PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON: TROUBLED PAST AND BLEAK FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00558R000100080004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ~-ECret- 25X1
Palestinians in Lebanon:
Troubled Past
and Bleak Future
t)H
-Seefet-
GI 83-10016
NESA 83-10017
February 1983
Copy 6 10
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Directorate of Secret
r i m; Intelligence
Palestinians in Lebanon:
Troubled Past
and Bleak Future
This paper was prepared by
the Office of Global Issues
of the Office of Near East-South Asia
Analysis. It was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council, Defense Intelligence Agency,
and Department of State. Comments may be directed
to the Chief, Near East Branch, Geography
Division, OGI,
Secret
G183-10016
NESA 83-10017
February 1983
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Troubled Past
and Bleak Future
Key Judgments The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which targeted both Palestine Liberation
Information available Organization (PLO) and Palestinian civilian concentrations, has left the
as of 27 Januarv 1983 400,000 to 500,000 Palestinians in Lebanon with a bleak and uncertain
was used in this report.
future. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), some 90,000 of the
Palestinians had registered as homeless through early December. Many
more are without adequate income because of the death, detention, or
deportation of breadwinners and the disruption of their economic system,
which was largely organized by the PLO. Most face economic discrimina-
tion by all Lebanese factions, and many are threatened with relocation or
deportation by Lebanese or Israeli authorities.
Until recently, both Israel and Lebanon had hindered UNRWA efforts to
rehouse the homeless. Israel wanted no settled concentrations of Palestin-
ians in southern Lebanon, and Lebanese authorities would prefer that most
of the Palestinians leave the country. Following the massacre in September
1982, in the Beirut refugee camps, Israel reversed its position, apparently
realizing it would be held responsible for the well-being of the Palestinians
in southern Lebanon, and has supported reconstruction of housing in the
camps.
The Lebanese Government has expressed its intention to expel all Palestin-
ians who lack proper papers-as many as 250,000, according to one
Lebanese official. We believe that only 50,000 to 100,000 actually lack
papers; the great majority of Palestinians are registered with either
UNRWA or the government, and some have acquired Lebanese citizen-
ship. Any such mass deportation, however, is probably not feasible because
no country has indicated a willingness to accept large numbers of
Palestinians.
We believe that most of the Palestinians living in Lebanon will remain
where they are, relying largely on outside assistance (mainly from
UNRWA and from foreign remittances). Physical harassment of the
refugees will probably increase if an Israeli withdrawal is not accompanied
by the establishment of adequate security for the Palestinians. The
Lebanese Government has not yet demonstrated its willingness or ability to
protect the Palestinians from their often hostile neighbors and from the
Christian militias. In fact, we believe that government-condoned harass-
ment to encourage emigration is likely.
Secret
GI 83-10016
NESA 83-100/7
February 1983
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Historical Background
The Refugee Flow
The PLO in Lebanon
Palestinian Population
Distribution
Alien Status
Palestinians in the Lebanese Economy
Impact of the Israeli Invasion
Displacement of Palestinians
Refugee Housing
Poor Economic Prospects
B. Individual Refugee Camps
Countries Receiving Palestinian Combatants From Beirut
Lebanon: Population in UNRWA Refugee Camps
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Figure
Lebanon
UNRWA Refugee Camps
Official-occ u pied
Official-unoccupied
Unofficial-occupied
Unofficial-unoccupied
Planned
Road
Airfield
15 Kilorne firs
15 Miles
Refugee camp names are from
UNRWA sources.
ndysadrien J
An Nabatiyah,r
Nabatielr =_. _at Tahti
El Bus Al Burghuliyah
Tyre ??Burj el-Shemali
Ra's al Ayn.?RasMdieh
Al Mink ?Nahe elBarer!
r,~hr a Mu=~
? ?Beddawl
Tripoli
Mount
Hermon
'Slemo g GOLAN
15 HEIGHTS
An Bint . t , ' ) (Israeli
Naqurah. Jubayl . ) Q / occupied)
Al Dunaytirah
I S R A E L
Jazzin
Az Zahrani Ein el-Hilweh
. Al Ghaziyah
Sidon
Metullft
1l
Mar Elias %Sh a r r /a
Sabra Burj el-Barajneh
Beirut 4`1 ' h
tort err orr AlaYh. B amdun
.Khaldah AI Mansuriyah
Beirut
Ad Demur 5 Bayt
ad Din
S Y R I A
*Damascus
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Troubled Past
and Bleak Future
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon last summer has
changed but not eliminated the problems created for
Lebanon and Israel by the presence of sizable num-
bers of Palestinians in Lebanon since 1948. Already
difficult conditions for the Palestinians have become
worse. Tens of thousands are again homeless, and
Lebanon remains torn by competing domestic factions
and occupied by foreign forces. With the evacuation
of the Palestine Liberation Organization combatants
from Beirut and the south, the future of the remaining
Palestinians has become particularly questionable-
as was dramatically illustrated by the massacre at the
Shatila and Sabra refugee camps in September 1982.
After tracing the history of the Palestinians in Leba-
non, this paper provides background information on
their status and role in the local economy. It then
assesses the impact of the Israeli invasion on the
Palestinian community and explores the prospects for
this troubled people.
Historical Background
The Palestinians arrived in Lebanon in three main
waves, two associated with the Arab-Israeli wars in
1948 and 1967 and one with the civil war in Jordan in
1970-71. Until the late 1960s, when the PLO wrested
control of the refugee camps from the Lebanese
Government, the Palestinians were an oppressed
group in Lebanon. During the 1970s, their economic
and political status improved, but their power was
resented by other Lebanese groups.
The Refugee Flow. The first large group of Palestin-
ians-about 50,000 businessmen and professional
people who foresaw the impending conflict in Pales-
tine over the UN decision to create Israel-moved to
Lebanon in early 1948. Many became well estab-
lished, particularly in southern Lebanon where they
bought land, houses, and small businesses. An addi-
tional 140,000 or so refugees fled to Lebanon just
before and immediately after the 1948 war to escape
harassment and military actions. Most of these refu-
gees were Sunni Muslims or Christians and were
strongly resented by southern Lebanon's backward,
largely Shiite population. Within a short time, the
majority settled in makeshift camps around Tyre,
Sidon, Tripoli, and Beirut where they could maintain
their Palestinian identity and find relative security in 25X1
the hostile environment (figure 1). UNRWA aid to
the camps began in 1949 (appendix A).
The refugee camps were under harsh control by the
Lebanese security and military services from the time
of their establishment until after the June 1967 war.
The Lebanese Government devoted few resources to
the well-being and comfort of the inhabitants, consid-
ering them a threat to the delicate balance of power
among the country's various religious groups.
