MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): TRANSITION OF ROCKET UNITS TO A NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE FROM PERMANENT LOCATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000101030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 20, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Front Rocket Troops in the
Transition tote ensive from Areas of Permanent Location
20 AInv 1474
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Front Rocket Troops in the Transition to the
Offensive from Permanent Location Areas
Y
Colonel-General of Artillery G. Kariofilli
The main demand made on the rocket troops in peacetime is constant
readiness to preempt the enemy in the delivery of nuclear strikes; and in a
surprise outbreak of war, to thwart his nuclear attack and destroy his main
ground forces groupings. This idea underlies the determination of the
periods of readiness for action of the rocket troops.
The experience of operational exercises conducted over the past years
has shown that a great deal of time is still being spent on readying the
rocket troops to carry out the initial nuclear strike (from the moment the
combat alert is declared).
Among the reasons affecting the increase in the periods of rocket
troop readiness we should include the imperfection of rocket-technical
support (according to the experience of exercises, up to 70 to 80 percent
of the total time allotted for preparing the initial nuclear strike
sometimes is spent on this), and the remoteness of the deployment areas of
the mobile rocket-technical bases, whic reac es o _
-mire""" rom fie sit ng-areas-of- the- rmket- mTits -they- se"rvice. In a number
ofnstances, due to untimely preparation and delivery of rockets to the
rocket brigades and battalions before the commencement of the initial
strike, some of the launchers cannot participate in it.
Quite often before the commencement of the strike the rocket troops do
not have information on all the targets to be destroyed, and therefore are
forced to carry out their tasks by launching several rockets over a long
period of time, and while considerably isolated from the strikes of the
strategic means.
The complexity of control based mainly on the use of a different kind
of procedural tables requiring considerable expenditures of time on coding
and decoding commands and instructions, has a substantial impact on
increasing the periods of readiness of the rocket troops.
Reducing the periods of rocket troop readineess is of especially great
importance when going over to the offensive directly from permanent
location areas, when the initial nuclear strike will be organized and
carried out in a more complex situation in comparison with an offensive
involving the consecutive deployment of troops from concentration or
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departure areas. Most important in so doing is to ensure a minimum
interval between the strikes of the front and the strategic means, which
considerably increases the surprise of using nuclear weapons and their
effectiveness resulting from the simultaneous destruction of the major
enemy targets in the entire depth of the theater of military operations.
Readying the rocket large units and units to conduct combat operations
entails carrying out a whole series of measures, the most important of
which are: deploying the rocket troops in combat formation and bringing
them to the appropriate degree of combat readiness; rocket-technical
support; determining the targets to be destroyed and allocating the tasks
to the executors; and organizing and effecting control.
The deployment of the rocket troops which are to participate in the
initiFnuclear strike with a preliminary move into the concentration areas
is, as a rule, carried out as follows: upon combat alert the rocket
brigades (battalions) first move into concentration areas and, subse-
quently, after receiving rockets, to siting areas located at a distance of
40 to 60 kilometers from the line of contact with the enemy for
operational-tactical rockets, and 10 to 15 kilometers for tactical ones.
This sequence of deploying the rocket troops cannot be used when going
over to the offensive directly from areas of permanent location, because
when the rocket units and combined-arms large units move from permanent
location areas at the same time, the initial strike has to be carried out
while they are still on the offensive. We cannot count on the advance
movement of the rocket troops to the siting areas which are considerably
distant from the permanent location areas of the units, since this would
result in increased periods of readiness, loss of surprise in preparing the
operation, and retaliatory measures on the part of the enemy.
Ground forces currently are armed with rocket systems having
considerable launching ranges. This increases the capabilities of the
rocket troops to perform their tasks and allows them to be deployed
somewhat differently. Specifically, it seems possible to deliver the
initial strike from siting areas chosen in immediate proximity to the
permanent locations of the rocket large units and units.
Our-calculations-have shown that the distance of the siting areas from
the permanent locations of the units. averages 10 to 15 kilQu1etexs._~ This
distance ensures the viability of the rocket units when the enemy delivers
strikes against the permanent location points.
