AN INTERVIEW WITH CIA CHIEF WILLIAM CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201740012-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
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National Security
And the Press
An Interview with
CIA Chief Gilliam Casey
The Pelton spy trial has triggered the
harshest confrontation between the govern-
ment and the press since the publication of
the Pentagon Papers. In an interview with
WJR Editor Katherine Winton Evans, Wil-
liam Casey, director of the Central Intelli-
genre Agency, gives the administration's
side of the conflict over national security
and the press.
WJR: Mr. Casey, what worries you most
about the American press?
CASEY: I worry about the propensity of
the American press to publish classified
information, which destroys and jeopar-
dizes intelligence sources and methods.
As director of Central Intelligence, I am
obligated under the National Security Act
to protect those sources and methods.
WJR: What do you mean by a "propensity
on the part of the press to publish classi-
fied information"?
CASEY: There's been a vast divulging of
sensitive information at an unprecedented
tempo in recent months. We've seen it
destroy our ability to follow terrorists in
specific instances. We've seen very impor-
tant capabilities to understand and follow
Soviet military plans and the development
of their weapons jeopardized and dimin-
ished. It seems to be happening more fre-
quently, more quickly and at an increas-
ing tempo and is doing more damage
than we can tolerate.
WJR: Do you think there's a changing at-
titude or standard in the press about what
constitutes a threat to national security?
CASEY: I think there's not a very good
general understanding of why we need to
protect the intelligence sources and meth-
ods that are the basis of our national se-
curity. I am trying to correct that situa-
tion. All of us in the intelligence
community have an obligation to sensitize
the people in the media to this problem.
We believe that fundamentally we all have
the interests of our nation at heart. No-
body wants to hurt our national security,
nobody wants to impair our intelligence
capabilities, but we may not have done as
good a job as we might have in sensitizing
the media to the damage that is being
done to our sources and methods. We're
just now trying to do it in a more system-
atic and aggressive way.
WJR: Quiet diplomacy has been the tradi-
tional way for directors of the CIA to deal
with the press on sensitive information.
Do you regret that you chose a noisy con-
frontation with the press when you an-
nounced, for example, that you were ask-
ing the justice Department to consider
prosecuting news organizations for inter-
cept disclosures and when you threatened
to prosecute the Washington Post if it pub-
lished details of the Pelton case?
CASEY: I was not alone in that. Many of
us thought it was necessary to warn the
media and ask the justice Department to
consider applying to the Washington Post
the 1950 law prohibiting intercept disclo-
sures. We do not see how, in fairness to
the media, or in the discharge of our own
obligations, we could permit the media to
violate the law, which flatly prohibits the
publication of communications intelli-
gence, without apprising them that they
were doing so and putting them on no-
tice. That's what I did. I told people who
were about to publish things that I
thought they ought to know that if they
published that kind of stuff they would he
in violation of a flat prohibition the Con-
gress has enacted. I don't think I threat-
ened. I said I'm not threatening, but I
think I ought to tell you you have this
problem. I and others have notified and
will continue to notify the Justice Depart-
ment that it should look into this violation
of law, or apparent violation of law. I
don't think I was all that noisy. It was a
private warning. It was the press that pub-
licized my warning and made it public.
WJR: Why get tough now? NBC's Jim
Polk reported on the operation Pelton re-
vealed to the Soviets hack in November
and the New York Times wrote about the
operation years ago. Why didn't you react
then?
CASEY: I can't answer that. I wasn't here
years ago when the New York Times wrote
about it. There's always a weighing, a bal-
ancing of equities. Sometimes you take ac-
tion and you in effect bring more atten-
tion to the matter. But we have all agreed
that the tempo and number of unau-
thorized disclosures over the last several
months has been such that we've found it
necessary to deal with the problem more
actively, more aggressively and to use all
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the legal authorities we have to deter fur-
ther damage to our national security and
our intelligence capabilities.
