POLITICAL UNREST AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS: A PRELIMINARY LOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00315R000200050004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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4 Aft' cuvI aac m
c Intelligence
)1r? y,.?
Political Unrest and
Economic Conditions:
A Preliminary Look
GI84-10143
September 1984
.copy 496
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Political Unrest' and
Economic Conditions:
A Preliminary Look
This paper was prepared by Office
of Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Economics
Division, OGI,
1
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Confidential
G184-10143
September 1984
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Political Unrest and .
Economic Condition
25X1
Summary . Political unrest, particularly in the Third World, continues to threaten US
Information available policies and interests. Although many factors contribute to political unrest,
as August 1984
was s used in this report poor economic performance has long been considered an aggravating
factor. If economic conditions per se do trigger unrest, then a significant
rise in unrest could occur over the next several years given the marked de-
terioration of the Third World economies.
To determine whether deteriorating economic conditions are an important
element provoking political unrest, we searched for systematic linkages
between periods of political unrest and periods of poor economic perform-
ance. Contrary to conventional thought, deteriorating economic conditions
alone have not been found to be a dominant cause of political unrest. In
particular, we were unable to identify a direct linkage between periods of
severe political unrest and measures of general economic deterioration such
as recession, inflation, and falling imports. It appears, therefore, that
economic conditions are simply one factor among many affecting Third,
World political stability. Our analysis strongly indicates that only when'
other destabilizing conditions are present are they likely to produce regime-
threatening instability.
At the same time, while general economic conditions can worsen substan-
tially without sparking unrest, government measures designed to address
economic problems can provide a rallying point for.public discontent. The
timing and presentation of sudden policy changes can help determine the
intensity of public reaction. In our review of Third World countries, we,
found that cuts in subsidies on key consumer commodities-rice, bread;
and petroleum products, for example-and government-mandated wage
controls seem to be two key trigger points for strong political backlash.
iii Confidential
G184-10143
September 1984
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I
Scope Note This research paper is part of the Directorate's ongoing study of Third
World political instability. This report takes a preliminary look at the role
of economic conditions. Based on the results of this paper, research will fo-
cus on more specific linkages between economics and political unrest as we
look more closely at the role of LDCs' domestic economic policies. For
example, we plan to examine the role of subsidies, analyzing their
inflationary nature, the distortions they cause in the domestic economy,;
and the potential for unrest caused when subsidies are reduced or
eliminated. Further, we will look, in detail, at the relationship between
government- or IMF-generated austerity and political unrest by examining
major debtors that have undertaken multiyear economic adjustment
programs.) 25X1
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Political Unrest and
Economic Conditions: 25X1,
A Preliminary LookO
struggling factions of these new states led to nearly lectuals and the government.
Introduction ? Loyalties to a subnational group such as the
Political unrest-demonstrations, riots, strikes, politi- Basques in Spain, the French separatists in Quebec,
cal assassinations, and, in the extreme, irregular and the Sikhs in the Punjab.
changes of government-in Third World countries -\
has been a?recurring problem for US interests. Since Dissatisfaction among elites such as between the'
the start of the 1960s, for example, conflict among military and the businessmen or between the intel-
200 coups or coup attempts. Continued efforts to find
early indicators of political instability on sudden
regime changes have increasingly focused attention on
economics. This paper examines the impact general
economic conditions and the response of Third World
governments to economic problems have on political
unrest. We focused on 28 countries that are either
strategically located, suppliers of strategic resources,
or strategic Third World allies.' To measure the
extent and timing of instability or unrest in these
countries, we used several indicators-protest demon-
strations, riots, strikes, armed attacks, deaths from
political violence, assassinations, political executions,
and successful and unsuccessful attempts to over-
Causes of Unrest
According to experts, a number of factors explain
political unrest; some are economic, others are socio-
Noneconomic Factors. Noneconomic factors thought
to contribute to political unrest include:
? Tensions between various ethnic and racial groups
such as the Sinhalese and Tamils of Sri Lanka,
various tribal factions in Africa, and the ethnic
Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia and their respec-
tive indigenous populations.
? Conflict between competing religious factions such
as the Shia and Sunni Muslims, the Hindus and
Muslims of India, and the Catholics and Protestants
of Northern Ireland.
' They are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, El Salvador,
Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Mexi-
co, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Peru, Saudi
Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Turkey,
Venezuela, and Zaire.0
' Appendix D presents a bibliography of literature dealing with this
subject
25X1
the Syrian support for various factions in Lebanon
and the Iranian-backed terrorism in Lebanon.
Economic Factors. Without discounting the noneco-
nomic factors, many think economic conditions play
an important role in creating unrest in a number of
ways. Many experts believe that unrest caused by
economic motivations is quite likely after an abrupt
interruption in economic growth. According to this
theory, in the least developed nations energies are
devoted to subsisting, and people expect and demand
very little. On the other hand, in wealthier societies
most people act to maintain the status quo. The 25X1
developing nations in which rapid growth has oc-
curred are the most volatile. In these countries, many
people have benefited from rapid economic growth, 25X1
and many more have seen its promise. Therefore, I
when economic growth slows or reverses, expectations
continue to rise, a large expectation gap is formed;
and a potential source of unrest is created (see figure).
25X1
The Historical Impact of Economic Conditions
To systematically examine Third World unrest and its
relationship with economic conditions, we devised 'an
overall measure of unrest using a political events data
base on protest demonstrations, riots, strikes, armed
attacks, deaths from domestic violence, assassinations,
Some observers argue the reverse, that is, that economic growth
itself is destabilizing. According to this view, economic growth, at
least in the LDCs, destroys traditional values and relationships-
for example, in villages and extended families-which offsets the
monetary gains and causes instability. If true, and reversible, an
economic recession offsets the destabilizing effects as people return
(temporarily) to a more traditional setting. F-----]
25X1
25X1
25X1
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The Political. Events Data Base.
The political, events. data base used inithisstudy to.'
quantify Third&World political unrest-is an updating
of data in,World Handbook of Political-and Social
Indicators; Second Edition; Charles L. Taylor and.
law-to numbers 'ofriots, strikes, and political dem-
onstrations: Ii includes the nine political 'unrest indi
Although the Taylor database is the most compre-
hensive; if not'the'only; systematic compilation of
political. events data, and has'been used-by a number
ofprivate-sector researchers examining this area, it . 25X1
does have weaknesses. The most important is under-
counting which,bccurs in large part because the,data
political executions, and successful and unsuccessful base draws'heavily on press 'reports: Consequently, in
attempts to overthrow the government' To examine' ., countries where press coverage is.constrained by
the connection between economic.conditions'andlpo:`i. censorship.or where little foreign press attention is litical?unrest, we analyzed the association betweenikey focused, political events may systematically be un- 25X1
ages between the measure of political unrest and the To minimize. distortions, we based the statistical
change in consumer prices, the level of andchanges in analysis'on a discrete transformation of the political
real per capita income, and the level of and'changes in events data.'Speci ically: .. ' ' - ... -? ;
real per capita imports.' These,measures-were chosen ? We aggregated the nine political events into:a
because they reflect general economic conditions both composite number.,
in terms of overall production and prices. In addition,'. ? If the composite events number'exceeded the
they should reflect other economic variables;that bear: threshold level we established, a country was iden-
on political unrest; but for which data, are,not'readily:-, tired as being" nstable'for that period." Zavailable. Changes in unemployment; for,example,,' ? To guard againstbiasesr we varied the, threshold I
should be inversely related to the movenienbinper,; . level to?test the sensitivity of theiresults to'such?
capita income levels. Likewise, changes in industrial varidtions4 ? ' .. 25X1
' For a description of the data base and how we used it, see the
inset. For 1971-82 trends in the nine indicators of unrest for these
countries, see appendix C. Because this measure does not capture
the level or intensity of particular disruptions, it cannot be used to
make intercountry comparisons. Rather it is intended to focus on
stability levels within a given country over a specified period.
