SOVIET ACTIONS TO COUNTER THE US STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: SNIE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R00
0300070001-8
\\
,~~f`:~`\ Director of Cp~at
SIG FILE COPY
Soviet Actions To Counter tie
US Strat~c I~ef~~ Initiative
s r~do~u ~ ~~
~' S~~
, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
SN I E 11-24-86
SOVIET ACTIONS TO COUNTER THE
US STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
Information available as of 13 February
1986 was used in the preparation of this
Estimate, which was approved on that date
by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5
The Soviet Perception of SDI and Its Implications ........................ 5
Political and Diplomatic Activities .................................................. 7
Military and Technical Activities .................................................... 12
Advanced Technologies for Countering SDI .................................. 15
~~~
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
KEY JUDGMENTS
Moscow recognizes that the US pursuit of the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) has potentially far-reaching consequences for Soviet
strategy, planning, and force structure. Soviet leaders apparently are
concerned that US development and deployment of strategic defense
systems resulting from SDI would:
- Directly affect the heart of their strategy, undermining their
confidence in the ability of their strategic forces to perform a
preemptive counterforce or retaliatory attack, and to maintain
the initiative throughout the conflict.
- Provide the United States with an advantage in strategic defense
that could be used for coercion in a crisis and give the United
States a strategic advantage in a conf lict. An alternative view
holds that, in addition to these concerns, the Soviets, as ex-
pressed in repeated statements by top officials, may also believe
that the development and deployment of strategic defense
systems resulting from SDI, even in a limited form, might lead
the United States to believe it could launch a preemptive
counterforce first strike against the USSR, secure in the belief
that any surviving Soviet retaliatory forces could be effectively
neutralized by the SDI defenses.
- Result in a long-term high-technology arms competition that
could exacerbate already-difficult decisions regarding resource
allocation. Although many of the technologies the Soviets need
to pursue the development of systems to counter SDI and to
develop their own ballistic missile defenses are already under
development in the USSR,2 the US effort disrupts the Soviets'
long-range plans, threatens to negate their longstanding invest-
ment in offensive ballistic missiles, forces them to consider the
US schedule in their planning, and introduces a more severe
penalty for technological failures.
Moscow's effort to halt or slow the US SDI program has been fo-
cused on generating Allied, domestic, and Congressional opposition to
both the US antisatellite (ASAT) and SDI programs. The Soviets have
i
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
lobbied hard to bring pressure on the United States to negotiate
constraints on these programs. They probably believe that SDI can be
slowed, and perhaps even halted, by their sustained efforts to erode US
public support, exploit Allied doubts, and encourage cutbacks in
Congressional funding. They undoubtedly are hoping for a change in
attitude with the next administration:
- The Soviets will continue a concerted propaganda campaign
against SDI in the United States and Western Europe, comple-
menting it with "active measures," perhaps to include threat-
ened new weapons deployments against US allies, to increase
the political cost to the United States of proceeding with the
program.
- They will continue to use arms control discussions as a means of
delaying or undercutting SDI.
- By offering 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive weap-
ons, coupled to a demand for an SDI ban (a much deeper
reduction than in their pre-SDI START proposal), the Soviets
probably believe they are using their best available lever to
obtain US agreement to limit SDI.
As part of their campaign strategy, the Soviets will falsely portray their
own well-established proiects for developing directed-energy and kinet-
ic-energy weapons and associated technologies as responses to SDI
Soviet defense planners, however, are unlikely to count on Soviet
public efforts or the unpredictable outcome of arms control negotia-
tions to block SDI. We anticipate Soviet programs across a broad front,
including development of technologies to counter a future US ballistic
missile defense (BMD) system and to improve the USSR's own
offensive and defensive force capabilities. Until US defense system
architecture is clearly defined and the extent of changes in US strategy
and force posture are better known, the Soviets will find it difficult to
tailor their responses to SDI. They will place highest priority on
acquiring intelligence on US SDI developments and on gaining access to
the key technologies. Increased Soviet collection activities against the
United States and its Allies, and programs to improve Soviet technical
intelligence capabilities, will result. At the same time, they will build
their forces for the early-to-mid-1990s as previously planned, and will
avoid maior disruptions in both the defense sector and the overall
planned economy for at least the next several years. In dealing with
SDI, they will seek to design longer term solutions that they can manage
at a deliberate pace with minimum disruption.
2
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
The Soviets will take a broad approach, developing operational
capabilities to suppress US defensive systems through direct attack, to
penetrate surviving US defenses with an improved and possibly
expanded ballistic missile force, and to avoid the US defenses by use of
aerodynamic weapons platforms. They are likely to emphasize pro-
grams that have intrinsic value to Soviet strategic forces, intercontinen-
tal and intermediate-range, even if SDI is only partially successful, and
we expect them to make ready adaptations of existing and already-
programed forces:
- Improved ASAT systems (particularly ground-based lasers) are
likely to be an early result of continuing Soviet directed-energy
weapon developments. The Soviets probably perceive that
space-based components would be the most vulnerable element
of a deployed SDI system.
- The Soviets' most obvious and certain countermeasure against
SDI would be to exercise their options for reducing the vulnera-
bility and improving the penetrability of their existing and
future ballistic missile systems. It should be noted, however, that
they would face difficult choices in implementing countermea-
sures against a comprehensive defense from boost phase to
terminal, involving several layers and using diverse techniques.
Many of the countermeasures would require performance and
capabilities trade-offs that could degrade the effectiveness of
their offensive systems.