A smaller number of refugees-some 6,000-fled to
Lebanon in the wake of the June 1967 war. They
tended to congregate with fellow Palestinians in the
camps in the southern part of the country, and
UNRWA established no new camps to accommodate
them. After the defeat of the Arab armies in June
1967, the Palestinians, in preparation for unconven-
tional warfare against the Israelis, began establishing
training camps, supply routes, and operational bases.
The last major influx-about 30,000 PLO officials,
commandos, and family members-arrived in Leba-
non after their expulsion from Jordan in 1970-71.F_
The PLO in Lebanon. Establishment of the PLO in
1964 and of its fighting units in the late 1960s helped
bring about the first notable improvements in living
conditions for the Palestinians in Lebanon. By 1969
the PLO had wrested control of the refugee camps
from Lebanese authorities and was improving condi-
tions in the camps, by installing electricity and run-
ning water, for example. UNRWA's charter limited
its role in the camps to providing education, food,
medical services, and some assistance in building
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refugee shelters. The UNRWA camps became places
to recruit additional commandos for the PLO, which
was commencing cross-border operations into Israel.
The PLO's growing power and its attacks on Israeli
towns in the Galilee aroused concern in Lebanon and
led to violent clashes in 1969 when the Lebanese
Army attempted to curb PLO activities in the south.
Lebanese Army and PLO representatives, meeting
later that year in Cairo, forged the Cairo Accords,
which were intended to formalize the presence of the
PLO in Lebanon yet prevent it from interfering in
internal Lebanese affairs. The PLO, however, reneged
on its part of the bargain and increasingly asserted its
military and economic control over much of southern
Lebanon, especially the so-called Fatah Land on the
western slopes of Mount Hermon.
south became armed PLO strongholds, they increas-
ingly became targets of Israeli attacks. Moreover, the
strengthening of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon
drew the PLO rejectionists 2 into Lebanese politics,
usually on the side of leftist Muslim groups. This
involvement aggravated the crisis between Lebanese
Christians and Muslims that erupted into the 1975-76
civil war. When the PLO and the leftists appeared to
be gaining the upper hand, Syrian President Assad,
determined to keep a rough balance of power between
the warring factions, intervened on the side of the
Christians-an action ultimately approved by the
Arab League.
The civil war and Syrian intervention set the PLO
back militarily and politically. Although it retained
some positions in Muslim West Beirut, the bulk of its
2 The PLO is split into two factions: moderate groups (led by
Arafat) that disdain involvement in the internal affairs of Arab host
The arrival of the PLO's political leadership and
militia from Jordan in 1970-71 created further prob-
lems for the Lebanese. As the refugee camps in the
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The UNR WA refugee camps were originally set up on
small patches of uncultivated land or on abandoned
sites formerly occupied by the French Army. Crowd-
ed tent camps with the most primitive of services were
gradually improved over the tears. Bare earthen
floors were covered by cement; tents gave way to
shacks, which in turn were replaced by brick and
cinder block houses; public latrines were replaced by
private facilities; and water distribution systems were
installed. Despite these improvements, conditions in
the camps are generally simple, and housing is
crowded and much inferior to that outside the camps.
The camps have come to resemble large villages;
small houses set along alley-like streets are inter-
spersed with stores and mosques. In the larger camps,
particularly those near Beirut, much of the housing is
two or three stories high or higher.
Although facilities have improved, the camps have
become overcrowded because most are surrounded bi'
privately owned land. Living space and basic ameni-
ties designed for a certain number of refugees are now
serving, in some instances, two or three times that
number. With the exception of members of the Pales-
tinian resistance movements, who reside in the camps
on principle and for military reasons, Palestinians
star in the camps primarily because they cannot
afford alternate housing, want to live with their
families and cultural group, and are discriminated
against in Lebanese society. In some cases, virtually
entire villages from Galilee in northern Israel were
relocated to sections of refugee camps where they
have retained their identity. In addition to the Pales-
tinians, poor Lebanese, mainly Shias from the south,
and a few destitute Syrians have moved into the
Lebanese UNRWA camps near Beirut because they
have been unable to afford other housing.
forces were pushed into southern Lebanon where they
became wedged between the Israelis to the south and
the Syrians to the north. In 1977 the Arab states
made another attempt to bring the Palestinians to
heel in southern Lebanon-the Shtawrah Agreement.
Designed to implement a strict interpretation of the
Cairo Accords, it would have greatly reduced the
Palestinians' freedom of action in Lebanon but, like
the Cairo Accords, was never put into practice.
In March 1978 following several Palestinian raids
into Israel, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invaded
southern Lebanon and seized a 32-kilometer-wide
strip of land between the Israeli border and the Litani
River. Subsequently, the United Nations Interim
Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was sent to the area and
the IDF withdrew. However, Israel maintained a
surrogate presence in the form of the Christian Leba-
nese militia, under Maj. Saad Haddad, which occu-
pied a narrow strip of land along the Israeli border.
Because the Christian militia and UNIFIL, were 25X1
occupying the area south of the Litani River, the PLO
was forced to move north of the river to the An
Nabatiyah and Sidon areas. However, it retained a
presence in and near Tyre, where there are three large
UNRWA refugee camps. Despite the zone separating
the Israelis and the PLO, occasional PLO commando
infiltrations and shellings of northern Israel continued
until July 1981, when a cease-fire was implemented
following the heavy Israeli bombing of Beirut.
Palestinian Population 25X1
Size. Estimates of the number of Palestinians residing
in Lebanon vary greatly. They range from a conserva-
tive estimate of 300,000, recently reported by an
international relief official, to more than 600,000, a
figure quoted by PLO and Israeli sources. We believe
that at the time of the 1982 Israeli invasion there were
between 400,000 and 500,000 Palestinians living in
Lebanon,' accounting for roughly 15 percent of the 25X1
country's approximately 3 million people.' We esti-
mate that at least 300,000 of the Palestinians residing 25X1
in Lebanon are refugees who arrived in 1948-49 or
their offspring.
' This estimate is based on a 1978 assessment by the American
Embassy in Beirut of the Palestinian population in Lebanon,
updated with 1982 UNRWA figures; it takes into account natural
growth and emigration.
This figure was recently derive y the US Bureau of the Census
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Table I
Lebanon: Palestinian Population
Area
CIA Estimate
Pre-June 1982
UNRWA Registered
30 September 1982
Total
400,000-500,000
238,663
Beirut
160,000-200,000
83,318
Tyre
30,561
Bekaa Valley
10,000- 30,000
According to UNRWA, about 239,000 of the Pales-
tinians in Lebanon prior to the 1982 Israeli invasion
were registered with UNRWA as refugees. An
UNRWA field director in 1978 estimated the number
of Palestinians not registered with UNRWA at
190,000 to 250,000. Of the unregistered group:
? 100,000 or so-many of them Christians-had ac-
quired Lebanese citizenship, mostly through family
connections or bribes.
? 40,000 to 50,000 were registered with the Govern-
ment of Lebanon's Directorate General of Palestin-
ian Affairs and received some form of welfare
benefits, but not from UNRWA.