' Appendix B presents these economic data.
Confidential
cal and Social lndicators; Charles L. Taylor and.:
David A. Jodice.This data base:is'a'compilation,
gap tion on domestic Political. events' from 1948 to early
1983. It contains information on the number, size,
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In our analysis, we looked at the political and econom-
ic data from 1971 to 1982 in three different ways.
First, we looked at the data head-on: political data for
1981, for instance, were studied against economic
political unrest-would be delayed.
data for that same year. We then approached the data
using a lag of one year to see if the economic
conditions of 1981 affected political unrest in 1982.
This allowed time for the impact of, perhaps, a rising
inflation rate. Often a deterioration in economic
conditions is not felt by the general public for several
months;, therefore, any negative reaction-in this case
freedom of expression.
We also looked at fluctuations in political and eco-
nomic data and compared them with what is typical in
an individual country. For example, if a country has a
traditionally low rate of inflation, a rise of a few
points would be considered significant; whereas, in a
country with a high rate of inflation, only a fluctua-
tion of 10 points or more would be considered signifi-
cant. Likewise, one or two protests in a highly repres-
sive country would have a greater impact on stability
than 10 demonstrations in a society that allows
In all approaches, the analysis indicated few linkages
historically between periods of unrest and periods of
deteriorating economic conditions. These results were
consistent for each of the 28 countries we examined
and for each political instability threshold case we
used. Our findings showed that, although over the
past 10 years economic deterioration occasionally has
led to unrest, there have been just as many times
when it did not. Sharply increasing prices, or declin-
ing real income and employment levels by themselves,
therefore, are not particularly good predictors of
Importance of Government Policy Shifts
Although aggregate economic performance is not
closely related to political instability, specific econom-
ic events can spark unrest. In particular, sudden
government economic policy changes-sometimes de-
signed to deal with general economic difficulties-are
more likely to generate a public reaction than broad
negative economic developments. Numerous anecdot-
al examples in press and Embassy reporting support
this conclusion:
? In May and June 1983, over 100,000 Brazilian civil
servants marched to protest austerity measures that
included wage adjustments and cuts in public jobs
spending.
? In Egypt, increased bread prices, caused by subsidy
cuts, led to bloody urban rioting in 1977. The price
hikes were rescinded.
? Guatemalan land reform in 1978, viewed by many
as tantamount to collusion between wealthy land-
owners and the government, led to protests. Media
reports indicate 100 campesinos were killed. 25X1
? In June 1981 a cut in food subsidies led to riots in
Morocco; 100 were killed and 300 were injured.
Again, in 1983, austerity measures led to a 25-
percent increase in food prices, and riots left over
100 dead.
? Earlier this year in Tunisia, the government re- '
moved subsidies on wheat and bread. Rioting result-
ed in 100 deaths. 25X1
? In Sudan, a 1982 decision to lower sugar subsidies
by 60 percent led to demonstrations and 21 deaths.
? Last fall, austerity-inspired policy changes by the.
Bolivian Government led to widespread protests.
Early this year, labor unions led a 72-hour strike to
protest cuts in spending and dramatic increases in
the price of government-subsidized food.
? In April 1984, bloodshed resulted in the Dominican
Republic during food riots protesting government-
mandated price increases. 25X1
Although these examples do not indicate that each '
change in economic policy leads to political instabil-
ity, they are evidence that specific policy measure that
hit key interest groups can have serious political
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Conclusions and Implications
We believe the link between economic conditions and
political unrest is unreliable and indirect, and caution
should be used when tying economic malaise to
political instability. Our preliminary evidence has
shown no statistically significant relationship between
general economic conditions, such as recession and
inflation, and political unrest. Several factors are
probably at work, including the impact of the extend-
ed family as a support mechanism and the lack of a
Although more sophisticated modeling that considers
different economic and political systems may show a
more direct linkage, we do not expect such an out-
come. We do believe, however, specific government
economic measures that directly hurt large popula-
tions stand a much greater risk of leading to political
unrest. We believe the different outcome here is that
action by a government agency provides a tangible
rallying point for opposition which, in fact, could
even reverse the policy7~
If the latter conclusion is correct, given the extent to
which LDC governments are being forced to initiate
austerity measures as opposed to simply allowing
economic erosion, we expect more economically in-
duced unrest in this decade. Indeed, adjustment pro-
grams-whether self-imposed or coordinated with the
IMF-although designed to stabilize economies,
could precipitate increased unrest since the policy
changes required by austerity programs are the type
that trigger protests and uprisings. Although these
programs vary in emphasis and degree, they do not
vary in substance. Generally, they rely on higher
taxes, increased fuel and utility prices, and decreased
government spending and subsidies-the sort of direct
government actions that can lead to direct public
reaction. Furthermore, an IMF-supported austerity
program can provoke nationalistic reactions as the
domestic government is seen as subservient to West-
ern and especially US interests. Conditionality pro-
grams also make the IMF-and often the United
States by association-an actor in domestic politics;
opposition parties can accuse the government of sell-
Although we believe the deteriorated Third World
economic conditions likely to prevail in this decade
will lead to increasing unrest, we are less certain they
Mexico: The Jury Is Out
Mexico is a rare example of a country in which
austere economic policies have not led to substantial
unrest. De la Madrid has successfully walked a
political and economic tightrope. Austerity measures
quickly hurt millions of Mexicans whose expecta-
tions had been raised by the country's oil boom.
Federal subsidies have been slashed, government
spending has been cut by 20 percent, the rates for gas,
telephones, and electricity have doubled, and price
controls on many goods have been lifted. Even the 40-
percent increase in the price of tortillas failed to
In our judgment, however, the pressure on de la '
Madrid appears to be mounting. A key to his success
has been keeping the loyalty of organized labor, but,
as the purchasing power of wages continues to fall,
union leaders will have increased demands from the
rank and file. Further, many experts believe that only
recently have household savings been emptied. They
expect the impact of the austerity program to worsen.
Lastly, de la Madrid's time may be running out. His
administration's grace-period is ending; and he may
be forced to show the populace the benefits of his
A recent study of the Mexican situation-Mexico:
Growing Challenges to Current Stability-reaches a
similar conclusion using an Instability Forecasting
Model developed by the Data Resources and Policon
Corporations. This model.confirms our analysis that
de la Madrid will face increasing trouble on economic
issues, but, because of strong positions in other areas,
he is in a relatively strong position to retain control in
will cause substantially more regime-threatening in-
stability. Political reactions to deteriorated economic
conditions have generally been confined to riots,
strikes, and demonstrations. Without ethnic tensions,
insurgencies, and traditionally weak governments, the
increase in unrest likely to be associated with LDC'
government austerity measures seems unlikely to pro-
duce major rises in regime change in Third World
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Appendix A
Testing for Economic Linkages
Tables A-1 and A-2 present the calculated correlation coefficients between various
measures of economic activity and our overall measure of instability defined under
changing requirements as to the number of events needed at each threshold. Table
A-1 presents the results of the unlagged economic variables; table A-2 presents the
lagged results.) 111?