- An effective US defense against ballistic missiles is likely to
increase Soviet reliance on bombers and cruise missiles that
would be able to circumvent US ballistic missile defenses,
although the Soviets would expect improved US air defenses as a
necessary complement to the SDI program. These aerodynamic
systems, incorporating advances in penetration aids and low-
observable technology, might be used to attack not only some
targets formerly allocated to ballistic missiles but also some SDI
ground-based elements as a defense suppression measure
Soviet technology, especially antiballistic missile (ABM) and
ASAT technology, provides substantial capabilities for developing
systems to attempt to respond to SDI. The Soviets have long had
vigorous research and development programs in advanced technologies,
particularly lasers for potential ASAT applications. They may also build
on their existing ASAT technologies, including the potential for direct-
ascent interceptors. They have a solid and innovative base for the
development and testing of a variety of countermeasure technologies.
Soviet developments are competitive with those of the West in many of
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
the critical technologies. However, the Soviets lag in many of the basic
technologies that are considered crucial for a comprehensive space-
based ballistic missile defense system and some aspects of counter-SDI
developments
The Soviet Union will continue to pursue its longstanding
strategic ballistic missile defense efforts, regardless of whether the
United States proceeds with SDI. The Soviet approach to BMD is
distinctly different from that of the United States. If the Soviets
perceive the need, they could deploy by the early 1990s their own
version of a nationwide terminal BMD system, based on ABM intercep-
tors armed with nuclear warheads and possibly supplemented with
some ground-based directed-energy weapons. They undoubtedly have
reviewed their own efforts in light of the US SDI, and we expect that
they will now seek to pursue their advanced BMD technology, planning,
and programs in a more integrated fashion:
- The Soviets have the potential for widespread ground-based
ABM deployments. They could strengthen their defenses at
Moscow, expand throughout the western USSR, and cover key
targets east of the Urals.
- The Soviets have been actively pursuing ground-based lasers for
BMD and ASAT applications for many years. They have major
laser research and test facilities at Saryshagan, Troitsk, and
Golovino. Possible directed-energy facilities are under construc-
tion near Dushanbe and Storozhevaya. An alternative view
holds that the evidence is insufficient to judge the purpose of
either the Dushanbe or the Storozhevaya f acilities.3
- The Soviets have been working on particle beam, kinetic-
energy, and radiofrequency weapons technologies.
- Soviet research includes a project to develop aspace-based laser
weapon. In addition, the Soviets are developing new space
systems, including the heavy-lift space launch vehicle, which
will probably be an integral part of any advanced-technology
strategic defense system they might develop and deploy.
The holders of this view are the Director, Bureau o} Intelligence and Research, Department of State,
and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
DISCUSSION
The Soviet Perception of SDI and Its Implications
1. The Soviet Union has traditionally regarded both
defensive and offensive strategic forces as essential to a
successful military strategy. The Soviets believe that a
nuclear war could happen, and if ii does they intend to
survive and prevail to the extent possible. The most
important element of the Soviet damage-limiting con-
cept is the destruction of enemy nuclear forces
through offensive strikes, but defensive operations are
an essential component of a viable nuclear strategy to
blunt the effects of the enemy's offensive nuclear
forces.
2. The Soviets have structured their strategic war
plans primarily around ballistic missiles and prize the
military advantage of using such systems to strike
decisive blows quickly and accurately over great
distances with a minimum of warning. Several new
and improved intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) that are currently either being deployed or
are in development will constitute the backbone of
their offensive forces for the next 15 to 20 years. The
Soviets see the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
program as having significant potential for developing
a US capability to undercut severely-even pre-
clude-the achievement and maintenance of Soviet
offensive force goals
3. Although the Soviets were undoubtedly alert to
increasing attention to strategic defense research in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, the President's announce-
ment of the US SDI in March 1983 almost certainly
caught Moscow by surprise. Soviet leaders did not
anticipate the high-level focus on strategic defense
research and the heavy commitment called for by the
program
4. The Soviets probably are not yet convinced that a
complete and effective US ballistic missile defense
(BMD) system, resulting from SDI research, is politi-
cally viable or technologically feasible. Nonetheless,
from the Soviet perspective, the US SDI has far-
reaching political, economic, and military conse-
quences for the USSR and its allies. Soviet leaders see
SDI as having the most serious consequence in terms
of its impact on Soviet strategic war-fighting capabili-
ties and strategic force planning
5. From a Soviet perspective, the military problem
posed by US deployments of strategic defense systems
resulting from SDI would be twofold:
- The Soviet concept of conducting strategic war-
fare emphasizes the value of a successful counter-
force strike to provide a decisive advantage.
Even a strategic defense system with a modest
degree of effectiveness, such as a terminal de-
fense of ICBM silos, would directly affect the
heart of the Soviets' strategy, reducing their
confidence in the ability of their ballistic missile
forces to perform such an attack. It could force
them to allocate a much larger number of war-
heads to assure the required high confidence in
achieving their strategic objectives, and in main-
taining the initiative throughout the conflict.
This might entail a significant increase in the size
of their offensive forces beyond current plans.
- To the extent that SDI would be able to neutral-
ize aSoviet retaliatory strike effectively, Soviet
military planners would be concerned that SDI
could be used to establish a strategic advantage
situation in a crisis or conflict, whereby the
United States, with impunity, threatens strategic
escalation in order to force Soviet conventional
forces to back down. Of particular concern
would be a situation of asymmetry, where only
the United States had an effective SDI capability
deployed.