? 50,000 to 100,000 were not registered with either
UNRWA or the Lebanese Government, but have
retained their Palestinian identity
Distribution. The Palestinian population in Lebanon
is concentrated in the south and in the Beirut area
(table 1). Over the years large Palestinian neighbor-
hoods have grown up around the refugee camps and in
the major towns. Until the recent Israeli invasion, the
Palestinians, particularly the PLO, had come to domi-
nate the southern cities of Tyre, Sidon, and An
Nabatiyah. They also congregated in some of the
smaller towns and villages in southern Lebanon-
such as Al Burghuliyah and Adlun (north of Tyre),
Arnun (near An Nabatiyah), and Al Ghaziyah (near
Sidon). In some cases, particularly in towns such as
Arnun, the PLO had ousted the local inhabitants and,
taken over.
In Beirut the Palestinians have tended over the years
to congregate in the vicinity of the sprawling refugee
camps on the city's south side. Entire neighborhoods
and suburbs have taken on a Palestinian character,
especially the Fakhani and Ar Ramlah al Bayda
quarters in Beirut proper and the suburbs of Burj al
Barajinah, Al Awzai, and Khaldah. Smaller clusters
of Palestinians have settled throughout Muslim West
Beirut, and many who have reached the middle and
upper income levels reside in the city's more cosmo-
politan Ras Bayrut area (figure 2).
Other concentrations of Palestinians have formed in
the largely Muslim city of Tripoli in northern Leba-
non, as well as in the vicinity of the two large refugee
camps there. Smaller clusters live in the Al Biqa
(Bekaa Valley), especially in the Balabakk area, and
in the Muslim sectors of Lebanon's other cities.
As much as one-half of Lebanon's Palestinian popula-
tion continues to live in the original UNRWA refugee
camps. We estimate that, prior to the Israeli invasion,
the 11 occupied camps contained from 165,000 to
250,000 residents (table 2 and appendix B); for the
same period UNRWA listed 13 camps with nearly
110,000 registered inhabitants.' Evidently, the camps
contained large numbers of persons who were not
registered as camp residents or even as refugees.
Most of the camps are situated along the coast near
major population centers-Tyre (3), Sidon (2), Beirut
(3), and Tripoli (2). One small camp is located in the
Bekaa Valley at Balabakk. In addition to the official
camps, UNRWA also supplies assistance to refugees
in several unofficial camps-most notably, the exten-
sive Sabra neighborhood south of Beirut. Another
' Two camps, Dbayeh, north of Beirut, and Nabatieh, in the south,
are unoccupied, but are still listed as official camps by UNRWA.
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Figure 2
Beirut and Vicinity
t .. ~ I ~r f v+~r .r! r.t
\C V ~ s' ~ " ~ nit
Mar Eryas s r . ? ..
(alati~r~Htme'
tfrt for-the )$iifld t
,-x and fietardid ~
,40mmerland Sports
Resort Stadium
Shatila
ITALY.
Predafuinantly
"'Shia
t o al
aort
t
tii Hazel
AUixandri :
L
UNRWA ref
ee cam
Multinational Force limit of operations
p
ug
L
Squatter/low-income housing
"Green Line"-former separation for East and West Beirut
Beirut neighborhood or suburb
Beirut municipal boundary
Jlsr el
(Former UNRYtampt
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Table 2
Lebanon: Population in UNRWA Refugee Camps
PLO Estimate
1975-76
UNRWA Registered b CIA Estimate
30 September 1982 Pre-June 1982
Burj el-Barajneh 18,000- 25,000
Mieh Mieh
Nabatieh d
Tyre Area
Rashidieh
Burj el-Shemali
El Buss
North of Beirut
25,000
4,500
5,000
32,000
14,000
10,000
30,000
25,000
10,000
Al Biqa (Bekaa Valley)
Wavell (Balabakk)
5,000
5,000
a These figures are based on two PLO studies: a field study made by
the Institute of Palestinian Studies in 1973-74, and an article that
appeared in the Journal of Palestine Studies in 1975.
b Estimates are based on figures appearing in the press,
unofficial camp arose amidst the ruins of the former
Christian town of Ad Damur. Some 8,500 or more
Palestinian refugees who fled the devastation of their
former East Beirut UNRWA camps at Tall az Zatar
(Dekwaneh) and Jisr el-Basha in 1976 occupied the
damaged structures in Ad Damur until the Israelis
moved into the area in June 1982.
Alien Status. We estimate that at least three-
fourths-or 300,000 to 400,000-of the Palestinians
in Lebanon are not citizens and under existing Leba-
nese law are ineligible for citizenship. Those who fled
to Lebanon in 1948 or entered legally in subsequent
109,438
80,074
165,000-250,000
130,000-204,000
28,294 52,000- 64,000
25,804 50,000- 60,000
2,490 2,000- 4,000
0
32,027 31,000- 47,000
15,356 15,000- 25,000
11,256 11,000- 15,000
5,415 5,000- 7,000
29,364 35,000- 46,000
24,678 30,000- 40,000
8,637 10,000- 15,000
16,041
4,686
Does not include the adjoining Sabra "unofficial" camp, which
probably houses tens of thousands of additional Palestinian refugees.
d UNRWA includes this camp under Sidon, although the camp is
located just west of An Nabatiyah. It has not been inhabited since
1974 when it was destroyed by Israeli bombing.
years, as well as their offspring, were entitled to
register with UNRWA, or the government, and to
receive residence permits identifying them as Pales-
tinians. (According to a US Embassy assessment,
many nonregistered Palestinians obtained residence
permits through bribes.) Palestinians who work or
travel abroad are issued special blue-colored Lebanese
residence cards and are issued a special Palestinian
laissez-passer (a travel document not acknowledging
citizenship) by the Government of Lebanon. Whether
or not they possess residence permits, Palestinians
without citizenship papers are legally denied full
participation in Lebanese society. For example, they
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are excluded from public primary and secondary
schools but are allowed to attend universities. Most
children attend UNRWA or private schools or, until
recently, PLO-operated schools.
Intermarriage, which might lead to Lebanese citizen-
ship by Palestinians and their children, has been rare
except among Christians. Close social relationships,
especially between refugee camp residents and Leba-
nese, have not developed because of Lebanese hostility
toward Palestinians and because of the Palestinians'
own desire to retain a separate identity.
Most of the estimated 100,000 or so Palestinians who
have Lebanese citizenship migrated to the country
before or during 1948 or are descendants of these
migrants. Some already were Lebanese citizens resid-
ing in Palestine; 6 others had close connections in
Lebanon-usually relatives. Bribes were sometimes
used to acquire Lebanese names and citizenship,
according to a Palestinian scholar, as reported by the
US Embassy. However, for the majority of the refu-
gees, citizenship is an unlikely prospect-probably
now more than ever
Palestinians in the Lebanese Economy
The 1948 Refugees. The first influx of Palestinians
into southern Lebanon in 1948 sparked a revival of
the area's agriculture. Farming had been stagnant
because local landowners found business in Beirut
more profitable than agriculture. The arrival of large
numbers of rural Palestinians in 1948, however, pro-
vided Lebanese landowners with relatively cheap and
efficient agricultural labor, and farming in southern
Lebanon began to revive.