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Table A-1
Correlation Between Unrest and Economic Variables
C1
Thresholds for Events of Unrest
I
Change in real per -0.096
capita income (percent)
Deviation from trend in -0.027
real per capita income
(percent)
Change in real per 0.026
capita imports
(percent)
Real per capita -0.041
imports (1980 US b)
Deviation from trend in .-0.030
real per capita imports
(percent)
Change in nominal -0.042
'exports (percent)
Nominal exports -0.043
(US-$)
Deviation from trend in -0.018
nominal exports
(percent)
Consumer price 0.013
inflation (percent)
Instances of instability 276
6
12
25
50
100
200
400
500
600
700
800
1,600
3,200
-0.075
-0.083
-0.093
-0.116
-0.064
-0.067
0.022
-0.078
-0.070
-0.079
-0.079
-0.066
-0.020
-0.009
0.024
0.079
0.046
-0.028
-0.011
-0.023
-0.050
-0.049
-0.053
=0.053
-0.062
0.004
0.017
-0.004
-0.018
-0.064
-0.055
-0.018
0.040
-0.026
-0.060
-0.056
-0.056
-0.012
-0.052
-0.071
-0.084
-0.017
- 0.002
-0.068
-0.044
-0.064
-0.057
-0.050
--0.045
-0.045
-0.040
-0.032
-0.025
-0.028
-0.020
-0.042
-0.099
-0.042
-0.045
-0.060
-0.080
-0.080
-0.080
-0.050
0.007
0.009
-0.012
0.014
0.021
-0.007
0.028 .
0.111
0.033
0.046
0.048
0.048
0.031
-0.005
-0.097
-0.094
-0.033'
-0.006
--0.058
-0.039
-0.035
-0.034
-0.028
-0.025
-0.025
-0.020
-0.015
-0.070
-0.079
-0.013
-0.063
-0.044
-0.002
0.020
-0.023
-0.056
- -0.059
-0.059
-0.051
-0.048
0.133
0.154
0.219 - 0.197
0.201
0.189
0.217
0.240
0.281
0.314
0.314
0.037
-0.025
202
163
103
71
43
25
13
10
7
6
6 .
4 -
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 Table A-2
Correlation Between Unrest and Lagged Economic Variables
Thresholds for Events of Unrest
1 6 12 25
Lagged economic variables
Change? in real per _ t 0.032. -0.097
capitaincome ;~t~ ...
(percent) ' ' -
Real per capital 0.091 0.089
income (1980 US $)
real per.capita income
(percent)
Change in real per 0.011
capita imports. -.
(pescerit)?
Real per capita - -0.011
imports (1980 US.$)
Deviation from trend in -0.049
real per capita imports -
(percent)
Change in nominal 0.067
exports`(ercent)
Nominal exports -0.030
(Us$).; . . .
Deviation from-trend-in 0.015
-0.013
-0.040
'
-0.051
-0.072
-0.048
-0.034
-
-0.016
-0.017
-0.122
-0;110
-0.088
-
-0.079
nominal exports ..
Consumer price -
inflation (percent) ,
0.084
0.082
0.108
Instances of instability
253
184
149 -
-0.133
-0.092
-0.078
-0.066
-0.083
-0.004
0.028
-0.061
-0.041
-0.123
-0.055
-0.092
-0.082
--0.061
-0.066
-0.023
-0.096
-0.071
-0.009
-0.001
-0.041
-0.059
-0.059
-0.041
-
; 0.038
-0.032
-0.046
-0.025
-0.098
-0.082
0.173:
0.11.1
0.157-,-.
0.174._.
41,
24
12
9
-0.093
-0.105
_-0.109
-0.132
-0.031
-0.023
--0.009
-0.025
-0.002
0.015
-0.092
-0.093
-0.076
-0.072
-0.089
-0.060
-0.067
-0.095
-0.093
-.0.078
-0.102
-0.103
-0.058
-0.046
-0.017
-0.026
-0.023
-0.015
-0.008
-0.010
-0.127
?.
-0.129
--.
-0.097
-
-0.074
-0.028
?
0.217.
0.250,
0.213
0.278
0.408
6
5
3
2
0.155
-0.105
-0.117
-0.008
0.022
0.038
' -
-0.008
-.
0.019
0.040
-0.060
-0.033
-0.038
-0.080
0.156
98.. - 68
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Indicators of Political Unrest
Table B-1
Argentina
Armed Deaths Riots Strikes . Political Protest Assassins- Successful Unsuccessful
Attacks From Executions Demonstra- lions Coups Coups
Violence [ions I
1972 43 21 6 1 0
1973 7 37 4 2 0
6 2 0 0 1
.19 10 0 0
1980 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1981 0 0 0 7 0. 5 0 0 0
1982 1 0 3 1. 0 , ,. 8 1 0 0
I
L
Table B-2
Brazil
Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
Political
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassina-
tions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1972
5
11
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1973
4
is
0
0
0 ?
0
0
0
0
1974
0
0
1
0
21
1
0
0
0
1975
1
3
0
2
1
I
0
0
0
1976
2
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
1977
I
0
5
2
0
2
0
0
0
1978
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1979
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1980
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1981
4
0
1
0
0
6
0
0
0
!25X1
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Table B-3
Chile
Armed Deaths Riots Strikes Political Protest Assassina- Successful Unsuccessful
Attacks From Executions Demonstra- tions Coups Coups
Violence tions
1973 15 537 23 18 465 1 1 1 1
1974 2 16 0 0 15 0 0 0 0
1975 0 120 0 0 6 0 0 0 0
1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1977 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1978 1 0 1 1 1 10 0 0 0
1979 0 0 0 1 0 7 0 0 0
1980 5 23 1 1 0 5 2 0 0
1981
1982
Table B-4
Colombia
Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
Political
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassins- Successful
tions .. Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1971
0
IS
2
2
0
1
0
0
0
1972
8
2
0
1
0
0
1
0-
0
1973
1
7
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1974
0
7
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1975
9
21
5
0
0
5
1
0
0
1976
1
13
5
3
0
8
2
0
0
1977
7
20
7
1
0
0
1
0
0
1978
7
0
3
2
0
10
0
0
0
1979
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1980
233
0
0
0
0
185
0
0
0
1981
10
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1982
19
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
Political
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassins-
tions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1971
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1972
1
2
5
0
0
5
0
0
0
1973
0
0
3
2
0
4
0
0
1
1974
1
11
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1975
1
1
2
0
2
1
0
0
0
1976
9
8
1
0
0
5
0
0
0
1977
9
45
1
0
0
4
1
0
0
1978
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
1979
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Table B-6
El Salvador
Armed Deaths Riots Strikes
Attacks From -
Violence
Political .
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassina-
lions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1971 0 0 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
1972 1 100 0 0
0
0
0
0
1
1973 0 0 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
1974 1 2 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
1975 1 1 1 0
0
0
0
0
0
1976 0 0 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
1977 3 19 2 0
0
4
2
0
0 1
1978 0 0 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
1979 2 0 0 0
0
I
1
0
0
1980 0 3 2
0
2
2
0
0
1981 0 0 1
0
1
0
0
0
1982 0 0 0
0
8
14
0
0
 Confidential
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Table B-7
Greece
Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
1971
9
1
0
1972
4
0
20
1973
21
21
35
1974
l
2
8
1975
2
3
11
1976
6
3
4
1977
13
1
2
1978
67
0
0
1979
2
1
0
1980
0
3
2
1981
6
0
0
Strikes Political
Executions
0 0
2 0
6 0
2 0
0 0
3 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassins- Successful
tions Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
7
0
_00
5
0
0
0
35
0
2
1
25
0
0
0
29
1
0
0
4
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
1
3
0
0
46
0
0
0
Table B-8
Guatemala
Armed
Deaths
Riots
Strikes
Political
Protest
Assassins-
Successful
Unsuccessful
Attacks
From -
Executions
Demonstra-
tions
Coups
Coups
Violence
tions
1971
1
5
0
1
0
2
2
0
0
1972
1
11
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
1973
1
22
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1974
3
1
5
0
0
0
1
0
0
1975
0
3
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
1976
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1977
2
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1978
5
0
3
1
0
3
2
0
0
1979
3
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
1980
31
0
2
0
0
1
1
0
0
1981
46
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1982
56
0
0
n
a
,
n
I
,.
