SHOESTRING OPERATION WAS CONTRA LIFELINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000200910002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 7, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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~1. ~H,;~
December 198
~h~k~,trin~ ~ )~x~r~~tion ~~.s Contra Lifeline
Il~at Il /n, utsfde of Nicaragua, provide a richly
detailed portrait of how 25 men from
all over the United States were re-
cruited in late 1985 and the first six
months of 198ti, were taken to the [lo-
pango military base in El Salvador and
slowly put together a fleet of five de-
teriorating airplanes to make flights to
"DZs"-drop cones-in and around
Nicaragua.
This unlikely crew achieved one of
the Reagan administration's central
policy goals: [t provided sustained lo-
gistical and weapons support to the
contras during part of the two-year
period when Congress either totally
banned or sharply restricted U.S. gov-
ernment assistance for their military
efforts.
Throughout the eight-month life of
the operation, crew members-mostly
former U.S. military or CIA men ac-
customed to the need for secrecy and
ambiguity in covert operations-never
How the weapons were purchased,
where the funds came from and who
controlled the operation. Neither the
sources who provided information for
this article nor the documents identify
the names of the ultimate sponsors of
the operation.
But some crew members-including
Eugene Hasenfus, the sole survivor of
a C123K cargo plane shot down Oct. 5
in an incident that exposed the resup-
ply operation to public view-had little
doubt from their vantage point that the
U.S. government was secretly running
it.
They also were well aware of the
stakes, the documents show. A flight
survival guide prepared for the crew
members said: "An emergency landing
in Nicaragua may well lead to capture,
embarrassment for the U.S. govern-
ment, even execution of the crew."
Some were in it out of nostalgia for
days of danger and camaraderie in ear-
lier wars. Some-but by no means
all-saw Central America as the
new front in a worldwide crusade
against communism. Others had
surprisingly commonplace goals like
saving money for peaceful retire-
ment with families used to the air-
men's long absences from home.
The chief U.S. military adviser in
El Salvador, Army Col. James
Steele, kept in regular contact with
leaders of the resupply operation.
The operation's telephone records
show several calls to the White
House phone of Lt. Col. Oliver L.
North, the National Security Coun-
cil official fired for his role in the!
diversion of funds from secret Iran-
ian arms sales to the contras.
Whatever happened to the $10
million to $30 million that U.S. of-~
ficials say was diverted to the con-~
tras, the bulk of it was not funneled'
to' the shoestring resupply opera-
tion at Ilopango. According to the
documents, some crew members
complained constantly of late pay-
checks, missing navigational equip-
ment and poorly maintained planes.
Atone point, in August, crew mem-
bers were told that the operation
might have to shut down for lack of
funds, the documents show.
Although the operation survived.
it remained short of cash, in part
perhaps because those running it
id not want to attract attention by
leaving the United States with large
sums that would have to be de-
clared at U.S. Customs. According
to the documents, crew members
who traveled to the United States
on leave or on business were often
asked to pick up $10,000-the le-
gal limit allowed without declara-
tion-at Southern Air Trans rt
Inc., the orf men C[t~1 company t t
waa hired to maintain the planes
and allowed its offices to be used as
a U.S. hub for the operation.
One of the retired Air Force of-
ficers involved in running the op-
eration warned crew members to
be discreet about how they ex?
changed the money once they re-
turned to El Salvador, according to
one message dated Sept. 19. "We
don't want to get SAT [Southern
Air Transport] or ourselves burned
with a leak or get money hung up
where we would have to expose the
op to get it back."
The documents do not reveal
who suoaGed Southern Air with the
money, but one crew member said
he believed that Southern Air was
not involved other than as a place to
pick up the cash. Crew members
were paid through wire transfers to
their U.S. banks from a Pennsylva-
nia company, Corporate Air Ser-
vices Inc., apparently acting as a
conduit for the true source of the
funds. Records show that Corporate
Air's president is Edward de Garay,
who has not made any statements.
Some crew members were told that
the money for the operation came
from "foreign sources," according to
one participant.
Attorney General Edwin Meese
III has said that profits from secret
arms sales to Iran were diverted
through one or more Swiss bank
accounts to help the contras. Inves-
tigators are now looking into the
possibility that this is the money
that financed the contra resupply
operation.
Contra leaders have said they did
not receive the Iranian arms sales
money. They also have said that
while the air resupply operation
ferried arms to rebel troops inside
Nicaragua, it was a separate organ-
ization not run by any contra group.
The decision to hire a former
CIA company such as Southern Air
fits into a pattern that emerges
from close examination of the re-
supply operation. At its heart are
three former U.S. Air Force offi-
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cers, Richard V. Secord, a retirea
major general; retired lieutenant
colonel Richard B. Gadd and Robert
C. Dutton, a retired colonel. All
three worked at various times in
special operations at the Penta-
gon-the covert arm of the mili-
tary.
Secord, who ran the covert air
war in Laos in the late 1960s and
headed the U.S. Air Force mission
in Iran from 1975 to 1978, has been
identified as a participant in secret
arms sales to [ran. Before leaving
government service in 1983, he
worked closely with North.