Like immigrants the world over, the newly arrived
Palestinians were anxious to improve their economic
status. Few could support themselves solely on the
UNRWA-provided rations, and many of the agricul-
tural workers used their meager savings to start small
businesses inside the camps or in neighboring towns.
Dr. Zvi Lanir, a Tel Aviv University social scientist,
claims in an interview in the Jerusalem Post that the
Palestinians also had access to an illicit source of
' As many as 30,000 Lebanese citizens were employed as migrant
workers in Palestine at the time of the 1948 war. When they fled
back to Lebanon, UNRWA registered them as economic refugees
income: families would draw UNRWA food rations
for deceased relatives and sell them for cash on the
local market
A few of the Palestinians who have successfully
integrated into Lebanese society rank among the
country's wealthiest and most prominent business-
men, holding a wide variety of positions in medicine,
business, construction, and agriculture. Their prosper-
ity is a matter of resentment among poorer Lebanese,
according to many observers. Such Palestinian suc-
cesses have occurred despite Lebanese Government
attempts to limit their economic opportunities. Ac-
cording to official edicts, no Palestinian may take a
salaried job without holding a government-issued
work permit, which must be renewed annually. After
the 1975-76 civil war, which the Lebanese believe was
sparked by the Palestinian presence, the government
became increasingly selective in issuing the permits.
We believe, however, that the restriction on work
permits has had little impact. Reconstruction efforts
necessitated by civil war strife led the government to
make exceptions in the case of construction workers.
Until recently, the government's ability to enforce the
permit requirement was minimal, especially in south-
ern Lebanon and the Tripoli area, where many Pales-
tinians are concentrated. Even in Beirut, work permits
were readily available to Palestinians for the price of a
bribe normally paid to the issuing bureaucrat.
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Informal limits on Palestinian economic activities, 25X1
especially discrimination by the Lebanese, have prob-
ably been more effective. The 1967 crash of the Intra
Bank, a large commercial bank founded and run by a
Palestinian Christian, is a case in point. Intra Bank
had been very profitable, but by the mid-1960s, when
political tensions between Palestinians and Lebanese
were increasing, it began facing serious financial
problems, although these were not widely known. A
US Embassy official reported that the Christian-
dominated Lebanese banking community spread ru-
mors exaggerating the bank's financial plight and
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succeeded in panicking enough depositors to cause a
run on the bank. As a result, Intra Bank went
bankrupt in a spectacular crash
Post-1967. The arrival of more Palestinian refugees
after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the emergence of
a strong PLO structure after 1970 significantly
changed the character of the Palestinian presence in
Lebanon. PLO spending of a large share of its income
among Palestinians in Lebanon brought new prosperi-
ty to the camps, causing added resentment among
their Lebanese neighbors.
Adult males in the camps could earn a monthly
income of roughly $250-equivalent to the going
agricultural wage-by enlisting in one of the PLO
militias, Because
additional stipends were paid to wives and children, a
family income from the PLO could rise as high as
$1,000 per month. The PLO financed some construc-
tion projects in southern Lebanon, such as repairing
sewage systems and roads that, according to a wire
service report, the Lebanese central government was
unable or unwilling to do.
=the PLO also helped refugees improve their living
conditions and the infrastructure within the UNRWA
camps.
The relatively high wages available from the PLO
lured many Palestinian workers from the farms, and
agriculture in the south again began to decline after
1970. However, even those who continued to work in
agriculture benefited from the PLO presence.
such Marxist-oriented PLO factions as
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (DFLP) bullied the local landowners to
improve Palestinian laborers' working conditions and
to raise their wages
The PLO earned some money through operating the
ports of Sidon and Tyre, which it controlled until June
1982. It collected "customs" duties on all goods
entering the ports except, according to a Lebanese
Shia source of the Jerusalem Post, on those items
destined for Palestinian merchants, who undercut
Lebanese merchants in the area and made corre-
spondingly greater profits.
In our view, a key factor in Palestinian economic
development was SAMED, the PLO's economic wing.
SAMED is an umbrella organization of numerous
PLO-operated businesses, primarily located in Leba-
non. SAMED is mainly a device to keep Palestinians
employed, although its stated purpose is "to lay the
foundation for the economic structure of the future
Palestinian state." According to press reports,
SAMED businesses include a film studio, numerous
furniture and clothing factories, handicraft shops, and
other small businesses, which employed about 5,000
people and grossed some $40 million in 1980. One
press report indicated that profits were plowed back
into the businesses rather than used to finance other
PLO operations.
Palestinians in Lebanon also benefited from remit-
tances sent home by working-age male relatives who
migrated mainly to Persian Gulf countries, where
labor demand has been strong and wages high. In the
Gulf the Palestinian workers have faced little of the
economic and social opposition they encounter in
Lebanon. We estimate that worker remittances to-
taled about $300 million annually. This figure is
based on a US Embassy estimate of the total 1981
remittances into Lebanon of both Palestinians and
Lebanese and on our estimate of the proportion of
Palestinians in Lebanon's population.
Social Welfare
The PLO had a fairly formal set of social welfare
programs for Palestinians residing in Lebanon, and,
according to its budget documents, spent roughly
$7 million on them in 1979. Widows and children of
dead PLO fighters were entitled to a stipend ("mar-
tyrs' payments"), and financial assistance was given to
Palestinians wanting to rebuild homes damaged in
fighting.
Although most of the welfare programs were run
directly by the PLO, some were undertaken by the
Palestine Red Crescent Society, the Palestinian equiv-
alent of the Red Cross. The PLO and the Red
Crescent Society operated a number of schools and
paid tuition for some Palestinians to attend other
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Figure 3
Countries Receiving Palestinian Combatants From Beirut
North
Atlantic
Ocean
Algeria
590
Upper
Volta
Jordan
L /290
Rrd
Sear
Saudi
Arabia
Sudan
490
Iraq
110
Ktiwait
dei:,ed
bouvdae Yemen
keen
.(Sena)
840_.
(Aden)
1,100
Induin
Ocrtrn
0 500 Kdorneters
0 500 Miles
schools. I IRed Crescent
Society hospitals treated Palestinians-and some poor
Lebanese-free of charge.
Impact of the Israeli Invasion
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 disrupt-
ed the entire Palestinian structure in southern Leba-
non and Beirut. PLO strongholds were destroyed and
tens of thousands of civilians were dispersed through-
out the countryside. PLO fighters trapped in West
Beirut were ultimately forced into exile in eight other
Arab countries (figure 3).