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/31: CIA-RDP85SO0315R000200050004-2
Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
Political
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassina-
tions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1976
1
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1977
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Table B-10
Indonesia
Armed
Attacks
Deaths Riots
From
Violence
Strikes
Political
- Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassina-
tions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1972
0
0 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1973
0
0 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1977
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1978
0
0 0
0
0
3
0
0
0
1979
0
0 0 .
0
0
0
0
0
0
1980
0
0 0
0
0
2
0
0
0
1981
0 1
0
0
1
0
0
0 I
1982
0 1
0
0
1
0
0
0
25X1
 Confidential
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Table B-11
Iran
Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
Political.
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassins-
tions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1978 12
0
62
8
0
12
1
0
0
1979 62
0
59
2
121
48
10
0
0
1981
1982
Table B-12
Iraq
Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
Political
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassins-
tions
Successful
coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1973
4
16
0
1
67
0
1
0
2
1974
17
455
0
0
15
2
1
0
0
1975
8
151
0
0
88
0
0
0
0
1977
4
2
2
0
107
1
1
0
0
1978
0
0
0
0
21
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
25
0
0
0
0
1980
3
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1981
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
 1 11
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Table B-13
Kenya
Armed Deaths
Attacks From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
Political
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassins-
lions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1971 0 0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1972 0 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1973 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1974 0 0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1978 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1979 0 0,
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1980 1 0
0
0.
0
1
0
0
0
1981 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1982 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
25X1
Table B-14
Mexico
Armed Deaths
Attacks From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
Political .
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassins-
tions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1971 0 14
3 0 0 3 0 0 0
1972 1 14
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1980 2 0
0 0 0 2 0 0 0
1981 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1982 0 0
0 0 0 2 0 0 0
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 Confidential
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Table B-15
Morocco
Armed Deaths Riots Strikes Political Protest Assassin- Successful Unsuccessful
Attacks From Executions Demonstra- tions Coups Coups
Violence tions
Table B-16
Nigeria
Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
Political
?..,Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassins- Successful
tions . Coups
.
Unsuccessful
Coups
1971
0
2
3
0
9
1
0
0
0.
1972
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1973
1
14
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/31 : CIA-RDP85SO0315R000200050004-2
it
Table B-17
Pakistan
Armed Deaths
Attacks From
Violence
Riots
-
Strikes
Political -
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
Lions
Assassina-
tions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1972
2 84
18
4
0
5
2
0
0
1973
7 155
6
0
0
4
1
0
0
1974
'7 502
7
0
0
I
2
0
0
1975
2 11
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1976
3 302
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
1977
10 153
26
5
0
17
1
1
0
1978
3 0
6
6
0
13
0
0
0
1979
1 0
13
1
5
2
0
0
0
1980
1 0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1981
5 0
2
2
0
4
0
0
0
1982
3 0
3
3
0
4
0
0
0
25X1
Table B-18
Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From -
Violence
Riots
-
Strikes
?
Political
' Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
lions
Assassina-
lions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1971
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1972
0
0
0
0
0
.0 -
0
0
0
1973
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1974
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1975
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1976
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1978
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
1979
0
0
4
1
0
2.
0
0
0
1980
0
0
1
0
0
1
0 *
0
0
1981
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1982
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
. r
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 Confidential
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Table B-19
Philippines
Armed Deaths Riots Strikes Political Protest Assassins- Successful Unsuccessful
Attacks From .,,r. Executions Demonstra- tions Coups Coups
Violence tions
1972 48 352 I 0 0 0 0 0 0
1973 32. 1,671 2 0 1 1 0 0 0
1974 21 557 0 0 0 5 0 0 0
1975 21 291 0 0 0 6 1 0 0
1976 9 112 1 0 0 5 0 0 0
1977 12 605 2 0 0 1 0 0 0
1978 3 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 0
Table B-20
Peru
Armed Deaths. Riots . Strikes Political Protest Assassins- Successful Unsuccessful
Attacks From Executions Demonstra- tions Coups Coups
Violence tions
1976 0 6 10 3 0 1 0 0 1
1977 1 36 6 7 0 0? 0 0 0
1978 0 0 7 5 0 2 0 0 0
1979 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0
1980
1981
1982
0 3 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0
li
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 Confidential
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Table B-21
Saudi Arabia
Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
:Political
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassina-
tions
Successful
Coups
'Unsuccessful
Coups
1971 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1972 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1973 0
0
0
0.
0
0
0
0
0
1974 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1975 0
1
0
0
P
0
1
0
0
1976 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1977 0
0
0
0
0
0
0.
0
0 1
1978 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1979 4
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
1980 0.
0
0
0
63
0
0
.0
0.
1981 1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1982 0
0.
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
Table B-22
Somalia
Armed
Attacks .
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
t
. Political
Executions
Protest '
Demonstra-
lions
Assassina-
Lions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1972
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1973
0
0
0.
0
0
0
0
0
0.
1974
0
0?
.0
.0
0
- 0
0'
?0
.0
1975
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1976
0
0.
0
0
0
0
0
0.
0
1977
0
0
0
0
0?
0
0
0
0
1978
0
0
0
0
17,
0
0
0
1
1979
0
0
0
0
0
0.
0
0
0
1980
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1981
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0-
1982
0
0
0
0.
0
0
0
0
0
'25X1
19.
 Confidential
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Table B-23
South Africa
Armed Deaths ' Riots -
Attacks From
Violence
Strikes Political Protest Assassins- Successful Unsuccessful
Executions Demonstra- tions Coups Coups
tions
1972
2
38
7
:0
0
8
0
0
0
1973
0
78
10.
3
0
1
0
0
0
1974
1
29
9
3
0
1
0
0
0
1975
2
17
1
0
0 ,
2
0
0
0
1976
20
437
51
9
3
6
0
0
0
1977
-28
65
31
3
0
5
0
0
0
1978
6
0
3
1
0
5
0
0
0
1979
2
0
0
2
1
2
0
0
0
Table B-24
South Korea
Armed
Deaths .
Riots " -
Strikes
Political
Protest
Assassins- ' Successful
Unsuccessful
...Attacks
From
Violence
+-
.:.. r
Executions
Demonstra-
tions
tions - Coups
Coups
1972
0
0
0
0
1973
0
2,
-"16
9
0
1974.
1
2 .
14 -
1.
1..
26 -
0
0
I
1975
2
6
6
2
9
12
0
0
0
1976
2
0
1
1'
"
0
5
0
0
0
1977
1
0
"6
- 0
0
3
0
0
0
1978
1
0
1
0
0.
10
0'
0
0
1979
4
0,
2
0
0
8
1
1
0
1980
3
0
5
0
6
- 9
0
0
0
1981
0
0 .
2 ,
0
0
1982
3
0
s
n
n
 iI Confidential
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Table B-25
Spain
Armed -
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
Political .
Executions
Protest -
Demonstra-
tions
" Assassins-
tions
Successful
coups .
Unsuccessful
Coups.
1971
5
0
0
0
0
.1
0
0
0
1972
21
7
7
7
0
12
0
0
0
1973
31
13
3
1
0
23
1.
"0
6
1974
19
14
29
5
1
21
0
0
0
1975
57
42
29
71
-.5
.91
1
0
0
1976
43
40
60
24 -
0
'61
2 "
0
0?
