SURVEY OF THE ILLEGAL OPPOSITION IN POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R000500200011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 1, 1947
• Content Type: IR

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' pt `e3 authority with well defined and un~.~vereaZlyrsacs objectives,
With no over-all leadership, the Polish Resistance is composed
of ni roux differing factions with have in oommn only their
siti to the current regirn
ruKient n( f. ".darka t~nefi
`.,if CLASSiF;dATBON ^"aecss
2
~1ext Re`'
e resist oe mane nt in Poland can be divided rou 1 into two groups t
the Partisans, ce to the Government through
rri -awar'er~awho favor direct, sirm?d rsaisgtanr
l and the conspiratorial Undorottad,a broador but IOOFrsiY
Organlied Movement prefers to a6t ndire y through propaganda
hirtl t
a ono 'ove~rnmante l ag n es
t tx h
Political Cc position of the Resistana
1. Po]ttimlly, the fesistancs 'includes all "elakents ranging from
t
e
t* Stalinist to the reactionary groupo Genetallyr,
's a part3.cularly the night extremi~t`s, are stx orike
the P~rti ror ,tione& w 1,11-a the moderates and liberals
more o Ito' be found in the err_ Dund.
der roj&d vents no return to the conditions of I an is
aio~er politi,;21y to they moderate socialist and 19,nrl resform
grogram of MIkAjazyk and the Polish Peasant Party (?.St).
There are brsauu rable excelA.'I is to and variations from this
MI pattern,
~ ta
P ud rosin
bps' t-hi , a1thou~ say they piofess r 'to oideazti themselves
. t?
.id,&red
with one anti-Govern nt faction or another, must be oons.
t ,,purely bandit groups witch no pol t1.oat objec1vea wna"cever
1. Neither the Partisans nor the Underground have a unified central
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c r rxAL INTELt,IGE NCE GROUP
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independent however, and have their own headquarters in Poland.
To'thesp latter groups belong also the numerous guerrilla bands
Which owel,!dlegiance solely to their own chieftains. Sharp
tit teas bet_ internally-led faatims and those con-
owny Zarzad Informar~~~* oi (Intelligence Service)
as s rwwww y ~~.r~rr+hr~w~w. ea _ _
l versive political activity in
?
P
X
eneralth CI organs of the
,
e
nformaoja are interested in the
Read OQ nprimarily because some of its elements not on receive
fr
le sutpport om abroa orei
p
ur s nce to f
~
i
Plishandgonce r a enofea in their t anti-~`aoviet operations.
a 11an
anstwa ;iewnetrznero (internal security corps)
to1ska (Police) and
on the
rde~ of ants.-pa~ san operations in the fiel l
The ba ell-e ui d ani reliable elite format~ioa
a a w 4 P1~ politically
which resembles the ,d ,atfetx SS or tha.MVl) Internal Troops. 'the'
KTM is organized in motorized regiments and independent battalions
strategically stationed throughou*b Polando
The Aral takes part in`anti-Partisan fighting only as a last resort
4&~?si ere F4rtlsau rend; is too great to be dealt with by
e m p? one a p on for nod o ttir the Ar r against the
psis ns ecoept when absolutely necessary is the questionable po--
Ut aI reliability of the rank and file, who often sympathize with
the asistq oe and a low themselves to be disarmed without a stru le.
,i'o dioooura~;e this practice the deneral staff issued an order pre-
Aid lbnF- the death penalty for those who surrendered 'their arms to
.v Vrlt F TtA V
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o~ however be made $
tro3. o 4u abroad cwui
The full agencies are concerned with anti-Resistance operations=
The 3,anest and most important groups, such asNSZ
national Armed Forces) and WIIS (Freedom and Indepen(ience) are
t 1a (Voluntary Police)
The unctions and have no authority
and
.n' political matters. They r' areY, Ptherefore, only occasleasily 'in
volve' inn anti-Partisan operations,, and have even lose to do with
- bsting the underground.
Ursad Bezpieczenstwa Publiaznexo (Public Security)
The t BP, like the M, acts as a higher'police agenccyy, and is charged
with the detection and destruction of internal political` opposition-
It is thug more concerned with the suppression of the Underground
than thfield operations against the Partisanse
 F %f, IP I, 9ti
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-srn
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f s r ^ y
N u ribGtJP
The P-artisans
A. Orhanization
organized, whereas smaller bands may be ruit._- without formal organization.
The leaders of Iartisan bands -- partieul~:rlr USZ groups -- are frequently
professional officers of the old Polish Army, with long experience in
uerrilla fighting:
The composition of the ranks is heterogeneous. Although some join as a.
result of politic4 conviction, some to e.ecsne the authorities and others
for excitement and adventure, there are those attracted by mercenary 50X1-HUM
considerations.
distinguisha"olo from regular soldiers, except that they wear the crowned
eagle on the cap instead of the crownless eagle of the. present regime.
