CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO AFRICA: MOTIVES AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84M00390R000600070001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign
Assessment
Center
Ft V.( eO)
t
ARMS X Ff k
Conventional Arms Transfers
to Africa: Motives and Prospects
PA 80-10333
August 1980
Copy 169
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National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Conventional Arms Transfers
to Africa: Motives and Prospects
Research for this report was completed
on 3 June 1980.
This assessment was prepared byl
International Issues Division, Office of Political
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Politico-Military Issues
Branch, International Issues Division, OPA,
This assessment was coordinated with the Offices
of Economic Research and Strategic Research, the
Directorate of Operations, and the National
Intelligence Officers for Africa and the Near East and
South Asia.
Secret
PA80-10333
August 1980
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Conventional Arms Transfers
to Africa: Motives and Prospects
Key Judgments Several security problems common to African states will sustain the demand
for foreign-made arms in Africa during the early 1980s. Arbitrary and
militarily indefensible boundaries expose many countries to separatist or
irredentist activity or to turmoil in adjacent countries. Weak regimes fear
political meddling by their own military or by unfriendly neighbors. To
correct past neglect of their defenses, several African countries have
launched long-term programs of military modernization that will require
continued imports of foreign-made arms.
The USSR, which sells more military equipment to Africa than does the
West, will maintain and if possible expand its security assistance throughout
the continent. Arms transfers are Moscow's most effective instrument for
gaining influence in Africa. Despite recent setbacks in its relations with
some recipients, the Soviets have gained political influence as well as
valuable military access rights from their most important clients. They will
use offers of military equipment to try to expand their influence in those
states, such as Zimbabwe and Uganda, that are building and equipping new
military establishments, and in Zambia, which is pessimistic about the
prospects for stability in southern Africa
As long as the superpowers do not restrain their arms exports to Africa,
other major suppliers are unlikely to do so. The West Europeans supply arms
to support their defense industries, to obtain access to raw materials or
military facilities, to counter leftist influence in the recipient countries, or to
preserve close relations with their ex-colonies. France, the leading Western
supplier, uses arms transfers to complement and support its other military
activity in Africa. China will continue to use its modest military aid to
compete with the Soviets in selected countries.
The size of the arms trade and the security problems that underlie it vary
from one part of Africa to another, but arms restraint does not now seem
feasible in any area.
? West Africa is the most peaceful part of the continent, but several West
African states distrust their more powerful northern neighbors. The
largest West African country, Nigeria, will make substantial arms
purchases to continue modernization of its armed forces.
? The Arab north is by far the most heavily armed portion of Africa. The
Western Sahara war, animosity between north African countries or with
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other Arab states or Israel, and Libya's role as both a supplier and the
leading purchaser of arms in Africa make arms transfer restraint in the
area very unlikely.
? Arms transfers to central Africa are relatively light, but continuous
fighting in Chad, potential instability in Zaire, and the concern of other
states over a spread of this instability will maintain a market for imported
weapons.
? Ethiopia's conflicts with Somalia and the Eritrean separatists, the plans of
Sudan and Uganda to build up their defenses, and great power desires for
access rights to support military operations in the Indian Ocean all assure
continued substantial arms transfers to east Africa.
? Zi.mbabwe's independence has removed a major bone of contention in
southern Africa. Distrust between the principal factions in Zimbabwe and
continuing insurgencies in Angola and Namibia, however, suggest that the
demand for arms in the area may not slacken soon.
Long-term trends in the African arms trade and persistent issues in African
politics dim the prospects for arms restraint. Opposition to white rule in
South Africa, which has the strongest armed force south of the Sahara, is
only one of several factors that will discourage black governments from
restricting their own acquisition of arms. The poverty of most African states
severely limits the use of their own resources to purchase weapons, but some
receive financial support from oil producers or credits from their arms
suppliers. Furthermore, many black African governments believe that the
low level of armaments in their region means they are less obliged than
others to restrain their imports of weapons.
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Contents.
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Conventional Arms Transfers
to Africa: Motives and Prospects
Introduction
In the second and third rounds of the US-Soviet
conventional arms transfer (CAT) talks, held in May
and July of 1978, the United States suggested Latin
America and Sub-Saharan Africa as regions in which
the two sides could make special efforts to restrain
arms transfers, both by encouraging restraint among
states in those regions and by establishing interim
controls on their own exports. Although the proposal
remained on the table, it made no further progress in
the fourth and last round (in December 1978) owing to
disagreements over the USSR's freedom to propose
regions of its own choice
Given this negotiating history, Africa could be a major
topic in any future US-Soviet talks on conventional
arms transfers. Early resumption of the discussions
now seems unlikely, however, and any chance for CAT
restraint in Africa in the near future hinges at least as
much on the Africans' own military needs and their
desires for outside assistance. In the meantime, arms
transfers to Africa will be one channel for the recently
intensified strateeic competition between the great
powers.
Since the CAT talks stagnated, several events besides
the intensification of superpower rivalry have affected
the climate for arms control in Africa, but their net
impact is unclear. Warfare in the Western Sahara
escalated and drew added attention to US military
assistance to Morocco. Several regimes were violently
overthrown-in one case through armed invasion from
a neighboring country (Tanzania's toppling of Ugan-
da's Amin). Finally, a British-mediated settlement
ended the guerrilla war in Rhodesia and led to Robert
Mugabe's election as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe.
This assessment examines the implications of these and
other recent events for the conventional arms trade in
Africa. It analyzes the motives of both recipients and
suppliers, the relationship of arms transfers to other
regional issues, and the likely environment for arms
transfer restraint in Africa during the coming months.
The discussion covers weapons exported to all portions
of the African continent except Egypt, which has never
been seriously considered for inclusion in an arrange-
ment for African CAT restraint and whose security is
still more a Middle Eastern problem than an African
one.
Patterns and Trends in Arms Transfers to Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for a very small
proportion of worldwide conventional arms transfers
before the Angolan civil war in 1975 touched off a
rapid increase in military assistance to the region. A
further surge occurred in 1977 as the USSR began a
major military aid relationship with Ethiopia during
the Ogaden war with Somalia. Despite this escalation,
however, Sub-Saharan Africa still receives only 10
percent of all weapons sold to the Third World and
only about 7 percent of worldwide arms transfers. The
Arab states of North Africa have been heavier buyers
of arms-particularly Libya, whose $7.2 billion in
weapons purchases between 1975 and 1979 easily
made it the largest arms importer on the continent.'
The USSR is the leading supplier of arms to Africa. It
already was the principal supplier to Libya and Algeria
when its aid programs to Angola and Ethiopia greatly
increased its share of arms exports to Sub-Saharan
Africa. The Soviets made about half of the sales to all
of the continent outside Egypt from 1975 through
1979, although new agreements with Moscow
slackened after the peak of the aid program to Ethiopia
in 1977-78. France is the second leading supplier of
arms to Africa, with four other Western suppliers-
Italy, the United States, West Germany, and the
United Kingdom-providing most of the remainder.
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North African states have imported the most sophisti-
cated weapons in Africa; both Algeria and Libya have
MIG-25 fighters, MI-24 attack helicopters, and T-72
tanks. Most materiel exported to Sub-Saharan Africa
has been much less advanced, but during the last few
years the USSR has introduced some of its more
modern products into black Africa. These include
MIG-23s provided to Ethiopia, SA-3 and SA-6 air
defense missile systems to Tanzania, and SA-3s to
Angola.