An alternative view holds that, in addition to these
concerns, the Soviets, as expressed in repeated state-
ments by top officials, may also believe that the
development and deployment of strategic defense
systems resulting from SDI, even in a limited form,
might lead the United States to believe it could launch
a preemptive counterforce first strike against the
USSR, secure in the belief that any surviving Soviet
retaliatory forces could be effectively neutralized by
the SDI defenses.a
The holder of phis oleo is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Department of Statv.~~
5
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
6. The Soviets also apparently are concerned that
US development and deployment of strategic defense
systems resulting from SDI would:
-Confront them with the possibility of new US
technologies that could have both anear- and
long-term impact on both their strategic and
their general purpose war-fighting capabilities.
Many of the technologies now being investigated
for SDI, particularly signal processing, sensors,
and advanced electronics, would be applicable to
battlefield weapon systems. Thus, the Soviets
have to be concerned with results of additional
Western political and resource commitment to
basic military research, regardless of the outcome
of the SDI effort itself.
-Result in a long-term high-technology arms com-
petition that could exacerbate already-difficult
decisionmaking regarding the allocation of scarce
resources. The Soviet development of advanced
technology for a variety of applications was
initiated in the 1960s and 1970s, well before the
announcement of the SDI program, and will
continue regardless of how the SDI program
fares. The US effort, however, disrupts the So-
viets' long-range plans, threatens to negate their
longstanding investment in offensive ballistic
missiles, forces them to adopt a faster pace in an
attempt to match the US schedule, and intro-
duces amore severe penalty for technological
failures.
makers. Their inclination must naturally be to build
their forces for the early-to-mid-1990s as previously
planned, yet they must hedge against SDI. The plan-
ning problem for them is how to translate the need to
hedge against SDI into specific actions.
Impact of Soviet Resource Constraints
9. As in the past, Soviet decisions on major military
programs and force modernization will continue to be
driven primarily by calculations of political and mili-
tary benefits and the feasibility of weapons technol-
ogy. We do not believe that economic problems will
lead the Soviets to abandon major strategic weapon
programs or forsake force modernization goals. We
judge that strategic forces will continue to command
the highest resource priority and, therefore, would be
affected less by economic problems than any other
element of the Soviet military. We believe the Soviets,
if they felt it necessary, could and would substantially
increase military spending over the levels we have
projected, even though a steep increase would have
painful consequences for economic modernization and
growth over the long term, as well as for the well-
being of the nonmilitary industry and the consumer
sector. The Soviets' intense campaign to stop the US
SDI, however, is at least in part an indication of their
awareness of the difficult economic choices and strains
they face. As a result of the stark economic realities,
decisions involving the rate of strategic force modern-
ization probably will be influenced more by economic
factors now than in the past.
- Create greater uncertainty about the nature of
the future strategic environment, causing the
Soviets to investigate a variety of force options
and carry out research and development (R & D)
that they might otherwise choose to delay or
forgo, and to pursue previously unplanned tech-
nology developments
7. While their concerns about SDI stem primarily
from its potential effect on their offensive force
capabilities, the Soviets appear to believe that SDI-
related technologies have inherent offensive applica-
tions. Although much of their professed concern is
undoubtedly for propaganda purposes, they may be
concerned that SDI technologies could ultimately sup-
port space-based weapons capable of attack on other
space-based as well as ground-based targets, including
both offensive and defensive systems, as well as com-
mand, control, and communications assets.
8. The uncertainties in the nature and extent of
possible changes in US strategy and force posture
compound the complexities facing Soviet decision-
10. Evidence from flight-testing, production facili-
ties, and deployment sites indicates that the Soviets
will continue to make resource commitments in line
with the high absolute levels of the past decade to
already existing strategic forces' research, develop-
ment, and deployment programs. Maior new programs
started in the next several years and greater produc-
tion efforts in response to SDI, however, would almost
certainly conflict both with resource allocation for
other military programs and with General Secretary
Gorbachev's industrial modernization program. In-
deed, Moscow sees the United States channeling ad-
vanced technology and concepts into the strategic
competition, and the possibility of significant results
means the Soviets have all the more incentive to
modernize their industrial base in order to put the
military in a better position in the 1990s to develop
and deploy systems depending on advanced technol-
ogies. Thus, there is concern among Soviet officials
over the resource and technological challenge posed by
US weapon programs, and by the potential of SDI in
particular. On balance, however, we judge that the
6
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
Soviets will, in the near term, be able to conduct the
R&D into advanced technologies needed to respond to
the US SDI program without facing serious disru i n
in their economy or ongoing military programs.
11. The Soviets will be particularly sensitive to the
prospect of further strain on the technology sector of
their economy and additional competing resource
demands stemming from a prospective open-ended,
high-technology arms competition with the United
States that could result from the SDI. Even using
existing antiballistic missile (ABM) and space assets as a
base, a maior increase in R&D funding would be
required in areas where Soviet innovative capabilities
are weakest, including high-speed computers, high-
speed signal processing, command, control and com-
munications software, sophisticated high-speed elec-
tronics, infrared, optical and nuclear sensors,
composite materials, and precision machinery to man-
ufacture the complex components of these new sys-
tems. Competing demands for high-quality economic
resources-trained manpower, raw materials, sophisti-
cated manufacturing techniques, and industrial capac-
ity-if not adequately resolved, may result in poorly
managed development programs and, even more like-
ly, in bottlenecks and disruptions in the manufacture
of large numbers of very complex systems. As a result,
the Soviets may find it necessary to spread develop-
ment and deployment over longer periods to overcome
these problems and to lessen the disruptive impact on
13. The Soviets have doubtless taken some steps to
refocus their technical efforts and to reallocate re-
sources in order to begin developing technology for
SDI-related countermeasures and to put greater em-
phasis on some of the specific research the United
there appears to be an element of concern in Soviet
statements over the potential long-term economic con-
sequences to the USSR of continuing to pursue its
strategic goals in the face of accelerated US programs
on strategic offense, strategic defense, and other mili-
tary fronts.