When the rocket large units and units are supplied with rockets in
permanent location areas in advance, their readiness to carry out the
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initial strike from the indicated siting areas can be substantially
reduced, and not exceed 2 to 2.5 hours after the combat alert is declared.
However, not all the rocket troops can participate in the initial strike
from siting areas located close to the permanent locations. Obviously, for
large units and units having systems with shorter launching ranges, the
siting areas must be designated at a greater distance from the permanent
location areas, but calculated to ensure the units can be rapidly deployed.
Tactical rocket subunits can move out at the same time as the first
echelon divisions at the head of the main forces column, in constant
readiness to deploy to deliver strikes against the enemy targets revealed
by reconnaissance. The siting areas for the rocket units which are to
participate in the initial strike, must be fully reconnoitered and the
routes to them checked out in peacetime. It is not desirable to prepare
the areas from the engineer standpoint, as this may attract the attention
of enemy reconnaissance.
It should be noted, however, that reducing the period of rocket troop
readiness to carry out the initial nuclear strike to 2 to 2.5 hours still
cannot guarantee them against destruction or enemy delivery of preemptive
strikes. The point is that the plans of our probable enemies provide for
assigning in peacetime a certain number of operational-tactical rocket
units to be on duty at launch sites and ready to strike in 20 to 30
minutes, depending on the type of rocket system.
Therefore, in order to thwart these strikes, we also must have our
rocket troops on combat duty at launch sites. This obviously becomes
necessary in the period of aggravation of the international situation. It
must be carried out by order of the General Staff.
Assigning rocket large units and units to combat duty requires,
besides operational decisions, many technical decisions associated with the
capabilities of long-term maintenance of readied rockets on the launchers,
the development of measures ensuring against accidental launches, and
others; and therefore they must be thoroughly planned in peacetime with
consideration for the special features of the theaters of military
operations and troop tasks. The technical level of our rocket armament
allows us to resolve these problems in a positive way.
Combat duty of rocket units must not be confused with the duty rocket
subunits usually assigned from large units and units. These former units
must be provided with specific tasks to destroy targets in the initial
strike.
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While not denying the importance and necessity of assigning duty
batteries, especially during an operation, it should be emphasized that
duty batteries as a rule are given tasks to destroy nuclear means of
attack. When there is insufficient data on those means, these batteries
essentially are in reserve. In our view, even when there is no information
on the enemy nuclear means of attack, the duty batteries must not be kept
in reserve, but assigned to destroy other targets in the initial nuclear
strike of the front, in order to inflict, in coordination with strategic
means, a crushing defeat on the major enemy groupings.
Rocket-technical support, as is known, provides for the supply of
rockets an -warheads from central bases and arsenals to mobile
rocket-technical bases (front and army); the preparation of rockets and
their warheads at these a and the deliery of chf gked nut, fuels and
assembled rockets to the rocket brigades and battalions; the carrying out
of transshipment work and the necessary technical checks in the rocket-
technical subunits of the rocket large units and units; and, finally, the
check of the rockets at the launch sites before launch.
Performing these functions sometimes requires the expenditure of a
great deal of time. To reduce it, and consequently to shorten the time
spent bringing the rocket troops to combat readiness, provisions have been
nMa,k for a number of rocket large units and units to keep checked out
delivery rockets (one for each launcher) which are ready for fuelling, as
well as a supply of fuel for these rockets. In the mobile rocket-technical
units the warheads are kept in a checked out status, ready for transition
to Special Readiness (SG) 5 without a monitoring cycle. All this permits
carrying out the transition of the warheads to final readiness in a shorter
(by 1.5 to 2 times) length of time. The warheads in Special Readiness S
supplied to the rocket brigades and battalions can be immediately mated to
the delivery rocket without additional preparation (which used to take more
than three hours).
This and other measures have considerably shortened the time required
to prepare the rockets, but still have not solved the problems completely.