The main targets in the Israeli push north were the
crowded Palestinian refugee camps and other Pales-
tinian concentrations in southern Lebanon.
reports from US officials who visited the
area confirm that the Rashidieh and Ein el-Hilweh
camps, both PLO strongholds, were particularly hard
hit; the latter camp was almost totally destroyed.
Suspected Palestinian concentrations in the Tyre and
Italy
230/ f Syria
(combined) __-~ r- Cyprusir
98 a 3,870
0
sad- Mediterranean Sea Lebanon
J Israel
,,,.. ,Cameroon
Central African
Republic
Sidon areas were also hit, as were concentrations in
the towns of Arnun, Al Ghaziyah, Adlun, Wadi az
Zaynah, and Khaldah. Khaldah, at the southern end
of the Beirut International Airport, sustained heavy
damage as Palestinian fighters made a stand there
and at the airport. Several wholly Lebanese towns and
villages suffered a similar fate; artillery duels between
the IDF and Syrian forces in Lebanon's mountainous
interior wrought havoc on such towns as Alayh,
Bhamdun, and Al Mansuriyah. Most Palestinians in
the south between the ages of 16 and 60-the most
economically productive segment of the population-
have fled, been killed, or taken prisoner by the
Israelis.
The siege of West Beirut was particularly devastating
for the Palestinians. Two months of Israeli shelling
and bombing leveled large areas of the southern part
of the city and its suburbs. The Fakhani district, Ar
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Ramlah al-Bayda, Burj at Barajina.h, Al Awzai, and
the refugee camps-where the Palestinians lived-
were especially hard hit. According to press reports,
most of the refugees fled the camps for the relative
safety of the Ras Bayrut commercial district where
they took cover in abandoned apartment buildings,
office buildings, movie theaters, parking garages, and
even public parks. The Israelis then pounded "suspect
PLO concentrations" in the district
Displacement of Palestinians. Estimates of the num-
ber of Palestinians killed, wounded, or made homeless
by the Israeli invasion vary widely. Lebanese Govern-
ment and United Nations sources suggest that 10,000
to 20,000 were killed and tens of thousands were
wounded. In December the UNRWA Commissioner
General claimed that the number of homeless Pales-
tinians in the Beirut area and in the south numbered
about 90,000, of which 55,000 were in the Sidon and
Tyre areas. The Israeli Government, in contrast,
reported only 30,000 homeless. Earlier, UNRWA had
estimated that an additional 12,000 Palestinians were
in the Bekaa Valley and that a few thousand had fled
to neighboring Syria.
Although some Palestinian refugees fled their camps
in the south for safer areas in the Bekaa Valley and
northern Lebanon, the majority, we believe, stayed in
the immediate vicinity, where they camped in vacated
apartments, damaged buildings, store fronts, schools,
UNRWA buildings, and groves of trees along the
coast. Some refugees have returned to their former
homesites in the camps and are living in the remain-
ing habitable shelters while others are rebuilding their
small cinder block houses with UNRWA financing.
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Makeshift tents at temporary Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon,
June 1982
UNRWA estimates that as many as 12,000 refugees
have returned to the devastated Ein el-Hilweh camp
and, according to press reports, some 6,000 Palestin-
ians have returned to the Rashidieh camp.
The loss or separation of a large share of adult males
from Palestinian families-especially in the refugee
camps-complicates the refugee resettlement issue.
Those separated include the 8,500 PLO fighters,
many of whom were recruited in the Lebanese
UNRWA camps where they lived with or near their
families before the invasion. An estimated 13,000
others are still in the north and in the Bekaa Valley
and may be sent abroad as part of any Lebanese peace
agreement. According to the International Committee
of the Red Cross, an additional 5,300 alleged PLO
members or sympathizers are being held prisoner at
the Ansar prison camp near An Nabatiyah (figure 4).
Most of the Ansar group are Palestinians, although
Israel has announced that it also includes about 1,000 25X1
Lebanese and 1,000 non-Lebanese Arabs. According
to UNRWA and press sources, most of the Palestin-
ian prisoners are from the refugee camps in the south.
Unsubstantiated reports in the Lebanese press claim
that Israel intends to deport most of the Palestinian
prisoners from Lebanon and wants their families to
leave also. Neither the Lebanese Government nor
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official Israeli spokesmen are known to have taken
PLO fighters, but would probably support such a
move if it seemed feasible. So far, Arab countries
have shown a willingness to accept only a few families
of deported fighters, but if all immediate family
potential deportees, the refugee population could be
significantly reduced.
Palestinians in southern Lebanon is an urgent task
that has been delayed by confusion over Israeli and
Lebanese policies. Initially, Israeli officials in discus-
ian civilians in groups of 100 to 200 families be
countries were not willing to take them. The Israeli
Government announced it would only allow the estab-
lishment of temporary camps north of a 40-kilometer
security zone bordering Israel. (figure 5). By mid-
August it was clear that time was running out, and
Israeli officials told US Embassy officers that they
feared they would be blamed for any illnesses or
deaths resulting from exposure. Thus, in late August,
the Israelis relented and announced that temporary
tent shelters could be erected by UNRWA within the
refugee camps in southern Lebanon.
Government for permission to clear the camps in
southern Lebanon of rubble and to erect tents. Ac-
cording to US Embassy officials, the Lebanese told
UNRWA and the United States that permission to
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Figure 5
Lebanon
Areas of Control
Israeli
Lebanese Government
Phalange
Syrian
0 15 Kilo-oh-
0 15 Miles
Khaldah ?Al Man$uriyah
Israeli-backed
m fluente
piryat(
emonl (Anl AN
,lh ! ) (Israeli
(Q occupied)
ISRAEL / '4.
Damascus
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establish temporary camps would have to wait until a
new government was formed, and UNRWA refused
to start work at the sites without a go-ahead from the
Lebanese Government. In early October the Govern-
ment of Lebanon gave its tacit consent
When the first tents were erected at Ein el-Hilweh in
mid-November, camp residents protested vigorously.
They claimed the tents offered only minimal protec-
tion from Lebanon's harsh winter weather and provid-
ed no security from hostile neighbors. Moreover,
many of the refugees, especially the older ones,
according to UNRWA reporting, viewed the tents as
a return to the abhorrent conditions of 1948-49. The
refugees were also concerned about the threat of fire.
Nevertheless, UNRWA expected that the refugees
would accept the tents when Lebanon's cold, damp,
and rainy winter set in.