14. Various Soviet officials, however, have asserted
that the USSR is prepared to bear the burden neces-
sary to counter US strategic offensive and defensive
programs. It is possible that some of the Soviet expres-
sions of concern over the economic impact of arms
competition are deliberately exaggerated to convince
Westerners that Moscow is approaching the US-Soviet
arms talks in Geneva in good faith because it has
compelling economic reasons to negotiate an agree-
ment. Other such statements, on the part of lower or
midranking scientific officials, as to the tangible eco-
nomic benefits of arms control agreements probably
serve the interests of top political and military leaders,
who almost certainly would not share that view. It is
also likely the Soviets believe such statements on their
part will encourage Western fears of repercussions
from SDI for Western economies.
Political and Diplomatic Activities
15. Since the US announcement in March 1983,
Moscow's effort to halt or slow the US SDI program
has been focused on generating Allied, domestic, and
Congressional opposition to the US antisatellite (ASAT)
and SDI programs and in some respects has exceeded
Moscow's past public efforts to derail intermediate-
range nuclear forces (INF) deployments. It is clear that
the Soviets see political opportunities to encourage US
domestic and Congressional opposition to these pro-
grams, and to provoke US-West European frictions
over the wisdom of pursuing what the Soviets have
sought to characterize as a "new dimension of the
arms race." In a clearly orchestrated attempt to use
Western media and established contacts with Western
scientists and officials to influence US policy, the
Soviets have sought to manipulate US and Western
perceptions of SDI. (See inset.) At various times,
depending on the targeted audience, they have taken
different, even contrary approaches. They have por-
trayed SDI as being technically unachievable or pro-
hibitively expensive to pursue, as militarily destabiliz-
ing, or as somat could be countered by Soviet
developments.
7
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
7X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
Soviet scientists have been especially prominent in
Mosa~w's well-orchestrated efforts to discredit the US
plans for SDI. The Soviet leadership probably calculates
that the views of these Soviet scientists would be
respected by their professional colleagues in the West
and, therefore, that they would be in a good position to
influence US scientists and the public who also might be
concerned about the use of science for weapons, partic-
ularly for ASAT or SDI systems:
- A Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of
Peace and Against the Threat of Nuclear War was
organized in 1983 and includes many Soviet scien-
tists who are heavily involved in Soviet research
on directed-energy weapons and other defensive
weapon systems. It sponsored and distributed sev-
eral versions of a major paper to Western scientists
on the scientific, economic, military-strategic, and
political implications of the US program. The
paper attempts to encourage the belief that space-
based SDI systems would be technically unachiev-
able, prohibitively expensive to pursue, but easy
and cheap to counter-themes the Soviet scientists
espoused at several international conferences and
in bilateral meetings, and have addressed in press
articles since the US announcement.
16. Because of the overlap between SDI and ASAT
developments, the Soviets have been seeking ASAT
constraints as a way of impeding SDI developments as
well. The first SDI-related arms control initiative was
announced by General Secretary Andropov in August
1983. He proposed a multilateral treaty to prohibit the
use or threat of force in or from space and announced
a unilateral moratorium not to be the first to put ASAT
weapons into outer space. The treaty proposal was
more comprehensive and ambitious than the Soviets
had previously been willing to accept. The Soviet
ASAT moratorium was intended to preclude testing of
the US developmental ASAT vehicle. It almost certain-
ly reflected Moscow's recognition that US ASAT plans
are much closer to fruition than US plans to develop
any SDI weapons, and that ASAT technologies are
applicable to the US SDI program.
17. The second Soviet initiative came in June 1984
in a government statement proposing bilateral space
weapons talks and a reciprocal moratorium on ASAT
tests. This proposal went beyond the 1983 Soviet
initiative in clarifying that the Soviet definition of
space weapons includes both ASAT and SDI systems.
When bilateral talks failed to take place as proposed
by the June 1984 proposal, a Soviet proposal to enter
talks on negotiations on both nuclear and space weap-
ons was advanced in November 1984 following the US
elections. At a meeting between Secretary Shultz and
Foreign Minister Gromyko in January 1985, agree-
ment was reached to begin negotiations in March
19. Although public Soviet statements have contin-
ued to claim interest only in a comprehensive agree-
ment, there have been indications the Soviets may be
prepared to explore the possibilities for a less compre-
hensive interim agreement:
- Gorbachev called for a reaffirmation of the 1972
ABM Treaty by the United States and the Soviet
Union in a July 1985 message to the Union of
Concerned Scientists and in his September inter-
view with Tirrze magazine.