WJR: Why did you react so strongly and
publicly over the press reporting of the
operations Pelton revealed to the Soviets
when the Soviets obviously already knew
about them?
"It's just intellectually
shallow to say that we
can publish anything
because the Soviets
know about it. The
media neither have the
capability nor the
authority to make that
determination ."
CASEY: How do the media know what
the Soviets know about intelligence opera-
tions? How do they know how much the
Soviets know? How do they know at what
level he received attention? How do they
know what this will tell other countries?
It's just intellectually shallow to say that
we can publish anything because the Sovi-
ets know about it. The media neither have
the capability nor the authority to make
that determination, particularly when
there are statutes that prohibit publica-
tion.
WJR: How are news organizations and re-
porters to know what is and what is not
damaging to the national security?
CASEY: We must have closer cooperation
and closer understanding about that. I
think they know that publishing certain
information can jeopardize lives and can
jeopardize capabilities. There is a fairly
wide understanding of that. We should
work to make the media's understanding
wider and deeper and fuller. And clearly
the media-as all other citizens-are re-
sponsible for knowing the law of the land.
WJR: You seem to be looking for a way
for news organizations, reporters and
broadcasters to practice self-censorship,
but how can they do that? You're not sug-
gesting putting a CIA official in every
newsroom?
CASEY: Of course not. That's a silly sug-
gestion.
WJR: How will they know where the line
is?
CASEY: They have a responsibility. Peo-
ple ought to know their responsibilities.
People ought to know when they're near
the line. We'd like to have them discuss
the matter with us when they think they
may be close to that line. You can't do
much more than that. I'm gratified when
the media have brought potentially dam-
aging stories to our attention that were
questionable and we've discussed them.
Sometimes the press has decided that the
information was not that important to
publish because the likely damage out-
weighed the worth of getting the informa-
tion out. In other instances, the media,
reporters and others, have been willing to
mitigate the damage by taking out par-
ticularly sensitive details that weren't nec-
essary to the conveying of the broad
story. We're always available to help on
that. Anybody who is uncertain or has
questions, all they have to do is pick up
the phone and call here. [Director of
Public Affairs] George Lauder will try to
help them work it out.
WJR: Did the Washington Post behave in a
responsible way after you asked them not
to reveal the details of what Pelton had
given the Soviets, and they trimmed their
story?
CASEY: Well, the Washington Post cer-
tainly considered the whole matter in a
very responsible way. I'm not really going
to comment on whether some of the
things that they published were not au-
thorized to be released in the Pelton trial
or whether they should have been pub-
lished or whether they shouldn't have
been published. I think on the whole the
conduct of the Washington Post was re-
sponsible.
WJR: On CBS' "Face the Nation" on
June 1, Bob Woodward of the Post said,
"We're going to cover intelligence. We're
going to write about it and the adminis-
tration is not going to like where we draw
the line." Mr. Casey, can reporters draw
the line themselves?
CASEY: Some of them can. Some of them
understand quite well and are rather care-
ful. There are some who are in a rush to
publish and are not particularly sensitive
to national security and intelligence ca-
pabilities considerations.
WJR: Can you give me some examples?
CASEY: No, I'm not going to name
names.
WJR: Who should be the final judge of
what is the national security? The admin-
istration, the press or the courts?
CASEY: It depends on the circumstances.
If there is a law or a statute, as there is
with respect to communications intelli-
gence, the courts would be the ultimate
determiners. As to what the requirements
of national security are, the elected gov-
ernment has the authority under the Con-
stitution to protect the national security.
And they need to make the judgment as
to what it requires to maintain that secu-
rity. It's a free country; the press may not
always agree with the government. We
recognize that. But the press has a
responsibility and the press has a stake in
the national security and that, we think,
should cause them to proceed cautiously
and carefully, to hear our point of view
and to arrive at measured decisions as to
what is appropriate and what is not ap-
propriate for publication.