1977
62
43
60
11
0
41
2
0
0
1978
64
0
13
2
0'
156
2
0
0
Table B-26
Turkey
Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
,
Strikes
.
Political
, Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassina-
tions
Successful
Coups - ?
Unsuccessful
Coups
1971
12
8
2
0
0'
1
0
1
0
1972
12
16
0.
0
4
.1
0..
0
0
1973
4
6
0
0'
0 .
0 .
0
0,
0
1974
0
0
1'
0
0
3
0
0
0
1975
6
18
8
4
0
5
0
0
0
{
1976
3
31
8
1
0
0.
0 -
-0
0.
1977
15
63
4
0
0
- 2.
0
0
0,
1978
10
0
9
1
0
1'
3 ..
0
0
1979
51 -
0
4
0
0
3
3
0
0
1
1980
28
1
15
3
3,
15
it
1
0
1981
5
0
0
0
0
1
0
01,
0
I'?
1982
2
0
0
0 .
1
1-
0
0
0
Confidential
I
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 Confidential
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Table B-27
Venezuela
Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
Political
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassina-
tions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1971
I
0
1
0
0
3
0
0
0
1972
3
12.
2
0"
0
1
3
0
0
1973
I
3
4
0
0
1
.0
0
0
1974
0.
0
0
0'
0
.0
0
0-
0
1975
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1976
0 -
0
0 "
'0
1
1'
0
0
0
1977
1
6
0 --
0
0
0
0
0
0
1978
0
0"
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1979
0
0 .
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Table B-28
Zaire
Armed
Attacks
Deaths
From
Violence
Riots
Strikes
Political
Executions
Protest
Demonstra-
tions
Assassina-
tions
Successful
Coups
Unsuccessful
Coups
1971
1
3
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1972
0
0
0
0
0 -
0
0
0
0
1973
1
0
0
-0 -
0
0
0
0
0
1974
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1975
0
0
0
0,
0
0
0
0
0
1976
0
0' '
0
0 - '
0
0'
0
0
0
1977
8 -
100
0 -
0 . " -.
0
0
0
0
0
1978
5
0
1
0
26 -
1
0
0
0
1979
0
0 '
0
-0- -
0
0. -
0
0
0
1980
0
0
2
1
0
1
0
0
0
1981
0
0
0
0
0
1
0"
0
0
1982
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
 i
Confidential i
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Table C-1
Argentina
Change in
Nominal Exports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Imports
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Imports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Income _
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Price's
(percent)
1972 10
247.9
-8.0
2,582
2.3
58.9
1973 66
232.8
-6.1
2,668
3.3
61.2
1974 19
269.7
15.9
2,821
5.7
23.3
1975 -26
265.2
-1.7
2,743
-2.8
182.5
1976 30
196.6
-25.9
2,623
-4.4
443.2
1977 42
243.9
. 24.1
2,695 . ? -?
2.7
176.1'
1978 11
201.3
-17.5
2,547
-5.5
175.5
1979 20
293.9
46.0
2,720
6.8
159.5
1980 1
381.3
29.7
2,669
-1.9
100.8
Table C-2
Brazil
Change in
Nominal Exports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Imports
(1980 US $)
Change in Real'
Per Capita
Imports
(percent) .
Real Per Capita
Income
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1971 3
131.0
19.7
1,618
10.4
20.2
1973 52
175.5
16.2
1,959
12.6
12.7
1974 25
249.7
42.3
2,099
7.1
27.6
1975 6
214.9
-14.0
2,164
3.1
28.9
1976 14
207.7
-3.3
2,307
6.6
42.0
43.7"
38.7
1979 18
198.3
9.1
2,539
4.0
52.7
1980 29
205.2
3.4
2,687
5.8
82.8
1981 13
195.9
-4.5
2,540
-5.5
105.5
1982 -15
174.1
-11.1
2,488
-2.0
98.0
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 Confidential
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Table C-3
Chile
Change in Real Per Capita
Nominal Exports Imports
(percent) (1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Imports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Income
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1971 -22 357.4
-3.2
2,351
5.8
19.4
1972 -16 308.8
-13.6
2,308
-1.8
79.1
1973 41 288.0
-6.7
2,189
-5.2
351.9
1974 98 355.0
23.3
2,239.
2.3
506.0
1975 -38 224.7
-36.7
1,951
-12.8
374.2
1976 32 266.2
18.5
1,926
-1.3
211.8
1977 4 331.3
24.5
2,061
7.0
91.9
1978 11 394.9
19.2
2,179
5.7
40.1
1979 55 464.1
17.5
2,330
6.9
33.4
1980 18 465.2
0.2
2,444
4.9
35.1
1981 -18 575.0
23.6
2,558
4.7
19.7
1982 325.5 _
-43.4 .. .
2,164,
-15.4
20.7
Table C-4
Colombia
Changein Real Per Capita
Nominal Exports Imports
(percent) (1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Imports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Income
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1971 -9 146.9
1.6
1,098
3.1
8.4
1972 22 121.3
-17.4
1,156
5.3
13.4
1973 33 119.2
-1.8
1,215
5.1 _
20.6
1974 18 126.4
6.1
1,266
4.2
24.3
1975 1 106.4
-15.9
1,293
2.1 _
22.9
1976 17 116.6
9.6
1,323
2.4
20.4
1977 37 124.6
6.8
1,372
3.7
33.1
1978 20 155.3
24.7
1,451
5.8
17.7
1979 8 147.3
-5.2
1,514
4.3
24.7
1980 17 174.3
18.3
1,572
3.8
26.5
1981 -27 192.4
10.4
1,578
0.4
27.5
3 205.8
7.0
1,563
-1.0
24.6
 Table C-5
Egypt
Change in
Nominal Exports
(percent)
1971
1
1972
2
1973
33
1974
32
1975
-10
1976
6
1977
9
1978
-1
1979
3
1980
61
1981
3
1982
-6
Change in Real
Per Capita
Real Per Capita
Income' .
Change in Real
Per Capita
Change in
Consumer Prices
Imports
(percent) .
(1980 US 5)
?.
Income
(percent)
(percent)
8.3 -
1,046
1.6
3.1
-12.4
- 995
-4.9
2.1
-18.9
937
-5.9
4.3
81.0
1,019
8.8
10.9
50.0
.1,002 -
-1.7
9.7
-7.6
938
-6.3
10.3
13.2
1,081
15.2'
12.7
23.8-'
11139.
.
5.3
11.1
-52.9
1,197
5.1
9.9
3.5
1,261
5.3
20.7
78.0 .
1,328
5.3
10.4
4.5
1,372
-
3.4
14.8
25X1
Table C-6
El Salvador
Real Per Capita
Imports
(1980 US 8)
94.9
83.2
67.4-
122.0
183.0
169.2
191.5
237.1
111.7
115.6
205.8
215.0
Change in Real Per Capita
Nominal Exports Imports
(percent) (1980 US 5)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Imports- 1
(percent)
Real Per Capita Change in Real
Income Per Capita
(1980 US $) Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1971
0
233.4 -
6.4
992
- 1.6
0.5
1972 '
20
233.0 -
-0.2 -
1,017 ..
2.5 -
1.5
1973
15
247.6
-6.3
1,039 -
2.1
6.4
1974
25
261.2 -
' 5.5
1,074- -
3.4 -
16.9
1975
12
247.5
-5.3
1,102 --
2.6 -
19.2
1976
36
289.8 -
17.1 -
1,114
1.1
7.0
1977
27
327.0- ' - -
12.8 - -
1,138 -
2.2
11.9
1978
-20
319.3 -
-2.3 .
