TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100360001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 16, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence MASI ER FILE
GOP
OR MARK C
Terrorism
Review
16 February 1984
Seeret
GI TR 84-004
16 February 1984
COPY 4 81
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Secret
Review
1 Perspective-South American Terrorism
OGI
3 Highlights
5 Argentina: The Montoneros and the New Government
ALA
9 Peru: Status of the Insurgent Threat
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23 Chronology
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Chief, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues,
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Secret
Terrorism
Review F
16 February 1984
flourished during the 1960s and 1970s-Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil-are quiet
now, thanks to the sweeping and brutal government crackdowns on leftist
extremism that took place throughout most of South America during the 1970s.
Terrorism in South America has changed-gone are the days of the Tupamaros
and Montoneros who terrorized their countries and threatened their governments
through repeated acts of violence. Most of the countries in which terrorism
from the urban guerrillas currently operating in Chile, the most active South
American terrorists today are those who form part of larger rural insurgencies.
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The South American terrorists of today are different from their predecessors.
Although there are remnants of the urban guerrilla groups that operated in the
past, some-for example, the Brazilian MR-8 and the Argentine Montoneros-
appear to have opted for political means to achieve their revolutionary ends. Apart 25X1
Only a few South American countries are currently experiencing a significant
terrorism problem:
? Four major insurgent groups have plagued Colombia for decades: the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the 19th of April Movement
(M- 19), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the People's Liberation Army
(EPL). All four claim to be seeking social and economic reforms. Some of the
groups have received training and assistance from Cuba although it is unlikely
that Havana has much control over their activities. Security forces estimate that
some 4,000 armed guerrillas operate in both rural and urban areas, engaging in a
brisk kidnaping business, assassinations, bombings, and armed confrontations
with the local police and military. The insurgency in Colombia also has caused
strained relations between President Betancur and the military regarding how
best to handle the problem.
? Peru's Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is an essentially homegrown
rural insurgency that has become increasingly active since the establishment of a
civilian government in 1980. Its ultimate goals are to mobilize the
disenfranchised Indian population and to topple the Belaunde government. Local
security services estimate its strength at 1,000 to 1,500 armed combatants, with
several thousand additional supporters. Violent attacks such as bombings against
public utilities, government ministries, foreign embassies, and various businesses,
as well as assassinations of local officials and suspected informants have been an
almost daily occurrence in the southern provinces and have become increasingly
frequent in Lima.
1 Secret
GI TR 84-004
16 February 1984
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? In recent months Chile has experienced an escalation in urban terrorist violence
characterized by bombings of public utilities and an assassination campaign
directed against the national police. Most of the attacks go unclaimed but local
services suspect that members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)
and elements of the Communist Party (PCCH) are to blame. The aim of the
terrorist violence appears to be to keep the atmosphere in Chile charged so that
the situation is not defused by negotiations between moderate opposition groups
and the government. In the past, Cuba has provided training to PCCH and MIR
members and currently provides safehaven to exiled leaders.
In those countries in South America where terrorism is not currently a significant
threat, local governments nevertheless take the possibility of its reappearance
seriously:
? Venezuelan security officials worry that the left's poor showing in the December
national elections will encourage some leftist groups to return to guerrilla
activity. The lack of popular support for violent actions coupled with the
effectiveness of the security services against the radical left, however, limit the
potential threat from terrorist activity.
? The Ecuadoran Government is concerned that, although there appears to be no
active indigenous terrorist group, difficult economic and social conditions could
give rise to such groups. In addition, Ecuadoran security services have, in recent
years, paid close attention to reports that Colombian guerrilla groups are using
the border area as a safehaven and for training bases.
? Argentina's President Alfonsin has announced that the government will propose
tough antisubversion legislation that will hold both the military and former
terrorists accountable for crimes committed during the 1970s. As evidence of
Alfonsin's resolve to prevent the return of terrorism to Argentina, in December
when two exiled Montonero leaders reentered the country to announce the
group's renunciation of violence, they were promptly arrested.
? Last month, Uruguayan security officials broke up a secret meeting of the small
radical leftist Party for the Victory of the People (PVP). Documents found at the
meeting site indicate that the PVP is attempting to reorganize and resume
operations. Evidence was obtained indicating that the PVP is in contact with
members of the Tupamaros. Uruguayan security services, however, appear to
have the PVP and other radical leftist groups sufficiently penetrated to prevent
them from becoming a threat.
It is unlikely that the scope of terrorism in South America will broaden
significantly in the immediate future. Renewed countersubversive campaigns in
Colombia, Peru, and Chile together with the enhanced effectiveness of local
security services elsewhere on the continent should keep terrorism from posing a
threat to government stability in the region.
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Highlights
Colombia: ELN Planning Anti-US Attack. As a result of debriefings of National
Liberation Army (ELN) members arrested in a police raid of an ELN "people's
prison," Colombian authorities have learned that the group is reportedly planning
to attack the US Marine security guard van in February to commemorate the
death of guerrilla priest Camilo Torres. The attack is to take place as the van
transports Marine personnel between the Marine House and the US Embassy. The
Marines have taken appropriate security precautions. It is not known whether the
raid on the people's prison and the subsequent arrests will cause the ELN to
postpone or cancel planned operations.
information confirming these French fears.
France: Concern About Libyan-Backed Terrorism. The French Ambassador in
Qatar informed the US Ambassador in confidence that Paris is concerned about
reported Libyan plans to target up to 15 French ambassadors for assassination.[
Libyan agents will be sent to
various unspecified cities to begin planning the killings. The Libyan decision is said
to be prompted by continued French military activity in Chad. We have no
internationally by a variety of terrorist groups with support from Syria and Libya,
Jordan: Favored Target for Terrorists. Jordanian interests are being targeted 25X1
Since the fall of 1983, Jordan has been the vic- 25X1
advancing a settlement
tim of several terrorist attacks by 'the Damascus-based Black June Organization.
Syria is determined to squelch negotiations between King Hussein and PLO leader
Arafat for a West Bank settlement. Damascus is therefore probably encouraging
attacks by its surrogate groups and sympathetic radical Arab states against those
Key Indicator Kuwait: Increased Concern Over Terrorism. The opening of the trial of Dawa
Party members on 11 February on charges of bombing the US Embassy and other
installations has prompted a worldwide alert against terrorist actions at Kuwaiti
embassies and overseas facilities. Dawa has threatened additional attacks, if the
suspects are not released, and Kuwait has received a number of specific, written
threats of bombings, kidnapings, or hijackings. A Kuwaiti foreign ministry official
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GI TR 84-004
16 February 1984
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warned that US personnel and installations might be attacked to put pressure on
Kuwait to free the prisoners. We believe the danger of Dawa terrorism against Ku-
waiti interests will remain high during a trial that could last many months.