WJR: When you deal with the media, do
you find a difference between television
executives and newspaper editors in their
understanding of, and sensitivity to, na-
tional security considerations?
CASEY: When you deal with a newspaper
editor, you usually have more time to
think about the situation. When you deal
with a broadcast person, the deadline
sometimes makes it difficult to give the
matter adequate consideration. On the
other hand, there are occasions when
broadcast people will hold back and de-
vote the time to thinking about the intelli-
gence equities and understanding our
concerns. We'd like that to happen more
frequently.
WJR: Has coverage of the Pelton trial
been responsible on the whole, do you
think?
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"There are quite a few
bits of sensitive
information that have
appeared in certain
reporting about the
Pelton trial that did
not come out of the
court proceedings ....
We are concerned
about that."
CASEY: I think coverage of the Pelton
trial has been responsible on the whole.
We do know, however, that there are
quite a few bits of sensitive information
that have appeared in certain reporting
about the Pelton trial that did not come
out of the court proceedings, or were not
authorized to be released in the Pelton
trial. We are concerned about that.
WJR: Critics are saying that the adminis-
tration is going after the press to divert
attention from the disarray of our intelli-
gence operations, meaning spies on the
payroll and secrets walking out the door.
How do you answer that criticism?
CASEY: I simply say that is not true.
We're concerned about protecting our
intelligence capabilities. We caught a lot
of spies. That's the work of the intelli-
gence community-like the FBI and oth-
ers. So we have no great apology. It's too
bad we have had these spies and it's too
bad we didn't catch them earlier, but
we've had quite a good degree of success
at catching people who are passing along
information to other governments.
WJR: Could you give me just a couple of
examples of when the press has endan-
gered national security?
CASEY: When I do that, I simply tell the
world, including our adversaries, more
than I want to tell them about our intelli-
gence priorities and capabilities. But I can
say that it's well and widely known that we
lost access to terrorist communications in
recent months by virtue of press report-
ing of communications intelligence, which
probably is in violation of a federal stat-
ute.
WJR: Are you talking about the Libyan
intercept?
CASEY: Information about communica-
tions that might have alerted us to the
bombings of the embassy and the Marine
barracks in Beirut appeared in the press
and those communications disappeared.
The same thing happened to our knowl-
edge of Libyan communications that
alerted us to Libyan-planned attacks on
Western installations.
WJR: But the communication between
Libya and its bureau in East Germany,
President Reagan talked about himself.
CASEY: President Reagan did not talk
about it first. When he talked about it, he
did so very carefully. He disclosed no
sources. In the second place, one reason
he was able to talk about it at all was that
some explicit information had appeared
in the media two weeks earlier. It was at
that time that the communications were
turned off. Get that distinction very
clearly, because everybody's talking about
President Reagan. That information was
previously disclosed by the media before
President Reagan talked about it.
WJR: Is the administration-or are you-
intending to intimidate the press but not
to prosecute? Is your threat to prosecute
serious?
CASEY: We're all obligated to enforce
the laws. I think everybody takes that seri-
ously. And if those laws are violated to
the detriment of our national security,
we're obligated to enforce the law. There
are judgments to be made. Sometimes we
don't prosecute because the damage
might be too serious. You want to get a
case you are going to win. That's a deci-
sion that the justice Department will have
to make. But everybody feels the same
obligation to apply and enforce the laws.
WJR: Do you think your frontal approach
with the press has worked?
CASEY: I think I've gotten the attention
of the press on this problem. I think
that's a good thing. You're going to help
me get more attention. The public has to
understand that this is a problem. It has
to be a sober, careful presentation of the
problem. You call it a frontal approach. I
can't get people's attention if I keep
quiet. The leaders of the intelligence com-
munity believe we have an obligation to
make the problem an issue and to explain
what harm can result from loose handling
of classified information, how it can dam-
age our national security, our defense and
the protection of our citizens against ter-
rorism. If I just kept quiet, I wouldn't be
doing my job.