The Partisans are universally well armed., mostly with,automatic and semi-
automatic weapons. Most of these arms are of Berman origin, but many of
Soviet manufacture have been captured from the Soviet and Polish military
forces.
Some Partisans units have
security reasons, is used sparingly. The larger formations have such
heavy equipment as mortars, light artillery, and motor vehicles.
In some areas there exists a type of l artisan. "mobilization" by wh ch men
are called up to serve for a month. qr two with one of, the forest
detachments.
B. Stre h
It is difficult to make even an approximate estimate of Partisan strength.
On the basis of. information at hand, however, it is felt that 40,000 to
50,000 men would be a reasonable approximation for the autumn of 1946.
. Equipment
1. The Partisans generally wear captured Polish Army uniforms and are in-
D. aup' lICY.
1. The procurement of supplies appears to present no problem. ;Jhatever
cannot be obtained in any other way is gotten by holding up trains and
looting public warehouses.
There, even those elements which otherwise would be inimical are kept in
line by fear of the Partisans.
Y .
F. (dent ted Sa ti an Strau s
IYIIs.Y~1 II .I GYM Y F.~~ ~Y
In addition to those groupings listed below, tyre are numerous local bands
groups, such as that of Szary. (see below), are well led and highly
1. There is no standard organization for Partisan formations. The larger
Rela~ions with the,,vil FgPulation
all lirl.Y. IYI. rr..l.r .m lllaltlr 1
Many people, while sympathizing with the Partisans in principle, deprecate
their activities on the grounds that they cause senseless bloodshed and will
accomplish no permanent rood. In such regions as i1zeszdv, I3ialystok, Lublin,
and the S wietokrzyskie 1:'ountains -- where Partisan activity is strongest --
the population is as much controlled by the Partisans as by the ^,overnrnent.
4.
radio equipment which, fo50X1-
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of varyinj strengths, which are sometiries nameless, and sometimes identified
only by the noms de guerre of their chiefs.
1.
firm Kra,joti,ra (Home Armyy)
The AK, which included all political groups except the Conmmunists, no
2.
loner exists as an organization. Its e tbers have ,joined
or Under-'round groups, associated themselves with the legal
p,Irties, or ,one over to the lovernnent.
Armin Ludowa (Paonle's Army)
other Partis
opposition
an
The Al. was the Communist-sponsored "official" resistance g
began its activity only after the German attack on the Sov
Since the defeat of Germany and the coming to power in Pol
Communist-dominated government, it has ceased to exist.
Bata"liony Ciz o sloe (peasant Battalions)
The BCH, as its name indicates, was a peasant Resistance o
associated with t, ikoxa,jczyk's PSL (Polskie 13trormictwo Lud
roup which
iet Union.
and of a
rganization
owe )during
the g",erman occupation. It no longer exists.
4..
Narodowe SiZbrolne (National Armed Forces)
The NSZ appears to be the largest of the organized Resistance groups.
Politically, it stands on the extreme :Might, having developed chiefly
out of such pre-war elements as the ONit and the Stronnictwo Narodowe
(National Party) -- now outlawed. Although the 113Z officially deplores
mistreatment of the Jews, it has b en responsible for anti-Semitic
excesses in a number of cases. The head of the N,Z in Poland is
reliably reported to be Bolesfaw Piasecki, successor to the late
Stanislaw Piasecki (no relation). Its military head is reported to
be Colonel Andrzej Rutkowski (not identical with Colonel Ltutkowrski,
Chief of Informac ja) .
~Wolnos??ci Ni leq osc (Freedom and Inidepe:idence)
Next to the NSG (to which it is similar politically) WIN is considered
the largest Partisan organization.
6. Polska Armia t,rztilrolenia (Polish Army of Liberation) 50X1-HUM
The A1J is a numerically insignificantgroup
Claims have been made that the AV has from 300,000
to 4.00,0J0 organized troops with reserves of over a million, and that
it is the successor to the AK.
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Comment: There has been no conf irmation of these exaggerated
estimates, and they seem to be the product of wishful thinking
i~
7. 'Jaisk Powstancze (Insurgent Troops)
0n3 of the smaller 1tightist Partisan groups.
G. Areas of Partisan t,ctivi
There is Partisan activity of one sort or another throughout Poland, but
it is concentrated in terrain which affords protection and concealment,
i.e., in areas which are forested-or mountainous or both. Thus, the
Partisans are strongest in the northeast, the, southeast, along the Polish-
Slevak border, and in the Kielce area of ce:itral Poland. The follov;.i.ng is a
more retailed account of activities by regions.