Principal Motives for Importing Arms
The low level of the arms trade in most of Africa
reflects the meager finances of African states more
than any lack of incentives to import arms. Straining to
develop their civilian economies, many of these states
prefer to rely less on their armed forces than on
diplomatic accommodation and the threat of interven-
tion by more powerful friends to deter attacks from
hostile neighbors.
One source of insecurity in Africa is the colonial legacy
of arbitrary international boundaries. Many of these
cut across ethnic frontiers, giving rise to irredentist
designs on neighboring territory. An ethnic or religious
minority can more easily mount an armed resistance
against a cental government when it finds refuge and
support among kinfolk on the other side of a political
boundary. Militarily indefensible frontiers ensnare
some governments in conflicts from which they prefer
to remain aloof because armed groups use their
territory as a base or transit route and become targets
of pursuit by opposition forces.
Fragile political institutions and the large political role
of the military in Africa also affect the appetite for
imported arms. Many African rulers came to power
through military coups, and many civilian leaders are
anxious to keep their military officers well equipped
and hence satisfied, because it is relied on as a base of
support or feared as an alternative government. A
military government's return to the barracks does not
remove these motives, because during such a transfer
of power it is more important than ever to nurture the
armed forces' confidence in their ability to accomplish
their military mission. The military's own fragility
only heightens the need to pay attention to its morale;
modern weapons sometimes are viewed as the glue that
will help hold together the only institution capable of
staving off internal chaos.
Weak regimes also fear meddling in politics by
neighboring governments. This meddling occurs fre-
quently enough in Africa to justify the fear. Radical
and moderate regimes are interspersed throughout
Africa, adding ideological antagonisms to ethnic and
religious ones.
Although all of these factors underlie the arms trade in
Africa, most African governments view their decisions
to import arms as legitimate responses to similar
decisions by their neighbors. Some governments that
previously were content to maintain only rudimentary
security forces have changed their minds in the face of
increases in someone else's arsenal, and several now
have significant programs of military modernization
under way. Even those regimes that continue to look to
a former colonial power or other patron to assure their
survival often value arms transfers as a symbol of the
political tie with their protector.
Military assistance to an unfriendly neighbor is even
more alarming when it includes advisers or combat
troops as well as arms. This threatens not only to upset
a local military balance but also to create a sphere of
influence for an outside power. For this reason,
moderate African governments have been expressing
concern over the increase in Soviet and Cuban military
activity on the continent over the past five years.
Perspectives of African States
West Africa. Sub-Saharan West Africa is the most
peaceful part of the continent, with no open warfare
since the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970. This
tranquillity, together with the poverty and small size
(in terms of either geography or population) of all
West African states except Nigeria, limits the arms
trade in the area. Many countries recognize they could
not maintain armed forces potent enough to cope with
all possible threats to their security and have elected
not to try. They have only small military establish-
ments and rely principally on their security ties with
major Western powers. Tiny Gambia has no armed
forces at all, apart from paramilitary police.
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Some tensions in the area have eased during the past
year, partly because of summit diplomacy and partly
because of moderation by the most radical West
African regimes (Guinea and Benin). The dangers
perceived by Guinea abated when Portugal vacated
adjacent Guinea-Bissau. Since then President Sekou
Toure has strived to improve relations with his other
neighbors. In 1978 he resolved some longstanding
differences with the leaders of Senegal and the Ivory
Coast (where most Guinean exiles reside), and in July
1979 he signed a nonaggression and defense pact with
Liberia. Benin and Nigeria recently completed a draft
agreement on defense assistance and training. A
border dispute between Mali and Upper Volta has
subsided, thanks in part to their participation with five
other members of the West African Economic Com-
munity (CEAO) in a nonaggression and mutual
defense pact signed in 1977.2
Mutual suspicions among these states linger, however,
even where relations have improved. Furthermore,
relations between Liberia and several moderate West
African states recently have grown worse because of
the excesses of the Dew r volutionary regime in
Monrovia.
The countries of the Sahel also perceive dangers from
the north. Niger is concerned about its vulnerability to
Algeria and Libya, especially in view of Libya's
support to rebels in Chad and unofficial claims on
Niger territory. Mali has been unable to stay out of the
Western Sahara conflict because of the Polisario's
uninvited use of its territory as a sanctuary. Senegal is
in a less precarious position, but warfare in Mauritania
nevertheless prompted it to orient its army away from
internal development and toward a more traditional
military mission. President Senghor was the prime
mover behind the CEAO defense pact, which he
deemed necessary to protect black African govern-
ments from intimidation by stronger Arab states. As
the current president of the larger Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS), he now is
trying to win agreement of its members to a similar
defense arrangement.
Civil-military relations have a large bearing on arms
purchase decisions in West Africa. Benin, Liberia,
Mali, Niger, and Togo all have military regimes, and
the military in Sierra Leone meddles in politics enough
to make the civilian leadership wary of it. The
military's role perhaps is most delicate in those
states-Ghana, Nigeria, and Upper Volta-where
long periods of military rule recently ended with the
election of civilian governments. The present rulers of
those countries necessarily are paying close attention
to the armed forces' needs. President Limann of
Ghana, in particular, is worried about possible political
activity by the military. Limann's recent requests to
the United States for military equipment stem from his
desire to sustain morale in the barracks and thereby
reduce the chance of another coup.
Several West African states that have hitherto relied
principally on a single arms exporter apparently would
like to diversify their sources of supply. They are
mainly Soviet customers-Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
and Mali-that have become either dissatisfied with
Soviet equipment and support or unwilling to permit
Moscow to enhance its political and economic influ-
ence. Weaning themselves from Soviet arms will not be
easy; Sekou Toure, for one, has hesitated to do
anything that might antagonize the Soviets, fearing
that a US refusal to assume the role of chief arms
supplier would leave Guinea in the same position as
Egypt and Somalia when they severed military ties
with Moscow.
Nigeria's disproportionate size and wealth make its
motives and role in the arms trade different from those
of other West African states. Oil revenues permit it to
shop for weapons from a variety of Western and
Communist suppliers, paying less regard to financial
terms than other recipients do. Nigeria wants to make
its army a smaller but more mobile and more capable
force, and recent or projected purchases of materiel are
designed to further this objective. Lagos probably will
continue to import significant quantities of arms
during the next two or three years, both to modernize
and to keep the officer corps satisfied under civilian
rule.
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Nigeria's armed forces are overwhelmingly superior to
those of its neighbors, and it appears to face no
external threat. It is concerned about the vulnerability
of the oilfields, however, and partly for this reason
wants to improve its air defense. Air Force officers are
displeased with the Soviet training and logistic support
that followed a 1974 sale of MIG-21 s, and they are
considering one of several advanced Western aircraft
to become Nigeria's main air superiority weapon for
the 1980s.
