MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): OBSERVATIONS ON NAVAL DOCTRINE BY THE SOVIET NAVY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 6, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Information Special Repor~
DIRECTORATE OF
OPERATIONS
6 April 1973
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MILITARY THOUGHT {USSR}; Some Current Problems of Naval
Science
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Some Current Problems of Naval Science
by Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov
At the present time the preeminent position in the
aggressive bloc of our probable enemies is occupied by nations
in whose armed forces the navy has long played a leading role.
This being the case, the Communist Party and the Soviet Govern-
ment strive unceasingly to maintain the Navy's capability to
guarantee the security of the maritime boundaries of our coun-
try, to destroy nuclear groupings of enemy naval forces, and
to operate in all areas of the world ocean, successfully ful-
filling the task of safeguarding the national interests of
the USSR. The fundamental changes in the forces and equipment
of our Navy in the postwar years have shattered traditional
views on its missions and methods of fulfilling them and on
its overall role and place in modern warfare. The further
development of the fleet also requires serious theoretical
research and the refinement of several principles of its use
under modern conditions. In this connection, the editors
turned to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Fleet Admiral
of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov, with the request that he
reply to a series of questions.
Question To what degree is scientific research increas-
ing its role in solving the problems of the development of the
Navy and its use in modern warfare?
Answer Scientific research and analysis are increasingly
becoming the foundation for the main directions of current naval
development, for the future makeup of each arm of the naval for-
ces, and for the methods of their operational-strategic use in
war and peace.
At the same time, science i.s emerging as one of the main
forces accelerating the development of the fleet and of naval
art.
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The development of science allows us not only to con-
centrate our main attention on working out the top priority
problems defined during the creation and development of quali-
tatively new forces and equipment, but also to determine ways
of fundamentally increasing the combat capabilities of our
Navy and of achieving superiority in all aspects over the navies
of our probable enemies. It goes without saying that one of the
most important of these problems is the comprehensive development
of methods and o~n dels for conducting combat operations at sea,
Pespecially indepenc-Tent fleet operations, and joint actions of
the Navy with other branches of the armed forces and with the
combined naval forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.
In turn, the further development of the Navy and the growth
of its role in modern warfare demand further broadening of the
scientific research front in bath naval art and the engineering-
technical field.
It is also necessary to take into account that the problems
of developing and using naval forces encompass a very large cir-
cle of questions, forming the subject of research by many branches
of science, from the "purely" technical sciences, such as ship-
building, oceanology, and hydrography to such divisions of mili-
tary science as tactics and the art of operations.
All of these scientific fields, each of which interrelates
with other branches of knowledge, are of use in achieving a sin-
gle common goal, and are therefore combined into one branch of
military knowledge--naval science.
The existence of naval science as one of the special com-
ponents of a single Soviet military science is not only legiti-
mate but also necessary. Naval science, sharing Marxist-Leninist
principles and a single methodology with military science, in-
vestigates the methods of conducting military actions which take
place under the special conditions of oceans and seas and in
which the Navy participates as the main force. This grouping
of a specific body of knowledge into a separate science does
not represent some kind of an exception; rather, it corresponds
to the present general process of specialization of sciences.
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The combining of the total body of naval knowledge
into a separate science is dictated not only by the specific
character of this knowledge but also by practical necessity.
The main threat to the security of oux country used to be from
an enemy whose military power was based on land armies. Since
World War II, the aggressive bloc of our probable enemies has
been represented by states with powerful, modern naval forces
capable of decisively influencing the situation on all fronts
f an armed conflict.
Therefore, under modern conditions, the significance of
naval science for all of the armed forces is greater than ever
before, and it would be difficult to overestimate its role in
ensuring the defense of the interests of our country and of all
countries of the socialist commonwealth. The more thorough and
detailed our investigation of the most important problems of
naval science, the greater will be the results attained in the
further development of the Soviet Armed forces as a whole.
Thus, considering the experience of the past, scientifi-
cally examining the present, and anticipating the future, naval
science is called upon to reflect mare fully the aspects of
development of theory and to work out practical recommendations
for conducting military operations on oceans and seas under
modern conditions.