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1. Eastern Poland
a) Bia stok Area
Between Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk lies the Puszcza Bie4owieska,
one of the largest forests in. Poland. There are numerous Partisan
bands in the forest, and the Government has kept large military
forces constantly in the area. When, however, large-scale punitive
expeditions are undertaken against them, the Partisans withdraw
across the new Soviet-Polish border, which bisects the forest.
Northwest of Bia}ystok, in the area between $omza and the former
Last Prussian frontier, are strong, well-armed Partisan formations.
One report estimated Partisan strength in this area at 10,000 but
this is considered exaggerated. During the summer and early
autumn of 1946 elenents of the Polish 18th Infantry Division (HQ
BiaXystok) were committed against the Partisans in this area.
b) Lublin Prze m,l Area
Since the war, many of the surviving peasants from this devastated
area have resettled in the newly-acquired western territories.
Others, as much from economic necessity as from political conviction,
have joined the Partisans whose detachments are particularly strong
and well orrranized in the forests of this region. The affiliation
of these detachments is not known. So far, the only one identified
is a WIN group, one of whose WIT sets was captured near Rzeszow in
September 1945.
That the Partisans are present in strength is evidenced by the heavy
troop concentrations in the Lublin-Przernysl area. Interrogations of
demobilized officers and men of the Polish Army showed that the 3rd
Infantry Division and elements of the 1st, 5th, 9th, and 13th Infantry
Divisions took part in anti-Partisan fighting in this re=lion during
the sunnier and autumn of 1946.
Not only are Government military and security forces engaged in a
continual campaign against the Polish Partisans in this area, but
they must fight off constantly the raids and incursions of the
Ukrainian Partisans, who freely cross the new Soviet-Polish frontier.
Souther=n Poland, between the San River and
Partisan activity is strong throughout the entire area between Przemys1
and Cracow, particularly in the foothills of the Beskides Mountains
along the Polish-Slovak border.
Just as there is a certain tacit collaboration with the Ukrainians, the
Partisans in this area are assured of, at least, the sympathy of the
unreconstructed Slovaks.
a) Sano
There are several known Partisan formations operating along the
upper reaches of the San river, between Sanok and Rostoki borne.
The strongest of them, the Zebeda group, ?s reported to number
between five and ten thousand men, and is well armed with infantry
weapons, light artillery, and mortars. In a battle with a Zebeda
detachment near Sanok in June 1946, Goverrinent troops captured two
Mark IV tanks.
b) Tarnow Area
A Partisan group led by a certain Captain Kabat has been identified
in this area. Kabats whose brother is Decnut~- 7:-rlror of Cracow, is a
professional soldier<
tl
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c) Isowv Tara-N Sacz Area
There are many Partisan units in this area., which is ozis o the most
mountainous in Poland. So far, only four or five Partis n groups
totalling; 500 man led by a certain Paszak (alias "nnius") have ueen
identified.
d) Cieszyn (Teschen Area
Two groups have been identified which operate between Cieszyn and
Pszczyna. The strength of these groups is not known, but their
leaders use the aliases of "Piorun" and "1ichura" respectively.
3. Central Poland
a) The Gory Swietokrzyskie
Lying between Kielce and Opatow, the area of the Gory Swietokrzyskie,
or Holy Cross ".'ountains, is wild and uninhabited, with peaks rising;
to 2,000 feet. Throughout the war it was an AK stronghold, and it
is still the head(.,,u4rters of arv one of the ono st famous Partisan
leaders in Poland. former deputy to
the URP Co mandant of the Kielce area, Szary's forces number between
7,000 and 8,000 men. 50X1-HUM
Forces combating the Partisans in this area are the provincial district
and local U13P and spacial K1311 units, as well as components of the 2nd
Infantry )ivision.
b) Czestochowa area
Several Partisan bands are known to be operatin7 in the hilly region
southeast of '.zsstochowa and in the Lasy I.ublinieckie (Lubliniec 'goods)
between Czestochowa and Opole (Oppeln). The leader of one of them is
reported to be a woman.
c) Viielun-Konskie Area
In this area, north of Czestochowa, there are several strong Partisan
bands. In the su;;mer of.l9ta6 they occupi fd Radomsko for two days
and disarm-:d the local UT?P and two companies of the 6th Infantry
Regiment which were stationed there at they tiraa. As a res}ilt, a
number of officers and men were tried by courts martial for permitting
themselves to be disarmed. Four officers were. condemned to death, and
many enlisted men were sentenced to long prison terms.
Strong artisan concentrations have been reported north of Bydgoszcz
(Bromberg) in the Tuehola Forest (Dory Tuuchoiski), but there has been no
confirmation of this information.
Other Areas
There have been no reports of Partisan activity north of iarsaw.
The newly-acquired territories east of the Oder and in East Prussia
seer, relatively free from Partisan activity. This is explained by the
strict regimentation of-the new Polish settlers and their preceupation
with problems of adjustment in their new homes.