-1,153 -
1.3 -
13.2
1979
37
266.0
--16.7
1,081 -
-6.3
15.9
1980
-7
201.1 -
-24.4
.958
-11.4
17.4
202.8
0.8 -
952
-0.6
14.8
183.8
-9.4- - -
877 -
-7.9
11.7
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 Confidential ,
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Table C-7
Greece
Change in
Nominal Exports
(percent) _
Real Per Capita y
Imports
(1980, US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Imports
(percent)
Real Per Capita .;
Income
(1980 US,$)
. Change in Real
Per Capita., .,
Income.
(percent)
Change,in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1971
2
826.2? .
0.9
4,370
6.6::
27.1
1972
30
840.9 -
1.81
4,726 ,
8.1
28.3
1973
67
1,008.3
19.9
5,112
8.2--
32.7
1974
39
913.4
-9.4
4,849..
-5.2
41.5
1975
11
1,008.3
10.4:., .
4,731 - -
-2.4
47.1
1976
11
1,110.6.
10.1 _
4,391
-7.2,
53.3
1977
6
1,142.0
2.8
4,454 -,.
1.4.
,' :..
59.8
1978
21
1,175.9:
3.0
4,718
'5.9
67.3
1979
14
1,214.3,
3.3
4,807:
1.9,
80.1
1980
32
1,094.1
-9.9
4,163,
-13.4,
100.0
1981
-19
914.8
16.4:..
3,159;
-24.1
124.5
1982
1
1,072.8
17.3.
2,664
-17.6.
150.6
Table C-8
Guatemala
Change in' c . Real'Pcr. Capita
Nominal Exports Imports .
Change in Real
Per Capita:
?.. 'Real Per Capita .
Income . -
-, Change in Real
Per Capita.
Change in
..,;Consumer,Prices
(percent) -
(1980 US S)
r.:.
Imports (1980 US $)
(percent)
Income:
(percent)
(percent). .
1971
-5 -
195.0
-1.8
1,283
2.8
-0.5
1972
13
185.1
-5.1
1,337.
4.2
0.6
1973
27
194.4
5.0
1,386.
3.6
13.6
1974
27
220.9 `
13.6
1,430
3.2
16.6
1976
19
225.5
9.4
- -
1,483 -
4.7
10.7
1977
52 -
252.2 ' -
11.8
1,641''.
10.6 ' -'
12.6'
1978
-12
272.0
7.8
-
1,675
2.1 L^e
7.9
1979
11
262.1 '
-3.6
,
1,698k
1.4 ?. ,c
11.5
1980
19
226.4
-13.6
-
1,706 "
0.4
10.7
1981
-22
232.5
2.7
1,671.
-2.0 -.~
11.4
1982
-9 -
194.0 - .
-16.6
1,566!, .
-6.4
0.4
 Table C-9.
Honduras
Change in
Nominal Exports
(percent)-
Real,Per Capita
Imports
(1980 US $) .
..
Change in Real
Per Capita
Imports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Income
(1980 US $) ..
.
Change'in Real
Per Capita
? Income . ..
, (percent)
Change in
"Consumer Prices
(percent)
i
1971
4
243.0
-19.6
1,104
0.3
2.3
1972
4
214.3
-11.8
1,106
0.2
5.3
1973
21
229.2
6.9
1,124
1.7
4.5
1974
9 -
231.4
1.0
1,095
-2.6
13.4
1979
16
270.4
-3.1
1,203
12.5
1980
9
267.9
-0.9
1,188
15.6
1981
-11
246.6
-8.0'
1,154
10.2
1982
-14
185.9 .
-24.6
1,104.. -',
9.9
Table C-10
Indonesia
Change in - : -
Nominal Exports
Real Per Capita .
Imports .
Change in Real
Per Capita'
'Real Per Capita
Income . .
, Change in-Real
Per Capita, .
Change in
: Consumer Prices
(percent)
(1980.US
$)
Imports
(percent)
(1980 US $)
-
Incomes,
' (percent)
(percent)
1971
9
1972
41
1973
53.9
39.1
1974
53.6
-0.7
1979
31
58.1
-10.4
872
2.9
21.9
1980
38 '
71.7 '
23.4
918
5.3
18.5
1981
0
86.9?,
21.2
967
5.4
12.2
1982
-2
112.0
29.0:
976 .
0.9
9.5
25X1'
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 rnnridential -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/31 : CIA-RDP85SO0315R000200050004-2
Table C-11.
Iran
Change in
Nominal Exports
(percent)
Real Per Capita,
Imports -
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
'Imports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Income'
-(1980 US$) .. '
Change in Real
- Per Capita -
Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1971 42
219.1
3.6
1,529
40.2'
4.2
1972 3
250.9 .
14.5
1,726
12.9
6.5
1973 49
279.5
11.4
2,090
21.1-
9.8
1974 238
313.3
12.1
2,804
34.2
14.3
1975 -9
532.1
69.8
2,968 .
5.8
12.8
1976 13
631.4
18.7
3,304'
11.3
11.3
1977 0
639.5 .
1.3
3,286
-0.6' ' -
27.2
1978 -12
522.6
-18.3
2,702
-17.8
11.7
1979 -12
310.5
-40.6
2,122
-21.5
10.5
1980 -32
316.3
1.9 '
1,465
-30.9
20.7
1981 -14
318.7
0.8
1,039
- 29.1
24.2
239.9 '
-24.T '
983
-5.3
18.7
Table C-12
Iraq
Change in -
Nominal Exports
(percent)' '
Real Per Capita .
Imports
(1980 US $)
Change in Real '
Per Capita
'Imports
(percent)
Real 'Per Capita
Income
(1980 US$)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Income'
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
_
1971
30
249.1
26.2
1,080
5.3
76.4
1972
-6
'221.4
-11:1. '
1,057
-2.1
80.4
1973
70
220.7
-0.3
1,105''
4.6
84.7
1974
226
407.2
84.5
1,896
71.5
91.3
1975
21
642.6
57.8
2,067
9.0 _
100.0
1976
8
501.1
-22.0
2,154':.
.4.2
112.8
1977
1
499.8
-0.3
2,165
0.5
123.1
1978
11
475.0
-5.0
2,238
3.4'
128.8
1979
87
647.9'
36.4 '
2,627
17.4
130.0
1980
18
1,021.3
57.6
2,665 '
1.5
140.0
1981
-61 -
1,391.9
36.3
1,803
-32.4-
150.0
1982
-6 .
1,443.8
3.7
.1,706
-5.4
160.0
28
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/31: CIA-RDP85SO0315R000200050004-2
Table C-13
Kenya
Change in
Real Per Capita .
'.Change in Real
,Real Per Capita
Change in Real
Change in
Nominal Exports
Imports-
Per Capita
Incomes
Per Capita
Consumer Prices
(percent)
(1980 US $)
Imports
(1980 US $)
Income
(percent)
. _
(percent)
(percent)
1977 39 136.2
16.7
1978 -18 158.6-,
16.5
-0.1
16.9
1979 4 125.6
-20.8
-1.0
8.0
1980 24 146.3
16.5,'
634
1.0 -,,
13.8
1981 -16 133.9
640
1.0
11.8
1982 -12 112.3
656-:;
2.4 ..
20.4
Table C-14
Mexico
Change in Real Per Capita,. ,
Nominal Exports Imports:
(percent) (1980 US $)
_
Change in Real
Per Capita
Imports ,
(percent) .
Real Per Capita:
Income
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Income.