8
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
Until late 1984, Moscow's steadily expanding propa-
ganda campaign against SDI was not accompanied by a
dedicated active measures effort.a Soviet forgeries and
disinformation campaigns directed at discrediting US
strategic policies emphasized INF and its alleged dan-
gers and rarely, if ever, addressed the issue of SDI. This
was true of other covert activity such as clandestine
Soviet involvement in the West European peace move-
ment. In November and December 1984, however, the
Soviet active measures directed against SDI began to
gain momentum and to grow in intensity. In particular,
efforts were made to reinvigorate the West European
peace movement apparently in the hope that it would
generate sentiment against SDI. To date, the active
measures effort has used mostly semiovert tactics such
as the staging of international conferences. The Soviet-
controlled World Peace Council, for example, spon-
sored the January 1985 "Third Vienna Dialogue on
Disarmament and Detente" that condemned SDI as
"destabilizing," and linked it to the prospect of "nucle-
ar winter." Other propaganda conferences have been
held in other European cities, and more have been
scheduled for 1986.
Tactics the Soviets are likely to use against SDI in the
future include:
- Forgeries and disinformation that misrepresent
the consequences of SDI development for Europe.
- Covert press placements designed to undermine
US negotiating and political positions on SDI.
- Reinvigorating Western peace groups, largely
through Soviet fronts, with the aim of engaging
peace movement representatives in the anti-SDI
campaign.
- Directives to West European and other Commu-
nist parties to step up demonstrations against SDI.
lion to critics of the US SDI.
a "Active measures" is the term the Soviets use to refer to worldwide
activities that are intended to promote Soviet foreign policy goals but
that go beyond traditional diplomatic, propaganda, and military means.
- In his 15 January 1986 proposal to eliminate
nuclear weapons by the year 2000, Gorbachev
did not explicitly call for a ban on SDI research.
With the exception of the ASAT proposal, however,
these hints of flexibility have not as yet been followed
up at NST. Since the 15 January proposal the Soviets
have indicated at NST that there is no change in their
position calling for a ban on SDI research.
20. The Soviets probably believe that SDI can be
slowed, and perhaps even halted, by their sustained
efforts to erode US public and Congressional support,
exploit Allied doubts, and encourage cutbacks in Con-
gressional funding. They undoubtedly are hoping for a
change in attitude with the next administration. The
Soviets see the negotiating process as offering opportu-
nities to pursue these objectives, and they will continue
to orchestrate their negotiating approach to buttress
their public campaign. The Soviets, for example,
21. At the same time the Soviet Union will continue
its political and other diplomatic efforts-comple-
menting them with active measures (see inset)-to
increase the political cost to the United States of
proceeding with its ASAT and SDI programs. Moscow
probably will seek to complement its diplomacy in
upcoming summits and in the Geneva arms talks with
efforts in the United Nations and the Geneva Confer-
ence on Disarmament to further promote its propa-
ganda campaign. Before the 1985 UN General Assem-
bly session, the Soviets approached Third World
capitals with demarches arguing against SDI and
encouraging these countries to make anti-SDI state-
ments in the United Nations. Indeed, in announcing
the 1985 Soviet UN arms control initiative before the
General Assembly in September, Soviet Foreign Minis-
ter Shevardnadze proposed a Soviet "Star Peace"
9
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Q
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
concept as a counter to the US "Star Wars" program.
The proposal links aid to developing countries for
peaceful activities in space to the achievement of
agreements on the nonmilitarization of space in an
attempt to generate additional opposition to SDI
among Third World countries
22. The Soviets will continue to make use of the
Soviet scientific community in their campaign to
encourage doubts among the US and European scien-
tific communities about the feasibility and wisdom of
going ahead with the program. Their calculations will
be that these scientists can bring additional pressure on
the administration and Congress to stop SDI. The
Soviets may also involve others who could appeal to
other politically active special-interest groups in the
United States and Western Europe
23. With regard to the future Allied participation in
SDI research, Moscow will continue to play a dual
strategy of threats and inducements. On the one hand,
Moscow already has harshly reprimanded govern-
ments that have expressed support for, or interest in,
research, saying that participation will make the Allies
accomplices in the abrogation of the ABM Treaty. The
Soviets have strongly criticized the decision of the
United Kingdom in early December to allow its firms
to participate in SDI research, have warned West
Germany that it will become an accomplice in the
arms race if it follows through with its plans to join the
research effort, and have charged that British and
West German actions are likely to lessen the chances
for any arms control agreements at Geneva and are
inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. The Soviets will
undoubtedly point to such complicity in the hope of
arousing the interest of peace groups and opposition
parties. With regard to Japan, the Soviets probably
surmise that, as the host of the May economic summit,
Japan will be under increasing pressure to join Britain
and West Germany in backing SDI. The Soviets are
likely to calculate that the best they can hope for is to
play on popular Japanese fears of "provocative" mili-
tary initiatives in order to circumscribe and delay
Tokyo's response to US overtures.
24. On the other hand, the Soviets will seek to use
to their advantage any Allied sensitivities on SDI,
especially technology transfer issues and any restric-
tions that are applied to developments made as a
consequence of participation in SDI research, by
publicly and privately exploiting Allied doubts that US
offers of true participation are genuine. At the same
time, they will actively seek to acquire the fruits of the
joint SDI research programs. The Soviets also will no
doubt take advantage of the opposition of some Euro-
pean scientists to participation in SDI research. Soviet
actions are likely to attempt to nourish the concerns of
these scientists, especially as Allied participation
grows, and as more Europeans become aware of the
low-key SDI-related research that is already being
carried out in Europe. An indication of the Soviet
approach came when Gorbachev, in discussions with
Italian Prime Minister Craxi in May, commended the
EUREKA 5 program provided it remains peaceful.
25. In the event of US demonstration of SDI tech-
nologies, the Soviets would in all likelihood seek to
turn it to their advantage in their ongoing internation-
al propaganda campaign. They would characterize US
actions as an attempt to force the pace of the arms
race, and would charge the United States with viola-
tions of the ABM Treaty, even if such technology
demonstrations were permitted under the terms of the
agreement. In this circumstance, the Soviets could
consider whether to demonstrate their own technology
in res onse.