Question To what extent do our accumulated views on the
role and gnificance of theaters of military operations (TMO)
correspond to the new combat capabilities of the Soviet Navy
and the probable conditions under which it will have to carry
out combat operations in a war against a powerful naval antag-
onis t?
Answer The question of theaters of military operations
is one of our major strategic problems having great practical
significance. This problem has a history of its own. It has
been resolved each time on the basis of the characteristics of
the war to be fought and an analysis of the influence exerted
on it by political, economic, geographical, and particularly,
military factors.
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z
In the event of a nuclear world war, which may envelop
the entire earth, it will differ from all past wars in the most
fundamental way. Therefore, as with many other strategic pro-
blems, a new solution is also required for the questions of
theaters, their boundaries, and the location and importance of
each one from the viewpoint of the importance of the strategic
missions to be fulfilled in them and of the strategic groupings
of our forces created for them.
In our opinion, the general trends affecting our defini-
tions of theaters are as follows. first, the growth in size
of theaters, caused by the characteristics of modern weapons,
the rapidity with which they can be used, and the vast distances
over which they can be employed.
Second, the mutual penetration and overlapping of the
boon a~ of individual theaters. Because of these factors,
it will be incorrect under modern conditions to make a distinc-
tion between ground and maritime theaters. It is more correct
to have two concepts: continental the ers (in which seas
adjacen~'~o con inents must~e included as well as the land);
and ocean theaters, in which the coastal areas of continents
must be included, in particular those in which naval forces are
based.
r
Third,, the theaters must be self-contained and independent
as regards the type and composition of their groupings of forces
capable of performing strategic operations and as regards the
unity of concept of their use and coordination with other
theaters.
Under modern conditions, military actions in ocean theaters
definitely have strategic significance, because of their in-
fluence on the attainment of common goals and because of the
composition of the groupings of forces participating in them.
These groupings will include forces from several fleets, mayor
formations and large units from other branches of the armed
forces, and, in particular, long-range aircraft. The influence
of the operations carried out on the oceans by these groupings
of forces, both on the general course of the war and on the
achievement of the final results of the war, will be determined,
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at least in large measure, by the fact that over forty percent
of the nuclear potential of our probable enemies is already con-
centrated in their naval forces. Moreover, these weapons are
clearly not designated as much for use against naval forces as
for attacking our installations and groupings of forces on all
fronts of the struggle and very deep into the rear area.
Considering these vital indicators, the large area of the
earth's surface involved, and the independence of ocean opera-
tions from continental theaters, we may conclude that ocean thea-
ters now fully qualify as independent theaters of military
operations.
Since it goes beyond the limits of our commentary to define
the boundaries of continental theaters, we will dwell on the
ocean theaters only. An ocean theater consists of a vast expanse
of ocean with its seas and islands, the adjacent area of the
continental coastline, and the air space above bath, in which
areas strategic groupings of armed forces are deployed for the
fulfilment of strategic missions leading to the attainment of the
political goals of the war. The most important strateg, ~.c missi9n
in ocean theaters is the total defeat or d~T`"~ ve weaken' f
major nuclear,_group~gs of enemy _n~Xa, _.for~.e~. and the destruc-
`t't~fl~of'"~militarily important ground installations on enemy
territory.
We must consider the first and foremast ocean theater to be
the Atlantic Theater, where the main forces of the opposing sides
are concentrated and where the primary missions of the war will
clearly be performed. next in order are the Pacific, Indian,
and Arctic theaters.
The Mediterranean Theater, where major groupings of forces
are concentrated, must be viewed as being of vital strategic
significance. In our opinion, this theater qualifies for inclu-
sion among the ocean theaters.
Question Under modern conditions, does the concept of
supremacy of the seas remain applicable to a specific situa-
tion on seas and oceans or to certain areas of maritime theaters?
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Answer As is well known, supremacy of the seas means
favorable conditions far using naval forces ~.n an operation
and the achievement of their assigned tasks.* This concept
had already developed in the Russian Navy at the time of the
Northern War of 1700-1721 and was not adopted fram the British
as is often maintained in foreign and even our own literature.