Significant Developments France: Iparretarak Increases Activities. The French Basque Nationalist Move-
ment Iparretarak announced to French authorities a "toughening of the armed
struggle" against "repressive" French authorities. French officials have reported
that terrorists-presumably members of Iparretarak-are attempting to extort
taxes from French residents. This is a tactic that the Spanish Basques have used
for years with moderate success. In this communique it was reported that on 31
January the group, whose aim is autonomy for French Basques, claimed responsi-
bility for attacks which occurred in 1980 and 1983. We also note that two alleged
Iparretarak militants are continuing a hunger strike in a Paris hospital 25X1
Sudan: Western Companies Attacked. Three third-country nationals were killed
and six wounded, including one American, during an attack by southern Sudanese
dissidents on Chevron's Rub Kona drilling barge, a main base of operations for
Chevron, on 2 February. Nothing was stolen, but two letters were left warning
Chevron to "stop operations and stop cooperation with the military." Chevron has
evacuated 200 of its personnel from the south and halted all oilfield operations ex-
cept for its activity in southern Kordofan. While the government of Sudan is
emphasizing a need to return to operations as soon as possible under increased
military protection, some Chevron personnel will not return under any circum-
stances. 25X1
On 6 February unidentified dissidents attacked a truck belonging to the French
contractor for the Jonglei Canal project. On 10 February the contractor was
attacked again. Six French nationals were taken hostage and the remaining
Israel: Aborted Terrorist Attack on Mosque. Moslem guards surprised intruders in
Jerusalem near two Moslem holy places, the Al Aqsa and Dome of the Rock
Mosques. Explosives and grenades were left behind by the terrorists who are
believed by Israeli police to be associated with the extremist Jewish group, TNT,
the Hebrew initials for "Terror Against Terror." The group is believed responsible 25X1
for 15 attacks in the last 12 months against Moslem and Christian sites in
Jerusalem. the attacks have had
considerable impact in the Arab community and have heightened Moslem-Jewish
tensions. Counterterrorism by the Muslim Brotherhood against Jewish holy places
reportedly may be planned. 25X1
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Argentina: The Montoneros
and the New GovernmentP
The Montoneros, the Peronist leftwing terrorist
organization that was decimated by security forces in
the late 1970s, are trying to make a political
comeback. In the wake of President Alfonsin's
stunning defeat of the Peronist party and the overall
poor showing of the left in the 30 October general
elections, Montonero leaders have apparently decided
against the use of violence-at least for now. The
Montoneros reportedly intend to focus on more
conventional tactics, such as infiltrating labor and
political organizations and strengthening their
position within the Peronist party. Their goals are to
move the Peronist party leftward and to splinter
Alfonsin's electoral coalition, but we see little
prospect for significant gains on either front any time
soon.
The Montoneros, who first emerged in 1970, were
used by party chief Juan Peron against the incumbent
military regime. They split with Peron over tactics
and ideology after he became President in 1973,
however, and were banished from party ranks in 1975
by his widow and successor, Isabel. Although they
became one of Argentina's most notorious terrorist
groups, they were soundly defeated after the military
took over in 1976; those not captured or killed were
forced into exile. Claiming to represent the true voice
of Peronism, they dubbed their group the Peronist
Montonero Party and embarked on a propaganda
campaign against the military. Argentine
officials recently estimated there were 500 abroad and
300 in country, but we believe this count is
considerably exaggerated.
The Election Impact
The Montoneros apparently saw the presidential
election campaign last year as an opportunity to
reassert themselves within the Peronist party.
exiled terrorist
press upon return to Argentina.
return to legitimate political activity. On several
occasions, he and his colleagues reentered Argentina
clandestinely for brief visits,
Meanwhile, Montoneros inside the
country interrupted television broadcasts a number of
times with political messages backing leftist Peronist
candidates. Sympathizers also distributed pamphlets
criticizing the military.
The impressive size of Alfonsin"s mandate, coupled
with the poor showing by the left, seems to have
convinced most Montonero leaders that political
action now provides the best means for achieving their
goals, although some undisciplined factions may still
resort to violence on occasion. A secret Montonero
Secret
GI TR 84-004
16 February 1984
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concluded that the new
P-re-sident's program had effectively co-opted potential
leftist supporters. The document further revealed the
Montoneros' fear that terrorism might prompt a
military backlash, thus threatening the civilians'
tenure in office. According to another document, the
Montoneros planned to speed up infiltration of leftist
political and labor organizations and hoped to make
inroads into rural and agricultural unions as well.
They intend to mobilize support for job actions should
the new government, as expected, turn down demands
for large wage hikes. Furthermore, they are seeking
ways to split Alfonsin's diverse electoral coalition.F_
Since Alfonsin's inauguration in early December, the
Montoneros' effort to increase their influence
reportedly has intensified. Their main target,
is the radical
Intransigent Mobilization Party-led by well-known
Montonero sympathizer Vicente Saadi.
his leftwing newspaper, La
Voz, is funded by the Montoneros and, as of at least
mid-1983, his personal income was subsidized by the
group. The leftists therefore apparently believe he will
use his newly won Senate seat and his post as head of
the Peronist bloc in the Senate to further their
interests.
Similarly, the Montoneros have stepped up their
public criticism of the Peronist party's rightwing
leadership, blaming it for the party's defeat.
the
challenge moderates for control of the party.
To further their objectives, exiled Montonero leaders
prepared to return to Argentina soon after the
election. The US defense attache in La Paz reported
that 20 to 30 members met overtly there to discuss
reentry. In December, following an open letter to
Alfonsin announcing the organization's intention to
pursue peaceful political objectives, two Montonero
leaders-former governors Ricardo Obregon Cano
and Oscar Bidegain-arrived in Buenos Aires
The government, however, has already taken a tough
stand against the Montoneros. Obregon Cano and
Bidegain were arrested soon after returning, making
good Alfonsin's public pledge to hold the former
terrorists-like the military-accountable for crimes
committed during the 1970s. The President,
reiterating his campaign promise to prevent a
resurgence of terrorism, plans to press for stringent
countersubversive legislation. Moreover, recent
statements by government officials suggest that
Alfonsin intends to preserve-at least for now-the
military's ability to gather intelligence on terrorist
capabilities.
Prospects Dim
We believe the Montoneros have little prospect of
achieving significant political gains in the near term
and that any violence will be swiftly contained.