The time required to supply the rocket troops with rockets for the
initial strike may be further reduced by keeping delivery rockets ready for
fuelling right in the rocket large units and units, and the warheads for
them in the mobile rocket-technical bases in Special Readiness 5, ready for
mating. Actually, in this case a rocket can be readied by the forces of
the technical subunits of a rocket brigade (battalion) in 45 minutes from
the moment the warhead is supplied from the mobile rocket-technical base.
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The time spent on the preparation of the initial nuclear strike may be
even further reduced if the warheads in Special Readiness 5 are supplied to
the brigades (battalions), and the rockets brought to fuelled status, when
the threatening-period is established.
Keeping the necessary number of warheads in Special Readiness 5 in the
mobile rocket-technical bases and rockets in the brigades (battalions),
besides shortening the time, considerably facilitates the security of
preparing the initial missile/nuclear strike, since it eliminates such an
important revealing factor as transports with rockets moving by road. The
warheads in Special Readiness 5 can be supplied from the mobile rocket-
technical base directly to the location areas of the rocket brigades and
battalions at any time of day in storage vehicles, which in outward
appearance are no different from the other special vehicles (workshops,
staff busses, etc.).
It should be noted, however, that this problem must be solved in
keeping with the location and function of the formations. Keeping delivery
vehicles ready for fuelling and warheads in Special Readiness 5 does not
provide an advantage Tor the rocket troops of the formations charged with
marching a distance bf more than 1500 to 2000 kilometers from deep in the
country, since the permissible distances for transporting ready rockets by
special motorized transport do not exceed indicated distances (1200
kilometers for R-170 missiles and 2000 kilometers for the R-300). Shipping
ready rockets farther than the permissible distances requires that they he
returned to a mobile rocket-technical base for rechecking.
Reconnaissance of targets for rocket troop strikes, along with other
factors, is also one of the decisive conditions for the effective use of
missile/nuclear weapons. It is especially significant for an initial
nuclear strike being organized in a complex situation when there is
extremely limited time available.
For the rocket troops to exploit their high combat qualities, they
must have specific targets to destroy by the commencement of the initial
nuclear strike. Otherwise, even when the rocket troops are in the highest
readiness, the tasks of the initial nuclear strike cannot be fully carried
out. This is just what happened in several exercises. Many of the targets
for the front rocket troops in the initial strike were determined by
piloted antic pilotless aircraft at the onset of war, i.e., essentially after
the strikes of the strategic means.
We know that the enemy, even before initiating the strike or
afterwards, will begin moving his troops out of their permanent location
areas. Under these conditions, even when the front rocket troops are in
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full launch readiness, they cannot destroy mobile enemy targets at the same
time as the strategic means without intelligence data. Consequently, the
strikes at best can be delivered only against stationary targets, which, it
goes without saying, does not fulfil the main task of the initial strike,
i.e., the destruction of the nuclear means and main groupings of the
opposing enemy.
At the onset of combat operations, final reconnaissance of field
targets by aviation forces, which are the basic means of reconnaissance in
support of the front rocket troops, requires an average of up to 1.5 to 2
hours, and preparing and delivering the strikes against these targets takes
another 2 to 2.5 hours. As a result, a strike will be delivered by
individual and group rocket launches as targets are spotted. Organizing
this is a rather complex matter, considering that all the problems must he
solved in an exceptionally tense situation and under the pressure of enemy
strikes.
The lack of a real capability by the reconnaissance forces to supply
the rocket troops with target data in a timely manner was, in the exercises
we conducted, the main reason that the tasks of the initial strike were
fulfilled by subsequent rocket launches 2.5 to 3 hours later.
The major targets for destruction by rocket troops in the initial
strike must be determined and planned in peacetime. Tasks must he
continuously refined for the rocket troops as new intelligence is received.
In a threatening period, when previously spotted targets are most likely to
change and new ones emerge, all the reconnaissance forces and means can be
pressed into service to make a final reconnaissance of them and refine the
plan for carrying out the initial strike in the shortest possible time.
The experience of exercises has shown that to reduce the time spent
preparing rocket units for launch, taking the refinement of tasks into
account, requires that intelligence data received at the front staff from
all the reconnaissance means be studied and analyzed by assigning
intelligence officers of the staff of the rocket troops and artillery.