Nigeria currently has only a limited capability to
manufacture its own weapons, but it clearly has
greater potential for developing an arms industry than
does any other black African state. It has contracted
with an Austrian firm for construction of a plant to
manufacture armored cars and all-terrain vehicles,
although the new government is holding the arrange-
ment in abeyance. Memories of the arms embargoes
imposed on the federal government during the 1967-70
civil war are still fresh, and Lagos may take further
steps to lessen its dependence on foreign supply for
relatively unsophisticated equipment. Although this
would reduce its imports of arms, Nigeria would
become more opposed to CAT restraint if it began to
seek export markets to support an infant arms indus-
try.
Lagos already is skeptical about. restraining arms
transfers to Africa. After the third round of the US-
Soviet talks in 1978, Nigerian officials told the United
States that it would be very difficult to reduce the
overall flow of arms to the continent while ensuring
that each state receives the materiel needed for self-
defense. Nigeria then cited a need to provide more
weapons to the resistance movements in southern
Africa, and it gave some logistic support to guerrillas
in Rhodesia.
North Africa. Several problems impair the climate for
CAT restraint in North Africa. In addition to having
tensions among themselves, the North African states
are enmeshed in the politics of the Arab world and thus
involved to varying degrees in the Middle East
conflicts. Algeria and Libya have oil revenues avail-
able for purchases of weapons, and Morocco has a
willing financier in Saudi Arabia. Not the least
important, the competing claims on the Western
sight.
As one of the main protagonists in that war, Morocco is
unlikely to accept curbs on its own arms imports for the
foreseeable future. Although the war is an economic
drain, King Hassan has shown no inclination to reach a
compromise settlement. Even with peace in the Sa-
hara, Hassan would have other reasons to retain access
to foreign weapons. Tensions almost certainly would
persist between his conservative government and the
radical regime in Algeria, whose armed forces along
their common-and disputed-border are superior to
his own. He also probably would want to complete a
military modernization program that was devised
before the Saharan war broke out but then delayed by
that conflict and by financial constraints.
Moroccan officials have expressed skepticism that
arms transfers to Africa could be curtailed, given the
lack of Soviet restraint in exporting arms. Rabat is
concerned about the spread of Soviet influence on the
continent, and to counter this it has provided its own
military assistance to moderate regimes to the south.
This aid has included military vehicles given to Gabon
and Zaire and most of the troops in the Inter-African
Force sent to Zaire's Shaba Region in 1978. Assured
reductions in Soviet military assistance to African
states probably would be necessary before Morocco
would agree to curtail either aid to other governments
or arms purchases for its own forces.
Having withdrawn from the Saharan war, Mauritania
currently has less desire to purchase arms than does
any other North African state. The war still presents it
with security problems, because both Morocco and the
Polisario make uninvited use of its territory. It is too
poor to buy much, however, and in any case it would
not have the capacity to absorb enough weapons to
make it a significant factor in northwest Africa's
military equation. The government probably would
welcome a lessening of the flow of arms to the area, but
the leadership is divided over the more specific issues of
US military assistance to Morocco and the political
future of the Western Sahara.
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Algeria enjoys a military edge over its neighbors but
nevertheless has strong reasons not to accept CAT
restraints in its region. Most important is the Saharan
war, in which Algeria is an important patron of the
Polisario guerrillas. Algiers also would want to pre-
serve its freedom and capability to provide military as-
sistance to Palestinian resistance groups. Any Algerian
decisions on arms transfers would be guided by the
military establishment, which has considerable influ-
ence in Algerian politics
Algeria relies chiefly on Soviet arms. It has taken some
steps toward diversification of its sources of supply,
evidently because of President Bendjedid's desire to
lessen dependence on the USSR and to make Algeria's
Conservative Tunisia is wedged uncomfortably be-
tween two leftist states, each of which has armed forces
much stonger than its own. Tensions with Algeria
eased somewhat after Tunis ceased to support Morocco
on the Western Sahara issue, but relations with the
Qadhafi regime have remained poor for several rea-
sons, including rancor over the failure of a 1974
agreement to merge the two countries. Tension with
Tripoli increased further in late January 1980 after
Libyan-backed Tunisian exiles attacked the town of
Qafsah. Following this incident, the government re-
quested emergency military assistance from several
Western powers and began receiving heavy equipment,
including armored personnel carriers, from the United
States for the first time.
Despite its relatively weak finances, Tunisia is moving
aggressively to acquire new weapons. It fears possible
future attacks like the Qafsah raid and wants to
complete a program of military modernization begun
in 1975 to make up for previous inattention to its
armed forces. Tunis is looking to Saudi Arabia and
other conservative Arab states to finance its purchases.
The Saudis have demurred in the past on the grounds
that they do not wish to arm one Arab country against
another, but their concern over Libyan actions may be
leading them to fund some Tunisian arms imports. F
Libya probably presents the greatest obstacle to arms
transfer restraint on the entire continent. The Qadhafi
regime has demonstrated its extravagant tastes in
foreign-made weapons with its purchases of the past
several years, which have given it one of the largest and
most advanced arsenals in Africa. Libya has purchased
arms far beyond its capacity to absorb them; foreigners
help to maintain and operate some of the more
sophisticated weapons, while others remain in storage.
Libya has acquired this stockpile partly to be able to
furnish arms to favored governments and movements
elsewhere, thus enhancing Tripoli's bargaining posi-
tion in the Arab world. The practice of purchasing in
volume and paying cash also has enabled Libya to
reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers. Even its
chief supplier, the USSR, has failed to obtain base
rights or other substantial concessions from Tripoli in
return for arms. In short, Libya sees its lavish military
spending as important in spreading its own influence
and remaining free of the influence of major powers.
Given Colonel Qadhafi's expansive views of Libya's
international role and his pretensions to Arab and
revolutionary leadership, Libya has numerous oppo-
nents against whom it might use its weapons, either
directly or as aid to like-minded governments or
resistance groups. Qadhafi is vehemently anti-Israel
and has furnished assistance to Palestinian re-
jectionists based in Lebanon. Egypt is a more immedi-
ate adversary, with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
having exacerbated the already considerable ill will
between Tripoli and Cairo. Egypt's position in the
Middle East probably precludes its participation in an
arrangement for African CAT restraint, but Libya
would oppose any limitation on its acquisition of
materiel that was unaccompanied by restrictions on
Cairo's armed forces. Libya also has meddled exten-
sively in fighting within its southern neighbor Chad
and currently occupies the disputed Aozou strip
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Libya has furnished military aid to a number of
African states or movements. It supplied Soviet-made
weapons to Algeria when the Saharan dispute intensi-
fied in 1975. It also has provided equipment to Benin,
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Togo, and Sao Tome and Principe,
and provided both arms and troops to Uganda's Amin
before his fall last year. Libya has financed purchases
of arms by other African states and has given various
forms of support to the Polisario guerrillas in the
Sahara, the Muslim Frolinat in Chad, and separatist
movements in Eritrea.
In sum, Libya is deeply involved in the African arms
trade as both recipient and supplier. Qadhafi values
arms and armed forces as instruments to further his
international aims and would be reluctant to curb his
use of them. He particularly would oppose any
initiative on CAT restraint by outside powers as
another attempt by developed states to stifle the Third
World.