Alfonsin's antisubversive measures deprive them of
the opportunity to organize effectively within the
country, and several key leaders have already put off
their return. Moreover, the Peronist party leadership
appears determined to isolate the radical left,
especially Saadi, although the odds on success are
uncertain. Isabel Peron, who for years did not exercise
her powers as nominal president of the movement, has
recently reasserted her authority and reaffirmed her
rightwinc supporters as the party's leaders.
she intends to contain Saadi, as
we as other elected leftists, by helping to shape anti-
left legislation.
The Montoneros probably will also receive less aid
and support from foreign benefactors than they did
during the military regime, thereby further cutting
their potential capabilities:
? The Palestine Liberation Organization, which in the
past provided the Montoneros with training and
funds, refused appeals for aid in mid-1983,
? Mexican officials, who had supported exiled
Montoneros with safehaven and government jobs,
are removing many from their posts and forcin
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? The Cubans, perhaps the Montoneros' most
important allies, are likely to maintain contacts but
probably will hesitate to provide much more than
low-level support for renewed terrorism, given
Havana's interests in strengthening ties with the
new civilian government.
? Bolivia's leftist President Siles probably will
continue providing safehaven and moral support-
the top two Montonero leaders were spotted moving
freely in La Paz as recently as late December-but
he is unlikely to permit use of his country as a base
for guerrilla operations.
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Emergency Zone in Peru
a
~ ,acs
o
Provincia boundary
25 50 Kilometers
25 50 Miles
Victor'
Fajardo
area of
main map
0 300 Kilometers
6-r r~ 41
0 300 Miles
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Peru:
Status of the
Insurgent Threat
One year after the military entered the
counterinsurgency effort, Peruvian Government
operations against the Sendero Luminoso (SL)
guerrilla group continue to encounter uneven results.
The police have crippled the group's apparatus in
Lima and have captured a major insurgent leader.
The SL remains firmly entrenched in its Ayacucho
highland stronghold, however, where progress by
security forces has waxed and waned.
Since last August, the guerrillas have been especially
active throughout the rural Emergency Zone. An
insurgent offensive in November forced cancellation
of municipal elections in at least four of the Zone's 11
provinces and distorted results in others.' The military
launched a major counteroffensive but,
the Interior Minister
expressed concern in December that the guerrillas
were gaining strength in the Zone and government
efforts were encountering little success.F_
the armed
forces are beginning to make headway in the Zone,
but we are not confident that this is an established
trend.
Outside the Zone, Sendero Luminoso has been less
successful. Municipal elections nationwide proceeded
normally, and in Lima-site of what we believe is the
largest SL concentration outside Ayacucho-the
police have se damaged the uerrillas'
organization. police sweeps
in November netted about 80 SL members. On
16 December, police in northern Peru arrested
Antonio Diaz-Martinez, the highest ranking SL
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The higher toll also may be the result of an unofficial
"no prisoners" policy that, according to the US
defense attache, the military apparently adopted after
mid-1983 out of frustration with guerrilla resilience.
Based on this we believe 25X1
that the security forces are taking only a few prisoners
in Ayacucho and counting on the area's remoteness as
well as government restrictions on press reporting to
conceal abuses.
The government's unimpressive showing in the
Emergency Zone stems, in our opinion, from the
military's lack of a coherent counterinsurgency
strategy, its cumbersome and confused command
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structure, tactical inconsistencies, equipment 25X1
shortages, and poor intelligence. The continuing
shortage of helicopters capable of operating at high
altitudes has hampered rapid reaction, restricted the
largely motorized Army to the region's few available
roads, and probably reinforced the tactical
conservatism of officers. Inadequate communication
among dispersed patrols in the rugged terrain, poor 25X1
maps, and conventionally trained troops unused to the 25X1
Andean climate have also probably discouraged
experimentation with small-unit tactics.
leader captured to date.
Situation in the Emergency Zone
Army intelligence summaries obtained by the US
defense attache's office indicate that government
documents obtained by
Peruvian police in late 1983 indicated that SL leaders
held a national conference last September at which
forces claimed to have killed 787 "subversives" from
September through early December. Our knowledge
of insurgent tactics and reports of continuing SL
attacks suggest, however, that not only are these body
counts probably inflated, but they likely include
relatively few armed militants. We continue to
estimate total armed SL strength at 1,000 to 1,500.
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GI TR 84-004
16 February 1984
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they agreed to a new offensive, consisting of two six-
month "waves" and concluding in October 1984.
Captured documents and interrogations of SL
prisoners reveal that the primary obstacle to these
plans continues to be a severe shortage of arms. Still
apparently lacking foreign support, Sendero
Luminoso remains dependent on domestic sources for
weapons. The documents also stressed the group's
need to recruit additional militia reserves.
Possible debate over strategy as well as greater heat
from the military could be responsible for the first
reports of insurgent factionalism. SL leader Abimael
Guzman has had little trouble quashing earlier
challenges to his leadership, however, and we have no
evidence of policy debates at the conference in
September.
guerrilla elements in Huanta
Province had decided to stop fighting temporarily and
reorganize. At the same time, according to the press,
white flags appeared in this area announcing that the
Sendero Luminoso had suspended fighting for two
years.
To date, however, the
factionalism appears to be localized and shows no sign
of significantly weakening the group or reducing its
activity.
Prospects
Although we judge that the SL will not directly
threaten the Belaunde government in 1984, it will still
present a major security problem in the Emergency
Zone and in Lima. We believe the group will continue
to attack rural police to obtain weapons, destroy
powerlines and other infrastructure, assault
uncooperative villages, and attack "imperialist"
embassies and businesses. The government's ability to
contain the insurgents would be threatened if they
began to receive financial and materiel support from
foreign powers, but this would require a dramatic
shift in Sendero Luminoso ideology and strategy. We
believe this is unlikely as long as Guzman's leadership
is not undermined by serious military setbacks or a
decline in his reportedly poor health.
Despite the administration's severe financial
problems, we expect it to allocate additional funds to
the security forces both to reduce the insurgent threat
and to prevent the military from blaming its
ineffectiveness on insufficient government support. In
addition, General Huaman, who is noted for his
aggressiveness, has recommended civic action
programs, withdrawal of most police units,
establishment of a coordinated intelligence network,
and relocation of some local inhabitants.