This makes it possible, even before the front troop commander adopts the
plans for the destruction of the reconnoitered targets, for the chief of
the rocket troops and artillery, who has the coordinates of reliably
detected targets, to undertake a number of measures to prepare the strikes,
particularly to make the necessary calculations to determine the yield of
nuclear charges, the altitudes and types of bursts, and to designate the
rocket units to fulfil the tasks.
The efficient and economical expenditure of the yields of the nuclear
munitions allocated to the front for the operation requires that the
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reconnaissance means have the kind of instruments which would allow them
not only to detect the location areas of the targets, but also to determine
the coordinates of their component elements, as well as to ensure that the
intelligence information is transmitted in a short time.
A reduction in the accuracy of determining-target coordinates makes it
necessary to.use higher yield nuclear charges for destruction, or increase
th it-expenditure and assign additional - launchers, to ensure more complete
and reliable destruction of the main enemy groupings.
The effectiveness with which the targets are destroyed, especially in
the initial strike, is influenced by the untimely receipt of intelligence
data in the interested headquarters. Thus, a 10-minute delay in receiving
the coordinates of a detected Pershing launch site can result in reducing
the effectiveness of a nuclear strike by 20 percent. In exercises this
information usually was received from aerial reconnaissance 1.5 to 2 hours
after strikes had been delivered by strategic means. One can imagine the
insignificant probability of destroying these targets after they have
carried out strikes against our troops.
At present there are practically no reconnaissance means of the type
that could independently resolve completely the reconnaissance problems in
respect to the accuracy and timeliness of spotting targets in support of
the rocket troops. This problem may be resolved only by the combined use
of all types and means of reconnaissance: radiotechnical, radar, and
especially aerial reconnaissance.
We would like to turn our attention to the very important problem of
meteorological support to the rocket troops.
Receipt of the initial meteorological bulletins requires an average of
up to 3 to 4 hours. Therefore, the deployment of meteorological stations
and the commencement of atmospheric sounding must be planned so that
meteorological data can be received by the rocket units at the moment they
occupy the siting areas.
But as is known, the operating radars of the meteorological stations
are easily detected by the enemy, which may allow him to determine the
siting areas of the rocket units. In order to hinder the conduct of
reconnaissance by the enemy, the minimum number of meteorological stations
must be assigned to the meteorological support of rocket launchers in the
initial strike, and already be deployed to operate in those areas which are
used in peacetime, or outside the siting areas. According to our
calculations, two or three meteorological stations may be required
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to deploy for simultaneous operation in each army zone. Meteorological
support must be planned on a front scale.
Rocket large units and units placed on combat duty may be provided
with meteorological data by the range meteorological stations until the
onset of combat operations. In principle, the further improvement of
existing, and the development of new, rocket systems, must be carried out
in the direction of automatic determination and input of meteorological
data right in the rocket.
There is no need to prove the importance the control of rocket troops
has in the modern conditions of the conduct of combat operations. The loss
of tight control of the rocket troops, which are the basic means of
destruction, even for a short time, can lead to a disruption of the nuclear
strikes or to a sudden reduction of their effectiveness.
At the same time, the experience of a number of exercises has shown
that there are many defects in this respect. A precise method of preparing
missile/nuclear strikes and organizing reliable communications with the
rocket troops has not been worked out in all the combined-arms formations.
As a result, after the front commander has adopted a plan for the strike,
the staffs spend a great deal of time coordinating the problems and
allocating tasks to the direct executors. Thus, in one of the exercises,
46 minutes were spent on allocating tasks to the rocket brigade and
battalion.
Obviously, radical improvement of the problems of control will become
posssible only by fully automating all of the processes. It is now
necessary to use more widely means with low mechanization and efficiently
use the computers which are available to the troops and which speed up the
production of calculations and the transmission of instructions and
commands.
A few words about carrying out the initial strike. With the
availability of a sufficient number of front roc eclt troops on combat duty
and their provision with accurate data on t e targets to be destroyed, the
tasks of the initial strike may be fulfilled by one rocket launch
simultaneously with the strike of strategic means or with a small interval
between them.