~~ The Soviets would have to consider that
technology demonstrations such as those suggested
here could be viewed as inconsistent with present
Soviet propaganda against SDI, and that Soviet efforts
to weaken domestic and Allied support for the pro-
gram could be seriously undermined by any such
demonstrations
26. On the other hand, the Soviets might wish to use
such a demonstration to foster a perception of Soviet
technological prowess, and to influence the US public
debate on SDI. The Soviets already have under way
technology development programs in countermea-
sures. ASAT, and ballistic missile defense that
Military and Technical Activities
27. While Moscow clearly hopes that Washington
eventually will abandon SDI, Soviet defense planners
are unlikely to rely on Soviet public efforts or the
unpredictable outcome of arms control negotiations to
block SDI. Instead, planning undoubtedly is under
way to assess possible outcomes of current and future
s EUREKA-a name derived from the European Research Coor-
dination Agency-is aFrench-proposed program to coordinate West
European civilian technological research
12
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
US technologies and capabilities against the USSR's
own options for strategic offensive and defensive
systems. (See inset.) Undoubtedly, the Soviets have
reviewed their own efforts in light of the US SDI, and
we expect that they will now seek to pursue their
advanced BMD technology, planning, and programs in
a more integrated fashion.
28. The USSR has been working on military appli-
cations of directed-energy technology as long as and
more extensively than the United States. Directed-
energy and kinetic-energy weapons potentially could
be developed for several weapons applications-
ASAT, air defense, battlefield use, and, in the longer
term, BMD. Three types of directed-energy technol-
ogies-high-energy laser, particle beam, and radiofre-
quency-have potential strategic weapon applications.
29. The Soviets have a solid and innovative base for
the development and testing of a variety of counter-
measure technologies, and we expect them to continue
regardless of how far the United States proceeds with
SDI. To be effective, countermeasures are usually
developed against a specific threat. Therefore, until
US hardware architecture is clearly defined and the
extent of changes in US strategy and force posture are
better known, the Soviets will find it difficult to
"tailor" their responses to SDI. Nonetheless, since the
1983 announcement the Soviets probably have taken
some steps to refocus their technical efforts to ensure
that they are in fact conducting all the necessary basic
research required to develop countermeasures.
30. The Soviets may be concerned that their system
development process is not suited to contend with
maior new US initiatives like the SDI program and
that they could lose out to the United States in an
open-ended competition in advanced technologies.
Their concern may result from the customary Soviet
development process that usually requires a relatively
early freeze of technology, and they have lagged the
West in many areas of technology. Nonetheless, they
have traditionally compensated for such problems
through innovative design solutions, an increase in
weapon quantities, or the deployment of initial sys-
tems that have a lesser capability than those the
United States would build. The Soviet development
style, moreover, emphasizes continued product im-
provement that often proceeds in parallel with new
developments. This procedure reduces the need for
the Soviets to push technology in each development
program since desired performance can be achieved
Since the March 1983 US announcement, 1s9oscow has
been claiming that it will not let the L"S SDI go
unanswered. Most Soviet statements, including those of
General Secretary Gorbachev, claim that the Soviet
response will be a buildup and improvement of strate-
gic offensive forces to overwhelm the US SDI. Several
Soviet military leaders, including Marshal Sergey Soko-
lov, Defense Minister, and Marshal Sergey F. Akhro-
meyev, Chief of the General Staff, indicate that the
Soviet countermeasures also will include the further
development of defensive weapons, while other spokes-
men have discussed the development of a counterpart
Soviet system
Some Soviet scientists maintain that ^umerous active
and passive countermeasures to defeat space-based SDI
stations can be based on existing technology, and will be
simple and relatively inexpensive to implement. Specif-
ic examples of active countermeasures cited by the
scientists include high-acceleration missiles, ground-
based lasers, space mines, cruise missiles, and "false or
preemptive missile launches." Passive measures cited
include those designed to protect missiles during carious
stages of flight, including smokescreens, ablative coat-
ings, and hardening of boosters.
Selected statements of senior Soviet officials follow-:
- "Perhaps someone in the United States had
decided that there has appeared a possibility to
overtake us, to put a hold on the Soviet Union.
But this is an illusion. It could not be done in the
past, and it cannot be done now. We shall find a
response, and an adequate one at that." Gorba-
chev, Time interview (quoted in Pravda, ?_
September 1985)
"The Soviet Union is far from naive and cannot
count only on peaceful assurances by US lead-
ers, which serve as a cover for developing strike
weapons in space. If that is continued, nothing
will remain for us, but to adopt countermea-
sures in the field of both offensive and other,
not excluding defensive, armaments, including
those based in space." Akhromeyev (Pravda, l9
October 1985)
"[People in the United States] are perfectly well
aware that the deployment of a large-scale
ABM system by one side will inevitably prompt
retaliatory actions by the other in the form of
gttantitative and qualitative growth of strategic
defensive weapons in the creation of a large-
scale ABM defense for the country, which also
means the creation of the means for the neutral-
ization of ABM defenses." Sokolov (Pravda, 6
November 1985)
through a series of modernizations.