Soviet units in Poland are forbidden to participate in battles against the
Partisans. Only if they are attacked may they defend the.:iselves. oven when
the Polish authorities call on the Soviets for help, ti,-- answer is always,
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"without specific instructions from '_oscow we cannot join you"; this, in
spite of the fact that many members of the Soviet rrmy, among them high
bfficers, have been killed by the Fartisans. Such special units as the LVll
have greater authority and a freer hand to aagage in anti-Partisan combat,
but even they rarely become involved.
II. The Underground
A. Origins
One reason for the early popularity of the Partisans was the general belief
among Poles at home as well as abroad that war between the Soviet Union and
the Western Allies would break out at any time and that, therefore, Partisan
activity against the :7arsaw !'government and the 3oviets would hasten the
down fall of these regimes and pave the way for the armies of the ;'Jest.
In the eighteen months following the end of the war, these hopes grew
constantly dimmer until finally it was realized that tiara was small chance
of their being fulfilled in the near future. With this realization, many
Poles concluded that the Partisans were fighting, in vain.
.by continuing their senseless
At the same time, political alignments became clearer: Behind the Partisans
stood General Anders and the "London" Poles, and behind thera,stood the , ritish.
In the minds of the Polish people, Anders and the London -coup are identified
with the large capitalists and feudal landowners. Although the "London"
Poles have the sympathy and approval of the people for their stand against
the :warsaw regime and the Soviets, it cannot be said that many Poles would
want the London group in control of the Polish State. The workers and
peasants especially feel that should the London group come to power it
would mean a return to the intolerable conditions of 039, with the current
dictatorship of thn Left supplanted by an equally distasteful dictatorship of
the flight. 50X1-HUM
struggle they were only aggravating the serious economic condition of the
country, causing needless bloodshed, and providing the Government with al
excuse for stricter measures of oppression.
Out of this dissatisfaction with the political philosophy and the methods of
operation of the Partisans grew the clandestine Underground movement.
B. Urr-,anization
Organized first among the intelligentsia, and especially in the universities,
the conspiratorial Underground groups have steadily increased in number and
influence. Although it is not possible to say that these groups are part of
a single organization, they are becoming more closely-knit as their number
increases, and eventually may form a tightly organized, long-term,
clandestine opposition.
The usual form of organization in the Underground is that of the small cell.
These are found throughout Poland,-but are concentrated chiefly in the cities.
C. Composition
The Underground includes all elements, but its chief support is among the
moderate, middle-of-the-road groups akin to the PSL. A great many members
of these are former AK men. The movement also embraces, however, anti-
Communists from the Polish Socialist "arty, and renegade Communists from
the Polish :forker's Party.
Str?ea7th
Because of the inchoate nature of the movement, no estimate can be made of
Underground strength.
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"' C.~;V 1 - AL Si`J 1.~.1.iLl ru _VVa ROUT
h,'ethods and Activities
he Underground envisages a lon^ period of plannin^ and preparation before it
will be in a position to act decisively. lit present, therefore, thv chief
concern of the Underground is th JJevelopment of its organization. At the
same time, Rreat emphasis is placed on infiltratin7 tha r?I'R and rrovernmental
agencies with reliable men on the widest and hi--hest levels.
:is distinguished from the overt operations of the Partisans, t; a- Underrrround's
operations are all clandestine. Occasionally a Soviet statue is blown up or
a prominent official is assassinated, but this is dotty t .ostly for morale
purposes, and not as a result of general policy.
iiYrare of the growing importance of th.: Underground, the Government is bending
every effort towards eliminating it. The Underground is considered more
dangerous than the Partisans because it is more elusive and has the
sympathy of the greater part of thy. Polish population.
Suppression of the Underground is one of the priority targets of both the UBP
and the Informacja.
III. Comments on Developments in the Polish Resistance
The high point of Partisan strength in Poland was reached in the wirt er and spring
of 1946. Since that time it has been steadily declining, partly because of Govern-
ment action, but largel,- because more and more of the Partisans have become convinced
of the futility of further Partisan activity, and have returned to their normal lives.
The ex-Partisans and former AK men have channeled their hostility to the Government
into the Underground. Thus, as the Partisans have become weaker, the Underground
has become stronger. Now that I'ikoXajczyk's "legal" opposition has been "defeated"
in the recent elections and an amnesty proclaimed for the Partisans, it can be
expected that this process will continue, and that the PST as well as the ex-
Partisans will increasingly turn to the Underground as the only remaining possibility
of actively continuing resistance against the Government.
This document contains information
affecting the national defense of the
United btates within the meaning of
the Espionage Act 509 U.S.C. 31 and
32 as amended. Its transmission or
the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
//
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