security
missions. That is roughly one foreign military advisor for
every 1,000 Nicaraguans.
In 1980 (just as in 1978 Castro had brought the three main
Sandinista factions together in Havana), Cuban agents brought
five guerrilla factions from El Salvador together in Managua,
worked out a unity pact among them, then set up a joint command
and control apparatus in the Managua area and organized
logistic and training support on Nicaraguan soil. Since that
time, the great bulk of the arms and munitions used by the
insurgents in El Salvador have flowed through Nicaragua.3
Meanwhile the Sandinistas moved to assert a monopoly of
power inside Nicaragua. Elections were ridiculed and
postponed. One by one the elements of the broad anti-Somoza
coalition were shorn off. The famous newspaper La Prensa was
censored, independent radio and TV stations curbed, the labor
unions intimidated, the private sector neutralized, the
Catholic Church subjected to repeated provocation and attempts
at division, the Miskitos and other Nicaraguan Indian
minorities persecuted.
Now, Nicaragua's southern border is 300 miles from the
Panama Canal, separated only by Costa Rica, a democracy that
for almost 35 years has had no army. Its northern border is
300 miles from Mexico. In between are two states, El Salvador
.and Guatemala, already torn by guerrilla violence, and
Honduras, whose fledgling democracy is under daily pressure
from Nicaragua.
It does not take very much imagination to understand how
the Sandinistas' "revolution without frontiers" might spread.
Nor how its spread might affect our security. Half our trade
flows through the Caribbean. And we depend on the stability of
our neighbors to avoid what in certain circumstances could
become an unprecedented flow of refugees northward to this
country. Especially now, when a troubled world economy invites
unrest, we must safeguard democracy and stability in our.
immediate neighborhood.
We have all seen predatory dictatorships of the right and
the left. Germany under Hitler. The Soviet Union under Stalin
and since. Yet, there is a school that attributes the
expansionism of left-wing dictatorships to pressures from
without. According to this proposition, Soviet aggressiveness
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is but a reaction to the creation of a network of alliances
around it, Castro was made a Communist by U.S. confrontation,
and Vietnam was radicalized by foreign armies.
Whatever the merits or defects of these arguments, let me
point out that the Nicaraguan case provides ample data to test
the policy that usually flows from this proposition -- that
left-wing radicalization and aggressiveness can be prevented by
the political support and economic assistance of the
democracies.
Nicaragua is a country of some 2 1/2 million people. Since
1979 it has received from the democracies and multilateral
agencies $1.6 billion in economic assistance, or $640 for every
man, woman and child. The U.S. supplied $125 million.
Politically, such democratic states as Mexico and the parties
belonging to the Socialist International have provided
consistent support.
Yet this same period marks the big build-up of the EPS,
direct support for violence in El Salvador and the
consolidation of internal repression.
It is clear that constructive engagement has not worked in
Nicaragua.
So far, negotiation has not worked any better. There have
been many efforts. Some continue to this day.
I was involved in a first such effort, travelling to
Managua in August 1981 to listen to Sandinista concerns. They
told me that they remembered the U.S. Marine occupation in the
first decades of the century, that they feared a U.S. invasion
and thus needed a big, army, and that we should understand that
the Salvadoran guerrillas were important as a "shield" to
.protect Nicaragua.
So we said ok, let's address your concerns. Let's enter
into a bilateral non-aggression agreement. The U.S. could use
its influence to encourage Nicaraguan exiles in this country to
moderate their behavior. And the U.S. could renew its economic
assistance. In return we asked the Sandinistas to stop
training and supplying Salvadoran guerrillas, to give pluralism
a chance in their own country -- as they had promised to the
OAS in 1979 -- and to limit their military build-up, perhaps
through agreement with other Central American countries.
We made these proposals in writing. In October 1981,
Managua formally rejected them as "sterile". At the same time,
they lied about their ongoing arms supplies to the Salvadoran
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guerrillas and said they would never limit their military
build-up.
A second attempt at negotiation occurred in the spring of
1982, this time at the suggestion of Mexican President Lopez
Portillo.