13
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
31. Timely development by the Soviets of tailored
countermeasures must be based on an assessment of
the strengths and vulnerabilities of the US approach to
SDI. They will place highest priority on acquiring
intelligence on US SDI developments and on gaining
access to the technology in which they lag. Increased
collection activities in the United States and in Allied
countries, and programs to improve Soviet technical
intelligence capabilities, will result
32. Although ~ have reported
diversions of resources to military projects, we have no
direct evidence, and we doubt, that the Soviets have
yet made major changes in their force planning or in
their R&D programs in response to the SDI announce-
ment. In the latter case, however, changes would be
difficult to detect and identify.
33. In structuring their efforts, the Soviets will build
their forces for the early-to-mid-1990s as previously
planned and will try to avoid major disruptions in both
the defense sector and the overall planned economy
for at least the next several years. They will seek to
design longer term solutions that they can manage
with minimum disruption. Thus we expect them to
pursue both near-term "quick fixes"-ready adapta-
tions of existing and already-programed forces-and
to establish R&D programs designed to yield payoffs
in the longer term, well after the turn of the century.
We anticipate efforts along a broad front, as the
Soviets investigate a variety of options to counter SDI
and continue their longstanding activities in conven-
tional and advanced technologies for strategic defense.
We also would expect them to deploy some systems,
using available technology, even when that technology
cannot fully satisfy their military requirements. This
would be consistent with Soviet philosophy and past
practices.
34. As SDI development proceeds, and in the ab-
sence of a negotiated agreement restricting ASAT and
space-based weapons, the Soviet approach would be
characterized by an emphasis on developing opera-
tional capabilities to suppress SDI systems through
direct attack (destructive attacks on ground facilities
and satellites, and interference with sensors and com-
munications); to penetrate surviving defenses with
improved and possibly expanded ballistic missile
forces; and to circumvent SDI defenses by the use of
aerodynamic platforms. This approach is most consis-
tent with evidence on Soviet military doctrine and
strategy, targeting objectives and operations, and
methods of countering strategic defenses. Also, the
Soviets could carry out deployment of widespread
ABM defenses based on existing technologies to pro-
vide terminal defense, although they probably will
avoid taking that step, at least at an early date, so long
as they hold out hope that they could stop the SDI
program
35. Although we cannot be certain, it appears from
the evidence that the Soviets' emphasis in developing
advanced-technology antisatellite -and ballistic missile
defense weapons is to concentrate initially on develop-
ing and deploying ground-based systems. Their near-
term objectives would be to provide better terminal
defenses than their conventional ABM systems alone
could provide and to extend their coverage to inter-
cept ballistic missile reentry vehicles (RVs) at higher
altitudes
36. Soviet space-based laser efforts apparently are
geared toward an initial antisatellite role. The devel-
opment of technologies for midcourse and boost-phase
intercept of ballistic missiles is probably viewed by the
Soviets as a more distant objective and would benefit
from the development of their ground-based technol-
ogies and their space system infrastructure, and the
acquisition of key Western technologies.
37. In the near term, the Soviets are likely to devote
most of their efforts to developing weapons that have
intrinsic value to their strategic forces even if the US
SDI is eventually abandoned. They will focus on
devising countermeasures to exploit anticipated weak-
nesses or vulnerabilities in what they view as the most
likely technologies for a future US defensive shield.
ASAT upgrades are the most obvious route to this goal
because they will be useful in any case to counter a
number of future US space systems
38. If the Soviets sought to increase the number of
boosters for existing land- and sea-based missile sys-
tems, the size of the increase would have to be
substantial in order to have any significant military
value against a multilayered SDI system. A significant
increase in missile production, however, would carry a
high cost. Although the Soviets have the ability to
boost output in the near term, such a move would
interfere with Gorbachev's industrial modernization
program, which is needed to support production of
systems with more advanced technologies in the 1990s.
In the absence of an effective US boost-phase intercept
capability, a more effective solution might be to
emphasize increasing the number of warheads per
missile, and expanding the use of decoys and other
penetration aids. An increase in the number of long-
14
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
range bombers and cruise missiles, and the introduc-
tion of low-observable technology to these systems
beyond current plans, is also an option, but would also
require substantial additional investment. Moreover,
the Soviets must expect that the United States would
pursue air defense deployments as a complement to
39. To have more advanced-technology counters to
SDI available in the midterm, the Soviets would have
to begin development soon. They will seek to avoid
limiting their options during development, and will
seek to postpone decisions on actual deployment until
they have a clear indication of US intentions to
develop and deploy SDI. These improvements could
conceivably include shielding boosters and RVs, hard-
ening RVs, and, with more difficulty, initiating pro-
grams to develop boosters with greater acceleration
performance than boosters currently in development
(so-called fast-burn boosters). The Soviets are probably
already pursuing such options as maneuverable reen-
try vehicles (MaRVs) to improve accuracies and avoid
terminal defenses, along with reduced observables and
terminal guidance technology on cruise missiles. These
efforts would have added urgency in response to SDI.
Current programs for space-based and ground-based
ASAT systems would be likely to receive added em-
phasis. These responses would require significant in-
creases in R & D as well as procurement, and could
entail substantial reallocation of funding. Given the
Soviet preference for relying on existing systems and
incorporating new technology only as required, how-
ever, these programs probably could be accommodat-
ed without unacceptable disruption of defense plan-
ning, given the level of industrial capacity already
required for the initial responses outlined above
40. An effective US defense against ICBMs and
SLBMs also is likely to increase Soviet reliance on
bombers and cruise missiles that would circumvent US
ballistic missile defenses. The longer flight times asso-
ciated with these systems, however, make them much
less useful than ICBMs in a primary counterforce role.