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1972 9 162.3 -
7.2-
2,158
4.0
5.0
1973 29 179.4 -
10.6
2,249
4.2
12.1
1974 28 198.9
10.9
2,307
2.6 -
23.6
1975 -6 192.0
-3.5.
2,326
0.8
15.2
1976 14 167.4-
-12.8
2,302
-1.0 .
15.8
1977 28- 145.8
-12.9,
2,309
0.3 .
29.1
1978 28 165.7
13.7,
2,404
4:1
17.3
1979 47 219.3 - -
32:3
2,530
5.2
18.2
1980 69 288.3
31.4
2,657
5.0
26.4
1981 21 351.1- -
21.8
2,796
5.2
27.9
214.5
-38.9.
2,719
-2.8
58.9
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 Confidential :
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Table C-15
Morocco
Change in
Nominal:Exports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Imports
(1980 us 3);
Change in Real
Per Capita
Imports
(ascent)
Real Per Capita .
Income
(1980 US S)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1971 0
149.3
-5.6
854
2.1
4.2
1972 25
148.0
-0.9
874
2.3
3.8
1973 38
172.2
16.4
864
-1.2
2.7
1974 83
200.9
16.7
924
7.0
17.5
1975 -12
242.2
20.5'
930
0.6
7.9
1976 -21
235.4
-2.8
956
2.8
8.5
1977 0
257.0
9.2
966
1.1
12.6
1978 13
211.0
-17.9
976
1.1
9.7
1979 26
215.6
2.2
977
0.1
8.4
1980 21
203.0
-5.8
968
-0.9
9.4
1981 -5
206.0
1.5
925
-4.4
12.5
203.4
-1.2
939
1.5
10.5
Table C-16
Nigeria
Change in
Nominal Exports
(percent) .
Real Per Capita
Imports
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Par Capita
Imports
(percent)
Real Per Capita .
Income
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
.
1971
43
92.1
33.3
636
16.7
16.1
1972
15
80.0
-13.1
580
-8.8
2.6
1973
57
78.1
-2.4
607
4.8
5.7
1974
171
82.7
5.8
778.
28.1
12.5
1975
-24
157.8
90.8
839.
7.8
34.7
1976
26
203.7
29.2
899
7.1
24.3
1977
13
245.0
20.3
1,080
11.2
19.3
1978
-13
249.6
1.9
1,016
1.7
18.7
1979
62
163.7
-34.4
1,058
4.1
11.1
1980
46
215.8
31.8
1,126
6.4
11.4
1981
-29
265.3
22.9
1,063
-5.6
20.8
1982
-19
183.8
-30.7
916
-13.9
25.0
 Confidential
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I ii
Table C-17
Pakistan
Change in Real Pe
Nominal Exports imports
(percent) (1980 U
r Capita
3'
S $J'
-Y.Changi in Real
Per Capita`.
Imports " "?
(percent)..
;.i Real Per Capita
Income
(1980 US$)'
"Change in Real
Per Capita',' :
Income
(percent).
Change in
' Consumer Prices
(percent)
1972
41 .. -'. . 30.6
-12.5,
428. ' - -
-1.3
5.2
1973
38 . .. 35.3
15.5 .
448 . ..
4.6 r
23.1
1978
21 56.5 _
18.9
496
5.1
. 6.1
1979 _
35 57.6.
1.9 :
512
3.3
8.3
1980
24 61.9
7.4
526 , . .
. 2.7 .
11.9
1.4
540
-1.7...
. 557
Table C-18
Panama
-
Change in Real Per Capita Change in Real
- ' Nominal Exports Imports Per Capita
(percent)',". (1980 US$_) Imports''
(percent).
Real Per Capita
Income
(1980 US 5)
- ? _
`' Change in Real
Per Capita
Income
. (percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent) ... , f
1971
4 894.9 `'... . __ 2.1 -'r{
1,805.
4.1
"r
.2.0
.
'
.
1972
2 ....886.9. ?: . _. -0.9. .i: ..
. 1,910. -.
5.8.
5.3
`
1973
9 .801.0 ?: .
-9.7
1,977. ..
3.5 . c'
6.9
1974
49 _ .919.1. .
14.8 i .
.. 2,046 ...
.3.5 :i -
16.9
t ? '
5.5
- 4.0
1978
-2.7.. '"
. 1,994
0.4..
' 4.2
1979
16 753.2 ^-7
4.3.
2,018
.1.2.
7.9
1980
17 .
.757.6
0.6
2,183 :
8.2
13.8
1981
798.5
-11
5.4
2,219'..'..
1.6
7.3
1982
827.7.,_;
.. 3.7.
2,199._
0.9
1..,..4.3
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 Canfidanfinl
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Table C-19
Philippines
Change in Real Per Capita
Nominal Exports Imports
(percent) (1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Imports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Income
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Income,
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1971 3 119.3
-1.4
681
2.9
15.1
1972 -3 113.8
-4.6
694
1.8
10.0
1973 67 114.2
0.4
740
6.7
14.0
1974 41 154.5
35.3
768
3.7
33.5
1975 -18 149.6
-3.2
798
4.0
8.1
1976 8 149.9
0.2
830
3.9
6.2
1977 19 145.4.
-3.0 -
860
3.6
7.9
1978 6 155.5
6.9
876
1.9
7.5
1979 31 164.5
5.8
921
5.2
18.9
1980 24 171.8
4.5
954
3.6
17.8
1981 -3 175.1
1.9
978
2.5
13.3
1982 -13 175.1
0.0
992
1.3
11.0
Table C-20
Peru
Change in Real Per Capita
Nominal Exports Imports
(percent) (1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita -
Imports
(percent)
_ Real Per Capita
Income
(1980 US S)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1971 -16 188.5
11.3
1,462
3.0
6.9
1972 3 177.8
-5.7
1,504
2.9
7.1
1973 14 180.0
1.2
1,555
3.3
9.5
1974 32 189.6
5.4
1,617
4.0
16.9
1975 -16 282.5
49.0
1,626
0.5
23.6
1976 3 215.5
-23.7
1,633
0.5-
33.5
1977 24 181.1 -
-16.0 _
1,573
-3.7
38.1
1978 10 164.7
-9.0
1,507
-4.2
57.8
1979 75 126.6
-23.1
.1,520
0.9
66.7
1980 9 141.9 -
12.1
1,555
2.3
59.2
1981 -19 192.7
35.8 '
1,575
1.2
75.4
1982 -1 203.3
5.5
1,538
-2.4
64.4
 Confidential
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Table C-21
Saudi Arabia
Change in Real Per Capita
Nominal Exports Imports -
Change in Real
Per Capita
Real Per Capita
Income
Change in Real
Per Capita
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent) (1980 US $)
Imports
(percent)
(1980 US$) -
Income
(percent)
(percent)
1971
49 454.9
7.6
2,253
16.3
4.5
1972
35 571.3
25.6
2,726
21.0
4.3
1973
70 797.9
39.7
3,544
30.0,
16.5
1974
293 822.2
3.0
7,808
120.3 -
21.4
9,461
21.2
34.6
1977
12 3,358.3
53.0
10,109
4.7
11.4
1978
-15 4,191.1
24.8
10,572
4.6
-1.6
11,232
6.2
1.9
1980
72 4,309.4.
2.9
.11,980
6.7
3.7
1981
10 5,027.5
16.7
12,789
6.8
2.4
1982
-34 5,933.5
- . ?
---18.0
13,515, a
5.7
0.0 -
Table C-22
Somalia
Change in
Nominal Exports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Imports
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Imports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Income
(1980 US $)
Change, in Real '
Per Capita
Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1973
23
87.7
8.0
309
-6.9 '
6.5
1974
12
78.4
-10.6
295
-4.5
18.3
1975
39
84.1
7.2
282 -
-4.5.