WJR: Are there too many secrets? Would
declassifying less important intelligence
material make it easier to secure the rest?
CASEY: I think so. That's something we
ought to work at. Don't think I'm blaming
this whole problem on the media. The
media is one element. We must have
greater discipline within the government.
People have to feel less free to talk, they
have to realize that there is a penalty for
violating their obligation to maintain the
secrecy of classified information. We
should work to make sure that the in-
formation that is classified really has to be
classified. We can reduce the body of clas-
sified information, but that can't be done
overnight and will take time. One of the
considerations that is likely to be applied
in enforcing the law is how sensitive and
how critical the violation is. How damag-
ing is it to our national security and to
our intelligence capabilities? So in all
3?
these things I support focusing on the
really damaging and critical disclosures.
WJR: Mr. Casey, if a government official
who leaks a damaging secret to the Sovi-
ets is a traitor, what is a government offi-
cial who leaks a damaging secret to a re-
porter?
CASEY: Well, he's certainly violated the
trust that has been placed in him. He's
violated his obligation as a federal em-
ployee. There are restrictions against dis-
closure of classified information and peo-
ple who violate that obligation should be
disciplined in some way. There are occa-
sions where extenuating circumstances ex-
ist. Sometimes the violation results in a
reprimand, sometimes it's a suspension,
sometimes it's a firing. If the leak is. delib-
erate, there may be prosecution. As there
has been in one case-Samuel Loring
Morison, the Navy intelligence officer.
WJR: If a government official leaks a
damaging secret to a reporter and the re-
porter prints it, which one is the more
guilty?
CASEY: Well, I don't think I want to
weigh that. They both violated either an
obligation or a responsibility. The govern-
ment employee has a more immediate ob-
ligation; the reporter has a responsibility
which he may or may not recognize.
WJR: Are the recent firings of officials at
the Pentagon and the State Department
for allegedly leaking to reporters, and
your "get tough" approach all part of a
big, overall administration plan to crack
down on the press?
"Foreign powers have
clearly been able to
benefit greatly from
sensitive, secret
information they've
been able to pick up in
the world and the
American media. "
CASEY: No. It's not part of any effort to
crack down on the press. We have no de-
sire to crack down on the press. I believe
in the press. I applaud the work of the
press in exposing inefficiency, corruption,
all kinds of other waste. I also applaud
the media for raising policy questions re-
lated to national security. It is essential
that those questions be raised in a man-
ner which doesn't violate the classification
of material that is secret, that doesn't
damage either our national security or
our intelligence capabilities. The press has
to be able to understand the distinction
between providing the public information
they need to carry out the self-governing
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process, to understand what's happening
in the world, and protecting that narrow
segment of information which can be
damaging to our national security. When
Congress made the mere publication of
information about communications intelli-
gence a federal crime, they said, this ap-
plies only to a very narrow segment of
information which is at once critical and
vulnerable. That was very carefully done
and there is a history behind it. During
World War II, we were able to read the
communications between the German
command and its field commanders, and
between Tokyo and its field commanders.
One little whisper that we were able to
read that and they would have turned it
off. We would have lost that capability.
We would have lost a lot of additional
lives and the war would have lasted a lot
longer. With that background, and be-
cause of the special vulnerability and sen-
sitivity of communications intelligence,
there is a statute that bars publication of
such information. The statute hasn't been
waived just because it hasn't been applied
very actively. It has been used in a num-
ber of espionage cases. Also, Justice
White said very clearly, in the Pentagon
Papers case, that this statute applies to
newspapers publishing information about
communications intelligence and he
would have no difficulty in supporting its
use. So it is a very serious law.
WJR: But in 35 years, this is the first time
it's been used against the press.
CASEY: It hasn't been used.
WJR: The spectre of using it has been
raised.
CASEY: We told the press that they had
better worry about it. If we hadn't done
that, we wouldn't be doing our duty.