We believe Huaman will receive substantial support
from the highly ambitious new Army commander,
General Julian Julia. We anticipate a concerted push
in 1984 by Julia to win full control of all military and
administrative functions in the Emergency Zone. The
Army already has, in our estimation, assumed
primary responsibility for most counterguerrilla
patrols, but it probably also will demand complete 25X1
control of the local civil administration, including the
power to dismiss and appoint provincial officials and
to try guerrilla suspects in military courts. Belaunde
may offer limited concessions, such as reducing the 25X1
police presence, but fear of surrendering his authority
and sparking increased human rights violations
probably will prevent him from yielding full control of
all operations to the military. Nevertheless, military
and government efforts across the board are likely to
produce some net progress this year.
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Chile:
Terrorism on the Rise
The serious rise in terrorist violence in Chile in recent
months has prompted President Pinochet to draft
stronger security measures.
The late August 1983 assassination of the Santiago
military governor, retired Maj. Gen. Carol Urzua,
marked the beginning of the most recent wave of
terrorist violence. Terrorist activity appears to be
continuing at a high level in 1984. The violence has
been characterized by a significant increase in the
number of bombing and arson attacks against public
property and a campaign of selective assassination,
directed mainly against the national police. According
to US Embassy reporting, more than 170 bombings
took place in 1983-two-thirds of them during the
last quarter of the year. Seven national policemen
have been assassinated since September. Seventeen
bombings were reported in the last week of January
alone.
Most of the bombings have been directed against
public utilities and have been designed to cause
maximum property damage but minimal personal
injuries. The most successful coordinated bombing
effort occurred in mid-December when unidentified
terrorists downed several high-tension electrical
towers, causing a simultaneous blackout in Santiago
and several other cities in central Chil
Local security services believe that members of the
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and
elements of the Communist Party (PCCH) are
responsible for most of the attacks, perhaps
collaborating in some operations. Obscure groups
such as the Manuel Rodriguez Front, the Zero Front,
and the Salvador Allende Brigade have claimed
responsibility for some of the attacks, but we believe
that these are merely cover names for MIR and
PCCH cells.
In response to the recent increase in terrorist activity,
President Pinochet reportedly has drafted a new
antiterrorism decree that will strengthen the 25X1
repressive powers of the much-criticized secret police
and require tougher sentences for all acts of
antigovernm4nt violence. Critics of the proposed law
contend that Pinochet's authoritarian regime is
threatened less by leftist violence than by growing
opposition to~the secret police. The proposal requires
only the approval of the ruling military junta,
comprising the chiefs of the three armed services and
the national police.
The current high level of terrorist activity appears
likely to continue into the near future. A return of the
"national days of protest" is being planned for next
month by moderate opposition groups, and it is likely
that radical groups will take advantage of the public
demonstrations that are intended to galvanize public
demands for Pinochet's ouster. Although the various
terrorist groups operating in the major Chilean cities
do not appear to have the capability to mount major
operations, they probably will continue highly visible
bombings of public property.
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GI TR 84-004
16 February 1984
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Colombia: Troubled
Future for the M-19
The M-19, Colombia's second-largest guerrilla group,
is apparently experiencing a leadership crisis
stemming from the accidental death last April of
Jaime Bateman, its charismatic former commander in
chief. The new leaders' lack of stature has severely
impaired their decisionmaking authority, aggravating
a reported split over whether to accept the
government's peace initiatives or to follow Bateman's
edict to continue the armed struggle. Although we
believe some spectacular terrorist actions-possibly
including moves against US personnel-are likely in
the coming months as the new hierarchy attempts to
prove itself, a continuation of internal dissension could
lead disillusioned moderates to leave the movement,
ceding de facto power to more radical elements.
Prior to its leader's death, the M-19 already was
reeling from a disastrous public relations error that
arose from Bateman's rejection of a government-
sponsored amnesty bill that he had originally
supported. This decision-which possibly occurred
because Bateman preferred being a revolutionary
celebrity rather than face an uncertain role in the
legal political arena-spawned a dramatic reversal in
popular sentiment toward the M-19. Public opinion
polls confirmed the disappearance of what remained
of the group's "Robin Hood" image from the 1970s.
The loss of popular standing led several previously
sympathetic major newspapers to cease routinely
publishing interviews with M-19 leaders or their
communiques.
Organizational Chaos
For the first time in many years, lines of authority in
the M-19 are unclear. Rumors persist that Ivan
Ospina-the new national commander-is forced to
share power with Alvaro Fayad, the current number-
two man and chief of political matters. Fayad's high
profile was underscored last July when he announced
Ospina's appointment and the initiation of merger
talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, the country's largest insurgent group.
Were Bateman still alive, he would have performed
such tasks. Fayad also accompanied Ospina to
Madrid last October
Moreover, he recently 25X1
participated in -a joint interview with Ospina that
formed part of a major, new M-19 public relations
gambit aimed at pressing the government into calling
a cease-fire.
Carlos Pizzaro
recently was con armed as military chief of the M-19,
despite the fact that he and Ospina reportedly do not
get along.
The struggle is further complicated by demands from
some of the 10 members of the national directorate
that it should be the final arbiter of policy. Last
month, for example, several of their signatures
untypically appeared alongside those of Ospina and
Fayad on a joint communique with the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia callin for a ne oti ted
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The M-19 also has been unable to resolve the disputes
spawned by the government's amnesty offer in 1982.
Many moderates, once fearful of opposing Bateman's
rejection of the amnesty, have emerged since his
death to renew debate on the issue. Several have
broken with the organization, and others have formed
a splinter group called the Alternative
Peace.
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this discord
extends to middle and lower ranks and is severely
affecting the M-19's operational capacity. The US
defense attache recently reported statistics showing
that M-19 activity has fallen dramatically since
Bateman's death. The number of reported incidents is
now consistently below the group's three-year average
of 15 actions per month.
Current Strategy
We believe the M-19 leadership has at least agreed on
two immediate goals: to reverse the considerable
beating the organization has taken on the propaganda
front and to demonstrate that the group is still a
potent force. To regain its image as an ally of the
lower classes, the M-19 has been hijacking milk
trucks to distribute the milk to needy families and
attacking buses to protest rising transit fares.
recent M-19
civic action projects in Caqueta Department-a
traditional stronghold-have solidified local support
and facilitated guerrilla operations in the area.
These efforts have had little success nationwide,
however, because of the M-19's threat to embark on a
new, more violent campaign to prove its continuing
strength and wring concessions from the government.
For example, in a televised press conference last
December, Ospina and Fayad attempted to portray
the M- 19 as fighters for social justice, anxious to
negotiate in good faith with a conciliatory chief
executive but frustrated by a reactionary military
establishment. Their bottom line, however, was clear:
the country would face a major resurgence of
kidnapings unless President Betancur ordered the
armed forces to cease offensive operations against the
guerrillas
Coming on the heels of an unprecedented national
condemnation of terrorism in general-sparked by
another insurgent group's kidnaping last November of
President Betancur's brother-the M-19's gambit
elicited an overwhelmingly negative public response.