Once again we presented concrete proposals in writing, this
time elaborated in eight points presented through our
Ambassador in Managua. Once again, there was no concrete
response, and no receptivity on issues. Nicaragua simply
replied that, before it could respond there would have to be a
meeting at a higher level in Mexico. This time, it seemed to
us, the Sandinistas wanted to appear to negotiate without
actually doing so.
We decided to try a third time. Under Costa Rican
leadership, a group of democratic states got together in San
Jose in October 1982 to work out a comprehensive set of peace
proposals for Central America as a whole. Let me speak a
moment about these proposals, because they continue to
represent the essence of what we, like Nicaragua's democratic
neighbors, are trying to do.
First, the San Jose group agreed the area should be freed
from East-West competition. The way to do that, the
democracies concluded, is to get all foreign military advisors
and trainers out of Central America -- Cuba's, the Soviet
Union's, Bulgaria's, East Germany's, the PLO's, and ours.
Second,.the Central American countries must find a way to
live with each other without fear. To this end, the San Jose
group proposed mutual and verifiable accords banning the import
of heavy offensive weapons, renouncing the support for
insurgency on neighbors' territory, and providing for
international surveillance of frontiers.
Third, each Central American country must find a way to
establish democratic institutions, open to opposition
elements. Central American democrats, led by Costa Rica, are
particularly clear on the need for democratization. Only in
this way could they be confident they will not have to face
sometime in the future an aggressive neighbor unconstrained by
the limits democracy imposes.
Representing the San Jose group, Costa Rica attempted to
contact Nicaragua to ask whether it would enter into a dialogue
on these principles. The Sandinistas refused even to receive
the proposal, arguing that they had not participated in its
formulation, and so were not bound to address it.
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So a fourth attempt at negotiations is now being made. In
January 1983, Mexico,: Colombia, Venezuela and Panama met on the
island of Contadora to propose an effort at mediation of
Central America's conflict. Honduras, Costa Rica and El
Salvador responded by proposing that the five Central American
countries -- including Nicaragua -- meet in the presence of the
Contadora group. This would enable Nicaragua to take part in
developing the proposals, as it had not in San Jose. And, to
maximize the chances that Nicaragua would participate, they
suggested that the U.S. not be present. That would also take
care of charges that the conference would be U.S.-dominated.
But still Nicaragua was not receptive. Instead, it went to
the UN Security Council, claiming that it wants to meet
bilaterally with the U.S. and with Honduras, not regionally.
In effect, Nicaragua is saying it wants to discuss Nicaragua's
charges against Honduras and the U.S. -- but not its neighbors
concerns about Nicaragua's militarization, dictatorship, and
intervention in El Salvador.
I have described this history at some length to give you
some idea of the extraordinary difficulty of dealing with the
Sandinista leadership.
The Sandinistas have made their contempt for genuine
dialogue -- for real negotiations -- quite clear. A month ago,
we all saw them interrupt the Pope in a calculated attempt at
intimidation -- and the Sandinistas followed this up by banning
broadcasts of Easter services. Last week, Interior Minister
Tomas Borge, in an interview for Cuban television, stressed the
subjects his country would not negotiate: Nicaragua, he said,
would not discuss.the principles of the Sandinista Revolution;
it would not enter into a dialogue about the overall Central
American situation; and it would not talk-about
"counter-revolutionaries". He might have added that the
Sandinistas are afraid to deal with these issues in any kind of
open way --.either with their own people or with Nicaragua's
increasingly concerned neighbors. So it is sad, rather than
surprising, that Borge tells his Cuban TV audience that the
proposed meeting of Central American Foreign Ministers is
"diplomatic demagogy".
Despite this record, we are not going to give-up. The
Sandinistas are obviously not yet persuaded that they have to
negotiate on substance with either their neighbors or their
internal critics. Perhaps they still think that if they bob
and weave enough, something will change -- that the U.S. will
end or weaken its support for democratic governments in Costa
Rica, El Salvador and Honduras -- and that the way will again
be open for\the "revolution without frontiers." We must
convince th,m that, that is not the case, that the U.S. will not
abandon it? ,friends in Central America. At the same time, we
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must go on probing, proposing ways to talk that overcome the
old objections -- until the Sandinistas tell us they are ready
to move to a fair and equitable dialogue.