19.4
1976
4
81.0
-3.7
275 -
-2.4
14.1
1977
-35
106.2
31.2
263
-4.5
10.6
1978
65
100.0 -
-5.8
249
-5.3 .
9.9
1979
2
98.5
-1.5
236
-5.2
24.3
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 Table C-23
South Africa
Changuin
..Real .Per Capita; -
Change in Real,
Real Per Capita - i Change in Real
Change in
Nominal Exports
(percent)
. Imports
(1980. US $)
.. ...
Per. Capita
' ".Imports'
(percent)
Income
(1980 US $)
,,.
Per Capita c'.
?Income:
(percent)
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1971
2
658.9
2,759
2.6.-
38.6
1972
16
531.0
2,547, '
-7:7
41.1
1973
42: '
5503
3.6 '-.
2,857..
. 12.2
45.01
1974
40
588:4
6.9,
3,048
6.7
50.3
1975
5583
-5.1.1
2,802
-8.1.'
57.0'
1976
468.6
-16.1
2,357
-15.9 ;:
63.4::
1977
21
359.5
-23.3
2,286
-3.0
70.5,.
1978
25
386:5
7.5
2,288 -
:0.0
77.7,
1979
39
376.7
-215,.
2,391'
:4:5
87.9.
1980
36
657.3
74.5
2,711
13.4 '
100.0'
1981
-21-
758:4 -
15.4
2,456
-.9.4.,
115.2:
1982
- 18
626.0
-17.5
1,903:
-22.5.:
132.1
Table C-24
South Korea
Change in
... -"Real Per Capita,..
Change in Real
Real. Per Capita .C-: Change in Real r
Change in
-
-'Nominal Exports ':iImports'
Per Capita
-Income` Per.Capita
Consumer Prices
(percent) (1980 US $)
Imports
(percent)
(1980 US $) .
: 1... , P
7 :Income
(percent)
(percent)
1971
25""
246.3
11.4-
805
6.1
13.4
1972
49
232.1
-5.8
832
3.3;.
11.7
1973
94= '
310.8
33.9 ,
935
12.51
3.2:.
1974
36'.'.
355.0
14.2-.-
991
5.99, '
24.3.
1975
12
340.1
-4.2
.1,043
5.2
25.3
1976
49.
395.7-
16:3': -
1,180
13.2
15.3
1977
28._"`.
440.7
11.4
1,281
8.5: _
10.2
1978
24'
546.5
24.0
1,406 --
-9.8.,.;
14.5:,
1979
17? '-
620.3
13.5
1,472
4,7
18.3
1980
14- -:
560.6
-9.6" .
1,387
-5.8
28.7.1-
1981
20 ? ]'
653.2 ' .
16.5
1,452..
4.7
21.3-
1982
1
618.4
-5.3.
1,506
3:7
7.3.'
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/31: CIA-RDP85SO0315R000200050004-2
Table C-25
Spain
Change in
Nominal Exports
(percent)
1971
23
1972
27
1973
35
1974
35
1975
7..
1976
12
1977
16 '
1978
27 .
1979
37
1980
13
1981
-2
1982
0
I Real Per Capita, Change in Real Real Per Capita
Imports Per Capita Income ?
(1980 US 5) Imports (1980 US 5)
(percent)
510.4 -1.2 4,655
630.4 23.5 5,384
718.2. 13.9 6,338
817.5 13.86,698
783.4 -4.2. .6,732.
816.6 4.2 5,889
757:9 -7.2 5,302
715.2 -5.6 5,291
816.6 14.2 6,002
910.5 11.5 5,647
862.9 -5.2'r 4,373
869.0 0.7 3,981
Table C-26
Turkey
Confidential'
Change in Real
Per Capita .
Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent) ,
4.7
26.7
15.7
28.9
17.7
32.2
5.7
37.3
0.5
43.6
-12.5,
50.2
-10.0 -
62.4
-0.2-
74.8
'1
13.4
86.5
-5.9
100.0
-22.6
114.5
T-
-9.0
131.0
1
1
25X1
Change in
Nominal Exports '
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Imports
(1980 US 5)
Change in Real
Per Capita
imports
Real Per Capita.
Income
(1980 US 5)
Change in Real
Per Capita
lacorhe
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
(percent)
(percent)
1971
12
112.4
13.9
5,504
-17.2
7.8
1972
28
134.0
19.2
6,081
10.5 '
8.7
1973
45
141.9
5.9'
6,250
2.8
10.0
1974
13
180.6
27.2
6,649
6.4
11.6
1975
-11
202.7 -
12.2
6,741
1.4 .
13.8
1976
37
210.7
3.9
6,398
-5:1
16.2
1977
-12
214.3
I.7:
5,982
-6.5 ?
20.6
1978
28
151.7
-29.2
4,220
-29.5.
30.0
1979
-3
139.0
-8.3 '
3,314
-21.5..
47.6
1980
26
172.5
24.1 '
1,312'
-60.4- ?
100.0
1981
198.4
15.0
916.
-30.2
136.6 '
1982
200.0
0.8
641
-30.0
178.7
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 Table C-27
Venezuela
Change in
Nominal Exports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Imports
(1980 US 8)
':Change in Real
Per Capita
Imports'
(percent).
Real Per Capita,
Income
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1973 45.
609.7
. -9.6 .
2,679
7.5 .
4.1
1974 126
628.4
3.1..
3,654, '
36.4
8.4
1975 -23
809.2
28.8
3,286.
-10.1
10.1
1976 2
,979.3'
21.0
3,096.
-5.8 .
7.7
1977 -1
1,241.8
26.8
3,281
6.0
7.7
1978
1,176.2
-5.3
3,365 .
2.5
7.2
1979
875.9
-25.5 ?.
3,375
0.3 -
12.4
1980
787.2
-10.1
3,396.
.0.6
21.6
1981
853.1
8.4
3,320
-2.3
16.2
821.2 '
..-3.7
3,142
-5.4
9.9
Table C-28
Zaire
Change in
Nominal Exports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Imports
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita
Imports
(percent)
Real Per Capita
Income.
(1980 US $)
Change in Real
Per Capita .
Income
(percent)
Change in
Consumer Prices
(percent)
1972 4
86.8
-10.1
406
-0.4
15.9
1973 33
82.7
-4.7
419
3.2
15.6
1974 32
80.6
-2.5
421
0.5 '
27.5
1975 -39
62.0
-23.1
385
-8.6
29.0
1976 0
43.6
-29.8
369
-4,2
88.2
1977 9
35.8
-17.8 -
366
-0.7
63.1
1978 -9
30.5
-14.8
346
-5.7
48.5
1979 38
25.4
-16.8
331
-4.3
108.6
1980 20
28.9
13.8
315
-4.8
42.1
1981 -61
22.7
-21.5
313
-0.5
34.7
16.4
-27.7?
298
-4.8
37.2
 I Confidential
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25X1
Appendix D
Related Open-Source Publications
Bishop, Vaughn, and J. William Meszarios, Comparing Nations, (esp. Chapter I I ),
DC Heath and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1980.
Hibbs, Douglas A., Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis,
Looney, Robert, Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution,.Pergamon Press,!
New?.York, 1982.
Lundbertg, Erik, Instability and Economic Growth, Yale University Press, New
Haven,.1968.
Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations, Yale University Press, New.
:Haven, 1982. ,
Williamson, Johq(editor), IMF Conditionality, Institute for International Eco-
nomics, Washington, DC, 1983.. ~
Zimmerman, Ekkart, Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions: Theories and
Research, Schenkman Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1983.
37
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