Numerous editorials decried the group's attempt to
practice "politics at gunpoint." Two highly respected
ex-presidents-Misael Pastrana and Carlos Lleras
Restrepo-both condemned the guerrillas' tactics.
Colombia's highest military leaders came out against
a cease-fire, public opinion concurred, and, according
to the US Embassy, President Betancur apparently
agreed as well. At least for the time being, he not only
has rejected the insurgents' call for a truce but
authorized an immediate military offensive against
them.
Outlook
We believe no single, charismatic leader like Jaime
Bateman will emerge, so that the M-19 probably will
remain disorganized for at least the next year. This
does not preclude-and indeed may encourage-the
use of terrorist tactics by a hierarchy trying to prove
that the M-19 is still a threat. Some such actions may
include kidnaping or killing US citizens and their
families as well as bombings of US public and private
installations. These efforts would complement the M-
19's announced strategy of targeting for kidnaping all
foreign representatives of multinational firms
operating in Colombia.
It is not impossible that the M-19 as it is known today
may no longer exist by the end of the year. A
continuation of the current state of disarray, we
judge, could lead many moderates to abandon the
armed struggle, thereby ceding de facto power to
more hardline elements. This "new" M-19, although
smaller than its predecessor, would be likely to
employ more indiscriminate violence as its major
weapon. This probably would destroy what little is left
of the M-19's romantic image and cost it any
remaining public sympathy.
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Colombia: A Look Inside
the FARC
The US Embassy's debriefing of a recently released
kidnap victim has provided a unique, detailed, and
sometimes fascinating view of the daily operations of
Colombia's most powerful insurgent group-the
2,500-man Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC). The son of former missionaries turned cattle
ranchers, the captive had lived in-country for more
than 20 years. He is a well known and respected
figure in numerous areas on the Colombian frontier
and is very familiar with the area, local conditions,
and the guerrillas. We and the US Embassy have
found nothing in the source's comments to question
the accuracy of his description of his experiences
during five months in guerrilla hands. The picture
that emerges is one of a well-equipped and trained
organization that expertly uses violence-and the
threat of it-to achieve its objectives and to ensure
the "loyalty" of members as well as civilians living
within the FARC's spheres of influence. His charac-
terizations of FARC motivation, tactics, and goals
help illustrate why guerrilla activity has been such an
enduring characteristic in Colombia and why the
armed forces are unlikely to make dramatic headway
any time soon.
Organization, Equipment, and Tactics
The basic operational unit of the FARC is an eight-
man squad which, according to the source's observa-
tions, is highly trained, self-reliant, and well equipped.
A commander, a deputy, and a control officer run the
unit, which also includes a communications specialist,
a medic, a gunsmith, a demolitions expert, and a
clerk. Each is armed with a rifle, a sidearm, and an
average of six handgrenades. Strong emphasis on
weapons familiarity is the norm. The source noted
that most ammunition appeared fresh and in good
supply with many thousands of rounds expended in
target practice during daylight hours. Squad demoli-
tions men enjoy similar training; each constantly
practices with various fuses and explosives.
In addition, the guerrillas travel with very light,
specialized equipment and are therefore much more
mobile than government forces. In case the squad is
attacked and scattered, each man carries enough
supplies and equipment to reach one of a number of
prearranged rendezvous sites and remain there for as
long as 30 days. These factors, combined with the
rebels' familiarity with the local terrain, give the basic
FARC unit several operational and logistic advan-
tages over comparable Colombian army squads,
which will make it very difficult for government
forces to root the guerrillas out of their base areas.
The next level of command is a three-squad unit.
When three of these groups join together, perhaps
augmented by a headquarters detachment, they con-
stitute a guerrilla front of roughly 100 men. For some
major operations, several of these fronts link up to
form a 400- to 500-man force. Nevertheless, FARC
tactics remain primarily based upon squad operations.
A single squad rarely patrols alone, but each such unit
in an operation generally has its own distinct mission.
Frontline guerrilla regulars are backed up by excel-
lent medical support facilities. Wounded soldiers, for
example, can expect rapid treatment in the field from
mobile medical teams before being transferred to base
hospitals-and the kidnap victim saw this type of
operation efficiently executed. On a more routine
basis, nurses or medics treat viral disorders with
intravenous vitamins and antibiotics and use drugs for
parasites, amoebas, or other gastrointestinal maladies.
Preventive medicine also is practiced with special
emphasis on personal hygiene.
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secret
Most operations are designed to collect supplies,
propagandize, and recruit supporters in local towns.
Typically, guerrillas herd the residents into some
central area and deliver a political harangue. They
then extort foodstuffs, medicines, and other "taxes."
They also impose taxes on narcotics traffickers oper-
ating in their areas. Routinely, young men and women
from the surrounding countryside are brought to large
FARC camps where they are given basic military
training and indoctrination as "reserves." These irre-
gulars are then sent back to their villages as infor-
mants, but they can be called to active duty at any
time. The "loyalty" of these irregulars is ensured by
threats of violence against them or their families.
FARC units usually are willing to fight national
police units, whom they regard as no military match.
Insurgents are more careful, however, in deciding to
attack even small army units, which they avoid unless
they enjoy clear military superiority. Moreover, even
if they are winning, the guerrillas generally do not
attempt to destroy an army unit, preferring instead to
withdraw after the advantage of surprise has passed.
That the FARC high command closely adheres to this
strategy was demonstrated just last month when a
120-member strike force assaulted an isolated 19-man
Army outpost, leaving seven dead and four wounded
before breaking off the attack. A decision to attack
may also depend on how close the insurgents are to
their base camps-if they are quite close, they usually
will not engage security forces for fear of attracting
attention to their strongholds.
Guerrilla Life
The lot of the average guerrilla is harsh. Commanders
employ strict discipline and tolerate no insubordina-
tion. Minor infractions draw verbal harangues from
the squad commander and negative peer pressure,
while disobedience of a direct order or unauthorized
absence can result in immediate execution. In a
combat situation, a squad leader has the authority to
summarily execute any troop under his command.
During more than five months of captivity the kidnap
victim witnessed no breaches of discipline. Even when
he wounded a guard during an escape attempt, the
squad responded in a controlled manner and took no
retribution against him.
Insurgent officers also employ intimidation to ensure
the loyalty of the lower ranks. The most common
method is close and constant vigilance-a FARC
troop is rarely left alone and is never permitted to be
away from his unit by himself. In addition, furloughs
are infrequent, usually for one night only, and taken
in groups. Probably the most effective technique,
however, is the standing threat that if a guerrilla
departs without authorization, he and his family will
be subject to retribution.