Meanwhile, Nicaraguans have taken matters into their own
hands. Sandinista intransigence has sparked an insurgency that
the Sandinistas themselves claim is a threat.
Several thousand guerrillas are now active in Nicaragua.
Disillusioned Miskito Indians operate in much of their homeland
in the Atlantic lowlands. In the eastern and northern border
departments of Jinotega, Nueva Segovia, Madriz, Esteli and
Zelaya, significant insurgents forces are attacking government
outposts and ambushing military convoys. Guerrilla activity is
reported in the central coffee-growing province of Matagalpa.
This month for the first time armed dissidence has been
reported in the south. Wherever the opposition groups show up,
they seem to attract local support,.and their numbers grow.
In light of recent allegations in the media, you will ask
me right off whether this insurgency has been created or
supported by the United States. No American administration has
ever discussed this kind of allegation -- other than in the
Senate and House committess created expressly for the purpose
-- and this one will not break precedent. But I will describe
the Nicaraguan opposition movements; it should be clear to you
that it has appeared and expanded in response to deep
grievances against the Sandinistas.
Who are the people who have dared challenge Managua's
ideologues? What do they want? Based on what we know, several
things can be said. Most importantly, they are Nicaraguans to
the core. There are two major groups.
One, the larger, is the Frente Democratico Nacional (FDN).
Although its main strength is inside Nicaragua, Sandinista
repression has driven most of its leaders to Honduras and Costa
Rica. The FDN's directorate is made up of Lucia Salazar, the
widow of Jorge Salazar, an anti-Somoza businessman murdered by
the Sandinistas in 1980; Alfonso Callejas, a former
vice-president of Nicaragua who broke cleanly with Somoza in a
1978 attempt to oust Somoza; Edgar Chamorro, an apolitical
private sector leader; Indalecio Rodriguez, former vice-rector
of the Central American University (UCA); Enrique Bermudez,..a
former National Guard colonel whom Somoza removed from
Nicaragua by sending him as military attache to Washington from
1975 to 1979 (and whom the Sandinistas themselves have
acknowledged played no part in Somoza regime repression); Marco
Zeledon, a respected private sector leader with no ties to the
Somozas; and Adolfo Calero, a life-long opponent of the Somozas
r'
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who was jailed by Somoza in 1978. They have publicly stated
that their objective is to bring democracy to Nicaragua, not a
return to Somocismo. Indeed, several FDN leaders were jailed
for their activities against Somoza. In sociological terms,
these leaders represent members of the professions and
teachers, plus small businessmen and farmers. Their followers
include disaffected peasants, former small farmers, Miskito
Indians, and other groups displaced or simply repressed by
Managua's ideologues. We estimate that the FDN's ranks include
over a thousand guerrillas. Former National Guardsmen --
mostly non-commissioned officers -- lead many of these guerrill
units, but most of the members are peasants and former small
farmers.
FDN pronouncements repudiate the Somoza past and affirm the
nationalistic and patriotic principles of Sandino. As I am
sure the Committee is aware, the FDN proposed a peace plan on
January 13, 1983, in which they offered to cease hostilities if
among other points the GRN held internationally supervised
elections by September 1983, revoked the state of siege in
Nicaragua, and separated public administration from partisan
political and ideological activities.
The second major group, led by the anti-Somoza hero Eden
Pastora, is ARDE -- the Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica.
ARDE's leaders include such well-known figures as former
post-Somoza junta leader Alfonso Robelo, Miskito Indian leader
Brooklyn Rivera, and former anti-Somoza fighter Fernando
"Negro" Chamorro. Pastora, who was the original Sandinista
Vice-Minister of Defense, has repeatedly denounced the
revolution's betrayal, which he argues was motivated by Cuban
agents enforcing a sellout to the Soviet Union. Most of ARDE's
statements have been issued from Costa Rica. ARDE's February 2
peace proposal calls for elections of a constituent assembly by
June 1983 to fulfill the promise of the Sandinista revolution.