Central Africa. The most recent armed conflict in
central Africa has been in Chad, where a civil war was
interrupted last year by a peace agreement that
established an interim coalition government compris-
ing the country's 1 1 dissident factions. The truce broke
down in March 1980 when fighting erupted in the
capital between the two main northern factions. Since
France withdrew its 1,200-man military contingent
from Chad in May, there has been no armed force
capable of acting on the government's behalf. Even if a
new truce were to take hold, the factions would use the
opportunity to prepare themselves for future fighting,
thus assuring a Chadian market for imported arms
despite the absence of a national army. Purchases of
weapons are aided by Libya, which has subsidized
every faction at one time or another in an effort to
nurture a future Chadian regime friendly to it and its
claims to the Aozou strip.
Second only to Chad, Zaire has the largest security
problem in central Africa. Its huge territory embraces
a diverse and disunited population and borders on nine
other states of varying ideological persuasions. Inter-
nally, President Mobutu perceives opponents among
disaffected residents of Shaba Region, remnants of a
former rebel movement inhabiting the eastern portion
Externally, Zairian officials feel threatened by Soviet
and Cuban attempts to make inroads in central Africa.
They interpret the two invasions of Shaba by Angola-
based rebels as part of the Soviet effort. Kinshasa
recently has tried to maintain good relations with all its
neighbors, but it distrusts those with a leftist orienta-
tion-particularly the Congo and Angola, both of
which play host to Cuban troops. The use of neighbor-
ing territories by Zairian anti-Mobutu forces also is a
concern, although Mobutu reportedly agreed with the
presidents of Angola and Zambia last year not to
harbor dissidents seeking to overthrow each other's
government.
Inadequate equipment is one of many weaknesses of
the Zairian armed forces. (Poor training and mainte-
nance are others.) Kinshasa will continue to rely on
several Western suppliers (particularly France and
Belgium) to meet its needs for weapons. China also has
provided Zaire with significant grants of military aid
in recent years. President Mobutu, who tries to convey
to his people the impression that the United States
firmly supports him, would no doubt welcome in-
creased US military assistance.
Zaire would be skeptical about an agreement on CAT
restraint for Africa, worrying especially that it would
be left militarily weaker than Angola. It might demand
that some Soviet-made equipment in Angola be
withdrawn or that its own inventory be augmented
before agreeing to a freeze or significant curtailment of
future arms imports. Kinshasa also would fear Soviet
circumvention of any agreement on supplier restraint
through the use of Cubans or other surrogates to
accomplish Moscow's objectives.
Ethnic tensions in Rwanda and Burundi are security
concerns for the military regimes in those two coun-
tries. The Tutsi rulers of Burundi are wary of both the
Hutu majority within Burundi and Ilutu dissidents
that have fled the country. The Hutu-dominated
Rwandan Government has similar fears about exiled
Tutsi in addition to its concern over growing Soviet and
Cuban influence in Burundi. Neither government
would be likely to greet initiatives on CAT restraint
with enthusiasm.
of the country, and elements in the military.
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The former French colonies south of Chad might
receive arms restraint in Africa more warmly. None of
these countries faces a significant external threat and
none is large enough to absorb much imported military
equipment. Nevertheless, more general fears about
activity beyond their borders would make them reluc-
tant to limit their future freedom to import arms.
The Marxist regime in the Congo has received
substantial credits and grant military aid from Com-
munist states in recent years and probably expects this
largesse to continue. The moderate governments in
Cameroon and Gabon share a concern about Soviet
influence in central Africa and instability in nearby
states like Chad and Zaire. Both would look to France
or other Western powers to rescue them from serious
difficulty, but they still import Western arms, both as a
symbol of the West's support and to enable their own
forces to police frontiers and maintain internal order.
Equatorial Guinea and the Central African Republic
recently have emerged from economically debilitating
periods of tyrannical rule and are less likely than
nearby states to import significant quantities of
foreign-made arms during the coming months. French
troops now provide most internal security in the
Central African Republic.
East Africa. Most recent arms transfers to East Africa
have been related to conflicts involving the area's most
populous country, Ethiopia. Ethiopia itself has im-
ported by far the largest quantity of weapons-chiefly
Soviet equipment received since 1977. Addis Ababa
faces insurgencies in both the Ogaden region (where
regular Somali troops are supporting the guerrillas)
and Eritrea. Ethiopia is determined to crush the
Eritreans militarily in spite of its substantial losses
during the past two years and the Soviet and Cuban
preference for a negotiated settlement.
Even though it already has more military equipment
than its neighbors, Ethiopia has shown no sign of being
satisfied with the materiel it has already received or
been promised by Moscow. Late last year it requested
further Soviet military aid, including two frigates, two
additional squadrons of MIG-23s, and construction of
maintenance facilities. So far, the Soviets apparently
have agreed only to build the maintenance facilities.
Since the severing of its military aid relationship with
the USSR in 1977, Somalia has obtained arms from
several sources, including other Islamic countries
(especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan), West
Europeans (mostly Italy and France, with France often
routing its arms through Saudi Arabia), and China.
Iraq has offered aid on condition that Somali President
Siad Barre reject US requests for access to his military 25X1
facilities. Somalia has not, however, found replace-
ments for much of the heavy equipment lost in the
Ogaden war. These losses, the influx of Soviet arms to
Ethiopia, and Somalia's continued support of in-
surgents in the Ogaden will induce Siad to keep
seeking a major military aid relationship.
During the past year, Mogadishu explored several
possibilities for establishing such an arrangement. A
Somali delegation traveled to China in mid-1979 to
discuss military assistance, and the visit reportedly
resulted in Beijing's agreement to provide additional
small arms, artillery, and antiaircraft guns on long-
term credit. More recently China has agreed to supply
F-6 aircraft.
Although Siad also has indicated a desire to reopen a
military aid relationship with the USSR, he realizes
there is little likelihood the Soviets will agree to one as 25X1
long as he refuses to renounce his irredentist claims on
Ethiopian territory and to stop supporting the Ogaden
guerrillas. Nevertheless, he sees flirtation with Mos-
cow and with radical Arab states as useful in extract-
ing support from Saudi Arabia, and from the United
States and other Western countries.
Siad's arguments for US military assistance combine
expressions of fear with promises of favors. He has
indicated concern that his support for President
Sadat's peace diplomacy may lead the Saudis to
withdraw their assistance. More recently, he has 25X1
argued that permitting US military forces to use
Somali air and naval facilities would make his regime
even more vulnerable to pressures from the USSR or
others, thus increasing the need to bolster his own
forces. The United States' current interest in using
such facilities no doubt has convinced Siad that the
prospects for receiving substantial US military assist-
ance are better than they have been any time in the 25X1
oppose any arms transfer restraints.
past two years; consequently, he probably would
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Located between two larger feuding neighbors and
subject to ethnic divisions among its own people,
Djibouti is a ward of France, which has approximately
4,000 troops stationed there. President Gouled has
been unhappy, however, over the failure of France and
other Western suppliers to meet his requests to equip
his own small army. By suspending diplomatic ties
with Egypt last year, Djibouti has stayed in good grace
with Arab states able to provide arms or to finance
The willingness of at least some Djibouti officials to
turn to radical suppliers was demonstrated in late
January when Libya began delivering several plane-
loads of armored personnel carriers and other materiel.