Social life for the FARC's soldiers is equally austere.
Drugs are not allowed, and alcohol is only distributed
in limited quantities on special occasions. Opportuni-
ties to have sexual relations with local women are rare
and, probably in order to discourage the establish-
ment of relationships that could conflict with a sol-
dier's devotion to the FARC, guerrillas are allowed to
have intercourse with any consenting woman only on
one occasion. In a similar vein, marriage between
FARC combatants is prohibited, although married
couples may join the group. As a result of all this,
homosexuality not only is fairly common but appar-
ently is tacitly accepted.
Perhaps the source's most penetrating observations,
however, are reserved for his captors in general.
Citing the fact that most came from broken homes, he
terms all of them emotionally disturbed or unbal-
anced. For example, one guerrilla had a sadistic
father who was a major in the army while another was
still grieving from a recent divorce. In addition, all of
them, without exception, were fascinated by weapons.
The source concluded by comparing the FARC to the
French Foreign Legion, where each member is run-
ning away from someone or something.
Ideology and Influences
The cornerstone of FARC ideology is anti-American-
ism, followed by a strong anti-Israeli sentiment. Many
of the rebels also are openly anti-Christian. Interest-
ingly, negative attitudes toward the government are
directed less at President Betancur-generally consid-
ered a well-intentioned leader who is being manipulat-
ed by the military, capitalists, and the United
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Secret
States-and more at the security forces. Cuban influ-
ence is extremely strong-Fidel Castro is widely
admired throughout the ranks. Several of the rebels
told the source that some FARC members had fought
in Nicaragua and others were now fighting in El
Salvador. The source also estimated that roughly one
of four guerrillas he encountered were not Colombi-
ans, but were from other Latin American countries.
The depth of ideological commitment among FARC
members seemed to vary widely. For example, within
the squad that guarded the source, the three squad
leaders were unshakably dedicated. The other five
members, however, seemed motivated more by desires
for revenge against the Army or the national police
than by philosophical bent.
Comment
The source describes a well-organized, highly disci-
plined, and well-armed guerrilla force. Although we
have no reason to doubt the source's estimate of the
number of non-Colombians he personally encoun-
tered, we have no evidence that this group accounts
for 25 percent of the FARC's membership nation-
wide. The insurgents are rarely threatened by govern-
ment incursions into their rural strongholds. The
movement lacks widespread popular support, however.
Peasants living within guerrilla-dominated zones co-
operate out of fear and lack of government protection.
FARC leaders' reliance on intimidation to maintain
control within their own ranks also raises questions
about both the level of commitment in the lower ranks
and the organization's ability to expand the size of its
fighting force. Also, the FARC remains no military
match for the army, and thus its chances of over-
throwing the government are nil. The guerrilla leader-
ship is highly dedicated, nevertheless, and evidently is
committed to a prolonged struggle aimed at reversing
this outlook.
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Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 1984 1983
Total
Terrorist Incidents by Region, 1984 a
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 1984 1983
Total
Terrorist Incidents by Category of Victim or Installation Attacked, 1984 a
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 1984 1983
Total
a Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as additonal data are received.
b Only terrorist-related hijackings will be reported in 1984.
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International Terrorist Incidents and Attacks, 1983-84
International Terrorist Incidents 140
Number of Incidents
0 1983
? 1984
International Terrorist Incidents 100
Involving US 90
Number of Incidents
Deaths and Injuries Due to
International Attacks
Number of Victims
Bombing of US Marine
figs, and French post
in Beirut
Multiple bombings in
Paris, London, Beirut,
and Kuwait
Car bomb in
Pretoria, S.A.
Bombing of US
Embassy in Lebanon
Bombing of Gulf Air
Boeing 737 in UAE
desert
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Chronology
This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international
terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider
implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology
unless new information has been received.
12 December 1983- Turkey: Turkish Counterterrorism Continues
20 January 1984 Between 12 December 1983 and 20 January 1984 Turkish security forces captured
21 members of the Revolutionary Way (Dev Yol) and two members of the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The Dev Yol members are charged with
numerous crimes including armed attacks, robberies, and murder in the Tunceli
district. The PKK members are accused of armed attacks and having participated
in guerrilla training camps in Syria and Iraq. A wide array of arms and
publications were also confiscated during the operation.
12 January 1984 Spain: Basque Company Bombed
A high-potency bomb was responsible for heavy damages to Olarra Industries in
Bilbao. The company is currently involved in labor disputes concerning its plan to
eliminate several hundred jobs, and the company founder is recognized for his
outspoken condemnation of ETA. The military wing of ETA (ETA-M) claimed
responsibility for the blast which caused no injuries.
14 January 1984 Italy: Bombing at Local Electric Company
A bomb exploded by the entrance of the offices of the local electric company
causing minor damages.
15-21 January 1984 Burma: Karen National Liberation Army Bombs Discovered
Burmese security teams discovered seven explosive devices at the Kyaikkasan
Stadium, site of the Burma Union Day celebrations which began 12 February. Six
were successfully defused while the seventh had to be detonated. Security teams
have been searching the grounds since construction of the pavilions began in
January.
17 January 1984 Italy: Indictments Handed Down to Rightists
As a result of a lengthy investigation into neo-Fascist terrorist elements, 158
suspects have been formally indicted on charges including subversive association,
murder, armed robbery, and illegal possession of arms. The investigation, which
began in 1978, concerns the activities of such groups as "New Order" (Ordine
Nuovo), "National Vanguard" (Vanguardia Nazionale), and "Proletarian Revolu-
tionary Movement" (Movimento Rivoluzionario Proletario).
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Honduras: Second Bombing Near Regional Military Training Center (RMTC)
A small bomb exploded during the early morning hours in a vacant lot in Trujillo,
the town where the RMTC is based. There were no witnesses, no casualties, and no
group claimed responsibility. The incident is very similar to a bombing on 13
January at the Trujillo airstrip and is noteworthy only because of the proximity of
the RMTC. It is unclear whether the bombings are terrorist inspired.
19 January 1984 Spain: ETA Arrests
In the Basque Provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya, Spanish police arrested 19
terrorists-members of both branches of ETA: ETA-M (Military) and ETA-PM
(Political Military). Most of those arrested were members of ETA-M. Discoveries
made during the arrests included large quantities of arms-including a grenade
launcher-explosives, two "people's jails" in which kidnap victims had been held,
and a safehouse. In Bilbao, the police arrested Armando Velez Cendoga, head of
the ETA-PM group responsible for the kidnaping and death of Army Captain 25X1
Martin Barrios in October 1983J
23 January 1984 Malaysia: Threat to US Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur
The US Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur received a threatening handwritten note in
English, addressing him by name. In addition the envelope contained a pro-
Khomeini, anti-US propaganda pamphlet and leaflet in Malaysian.