Caught off balance by the scope of the opposition it has
brought upon itself, the Nicaraguan Government has sought to
discredit its opponents as "Somocistas" -- attempting to
associate them with the crimes of the former government. The
Sandinistas' current propaganda plan -- we have seen the March
24 FSLN memorandum -- instructs its political cadres to blame
"U.S. imperialism" for the country's problems, to-smear. Adolfo
Calero -- a Democratic Conservative Party leader with whom they
have negotiated, and Alfonso Robelo -- a former member of their
own Junta, as "traitors", and to portray opposition as aimed
against Nicaragua rather than against its current rulers.
Now.the Comandantes have not accepted our proposals before,
but I would urge them, before they get too far calling Calero
of the FDN..and Robelo of ARDE "traitors," to recall that last
year they failed to convince their own people that Eden
C a
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Pastora, a man who is'still proud to call himself "a true
Sandinista", could be a traitor to the Nicaraguan people or to
the original ideals of the Sandinista revolution.
The Sandinistas assert that the only alternative to what
they've created is "Somocismo". Nothing could be more
simplistic or more false. "Somocismo" was a highly personal
traditional dictatorship that died with Somoza. It could not
be recreated even if one wished to do so. The Sandinistas know
that most Nicaraguans want democracy, peace and an end to Cuban
influence. Indeed, that is the program promised the Nicaraguan
people in 1979. And that is the program the Sandinistas are
today always trying to sweep under the rug they call
"Somocismo". The Nicaraguan people remember their history. So
should we.
It is not clear what the
course
of
Nicaragua will be. What is
certain
is
Nicaragua forces legitimate
dissent
at
means and persists in threatening
and
neighbors, it will never be stable,
nor
the struggle in
that, as long as
home to follow violent
destablizing its
will Central America.
It is conceivable that Cuba or the Soviet Union could be
tempted to escalate the conflict, introducing modern fighter
aircraft or even Cuban combat troops. Clearly a dangerous
situation would then develop, unacceptable not only to Central
America but to the American nations as a whole. We have
communicated to Moscow and Havana how. dangerous such a move
would be.
It is also conceivable that, in an effort to distract
attention from their internal problems, the Sandinistas might
lash out at their neighbors, attacking Costa Rica or Honduras.
For over a year, Managua has already been running terrorist
operations in San Jose and infiltrating guerrillas into
northern Costa Rican provinces. And there have been frequent
border incidents with Honduras. Although journalists who have
visited the area report no activity on the Honduran side,
Nicaragua has recently reinforced military units on the
border. Again, I believe the Sandinistas understand that they
could not gain by attacking their neighbors. It is also
important to stress that every resource of inter-American
diplomacy, including of course that of this country, would be
available to prevent such an outburst.
But there is a better way. It is through dialogue and
negotiation.
We ask the Sandinistas to think of the Nicaraguan people.
Despite all that foreign aid, Nicaraguans in city and
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countryside are much less well off than before the revolution.
They resent the pressures on their churches and their clergy.
They distrust and dislike the Sandinista monopoly of power.--
they have lived under such a system before.
We ask the Sandinistas to consider the insurgency in their
own country. Despite -- or is it because? -- of the presence
of all those armed Cubans, popular resistance is spreading.
They may conclude that the dialogue they have so many times
spurned is preferable to widening civil strife.
We ask the Sandinistas to consider the insurgency they are
supporting in El Salvador. If it has legitimate grievances,
let them be pursued through democratic institutions. The
international community is willing and able to provide security
and other guarantees for elections as the answer there as well.
Each element of the Central` American problem is related to
the other. No amount of land reform, or open elections, or
improvement in human rights will end the conflict in El
Salvador if Nicaragua continues to fuel it. Democracy will not
prosper in Nicaragua's neighbors unless it is practiced in
Nicaragua aw well. Nicaragua will not be free of the hostility
of its own people and of its neighbors, until it begins to
address their concerns for democracy and security.