The Djiboutian Government professed surprise at the
move, but it is likely that the shipments were arranged
as a way of pressuring France and Saudi Arabia into
accelerating their deliveries of arms. The tactics
succeeded in getting Paris to expedite delivery of five
armored reconnaissance vehicles. France probably will
remain Djibouti's principal source of security assist-
ance, but Tripoli's gifts appear to have strengthened
pro-Libyan and pro-Arab elements in the government
and may facilitate future imports of arms from leftist
suppliers. The shipments also have complicated
Gouled's uneasy relations with his military, although
the arrival of the French equipment could alleviate the
concerns of some army commanders.
Sudan sees Ethiopia as its main external threat.
Dissidents opposing each regime reside in the territory
of the other, and the war in Eritrea sometimes has
spilled over the unmarked border into Sudan. Libya-
a lesser threat sponsored an unsuccessful coup at-
tempt against President Numayri in 1976. Numayri's
belief that the USSR was involved in this and other
efforts to overthrow him underlay his expulsion of the
Soviet military advisory group in May 1977. (Sudan
also cited other reasons for the eviction, including
delays in maintenance and alleged tampering with
Sudan's radar system to enable Soviet overflights to go
undetected.)
The termination of Moscow's decade-long role as
Sudan's principal military supplier left Khartoum
without a source of spare parts (except for some sent by
China) and thus set back modernization of its military.
The modernization program lacks funds, and no single
supplier has stepped in to fill Moscow's former role.
The Sudanese probably recognize that they would be
weak competitors in any local arms race and conse-
quently might welcome arms transfer restraint. The
extent to which such sentiments are overridden by the
more immediate objective of bolstering Sudan's
defenses will depend on the availability of foreign
financing of arms purchases, particularly from Saudi
Arabia. Recent Saudi procrastination in funding the
purchases of US F-5s must be discouraging to Sudan,
but its muting of support for the Egyptian-Israeli peace
agreement suggests that it still hopes for Arab
financial support.
Partly because of the late President Kenyatta's distrust
of the military, Kenya allowed its armed strength to
lag behind that of its neighbors for many years. In
1976, Nairobi finally launched an ambitious program
of military procurement in response to several persist-
ing concerns-Somalia's irredentist designs on north-
east Kenya, instability in Ethiopia and Uganda, and a
general feeling of encirclement by leftist states.
Financial problems forced deferral of purchases begin-
ning in early 1979, but this is only a slowdown in the
modernization program, not an abandonment of it.
Nairobi will continue to shop among several Western
suppliers, including the United States, from which it
has obtained F-5 aircraft. Kenya hopes that under its
new relationship with the United States, Washington
will provide the necessary military support against
better armed neighbors.
initiatives from outside powers.
Kenyan officials expressed little support for CAT
restraint in Africa when they were briefed on the
progress of the US-Soviet talks in 1978. They are
aware of the many subregional imbalances in military
strength, skeptical that the USSR really would forgo
the arming of revolutionary groups, and irritated that
non-African powers were discussing what was good for
the continent without involving the Africans them-
selves. No events in the interim probably have changed
this attitude, particularly with regard to CAT restraint
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Tanzania has been equally dubious in the past about
the feasibility of CAT restraint in Africa, citing the
higher priority that it, as a Frontline State, places on
overturning white minority rule in southern Africa. In
addition, Tanzania has used its own armed forces in
other regional roles, including military cooperation
with Seychelles and the invasion that drove Idi Amin
from Uganda. The Ugandan operation also increased
the Tanzanian military's domestic importance; an
additional motive for arms purchases may be to placate
officers who have complained periodically about their
lack of advanced equipment.
Tanzania faces no serious threat to its territory, and
even without major new purchases of arms it is
militarily stronger than any of its immediate neigh-
bors. Furthermore, some senior Tanzanian military
officers are having second thoughts about the rapid
acquisition sophisticated equipment, which has ex-
ceeded Tanzania's needs and ability to operate it.
Nevertheless, Tanzania clearly intends, financial trou-
bles notwithstanding, to import additional foreign-
made weapons during the coming months. This objec-
tive and Nyerere's willingness to facilitate the ship-
ment of arms to the Southwest Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO) probably will deter him from
endorsement of CAT restraint in the near future
The former Ugandan government of Godfrey Binaisa
had just begun constructing a new national army when
it was ousted in a military coup in May. Further
rebuilding of the armed forces will be impeded by
personal and tribal rivalries among military leaders
and by general internal disorder. With the Ugandan
economy in disarray, financing arms imports will be
Binaisa wanted to limit 25X1
contacts with the USSR (which was Idi Amin's main
supplier of arms), but Moscow now has an opportunity
to reestablish military ties with Kampala, particularly
if left-leaning former President Obote returns to
power. Obote probably would seek arms from diverse
foreign sources but might wind up relying primarily on
Soviet weapons, particularly if they were available on
easy financial terms
Southern Africa. Southern African states have not
imported weapons as sophisticated as the advanced
Soviet-built aircraft obtained by Ethiopia and Libya.
Nevertheless, the subregion has had the least favorable
climate for arms restraint in Africa in recent years,
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with more governments and resistance groups being 25X1
directly involved in armed conflict there than in other
parts of the continent. Furthermore, the governments
of Mozambique and Angola are still attempting to
convert anticolonial insurgent forces into conventional
armies. In some respects, this makes military modern-
ization more difficult for them than for African states
that inherited a military structure from their colonial
rulers.
The conclusion of the guerrilla war in Rhodesia and
the fortunes of the new Zimbabwe Government will
affect the demand for arms in southern Africa more
than any other recent event. A long period of peace
under Mugabe would remove many of the concerns
that have supported the arms trade in the area, but
distrust between the principal factions in Zimbabwe
suggests that each will want continued access to
modern arms. Furthermore, security problems else-
where in southern Africa will remain and probably will
receive even more attention.
Mugabe's own government will rely heavily on foreign
military assistance during the coming months.
Zimbabwe's proximity to South Africa will lead many
to consider it the newest Frontline State in the struggle
against white minority rule even if Mugabe himself
tries to keep his southern border peaceful. Further-
more, his government needs to convert the equipment
and logistics of insurgent and counterinsurgent forces
to those of an efficient standing army. This will be
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difficult in view of the varied sources of supply of the
forces that fought the war. Establishment of a new,
major supply relationship with an outside power could
ease this task. The USSR has signaled its willingness
to provide military equipment to the new government
in Salisbury, but Mugabe is suspicious of Soviet ties
with his former guerrilla rival? Joshua Nkomo, and
his forces, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
(ZAPU). Mugabe probably will look more to the
West, particularly the United Kingdom, and to East
European suppliers for assistance.
Apart from Zimbabwe itself, the peace settlement
most directly affects the military needs of the three
Frontline States that border it (Botswana, Mozam-
bique, and Zambia). Their proximity ensnared them in
the guerrilla war and would cause them renewed
security problems if disorder prevailed in Zimbabwe.
Stability across the border would give them the
opportunity to repair some of the economic damage the
war inflicted on them. Despite competing priorities,
however, none of these governments probably is
optimistic enough about security in southern Africa to
curtail its current plans for military development. F_
Zambia's President Kaunda demonstrated his pessi-
mism by recently negotiating a new $100 million arms
deal with the USSR. The agreement apparently
includes MIG-21 fighter aircraft and SA-3 surface-to-
air missiles. Kaunda sees potential security problems in
all directions: his relations with Mugabe are cool; he
considers the governments in Angola and Mozambique
to be unpredictable; and his territory is used by
SWAPO (thus becoming a target of South African
raids) and by Katangan dissidents. Kaunda is wary of
Soviet intentions but complains that Western arms
suppliers have not provided sufficient equipment to
enable him to cope with these threats. Some party and
government officials, however, are pressuring Kaunda
to reduce government spending, particularly on Soviet
weapons. An economic review now under way in
Luanda could help determine Zambia's future policies
on arms procurement.