Israel, meanwhile, reversed its earlier position oppos-
ing permanent shelters. In November, Economics
Minister Yaacov Meridor stated that Israel would
permit the rebuilding of solid shelters and would also
sell Israeli-produced prefabricated housing and pro-
vide one-half ton of cement to each Palestinian fam-
ily. A few weeks later, Meridor offered each Palestin-
ian family desiring to buy a prefab, produced in Israel
or not, $250 toward the purchase price and a ton of
cement for those building their own homes. UNRWA
is giving each family $750, a plot of land, and a tent;
large families receive more than $750 and get a larger
plot of land and an extra tent. According to reporting
from the US Embassy, the Israeli Government hopes
private donations will provide funds to pay for the
cement; the American Jewish Joint Distribution Com-
mittee paid for the earlier Israeli shipments of cement
to the refugee camps.
Land ownership problems at the refugee camps are
hampering the rebuilding. Lebanese whose land was
encroached upon by the expanding camps during the
past 30 years are reclaiming their property. UNRWA
has not conducted a survey of camp boundaries but
estimates that there may not be enough space in the
camps for 20 percent or more of the inhabitants
An Israeli official told a US Embassy officer that
Meridor reversed the ban on solid construction in the
camps because the refugees indicated they could erect
Winter weather is cool and wet along Lebanon's coast
south of Beirut, where most refugees are concentrat-
ed. In a normal year, rain falls on 10 to 15 days
per month from December through March. Despite its
frequency, the total four-month rainfall is only five to
seven inches. Maximum daytime temperatures aver-
age between 60 ? and 65'F, and rise into the 70's
during warm spells. Minimum nighttime tempera-
tures average about 50?F and drop into the low 30's.
Snow, which is common on the higher inland eleva-
tions, rarely falls in the coastal lowland.
better shelters than tents at their own expense. In our
view, it was also because Israeli officials realized that
the Lebanese Government could not deal with the
Palestinian refugee problem any time soon and, in the
wake of the massacre at Sabra and Shatila, that the
Israeli Government would be held accountable for the
welfare of the Palestinians. The US Embassy reported
there are rumors that the Lebanese Government
objects to solid construction in the camps, but Israeli
officials have not gotten nor asked for official word
from the Lebanese.
Poor Economic Prospects. Because of the Israeli
invasion, many Palestinians have lost their primary
source of employment and welfare services-the PLO.
The shattering of the PLO's military structure and
the evacuation from southern Lebanon will cut PLO
expenditures in the region substantially:
? Some Palestinians working abroad have pulled their
families out of Lebanon as a result of the recent
fighting, and President Jumayyil will try to expel as
many others as he can. Consequently, Palestinian
remittances to Lebanon also will decline over the
medium term.
? We believe, based on scattered reports, that most of
the SAMED plants in southern Lebanon were de-
stroyed or badly damaged in the summer's fighting,
although a press report claims that some have been
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quietly reopened. SAMED probably intends to re-
tain its enterprises in Lebanon, particularly those
still operating in the north.
? The departure of the top PLO leadership has proba-
bly disrupted PLO social service activities in the
Beirut area and in southern Lebanon for now;
advance welfare payments were reportedly distrib-
uted to cover the period from September to Decem-
ber 1982. State Department reporting indicates that
Red Crescent Society hospitals south of Beirut are
no longer operating; UNRWA is expanding its
medical program to fill the gap.
Outlook
Under almost any set of foreseeable circumstances,
we believe that most Palestinians will remain in
Lebanon, continuing as political and social outcasts.
As long as Israel occupies southern Lebanon, most of
the Palestinian refugees will probably be allowed to
regroup in existing refugee camps. The difficulties
encountered in finding other Arab states willing to
accept PLO fighters have probably convinced the
Israelis that finding homes for Palestinian civilians in
these countries-the best solution in the eyes of the
Israeli Government, according to US Embassy report-
ing last summer-is not feasible. The next best
solution, in the Israeli view, is integration of the
Palestinians into the social and economic fabric of
Lebanon, which also poses major obstacles. As long as
they control the area containing most of the camps,
the Israelis probably will ensure that security as well
as minimal standards of housing, sanitation, and
medical care are maintained. We believe they will
seek to have UNRWA, donors, and private voluntary
organizations pay the cost
The Lebanese Government blames the Palestinians
for the civil strife of recent years and wants them out
of Lebanon. Realizing that expelling them all is
impractical, the Lebanese Government, according to
its spokesmen, will attempt to deport those Palestin-
ians who lack proper papers. We believe this could be
some 50,000 to 100,000, although one Lebanese offi-
cial said the number may be as high as 250,000. Press
accounts of government searches of the refugee camps
in Beirut indicate that the process has already begun.
UNRWA officials, according to a press report, claim
that 15,000 to 20,000 Palestinians from the Beirut
camps had voluntarily left the country by December
1982.
Integration of the Palestinians into Lebanese society
is implausible because it is opposed by almost all
Lebanese, particularly the Christian and Shia com-
munities, according to reporting from the US Embas-
sy. The Palestinians themselves would probably be
apprehensive about such a move because they would
feel neither accepted nor safe. To the extent the
Palestinians use their own financial resources to build
homes in the camps, they will not want to lose their
investment unless they are offered a better prospect.
Many cling to the hope of eventually returning to a
Palestinian homeland
If foreign forces withdraw, Palestinians can expect
harsh treatment in any areas controlled by the pres-
ent, Phalange-dominated Lebanese Government. The
deeply rooted animosities between the Lebanese and
Palestinians make isolated incidents against Palestin-
ians likely, and widespread violence between the two
groups cannot be ruled out. Official harassment to
encourage emigration probably will include denials of
work permits, arrests and detentions, and further
destruction of refugee housing at the slightest pretext.
Such policies may bring increasing numbers of Pales-
tinian civilians to try to join relatives who were
expelled or have settled abroad, but all such attempts
will be subject to the policies of the host governments.
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Appendix A
Role of UNRWA
in Lebanon
UNRWA, created in 1948 as a temporary agency of
the United Nations by the General Assembly, com-
menced operations in December 1949. Its mission was
to aid the Arabs who fled the areas of Palestine that
became part of the State of Israel. The agency's
mandate is renewed periodically and was expanded
after the June 1967 war to include a new class of
refugees-those inhabitants of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip who fled or were expelled to Jordan as
well as residents of UNRWA camps in southwestern
Syria
The agency defines refugees as those people and their
descendants whose normal place of residence was
Palestine for at least two years prior to the Arab-
Israeli conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of that
conflict, lost both their homes and their means of
livelihood and are in need of assistance. Sixty tempo-
rary tent camps were established in Lebanon, Syria,
Jordan (including the West Bank), and the Gaza
Strip. Minimal rations were provided to camp inhabit-
ants, who in 1950 numbered almost a million.
UNRWA was later forced to build more permanent
shelters when it became clear that few Palestinians
would be allowed to reenter Israel.
By 1982 the total number of refugees in these coun-
tries receiving education and health and relief services
had grown to more than 1,900,000. In Lebanon, the
agency had 2,377 employees, 85 schools, 23 clinics,
and a number of other installations, including the
Siblin Vocational Training Center near Sidon, about
half of which was destroyed or damaged in the recent
fighting.