However, a different situation is possible. The signal to bring the
rocket troops to combat readiness may be received shortly before or at the
same time as the launches of strategic rockets. Under these conditions,
obviously there is no need to wait until all the front rocket units are in
full readiness to deliver a massive strike. To reeuce the interval between
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the nuclear strikes of the strategic rockets and the front means to a
minimum, the launches will have to be made as soon as-e-a-cT rocket unit, and
even launcher, is ready. Of course, the force of such a strike will be
considerably less than the total nuclear capabilities of the front. But
the timeliness of strike delivery, especially against the enemy nuclear
means, will permit weakening the power of his nuclear strikes and 5OX1-HUM
destroying his major troop grouping.
In conducting the initial nuclear strike there arises a problem of no
little importance, which is or anizin the coordination of the front
strikes with the strikes of the strategic roc et troops. The point is that
if in an o ensive from the concentration areas the tactical rocket
but --
battalions of the first echelon large units, whic1have_'Luna-M roc a can
ccessfully destroy the enemy first-ecielon divisions, his tactical, and
in a number of cases also some of his operational, nuclear means, then in
an offensive from the permanent location areas the fulfilment of these
tasks has to be assigned to the operational-tactical rocket large units and
units to the detriment of destroying targets in the operational depth.
Locating the siting areas of the front rocket brigades and units near
their permanent location areas at a distance of 90 to 100 kilometers or
more from contact with the enemy also will reduce their capabilities to
destroy enemy targets in the depth, especially the operational reserves,
rocket means of the Mace and Pershing type, nuclear munitions depots, and
the airfields of nuclear delivery aircraft.
Hence it follows that, when fulfilling the tasks of the initial strike
under these conditions, the strikes of strategic mp^nc h^TP o b~ brou ht
closer to the national borders to perform tasks in_Aof the front.
The coordination of the strikes of the front with those of the
strategic rocket troops must not be limited y~an agreed line dividing
their zones for destruction, but organized specifically by targets and
time. The front commander, who has data on the targets being hit by the
strategic means in the front zone, as well as the yields of the munitio
being used, can more purposefully decide the use of his nuclear means i
the initial strike.
When the rocket troops carry out the initial strike from siting areas
occupied near the permanent location areas, it is possible for them to be
considerably isolated from the troops on the offensive, whose rate of
advance to contact with the enemy will considerably surpass the usual
offensive momentum. Thus, according to calculations, by the end of the
first day of the operation, the front and army R-300 missile brigades may
be located at a distance of up t-o= kilometers or more from the forward
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units of our troops. If the necessary steps are not taken in time, it may
become necessary to move all or a large part of the rocket brigades to new
launching areas in one night. Therefore, in order not to allow the rocket
units to be so isolated from the advancing troops, it obviously will be
desirable to move the most distant rocket units to new siting areas on the
first day of the operation, and the rest at night between the first and
second days.
In this connection, certain special features are possible in the
organization of rocket-technical support. In the event that rocket units
are provided with rockets for the initial strike in permanent location
areas, their next supply of rockets obviously will be carried out from the
deployment areas of the mobile rocket-technical bases while the initial
strike is being carried out. These deployment areas must be selected
differently for each separate mobile rocket-technical base. Thus, for
example, it is desirable to locate the mobile rocket-technical bases which
are part of and servicing the front rocket units, close to the siting areas
of these units. Mixed army mobile -rocket-technical bases upon combat alert
sometimes have to deploy to prepare rockets in not one, but two areas: one
element close to the siting area of the army rocket brigade, and the other
in the center of the fiain grouping of the division rocket battalions, in
order to simplify the supply of rockets as much as possible and to save
time.
The views stated here on some of the questions of the combat use of
the rocket troops during their transition to the offensive from permanent
location areas, naturally cannot be settled and adopted to the same extent
for all theaters of military operations. However, we think that the
principal questions examined call for an exchange of opinions, which will
allow us to develop a common view on this problem.
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