The result of the Rhodesian election cheered Mozam-
bique more than any other Frontline State, since it had
aided Mugabe's forces, the Zimbabwe African Na-
tional Union (ZANU) and considers Mugabe himself
virtually a native son. The installation of a friendly
government in Salisbury also means an end to Rhode-
sian support for the National Resistance Movement, a
guerrilla group that had used bases in Rhodesia to
strike against President Machel's government since
1977. Nevertheless, Mozambique continues to look to
foreign military assistance, particularly from the
USSR, to complete the job of converting the Frelimo
military elements into a national army.
Botswana did not give Mugabe and Nkomo's Patriotic
Front the kind of direct support provided by Zambia
and Mozambique, but unauthorized use of its territory
by the guerrillas caused border incidents and prompted
the government to decide, in March 1977, to create a
defense force. That force is small, but Gaborone now is
seeking arms-preferably from the United States and
Western Europe but if necessary from other suppliers,
such as Yugoslavia or even South Africa.
Another Frontline State, Angola, has major security
problems in its own territory. The National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) operates
over much of the southern countryside and will keep
military pressure on the Luanda regime as long as
prospects for a negotiated settlement remain bleak.
This implies that each side will continue to rely on
foreign military aid. For Luanda, this means primaril
Security in Angola is linked to the political future of
Namibia, partly because South Africa uses its cross-
border raids and support for UNITA to restrict
SWAPO's military capabilities as well as to punish
Luanda. Mugabe's victory in Rhodesia reinforced
South Africa's inclination to delay acceptance of UN-
sponsored elections in Namibia. A continuation of
SWAPO's insurgency and its demand for imported
arms thus are likely to continue. Even a peace
settlement in Namibia would not significantly curtail
this demand, since a newly independent Namibia
would want to organize an effective permanent secu-
rity force-difficult enough even if SWAPO elements
were the sole basis for such a force-and would see
CAT restraints as hindering this task
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Three aspects of South Africa's security situation
would influence its views on arms transfer restraint:
? Its military forces are by far the strongest in
southern Africa.
? It is the object of a UN-sanctioned arms embargo,
voluntary since 1963 and mandatory since Novem-
ber 1977.
? It has the only sizable arms industry in Africa, which
produces most of its small arms and ammunition as
well as some armored vehicles, aircraft, and other
materiel
The embargo has been the principal incentive for
Pretoria to strive for self-sufficiency in arms manufac-
ture. It used the 14 years of the voluntary embargo to
import from willing suppliers (chiefly France, Italy,
and Israel) not only weapons but, when possible,
production technology and assembly rights as well,
thus improving its ability to weather the later manda-
tory embargo. All three factors suggest that South
Africa would have little to lose from a regional
agreement on CAT restraint. It receives no military
assistance from other governments, and it would
welcome any curtailment of Communist arms ship-
ments to nearby states or movements as a brake on
both local military threats and the influence of hostile
outside powers.
Although it has coped well with the embargo, South
Africa would see tempting opportunities if the em-
bargo could be removed. Overt arms deals with foreign
governments would offer better financial terms and
quality control than it now gets with its secret
procurement on the private arms market and a greater
variety of equipment than it can obtain from either
private dealers or its own production. Nevertheless,
Pretoria almost certainly believes that the political
climate in Africa and the UN preclude removal of the
embargo. It thus would probably endorse regional
arms restraint if asked to do so.
In the meantime, Pretoria might use arms transfers to
develop its "forward" regional security policy, which
envisions military cooperation with other southern
African states. South Africa previously has provided
advisers or small amounts of equipment to Malawi and
Swaziland, and it might use its transportation network
and experience in the international arms market to
assist these countries and possibly others to equip their
forces in the future. Any South African military aid
would be token, however, because of the higher priority
Pretoria would continue to give to its own forces.
Motives of Principal Suppliers
USSR. Africa became an increasingly important
market for Soviet arms during the 1970s. Libya and
Algeria already were customers at the start of the
decade. Soviet arms exports to sub-Saharan states
became substantial with sales to Nigeria, Somalia, and 25X1
Tanzania in 1974, expanded further with Moscow's
involvement in Angola in the mid-1970s, and peaked
when the very large agreements with Ethiopia were
signed in 1977 and 1978. Since 1975, approximately
30 percent of Soviet arms exports have gone to
Africa-a much higher proportion than previously.
Moscow relies on arms transfers to supplant the
influence of the Western powers and China as well as
to secure transit rights and access to air and naval
facilities. Arms transfers, particularly to the Frontline
States, also have been useful in burnishing Moscow's
revolutionary and anti-imperialist image. Economic
motives are less important; the Soviets seem willing to
offer generous credit terms to cement a political or
security relationship with a client too poor to purchase
arms with cash. In some cases, however-notably
Libya-the Soviets have seemed.intent on maximizing
their hard currency earnings through arms sales
Although frictions sometimes arise over spare parts,
training, and other aspects of their military assistance
programs, the Soviets have competed for influence in
Africa more effectively with arms exports than with
other instruments of foreign policy. They have been
able to supply with little delay a wide variety of
weapons and generally have been more willing than
Western suppliers to export advanced arms to the
region. In contrast, their economic assistance to the
continent during the last 25 years has been less than
one quarter the amount of their military aid. Most
African governments criticize this imbalance and view
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the West as a more promising source of development
assistance. Moscow also has succeeded less often than
the West in playing an influential role in the mediation
of African crises. This has been particularly true in
southern Africa, where the United Kingdom mediated
the Rhodesian peace settlement and a Western diplo-
matic consortium leads negotiations on Namibia. The
USSR's principal means for influencing the future of
Namibia is military aid to SWAPO.
Moscow has been flexible in its choice of customers.
Although its most obvious gains have come in leftist
states relying heavily on Soviet support (particularly
Ethiopia and Angola), the Soviets are willing to deal
with more moderate regimes that also purchase
weapons from the West or China. Arms shipments to a
nonaligned state like Tanzania do not always buy the
Soviets close security ties or access to military facili-
ties. The chance to benefit in more subtle ways,
however, such as by undercutting Chinese influence or
winning friends among the recipient's officer corps,
makes a military assistance program seem worthwhile.
The USSR has been moderately successful in gaining
access rights from several clients in return for military
equipment. Naval facilities along the Ethiopian coast,
particularly at Dahlak Island, provide support to
Soviet forces operating in the Red Sea and the
northwest Indian Ocean. Angola gives the USSR
access to its ports and airfields, from which the Soviets
have staged long-range TU-95 reconnaissance flights
over the Atlantic. The Soviets have also found useful
access to air and naval facilities in Benin, Congo,
Guinea, and Mali. The exchange of military assistance
for such access rights tends to feed on itself, because
the shipments of arms to the more distant clients
(particularly Angola during its civil war) is one of the
military missions that has required refueling stops at
intermediate locations like Conakry, Guinea.