In the 1870's questions of supremacy of the seas comprised an
important division of the training program of the Naval School.
The importance of this question did not escape the
attention of V.I. Lenin himself, who made a thorough scien-
tific analysis of the reasons for Russia`s defeat in the
Russo-Japanese War of 19Q4-105. He emphasized that the
fall of Port Arthur "settled the question of domination of
the seas--the principal and fundamental question of the pres-
ent war" (Complete Collected G3orks, Volume 9, page 153).
The problems of supremacy of the seas have been studied
in the Soviet Navy as well. The views of individual officers
of the Russian and Soviet Navies naturally differ a great deal
on the essence of supremacy of the seas and the methods of
attaining it. This is explained mainly by the fact that for
more than two hundred years the essence of this concept was
distorted by many bourgeois naval theoreticians such as Colontb,
Mahan, and their followers. However, from the first day of
its existence, Soviet naval science re udi ed attem is to
exte conc of acme co at at sea in the rea m io
a lic and to id nt rema of the e with " a-
_~ion of he world". We viewed the idea o supremacy o the
sea not as an en in itself but only as the specific condi-
tions ensuring the successful fulfilment of given objectives
by our naval forces and weapons in designated areas of a theater.
It is true that at one time we rejected the concept of
supremacy of the seas altogether, replacing it with the concept
of favorable operating conditions. The reason for this lay in
attempts to interpret the concept of supremacy of the seas as
* The same thing as predominance on the sea, ruling (co~nanding)
the sea, favorable operating conditions, etc. 50X1-HUM
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a reactionary, outdated idea introduced into our Soviet science
by bourgeois military science. However, further research into
the possible conditions for conducting combat operations at
sea obliged us to return each time to the concept of supremacy
of the seas and to give it an interpretation appropriate to
Soviet military ideology.
For a relatively long time before World War II, the con-
cept of supremacy of the seas was discussed in our manuals,
where it was emphasized that such supremacy is the reation of
conditions~romot~ successfu~_~fulfilme f the mis s
,..._..,..._..._..-..~. ~T
as~st~ned~to the fleet. ~ this connection, conditions meant
thos~ -e`e'T~ement'~s ~~ie situation which promoted the creation
of necessary groupings by our naval forces, the delivery of
strikes, and the fulfilment of assigned combat missions with-
out appreciable deviation from the set plan. In order to
bring about these conditions, we anticipated a stubborn and
often lengthy struggle using various farces and weapons at
sea, in the air, and in some instances even coastal areas.
World War II underlined the necessity of gaining supremacy
of the seas in order to conduct mayor offensive operations
and to ensure our capability to carry out large-scale maritime
transport.
In the postwar period, especially with the appearance of
missile/nuclear weapons, we_d~d not devote proper atte~ti~n to
working outTthe problems of gai_ning~supremacy of the seas, since
it was considere~~that ~~ category wou'~$~'not be characteristic
o nuclear warfare . .-~`.~._.._.--.----- ~~
Meanwhile, from the collation of the experience of opera-
tional training and of experience from naval combat service,
as well as study of the views of robable enemy concerni g
the character and methods of conducting a _ uture war, we conclude
thane must do add'ationa wor on zs prob em--on a new technical
and scientific basis, of course, proceeding from the actual
capabilities of our present ocean fleet. The task of military
researchers, therefore, is to resolve this problem for nuclear
and non-nuclear war and to work-out practical. recommendations
or regarding ways and means of gaining supremacy
of the seas in combat with a powerful naval antagonist.
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In light of the international situation, the Party and
government are doing everything possible to continually
strengthen our naval power and to maintain its defensive capa-
bility at the highest level. General Secretary of the CC/CPSU
Comrade L.I. Brezhnev reminded us of this once again at the
International Congress of Communist and Workers Parties [Moscow,
June 19 6 9 ] .
The tasks of further increasing the combat readiness of
the Navy are making great demands on science and are giving
rise to a need for expanding the front and the depth of re-
search into current problems of naval science. Its development
by all possible means will be an appropriate reply to the
CC/CPSU call for a selfless struggle toward the further strength-
ening of our country's defensive capability and an appropriate
welcome to the hundredth anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin.
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