So the answer is democratization and dialogue among
neighbors. The purpose of U.S. policy in the area is to create
conditions in which the area can be removed from East-West
conflict, the import of offensive weapons and mutual support
for insurgencies ended, and the democratic transformation of
each society achieved. Negotiations among all the Central
American countries and negotiations within countries can
provide the opportunity for all groups to.compete in the voting
booth rather than on the battlefield.
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FOOTNOTES
1. EPS Chief of Staff Joaquin Cuadra to U.S. Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Major General
William E. Odom in November 1982.
2. By way of comparison, El Salvador received $121 million
from the U.S. during the same period.
3. Nicaragua's Sandinistas aid the guerrillas in El
Salvador by supplying arms, training, financial aid, and by
allowing the guerrillas' command and control center to operate
near Managua.
ARMS SUPPLY
-- Arms and ammunition destined for clandestine delivery to
El Salvador reach Nicaragua by ship and by direct
flights from Havana to Nicaragua. The arms remain
stockpiled near Managua until their use by the
guerrillas.
-- Several "smoking guns" have revealed Nicaraguan arms
shipments to El Salvador. Nicaragua's Papalonal
airfield was used for direct supply flights to the
Salvadoran guerrillas for the January 1981 "final
offensive"; two overland shipments from Nicaragua
through Honduras discovered in 1981 contained weapons
originally shipped to American units in Vietnam (similar
caches of arms were discovered in Guatemala City in
mid-1981, apparently destined for the Gutemalan
insurgents); a captured Salvadoran guerrilla leader,
Lopez-Arriola, confirmed that the Sandinistas control
weapons delivered from Vietnam to Nicaragua for the
Salvadoran insurgents.
-- The Sandinistas use a variety of routes (overland, air
drop and sea) to furnish arms and, increasingly, vitally
needed ammunition. In 1982, these supply operations
have included increased quantities of heavier weapons,
including M-60 machine guns, M-79 grenade launchers, and
M-72 antitank weapons.
-- A Salvadoran guerrilla, Alejandro Montenegro, captured
during a raid on a guerrilla safehouse in Honduras in
August 1982, confirmed that Nicaragua remains the
primary source of insurgent weapons and ammunition,
although the guerrillas capture some weapons and
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ammunition from the Salvadoran military. One of the
guerrillas captured with Montenegro had made five trips
to Managua in 1982 to pick up arms.
TRAINING
-- Since mid-1980 Salvadoran guerrillas have trained in
Nicaragua and Cuba in military tactics, weapons, and
explosives. Cubans and other foreign advisors are
involved in the training.
-- One Salvadoran guerrilla who defected to Honduras in
September 1981 reported that he and 12 others went from
Nicaragua to Cuba for extensive military training in
Cuba where over 900 Salvadorans were receiving training.
-- Several terrorists captured in a safehouse raid in
Tegucigalpa in November 1981 told authorities that the
Nicaraguan government had provided them with funds for
travel and explosives.
-- Two weeks ago, responding to a local citizen's tip,
Honduran security officials surprised a group of
Salvadoran guerrillas in transit through Honduras to El
Salvador from training camps in Nicaragua. The
anti-socials escaped after a firefight, but left behind
documents identifying infiltration routes.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
After two years of combat, the FMLN headquarters near
Managua has evolved into a sophisticated command and
control center which guides operations. Cuban and
Nicaraguan officers are present at-this headquarters.
The headquarters coordinates logistical support,
including clothes, money, and ammunition.
Intelligence agencies have provided a mass of classified
information on arms supply, training and command and control to
the relevant Congressional committees. In a report dated
September 22, 1982 the House Intelligence Oversight Committee
noted that "intelligence has been able to establish beyond
doubt the involvement of communist countries in the -
insurgency." The Chairman of the Committee issued a statement
on March 4, 1982 stating in part that:
. The insurgents are well-trained, well-equipped with
modern weapons. and supplies, and rely on the use of sites
in Nicaragua for command and control and for logistical
support. The intelligence supporting these judgements is
convincing.
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There is further persuasive evidence that the Sandinista
government of Nicaragua is helping train insurgents and is
transferring arms and support from and through Nicaragua to
the insurgents. They are furhter providing the insurgents
with bases of operation in Nicaragua. Cuban involvement in
providing arms -- is also evident.
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