The Soviets have had less success in redirecting the
internal policies of African clients, even Ethiopia.
Although Addis Ababa has supported Moscow's for-
eign policy line as well as permitting Soviet military
use of its territory, it has not followed Soviet advice to
negotiate a settlement with the Eritrean insurgents.
Neither has it moved rapidly to organize a political
party along Marxist-Leninist lines.
African purchasers of Soviets arms have several
reasons to avoid a close embrace with the USSR. Some
are dissatisfied not only with the low level of Soviet
economic aid but also with aspects of the military
assistance program, including the arrogance of Soviet
military personnel, poor maintenance support, and the
withholding of spare parts in an effort to gain leverage.
Several governments have eschewed a major military
aid relationship in order to minimize the potential for
Soviet subversion and to avoid heavy dependence on
the USSR or Soviet influence in their military
establishments. The Frontline States did not encour-
age Moscow to play a major combat role in the
Rhodesian war partly for these reasons and also to
avoid a South African military response or a Western
perception of the struggle as an East-West issue.
During the last three years, the USSR's military
relations with African states have suffered several
setbacks that partially offset the gains in Ethiopia and
Angola. The most dramatic was Somalia's ouster of
the Soviets in 1977 following the Soviet embrace of
Ethiopia. In the same year, Sudan expelled the resident
Soviet military advisory group, and Guinean President
Sekou Toure revoked permission to operate TU-95
flights from Conakry. Guinea requested the with-
drawal of most Soviet advisers in 1978, and Nigeria
has shown increasing reservations about its limited
military aid relationship with Moscow. More recently,
frictions have arisen with Mali over payments for arms
and the provision of spare parts.
Despite these reverses, Moscow will continue to view
arms transfers as an important instrument for further-
ing its objectives in Africa, one it would be loath to
restrict. In the conventional arms transfer talks, the
Soviets declined to discuss Africa seriously, partly
because the United States had proposed it as a topic
but refused to address regions proposed by the USSR.
Apart from this procedural difficulty, the Soviets were
concerned that the Frontline States would see any
arms restraint initiatives from the major powers as
directed against them and tending to preserve the
military superiority of South Africa and Rhodesia.
Moscow's participation in an initiative to curb arms
transfers would have forfeited the political advantage
it hoped to maintain by virtue of its military support to
forces seeking to overthrow white minority rule.
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Zimbabwe's independence may change the USSR's
tactics but will not discourage it from using arms
transfers as a major tool of its African policy. Even
before the Lancaster House settlement, Moscow may
have increased its indirect shipments of arms to
ZANU via the Organization of African Unity. The
establishment of a new national army in Zimbabwe-
as in Uganda-is an opportunity to use arms exports to
nurture ties with an insecure government and its
nascent military establishment. The Soviets already
have indicated their willingness to extend military aid
to Mugabe's government, but he has rebuffed these
overtures.
The increase in tensions with the United States
following the invasion of Afghanistan has decreased
further any incentives the Soviets may have had to
restrain their exports of weapons to Africa. The United
States now appears less likely to restrain its own arms
transfers to the region (and to Egypt, whose impending
acquisition of US-made armor and combat aircraft is,
given the peace with Israel, directed chiefly against
Libya). Also, the intensified strategic rivalry in the
northwest Indian Ocean makes access rights in East
Africa for Soviet forces-and the denial of such rights
to US forces-even more important.
Western Europe. West European states supply arms to
Africa partly for the same economic reasons they
export them anywhere else. Foreign sales help to
sustain arms industries and reduce unit costs for
weapons the Europeans use in their own armed forces.
As with other exports, they also help to compensate for
slow domestic expansion and to alleviate balance-of-
payments problems. The poverty of black Africa and
the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa,
however, mean that the sub-Saharan portion of the
continent purchases only a small proportion of ex-
ported European arms. In North Africa, though, Libya
is a major buyer, particularly of Italian hardware.
Access to oil also is an important economic motive for
some European arms exports to Africa. This includes
shipments not only to Libya but to Somalia, which does
not produce oil but whose security has become a special
concern of Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil-producing
The European powers' historical ties to Africa also
underlie their military assistance programs. Arms
exports have mirrored past colonial relationships:
France is the principal supplier for the moderate
francophone states; the United Kingdom has sold
primarily to Kenya and Nigeria; Italy's exports have
gone mostly to Libya and Somalia; and Zaire has been
Belgium's chief customer.
France, in particular, has tried to maintain close
military ties with its former colonies. These links
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include arms transfers, training and advisory services,
and in some instances the deployment of French
troops, as in Djibouti and the Central African Repub-
lic. Although specific instances of favorable treatment
cannot be attributed to arms transfers alone, France
has derived several benefits from the close relations
with its ex-colonies, including greater access to air- 25X1
fields, transit routes, markets for its nonmilitary E
exports, and raw materials like Niger uranium.
Protection of its military presence in Africa has itself 25X1
become an important motive for some French arms
transfers to the continent. One of France's reasons for
providing arms to Somalia is to correct what it sees as a
disequilibrium in that area that could threaten Dji-
bouti, where French forces not only ensure the host
country's security but also support France's naval
activity in the Indian Ocean. Assisting Mogadishu
helps to offset Ethiopia's military superiority and
possibly tempers Somalia's own designs on Djibouti.
The West Europeans view their arms exports to Africa
partly as a defense of the West's overall interest in
countering leftist activity and influence on the conti-
nent. Again, this is most true of France, which sees 25X1
itself as the principal bulwark against such threats and I
as shouldering a burden that the United States has
been lax in assuming.
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Although the major West European suppliers share
most of these motives, the emphasis they place on each
objective varies. No other supplier seems as concerned
as France with countering leftist influence, and no
other supplier stresses economic benefits as much as
Italy. The United Kingdom will be particularly careful
to avoid any decisions on arms exports that could
jeopardize the Rhodesian peace. West Germany will
probably continue to have the most restrictive arms
export policy, although Bonn faces internal pressures
to loosen it. Despite these differences, however, all of
the European suppliers probably rate as slim the
prospects for curbing arms transfers to Africa. Skepti-
cism about Soviet willingness to exercise restraint,
which the West Europeans expressed when the CAT
talks were in progress two years ago, undoubtedly has
increased. They will consider it consistent with their
economic needs, special interests in Africa, and respon-
sibilities as Western allies to export arms to the
continent during the coming years at least at the rate of
the past decade.
China. China lacks the superpowers' ability to project
military force in Africa or the adjacent oceans and
thus does not share their interest in access or transit
rights. It would be difficult for Beijing to become the
sole or even principal supplier of arms to an important
African state because it cannot match the USSR's
capacity to deliver large quantities of advanced equip-
ment. Most of China's military assistance to Africa has
consisted of small arms and ammunition sent to
recipients (principally Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia,
ZANU) that also rely on other suppliers.
China's chief concern in Africa is to check the
expansion of Soviet and Cuban influence. Accordingly,
Beijing has used its modest military aid program
primarily to react to Soviet moves, rewarding those
who reject Moscow's advances and bolstering those
who feel threatened by Soviet surrogates. For example,
its gift of infantry weapons to Sudan in 1977 was a
gesture of appreciation for President Numayri's expul-
sion of Soviet military advisers. Much of its military
aid to Zaire during the last few years was in response to
the two invasions of Shaba by Angola-based rebels. In
Mali, China increased its assistance after an unsuc-
cessful coup attempt by a group that favored closer
military ties with the USSR.