26 January 1984 El Salvador: US Citizen Murdered
A US citizen riding in a private vehicle with her husband and two children was
shot to death in Morazan Province when their vehicle slowed but did not stop at an
apparent guerrilla roadblock.
27 January 1984 El Salvador: Ultraconservative Deputy Assassinated
A legislative deputy and member of the ultraconservative Republican Nationalist
Alliance (ARENA) was gunned down near his San Salvador home by heavily
armed men who opened fire on his car, forced it off the road, and shot their victim
13 times when he attempted to flee on foot. Responsibility was claimed by
elements of the Popular Liberation Forces.
Spain: Steel Works Bombed
Members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) claimed responsibility for a
bomb explosion at a steel factory in Llodio. The blast caused no injuries
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one has claimed responsibility for the incidents.
27-28 January 1984 Chile: More Terrorist Bombings
Eleven bombings took place in Santiago, damaging electric powerlines and a small
transformer. Six bombings in the Vina del Mar area caused minor damage to
powerlines, a hotel, and the municipal building. No injuries were reported and no
2
8 January 1984
Sudan: Attack on Chevron Camp
Five armed men entered the Chevron camp near Melut and stole the employees'
money and personal possessions.
French military presence in Chad.
29 January 1984 France: Protest Bombing
A bomb explosion at a Paris manufacturing company was claimed by members of
Direct Action who stated that the bombing was a symbolic action against the
the CAR to point out the unpopularity of the French there.
30 January 1984 Central African Republic: Libyans Implicated in Attempted Bombing
Under interrogation, one of the two men who attempted to plant a bomb at the Ly-
cee Caron in Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR), has admitted he is a
Libyan. He was allegedly in charge of a team of Libyan-controlled terrorists
mainly of Chadian or Sudanese descent who were to sabotage French facilities in
India: Official Killed
The former Chief Minister of Manipur, Yangmasho Shaiza, was shot at close
range at his home. A hitherto obscure terrorist group, the People's Independent
Group, claimed responsibility. Their motive is not known.
Turkey: Counterterrorism Continues
On 30 January Turkish security forces captured 11 members of the illegal Turkish
Communist Party-Unity (TRP-B) and Freedom Path organizations. Arms and
ammunition were also confiscated.
31 January 1984
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West Germany: Arrests of Croatian Emigres on the Eve of the Winter Olympics
According to the Yugoslav press, West German police arrested 12 suspected anti-
Yugoslav Croats and a German associate, and seized pistols, rifles, antitank
weapons, and anti-Yugoslav propaganda in a coordinated raid carried out in nine
West German cities. Those arrested are reportedly suspected members of a
terrorist group believed to be responsible for numerous bombing attacks against
Yugoslav establishments in West Germany over the past few years, as well as
unspecified activities in Yugoslavia. While the press accounts made no connection
between the arrests and West German-Yugoslav cooperation to forestall a
terrorist incident at the Winter Olympics currently taking place in Sarajevo, US
Embassy officials in Belgrade have no doubt such an angle exists.
West Germany: Threat Against Radio Free Europe
An anonymous letter addressed to Radio Free Europe contained a threat against
its personnel covering the Winter Olympics.
France: Armenians Sentenced
On 31 January a Paris court sentenced four Armenian terrorists to seven-year
prison terms for the 1981 attack on the Turkish Embassy in Paris which resulted
in one death and three injuries.
Late January 1984 Greece: Threats Against Albanian Embassy
According to the Greek press, Albanian Embassy officials in Athens reported to
Greek police that they have received threatening telephone calls and requested
increased security.
Early February 1984 Yugoslavia: Terrorist Death Sentence Stands
The Croatian supreme court has rejected an appeal by convicted terrorist Jandra
Fracin to have his death sentence commuted. Fracin had been sentenced to death
for having planted six bombs in public buildings and tourist facilities throughout
Yugoslavia during 1982, injuring seven people. Reported to have been a paid
member of an anti-Yugoslav terrorist organization located in West Germany,
Fracin was accused of engaging in terrorism to provoke an exodus of foreign
tourists from Yugoslavia. As death sentences are relatively rare in Yugoslavia, the
harshness of Fracin's sentence underscores Yugoslav interest in preventing anti-
Yugoslav terrorism.
1 February 1984 Turkey: Communist Party Member Killed
A leading member of the Turkish Revolutionary Communist Unit who was
responsible for the death of three policemen in 1983 was killed in a shootout with
police on 1 February in Istanbul. Ten other key members of this group were also
arrested at this time, possibly destroying the infrastructure of the organization
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2 February 1984 Czechoslovakia: Bomb in Department Store To Protest Rising Consumer Prices
Authorities defused a homemade bomb placed in one of Prague's most popular
department stores shortly before Christmas. An unnamed group claimed responsi-
bility for the bomb attempt, delivering an ultimatum to the government: if
additional price increases were implemented, more bombs would be placed in
metros, other stores, and crowded places.F__
Poland: Bomb Threat at US Embassy
The US Embassy in Warsaw received a telephone bomb threat, resulting in
evacuation of the facility. A subsequent search proved negative.
Spain: Five Bombings in Bilbao
Five bomb blasts in Bilbao caused extensive damage to the stock exchange, two
French banks, and a suburban rail line. A sixth bomb was found at the Bilbao
court building and later defused. The unclaimed attacks occurred just prior to the
official opening of a campaign for autonomous Basque parliament elections and
were probably instigated by members of ETA who have recently begun targeting
the French in Spain.
Spain: Retail Business Bombed
On 2 February in the early morning, a furniture company in Vitoria was bombed.
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South Africa: Bombing at Ciskei Consulate General
A TG50 Crocodile-type bomb exploded outside the Ciskei Consulate General in
Durban. Although it was the height of the rush hour, only one passerby was
injured. The ANC, which uses this type of bomb, has claimed credit.
Sudan: Attack on Chevron Facility
Three third-country nationals were killed and six wounded, including one Ameri-
can, during an attack by southern Sudanese dissidents on Chevron's Rub Kona
drilling barge, a main base of operations for Chevron. Nothing was stolen but two
letters were left warning Chevron to "stop operations and stop cooperation with the
military." No group has claimed responsibility.