UNRWA is funded by contributions from UN mem-
ber nations and by donations from a variety of private
voluntary organizations. The United States is the
largest single contributor, providing $62 million-
about 32 percent of the agency's operating funds in
1981. Although UNRWA is a UN organization,
except for its top officials who represent UN member
nations, it is staffed largely by Palestinians. In fact,
UNRWA is the Palestinians' largest single employer.
Statistics based on UNRWA's registration records do
not accurately reflect the refugee population.
UNRWA has not been able to conduct a population
count since 1975, and its published estimates have
been affected by unreported deaths and births and
extensive population shifts caused by the civil war and
later conflicts. Nevertheless, UNRWA's figures have
been generally accepted as the most official statistics
available on camp populations.
Registered refugees, whether or not they live in
camps, fall into three main categories:
? "R" - those eligible for all services including basic
rations (includes those living in camps: approximate-
ly 170,000 in 1981).
? "S" - those eligible for health and education services
only (approximately 30,000 in 1981).
? "N" - those registered, but no longer eligible for
assistance (approximately 30,000 in 1981).
After the Israeli invasion these distinct categories
were suspended for the duration of the emergency
period-through June 1983. UNRWA has accepted
responsibility for assisting all Palestinian refugees in
need-whether or not they were previously registered
with the organization.
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Appendix B
Individual Refugee Camps
Rashidieh
Population: 15,000 to 25,000.' This is the largest
refugee camp in the Tyre area, and it has been a
frequent target of Israeli attacks in recent years.
UNRWA estimates that the camp was approximately
60 percent destroyed by the recent Israeli shelling and
bombing and by reported IDF dynamiting of bomb
shelters and bulldozing of corridors along the main
streets. According to press reports and UNRWA
sources, most of the remaining housing suffered vary-
ing amounts of damage and some of the UNRWA
service buildings were severely damaged. The
UNRWA secondary school remained intact and tem-
porarily housed hundreds of refugees. According to
camp residents, casualties were minimized because
most residents fled to the nearby beach and orange
groves after being forewarned by the Israelis of the
impending attack on the camp
Relief assistance has been provided largely by
UNRWA, which estimated that by mid-October ap-
proximately 6,000 refugees had returned to Rashidieh
to repair their dwellings; others have moved into the
Burj el-Shemali and Ein el-Hilweh camps. At that
time living conditions were extremely crowded-as
many as 25 to a room-and there was no electricity or
water. Water service is now being restored, but there
is still no electricity. The nearby pumping station at
Ras al Ayn, hit by the Israelis in their attack on
adjacent antiaircraft positions, was put back into
operation with temporary pumps supplied by
UNICEF. According to press reports, most of the
male residents between the ages of 16 and 60 were
taken prisoner by the Israelis, leaving mostly women,
children, and the elderly to shift for themselves. A
limited cleanup operation, aimed at clearing the rub-
ble for new shelters, began in early October and was
completed by the end of December, according to
UNRWA officials.
As of mid-December, little reconstruction had begun
at Rashidieh because of the residents' continued fear
for their security. According to UNRWA officials,
the refugees are afraid of venturing outside the
isolated camp and are apprehensive that they will
come under the control of Saad Haddad's militia after
the Israelis withdraw from the area.
Burj el-Shemali
Population: 11,000 to 15,000. This camp was often a
target of Israeli air raids and shelling during the
1970s, and in more recent years was shelled by Saad
Haddad's Christian forces. During the Israeli inva-
sion, it suffered the least damage of the three
UNRWA camps in the Tyre area, probably because
of its location east of the main Israeli advance. About
35 percent of its shelters were destroyed. UNRWA
officials reported that their service buildings also
sustained some damage. No figures are available, but
casualties probably were light because of the fore- 25X1
warning of the Israeli attack. According to UNRWA,
some 7,500 refugees, including some from Rashidieh,
were living in Burj el-Shemali in July 1982. They
mainly included the elderly, women, and children
under age 16. Rubble clearing, hindered by the steep
terrain, has been completed and reconstruction has
begun.
El Buss
Population: 5,000 to 7,000. About 50 percent de-
stroyed. Damage to UNRWA facilities was extensive
and included the loss of a vocational school, a food
service facility, and a handicraft center. According to
press reports, about 40 residents were killed. Families
have reportedly doubled up in the habitable shelters.
UNRWA estimated in mid-October that 3,500 refu-
gees (elderly, women, and children under 16) were
living in these remaining shelters and amidst the
rubble. Since then, rubble-clearing operations have
been completed.
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Ein el-Hilweh
Population: 50,000 to 60,000. Ein el-Hilweh, the
largest UNRWA refugee camp in Lebanon, accord-
ing to UNRWA and other sources, was virtually
razed. UNRWA's nearby Siblin Vocational Training
Center also was heavily damaged. The Israelis found
that the center was used as a PLO military training
facility; a large cache of explosives and weapons as
well as PLO training manuals were uncovered there.
An UNRWA investigation verified the findings
Estimates of Ein el-Hilweh's prewar population vary
widely, but all are higher than the UNRWA figure of
26,000 registered camp inhabitants. IDF spokesmen
have given estimates of 30,000 to 40,000, while UN
camp medical officers claimed that the population of
the camp and adjacent areas was close to 70,000.
Lebanese officials in Sidon reported the population at
about 60,000. The higher figures probably included
nearby Palestinians who did not actually reside in the
camp. Casualties at Ein el-Hilweh were probably high
because of the heavy fighting there. Many residents
fled to the coast north of Sidon at the mouth of the
Awwali River. UNRWA officials indicate that about
12,000 elderly residents, women, and children made
their way back to the camp and were living amidst the
ruins in mid-October. They live in fear of their
Lebanese neighbors, especially since the Shatila-Sa-
bra massacre and the earlier destruction at the neigh-
boring Mieh Mieh UNRWA camp. Rubble clearing
to allow the erection of tents was completed by the
end of November and reconstruction of housing is
well under way.
Mieh Mieh
Population: 2,000 to 4,000. This small camp within
the Christian village of Al Miyah wa Miyah escaped
with little or no damage during the fighting. However,
the lower section of the camp was destroyed by the
Phalangists in August. There were no casualties, but
the burning of some 150 shelters left 800 additional
refugees homeless. Fearing the return of Christian
forces, many residents temporarily fled to the nearby
Ein el-Hilweh camp or to Sidon. UNRWA estimated
the camp's population at nearly 2,600 in mid-October.
The camp residents' fears of further violence have
been heightened since early December when the IDF
turned over responsibility for camp security to
Haddad's militia
Nabatieh
Population: 0. Nabatieh was destroyed by Israeli
shelling and air attacks in 1974 and has not been
rebuilt because of repeated shelling in subsequent
years by the Israelis and Haddad's Christian militia.