Given its comparative weakness as an arms supplier,
China probably would welcome an agreement that
restricted exports of arms to Africa, particularly the
more advanced weapons furnished almost entirely by
the USSR. It undoubtedly considers such an agree-
ment unlikely, however, and it will continue its exports,
particularly of relatively unsophisticated arms, to
Africa. ZANU's election victory in Rhodesia and the
apparent desire of several Soviet customers elsewhere
in Africa to diversify their sources of supply probably
have bolstered Beiiing's belief in the usefulness of its
military aid.
Prospects for Restraint
In the near term, the prospects for significantly
curbing conventional arms transfers to Africa, through
either multilateral agreement or unilateral restraint,
are dim. In addition to old antagonisms among African
states, the recent increase in East-West tensions has
diminished the chances for CAT restraint in several
ways. First, early resumption of the US-Soviet talks
now seems even less likely than before. Second, arms
suppliers and financiers feel more concerned about
what their adversaries are doing in Africa and less
restrained in helping their friends there. Third, some
African states are more fearful of becoming incidental
victims of an extended great power rivalry and thus are
more inclined to seek security assistance. Finally,
increased military assistance from the great powers
will accompany their efforts to secure access to
strategically located facilities.
The end of the Rhodesian war and the easing of
tensions in some other parts of Africa may offset these
effects to some extent. Nevertheless, it sometimes
takes a long time for an arms race to dampen after the
issue that started it is removed. A neighbor's acquisi-
tion of arms itself becomes an object of suspicion as the
neighbor launches a long-term program of military
modernization and orders weapons that it will receive
and absorb over a period of years.
The growth of subregional security arrangements, like
the West African Economic Community's (CEAO)
defense pact and any military extension of South
Africa's proposed "constellation" of southern African
states, would affect the African arms trade in complex
ways. To the extent that pledges of assistance from
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one's neighbors seem to enhance deterrence of aggres-
sion, such schemes would lower some of the fears that
underlie arms purchases. Subregional pacts could also
serve as vehicles for detente among their own members
and for collective commitments, similar to the Decla-
ration of Ayacucho in Latin America, to exercise
restraint in the acquisition of arms. To the extent that
such schemes tend to divide the continent into rigid
blocs, however, they would risk amplifying and spread-
ing some tensions and thereby encouraging new arms
races. They also would focus attention on defense
requirements and probably increase the legitimacy of
military modernization by making it an alliance
obligation and not just a product of unilateral ambi-
tionJ
The future African arms trade will depend at least as
much on more permanent features of Africa's politics
and economy. One is the poverty of most African
countries and their desire for economic development,
which will severely restrict the use of their own
resources to purchase arms. Financial difficulties,
coupled with the limited capacity of their armed forces
to absorb new arms, already have caused some African
leaders and military officers to have second thoughts
about their more ambitious modernization plans. F_
Opposition to white minority rule in South Africa will
remain strong throughout black Africa. This will
discourage arms restraint by black-ruled states even if
peace prevails elsewhere in southern Africa and no one
mounts a serious military challenge to Pretoria's rule
within the republic itself. Although no black African
state can hope to match South Africa's military
strength, none will want to forswear the right to do so.
Furthermore, the issue of minority rule in South Africa
will continue to make Soviet and Cuban military
activity on the continent seem more legitimate to many
of these states than it otherwise would.
Some leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa feel that the
relatively low level of arms transfers to their region,
rather than making CAT restraint more feasible there
than elsewhere, means they have less obligation to
curtail their acquisition of weapons than do govern-
ments in more heavily armed regions. Furthermore,
minor arms suppliers-including some less developed
countries outside Africa that are vigorously promoting
their exports in order to sustain infant defense indus-
tries-can more easily acquire a significant proportion
of the trade in less sophisticated weapons in areas
where the trade now is small. The cooperation of many
suppliers thus would be necessary for effective curbs on
sales to Sub-Saharan Africa.
Skepticism about the feasibility of CAT restraint will
persist throughout most of the continent. It stems from
suspicions both of neighbors and of unfriendly outside
powers. South Africa's adapation to the mandatory
arms embargo has reinforced such skepticism, since it
demonstrates how even widespread governmental com-
mitment to observe an embargo has failed to stop
clandestine shipments of weapons, particularly the
smaller, less advanced arms that are most important to
most African states.
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Appendix
Arms Sales to Africa
1975-1979, by Recipient'
Libya
Algeria
Ethiopia
Morocco
617.4 66.7 4,636.5 1,404.5 515.3 7,240.4
794.5 39.5 800.7 400.3 2,200.5 4,235.5
51.5 411.2 1,219.0 815.2 .6 2,497.5
981.6 313.3 537.8 330.0 14.5 2,177.2
Angola 298.9 388.9 186.3 112.0 34.1 1,020.2
Nigeria 66.9 26.9 396.4 53.4 193.8 737.4
Somalia 153.2 46.2 63.1 449.5 40.0 752.0
Kenya 1.6 167.1 114.0 194.7 140.3 617.7
Sudan 42.3 0 149.4 205.1 149.6 546.4
Ivory Coast 11.5 .6 156.0 256.9 0 425.0
Mozambique 29.1 117.5 60.9 28.2 113.9 349.6
Tanzania 9.0
Tunisia 13.3
Zambia 14.8
South Africa 80.4
Zaire 11.5
Ghana 4.2
Gabon 17.3
Togo 19.0
Mauritania 2.5
Mali 5.2
Guinea .9
Uganda .4
Senegal 3.3
29.0
.3
2.4
1.5
33.4
44.0
6.8
91.2
52.2
67.7
28.0
32.9
28.8
5.0
3.0
34.1
0
26.4
2.0
2.4
12.8
0
343.2
292.6
235.5
222.4
202.8
142.5
103.2
102.3
96.6
94.5
93.0
74.5
67.6
63.5
51.1
39.8
37.7
33.1
24.7
136.9
228.3 42.1 30.4
128.5 21.3 85.5
71.2 26.8 115.9
34.2 16.1
39.2 41.1
38.4 32.2
4.2 52.9
42.6 7.8
42.4 19.6 3.3
61.8 7.8 14.7
0 86.1 3.0
40.0 0
3.3 .3
7.3 3.5
13.7 7.7
0 17.5
7.7 7.5
27.7
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Arms Sales to Africa
1975-1979, by Supplier'
France 1,083.6 81.0 733.6 847.9 143.6 2,889.7
United States 327.5 340.8 236.4 258.8 165.5 1,329.0
West Germany 335.0 96.5 474.7 60.1 323.5 1,289.8
United Kingdom 69.9 146.8 28.6 205.7 79.4 530.4
Italy 293.7 42.6 420.9 777.7 80.6 1,615.5
Czechoslovakia 3.5 12.1 199.4 11.0 0
' Includes all sales to continental Africa except Egypt. US sales are
by fiscal year, all others by calendar year.
55.4 0 2.5 123.8
42.8 38.8 8.0 131.9
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