WJR: Isn't the real problem of leaks-
from administration officials to report-
ers-the officials who leak the stories, not
the reporters to whom they leak?
CASEY: Well, that is debatable. Certainly,
the primary problem comes from the peo-
ple in the government who leak the sto-
ries, and who violate their obligation to
protect classified information. When
somebody violates that obligation, when
they hand out what might be said to be
stolen goods, there is certainly some onus
on the person receiving those goods. We
should not close our eyes to that.
WJR: How do you feel about the use of
lie-detector tests within the government
to plug leaks?
CASEY: In order to plug leaks, as you put
it, you have to investigate a situation
where there is damage by disclosure of
classified information. In the course of
investigating, the polygraph is a tool we
use. It's an effective tool. It is used
throughout the government, on occasion,
and I think it will continue to be used.
WJR: How do you and Secretary [of
State] Shultz differ on the use of lie-de-
tector tests of government officials?
CASEY: I don't think we differ as much
as it is generally perceived. I don't want
to speak for him. Neither one of us is in
favor of widespread use of the polygraph.
We both are willing to have the polygraph
used to make the investigative process
more effective when that appears to be
appropriate to those who are conducting
the investigation. FBI, justice or whoever.
WJR: Would you submit to one?
CASEY: Oh, I do. In CIA and NSA, ev-
erybody has a polygraph before they
come in. I don't think that would be prac-
tical government-wide. Nobody's ever rec-
ommended that. Although some of the
media's discussion of polygraphs appears
to assume that. That's another one of
those misperceptions. I took the poly-
graph when I came to the CIA. I knew
that everybody else took it, so I ought to
take it.
WJR: Do you think more legislation is
needed to safeguard national security in-
formation?
CASEY: I think it should be carefully con-
sidered.
WJR: What kind?
CASEY: A lot of people believe that the
espionage laws are outdated, are no
longer adequate to meet the requirements
of protecting sensitive information, be-
cause the key prohibition is on directly
passing information to a foreign power.
Today the intelligence community sees
much more information going to foreign
powers by the leakage of sensitive in-
formation and the immediate broadcast
of that information to the world. That's
the fastest way to get it to a foreign
power. Those foreign powers have clearly
been able to benefit greatly from sensi-
tive, secret information they've been able
to pick up in the world and the American
media.
WJR: What kind of new Igw would you
recommend?
CASEY: Well, that's under discussion and
study. I'm not recommending any particu-
lar law at this time. There is quite a bit of
interest in the Congress in what kind of
legislative steps are called for to protect
our national security or intelligence ca-
pability more strongly. I suppose the law
would apply to the misuse of classified
information.
WJR: The misuse by the press?
CASEY: The misuse by anybody of classi-
fied information. And how far that goes
or how it's applied within the government
or outside the government, I don't have a
judgment on that.
WJR: You're talking about a leak of classi-
fied information by somebody in the gov-
ernment to a member of the press who
prints it.
CASEY: To anybody.
WJR: Those laws are being considered
now by you in the government?
CASEY: It's always under consideration.
People on the Hill are always talking
about it. Just where that process stands, I
don't want to comment on that.
WJR: Can you sum up your overall con-
cerns?
CASEY: There is just too much informa-
tion that hostile countries can get from
the American press. Sometimes by acci-
dent, sometimes because people violate
their obligation, sometimes because re-
porters are assiduous and creative and
put a lot of information together. We
need to get a better control over that
whole process. The way to get better con-
trol is to tighten up within the govern-
ment and have a mutual acceptance of
responsibility between the media and the
government. Many people in the press are
concerned and recognize that they have a
responsibility too. They have as much in-
terest as we do, certainly, in the security
of the country, and the capability of our
intelligence organizations to deal with an
increasingly dangerous and complicated
world. I am encouraged by the willingness
among many in the media to face the
problem, to understand it, to cooperate
and to deal with it. I'm hopeful that will
gradually develop and improve. ?
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