Some 75 families returned briefly to the camp in 1978
but fled once again in the face of the Israeli invasion
that year. Although UNRWA had 4,039 Palestinian
refugees registered at Nabatieh until 1981, we believe
most were residing in nearby towns and villages and
in temporary shelters in the Sidon and Beirut areas.
Burj el-Barajneh
Population: 20,000 to 40,000. This major PLO strong-
hold, located some 2 kilometers north of the Beirut
airport, was more than 50 percent destroyed by more
than two months of heavy Israeli bombing and shell-
ing. Most of the camp's civilian residents fled to the
relative safety of West Beirut north of the Corniche
Mazraah; some seized empty or vacated apartments,
and others took refuge in garages, office buildings,
and public parks. As these Palestinians left, Shiite
Muslims, fleeing the fighting in the south, moved in.
We believe the camp may still house some of these
Shiite refugees as well as Palestinians who returned
after the shelling ceased.
Burj el-Barajneh had 10,450 UNRWA-registered
Palestinian refugees in 1982, press re-
ports support a much higher
number. In addition, primitive housing has grown up
on all sides of the camp, most of which, we believe, is
occupied by Palestinian refugees. Although the mid-
September massacre was confined to Shatila-Sabra,
the effect on refugees in this nearby camp has been
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traumatic. Alarm recently spread among camp resi-
dents when the Lebanese Armed Forces began round-
ing up Palestinians for interrogation. American press
reports state that 500 to 600 people-illegal aliens,
Shatila and Sabra
Population of each: 25,000 to 50,000. This sprawling
refugee complex on the southern outskirts of Beirut
may now be the largest refugee camp in Lebanon.
Shatila is the official UNRWA refugee camp; the
Sabra area, just south of Shatila, is not an official
camp. Shatila, although smaller in area, may contain
a larger population, as most of its shelters are multi-
storied. UNRWA listed only 5,865 refugees there in
1982, bu
~ the camps and their environs housed
many thousands of additional refugees. Apparently, a
sizable number of Lebanese civilians (probably Shias)
also live in the camps.
sustained damage during the Israeli siege
of West Beirut. Children living at the Islamic Home
for the Invalid and Retarded, located within the
camp's confines, were evacuated by Mother Teresa to
a convent in East Beirut during the Israeli siege.
The vivid memories of the massacre on 16-18 Septem-
ber cause camp residents to live in fear that the
Phalangist and/or Haddad militiamen will return to
kill more refugees. Despite the presence of Italian
troops of the Multinational Force (MNF), many
refugees flee the camps at night to sleep with friends
or in destroyed or abandoned buildings near the camp.
Mar Elias
Population: 2,000 to 3,000. A small, predominantly
Christian Palestinian refugee camp comprised of
three separate small sectors. It is located near the
UNESCO compound and the Soviet Embassy and is
the only refugee camp within the Beirut city limits.
The camp suffered minimal damage during the two-
month Israeli siege, but according to press reports was
heavily shelled when the Israelis entered West Beirut
in September. No casualties were reported, but some
35 families were made homeless, and the Mar Elias
Greek Orthodox Church and its school sustained
heavy damage. Reportedly, the camp housed no PLO
fighters or arms. Press reports claim many of the
camp's residents fled to the nearby Lebanese Army
barracks during the attack. Most have since returned.
The camp is now guarded by the Lebanese Army as
well as French MNF troops.
Dbayeh
Population: 0. The only UNRWA camp left in the
northeastern Beirut area. The camp's 2,000 to 3,000
predominantly Christian Palestinians fled in 1978
when clashes broke out between the Syrians and
Phalangist militias. Displaced Lebanese Christians, in
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there. Nevertheless, UNRWA continues to carry the
camp on its rolls. Most of the Palestinians who fled
moved to the Shatila camp where they were living at
the time of the Israeli invasion
Beddawi
Population: 10,000 to 15,000. Although located in
northern Lebanon near Tripoli, Beddawi has occa-
sionally been a target of Israeli reprisal raids and
sustained some damage during the 1975-76 civil war.
An Israeli air raid in early June 1982, as well as later
clashes in the area between the PLO and Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF), probably inflicted some dam-
age.
Fatah military forces may be stationed at Beddawi; a
unit of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) also reportedly has an office there.
UNRWA has reported that some 2,000 to 3,000
Palestinian refugees from southern Lebanon fled to
the Tripoli area; it is likely that some are doubling up
with refugees at the Beddawi camp
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Nahr el-Bared
Population: 20,000 to 25,000. The larger of the two
UNRWA camps in the Tripoli area. We believe the
camp houses some of the 2,000 to 3,000 refugees from
southern Lebanon that UNRWA claims are in the
Tripoli area. It also contains an office of the PFLP
and probably some PLO fighters. In past years the
camp has been the occasional target of Israeli reprisal
raids, and in early June 1982 it suffered some damage
from Israeli bombing. The camp probably will remain
a target for the IDF and for the LAF as long as PLO
forces remain there.
Wavell
Population: 5,000 to 6,000. The only UNRWA Pales-
tinian refugee camp in the Bekaa Valley. Located on
a former French military base at Balabakk in Syrian-
held territory, the camp is not believed to have been
directly involved or damaged in the recent round of
fighting. According to UNRWA, the camp has be-
come a refuge for many Palestinians who fled south-
ern Lebanon in the early days of the invasion.
UNRWA estimates that there are some 20,000 Pales-
tinians in the Balabakk area, including about 9,000
recent arrivals. Not all of these are living in the
Wavell camp; many have taken refuge in schools and
other uninhabited structures in the area, including the
famed Roman antiquities.
Bayssarieh
Population: 0. An undeveloped site near the town of
Al Bisariyah on which UNRWA planned to build a
new camp. It was intended that the camp would
accommodate the 8,500 refugees displaced from the
Tall az Zatar and Jisr el-Basha UNRWA camps in
Beirut during the 1975-76 civil war. These refugees
were squatting in the damaged housing in Ad Damur
before the Israeli invasion. The site was not developed
because it is on rocky slopes too steep for construction
of shelters.
Ad Damur
Population: 8,500 to 14,000. A Christian town prior to
the 1975-76 civil war and a PLO stronghold from
then until June 1982. Now under Israeli occupation,
the town has been reinhabited by many of its former
Christian residents. Ad Damur never was an official
UNRWA refugee camp, but until June 1982 the
agency provided rations for 8,500 refugees living in
the town's damaged structures. UNRWA reporting
suggests that several thousand additional refugees
lived in and around the town. Most of these refugees
had fled the Tall az Zatar and Jisr el-Basha
UNRWA camps in 1976 when the Christian Pha-
lange militia shelled the camps and reportedly massa-
cred 1,500 to 3,000 residents. In June 1982, heavy
Israeli shelling inflicted additional damage, and the
refugees were forced to flee again-this time back to
Beirut.
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