England: Indian Diplomat Killed
The second ranking official at the Indian Consulate in Birmingham, Ravindra
Mhatre, was kidnaped and later killed by a previously unknown group, the
Kashmir Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA had demanded that the Indian
Government release certain political prisoners and a ransom of $1.4 million.
3-4 February 1984 Guadeloupe: Tourist Hotels Bombed
Terrorists set five bombs, two of which exploded injuring five persons including
two tourists. Bombing targets included the Hotels Meridian and Arawak, as well
as a large supermarket, a newspaper office, and the automobile of the manager of
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the local Renault agency. No one claimed responsibility for the attacks, but local
government officials speculate the bombings to be the work of the Revolutionary
described his execution as a warning.
Spain: Former ETA Member Shot
Industrialist and former member of ETA Miguel Angel Solaun was shot and killed
in Algorta. Solaun was one of the 140 "repentant" ex-members of ETA. ETA-M
claimed credit for the killing, called Solaun a traitor and collaborator, and
Government action or in support of the French Basque hunger strikers
may be the work of either French or Spanish Basques in protest of French
France: Socialist Party Headquarters Attacked
On the evening of 4 February two molotov cocktails were lobbed into Socialist
Party Headquarters in Ciboure. A similar attack occurred on 28 December. This
5 February 1984 Spain: Civil Guard Shot
A retired paramilitary civil guard was shot and seriously wounded in Lasarte by a
gunman suspected of belonging to ETA.
Spain: ETA Groups Plan Merger
In a public communique in Madrid the small politicomilitary wing of ETA
announced its intention to merge with the larger and more violent military wing,
ETA-M. The two groups split in 1974 over the issue of violent attacks. Several
ETA-PM members have been granted amnesty by the Spanish Government, and
we suspect the remaining members feel a merger will enhance their capabilities for
terrorist actions.
6 February 1984 Spain: Spanish Rightists Sentenced
On 6 February in Madrid, Spanish courts sentenced two members of an extreme
rightwing gang for crimes committed against leftwing intellectuals. Rafael Gomez
Alvarez received a 67-year sentence for a 1979 bomb attack on a Madrid bar in
which one person was killed and 10 injured. He was also responsible for another
murder and an attempted murder in 1981. Ramiro Rodriguez Borlado was
sentenced to 43 years in prison for sending a letter bomb to a club in Madrid in 25X1
1980 which blinded one person and maimed another.
Sudan: Attack on Jonglei Canal Contractor
A truck belonging to the French company working on the Jonglei Canal was
attacked by unidentified dissidents after it hit a mine. An unknown number of peo-
ple in the truck were killed.
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7 February 1984 Morocco: Bomb Threat to US Legation
The US Legation in Tangier received a bomb threat on a nonlisted phone number.
Police found nothing suspicious. 25X1
France: Assassination of Iranian Exile
General Oveisi, the Shah's former martial law administrator, and his brother were
machinegunned to death in Paris. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the
Islamic Jihad as well as by a hitherto unused name, the Iranian Revolutionary Or-
ganization for Liberation and Reform. The assassination almost certainly was
directed by the Khomeini regime and reflects its concern over the increasing anti-
Khomeini activities of Iranian exiles in Paris.
8 February 1984 France: UAE Ambassador Shot
The Arab Revolutionary Brigades (ARB) shot the United Arab Emirates'
Ambassador to France in the head as he left his apartment building. The ARB has
previously claimed responsibility for a Gulf Air airplane crash in the UAE, for
murdering an Israeli diplomat in Paris, and for several attacks on Jordanian
interests. We continue to believe that the ARB is either a covername for the Black
June Organization or a special unit under BJO's leader, Abu Nidal.
Corsica: Villa Bombings
In their continued agitation against French rule, Corsican terrorists bombed a
villa, seriously injuring a woman. Another bomb attack against a private residence
caused considerable damage. 25X1
France: ETA Members Killed
Two members of ETA's military wing were shot and killed by unidentified
gunmen on 8 February in the French border town of Flendaae. Antiterrorist
Liberation Group (GAL) has claimed responsibility.
Mauritius: Threat Directed at French Embassy
The French Embassy in Port Louis has recently received two threatening letters
from the Islamic Jihad, one of which named the French Government-sponsored
school there as a target. The Embassy is conducting an investigation into the
threats since 18 percent of the local population is Muslim, which includes several
thousand Shiites.
Italy: Arrests of Terrorists
As a result of rumored plans for a terrorist "summit" to be held in Milan, the Ital-
ian Carabinieri conducted a series of operations against terrorist groups in early
February. Authorities made 17 arrests and seized a large quantity of weapons.
While Italian press speculated that Barbara Balzarani-the most important BR
leader still at large-was among those taken into custody. Carabinieri officials
indicated that Balzarani was not arrested.
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Guatemala: Safehouse Seized; Guerrillas Commit Suicide
Guatemalan authorities captured a safehouse used by the Organization of the
People in Arms (ORPA) and seized explosives, weapons, ammunition, Russian
handgrenades, an M-79 grenade launcher, and a claymore mine. When authorities
entered the residence, they found that two men, believed to be high-level members
of ORPA, had taken poison. One died; the other was in critical condition.
8-9 February 1984 Greece: Bomb Explosions in Athens
Two bombs exploded near the National Museum and National Technical Univer-
sity, causing property damage and slightly injuring two persons. A third bomb
exploded earlier in a suburb of Athens. According to various Greek newspapers,
there have been several claims of responsibility. The most plausible to date is that
of the "Yellow Secret Organization of Air Force Officers and Noncommissioned
Officers," who reportedly have demanded the resignation of the Greek Air Force
Chief of Staff, threatening sabotage of aircraft if the official does not step down.
10 February 1984 Sudan: Second Attack in a Week on Jonglei Canal Project
Unidentified dissidents attacked the French contractor for the Jonglei Canal
project. Six French nationals were taken hostage, and the remaining employees are
being evacuated
11 February 1984 Lebanon: American Kidnaped
Frank Regier, an American professor at American University Beirut, was
kidnaped at gunpoint while walking along a Beirut street. The identity of the
abductors is unknown. The abduction increased fears of terrorist activity among
US citizens in Beirut, and probably has led more of them to decide to leave Beirut.
12 February 1984 Lebanon: Kuwaitis Kidnaped and Freed
Two sons of the Kuwaiti press attache in Lebanon were kidnaped by gunmen.
Lebanon's state radio later reported that Amal militiamen seized the kidnapers
and released the victims. The kidnaping could have been an Iranian-inspired
attack timed to coincide with the opening of the trial in Kuwait of suspects in the
December bombing of the US Embassy and other installations
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