These offensive systems, incorporating advances in
penetration aids and low-observable technology, could
attack not only some targets formerly allocated to
ICBMs but also some SDI ground-based elements as a
defense suppression measure. Moreover, new attack-
class submarines carrying cruise missiles are likely to
be quieter and more survivable and to be deployed in
broad ocean areas, thereby increasing the search area.
The Soviets are already deploying Bear H bombers
equipped with the AS-15 long-range air-launched
cruise missile (ALCM) and are testing a new aircraft,
the Blackjack, that clearly will have an intercontinen-
tal mission. This bomber and its future variants will
remain operational well into the next century as a
carrier of cruise missiles and gravity bombs. In the
early-to-mid-1990s, the Soviets could begin deploy-
ment of cruise missiles that would incorporate trade-
offs between lower radar and infrared observables and
supersonic or perhaps hypersonic speeds to penetrate
future air defense systems.
41. The Soviets have an excellent theoretical knowl-
edge of electromagnetics and traditional signahzre-
reduction technologies. They have shown an interest in
signature-reducing technologies with broad applica-
tion to a variety of aerodynamic vehicles and have
acquired related technical information, materials, and
manufacturing equipment from a variety of foreien
we doubt that Soviet designers
aye as yet eci e on an overall conceptual approach
to low-observable aerodynamic systems design.
Advanced Technologies for Countering SDI
42. Soviet developments are competitive with those
of the West in many needed technologies, including:
- Laser and other directed-energy technologies ap-
plicable to weapon system developments.
- Communications technologies (for survivability
and secure command and control systems).
- Radar technologies, especially high-power radio-
frequency (RF) devices.
- Electronic countermeasures.
- Power sources (particularly nuclear sources).
- Ion sources, and accelerators for high-energy
beam weapons.
- Propulsion.
- Structural materials and metalworking
technologies.
- Nuclear weapons.
43. Four areas of Soviet technological weaknesses
are of special importance because they have broad
impact on Soviet capability to demonstrate and deploy
counter-SDI systems. All will require further indige-
nous development and continuing infusions of West-
ern technology if they are to improve:
- In computer technologies, the current level of
technology available to a Soviet system designer
15
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
~~x~
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Q
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
is five to 15 years behind that available to a
Western system designer. Computer technology
developments appear to be falling further behind
as the decade progresses. These deficiencies are
offset somewhat by the Soviet development pro-
cess, which is fairly efficient in incorporating the
best of the available technology into both existing
and new systems. In addition to deficiencies in
computer hardware, the Soviets are significantly
behind the West in their ability to produce
sophisticated software.
- In production technologies for microelectronics,
the Soviets have been unable to achieve high-
quality mass production, sufficient for their
needs, of both electronics-grade silicon and the
microelectronics devices themselves.
- The Soviets have long had a problem in produc-
ing sufficient amounts of high-quality precision
test equipment (experimental, testing, diagnostic,
calibration) for use in their research, develop-
ment, and production programs.
- In sensor technologies, the Soviets have lagged in
the development of optical and infrared large-
array developments.
44. Lags or weaknesses in Soviet technology within
specific areas, however, do not necessarily translate
into less capable military systems. Innovative design
engineering, or larger weapon deployments and other
operational measures, can often offset technology defi-
45. Moreover, in many cases, in order to be able to
produce systems using these sophisticated technologies,
the Soviets will emphasize the legal and illegal acquisi-
tion of these technologies, especially manufacturing
technologies, from the West
Technologies for Penetrating Ballistic
Missile Defenses
46. there are a variety of
technologies the Soviets could pursue to improve the
ability of their ballistic missiles to survive and pene-
trate adeployed SDI. For example, the Soviets will
have by the early 1990s the technology to be able to
begin development of high-acceleration (fast-burn)
boosters. Such boosters could reach initial operational
capability (IOC) by the period 2000-2005. Propulsion
technology has been a strength of the Soviets, and we
expect such a development program to be well within
their capability. Fast-burn boosters will be much more
complex than present ones, however, and thus will
require high development costs, will be more difficult
19
SECRET
~~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
and more costly to produce, and will possibly be less
reliable. Throw weights probably will be smaller for a
given booster size because of greater structure weight,
greater atmospheric drag, and probably less efficient
propellant combustion. The Soviets would face a
challenge in maintaining the accuracy of fast-burn
boosters to the same level as current ICBMs, much less
improving accuracy; boost completed within the atmo-
sphere would expose RVs to drag that would be
difficult to model. This could be partially compensat-
ed for by an improved navigation system.
49. The Soviets are a so con ucting researc un er
military sponsorship for the purpose of acquiring the
ability to develop particle beam weapons (PBWs), but
the size and scope of this effort are unknown. We
believe the Soviets will eventually attempt to build a
space-based PBW, but the technical requirements are
so severe, including those for power generation, power
conditioning, and beam pointing, that we estimate
there is a low probability they will test a prototype
before the year 2000.
The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State.
20
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
52. We have evidence that the Soviets have expend-
ed considerable resources since the 1960s on research
and development on technologies with potential appli-
cations for hypervelocity kinetic-energy weapons, in-
cluding rail guns. Currently, they appear to be concen-
trating their efforts on these technologies to those
applicable to short-range, ground-based systems. ~
'~~Y~
25X1
21
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. Because of the
sensitive nature of some source material reflected herein, this copy is for the exclusive
information and use of the recipient only.
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable
security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence.
3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a
period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed
or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding
agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/18 :CIA-RDP09T00367R000300070001-8