Participants in the contra resup-
ply effort made phone calls to Se-
cord's home and firm from San Sal-
vador, according to telephone
records, but Secord was quoted as
saying he never talked to anyone in
the operation. He has said he occa-
sionally gave advice to the contras
on "how they ought to design their
efforts .... But ['m not running
the contra air force." In another
interview, though, he said he sold
the contras a short takeoff plane
owned by a company he heads.
Some crew members believe,
however, that Secord is the key
man in the resupply operation and
note that Dutton-an employe in a
Secord company-began managing
the operation in April or May.
The documents clearly show but-
ton's role; he was sent coded mes-
sages detailing air drops, financial
needs and maintainance problems.
Immediately after the cargo plane
was shot down Oct. 5, killing three
crew members and leading to Ha-
senfus' capture by the Sandinistas,
Dutton was alerted.
For several days, Dutton was in
frequent communication, apparent-
ly from the Northern Virginia office
building that houses Second's firm,
Stanford Technology Trading
Group International Inc. For exam-
ple, the day after the downing of the
plane, he sent a message in midaf-
ternoon that began: "Have passed
your info and will see what other
means of searching may be avail-
able." About the time the message
was sent, the Sandinista govern-
ment announced Hasenfus' capture.
Before Dutton was involved, two
crew members said, many of his
duties were performed by Gadd,
who owns several companies lo-
cated in the building that once
housed Second's firm. Gadd and Se-
cond know each other, according to
sources. Gadd's role appears to
have begun last January; after Dut-
ton took over, Gadd's role dimin-
ished, although the documents
show references to him through
July. Dutton and Gadd appear to
have worked in the same Pentagon
office in 1980-81, according to a
Pentagon phone directory.
During part of the time that Gadd
worked with the operation as it sup-
plied weapons to the contras, a firm
he headed received more than
$100,000 in State Department con-
tracts to ferry nonlethal aid to Cen-
tral America under the $27 million
humanitarian aid program approved
by Congress in August 1985.
The company, AIRMACH Inc.,
does not own any registered air-
planes, according to a Federal Avi-
ation Administration spokeswoman.
To deliver the nonlethal aid, Gadd
hired Southern Air Transport, ac-
cording to )Mario Calero, a contra
official. Southern Air, like Gadd,
was working with the weapons re-
supply network. Its chairman is
James Bastian, an attorney associ-
ated with Southern Air and a similar
firm, Air America, since the days
both were proprietaries of the CIA.
[n Central America, according to
the internal documents, the key
managers included William J. Coop-
er, aformer chief pilot for the CIA-
ownedfirm Air America who died in
the Oct. 5 shoot down, and two
Cuban-Americans-Rafael Quin-
tero, allay of Pigs veteran who con-
tinued working for the CIA into the
1970s, and a man who went by the
name of Ramon Ntedina.
Medina is thought to be Luis Po-
sada Carriles_ another Bay o~
participant who worked for the CIA
from 1961 to 1967. The Sandinis-
tas identified Medina as Posada and
the resupply operation's telephone
records show several calls to the
home of Posada's wife in Miami.
Until just a few months before
the resupply operation started up,
Posada was in a Venezuelan jail on
charges stemming from the 1976
bombing of a Cuban airliner that
killed 73 people. He escaped in Au-
gust 1985.
The documents indicate that Ra-
mon Medina played a key financial
role. It was Medina who handled
the group's expenses, including
$1,800 in monthly rent for crew
members' living quarters in houses
in San Salvador, the capital of EI
Salvador. The documents show that
Medina received large sums of cash
to pay the expenses-sometimes as
much as $12,000.
Medina's role was disclosed by
Hasenfus after his capture. He said
that Medina and another Cuban
American, Max Gomez, coordinated
flights out of [lopango. Gomez is an
alias for Felix I. Rodri uez another
CIA and y o gs veteran who
was the operation's chief contact
wtth Jalvaaoran tUr torte otfidals
responsible for the Ilopango base.
"!f we needed gas on credit, we'd
get it if he [Rodriguez) signed for it
because he was trusted, particularly
by the (Salvadoran) air force," said
one crew member.
Rodriguez's good relationship
with the Salvadoran military devel-
oped after he was recommended to
them by Donald P. Gregg, a former
CIA officer who is national security
adviser to Vice President Bush.
Gregg worked with Rodriquez in
Southeast Asia during the Vietnam
war and, according to Bush aides,
Gregg recommended Rodriguez to
the Salvadorans as a counterinsur-
gency expert.
Bush has acknowledged meeting
Rodriguez through Gregg twice in
Washington and later ran into him
at a reception in Miami. The second
Washington meeting and the Miami
reception occurred last May when
the resupply operation was well
underway, but Bush said they con-
fined discussions to El Salvador and
did not discuss contra activity.
Quintero frequently went to Cos-
ta Rica to obtain ,information on
where supplies should dropped to
contra forces inside southern Nic-
aragua, according to the documents
and a crew member. He relayed
coordinates, usually to Rodriguez or
Medina, who in turn reported them
to crew members scheduled to
make the trip.
Rodriguez served mainly as a li-
aison with the Salvadoran air force
and was not formally a member of
the oceration.
At one point, after the plane was
shot down in Nicaragua, the docu-
ments indicate that Dutton believed
Rodriguez was exaggerating his ties
to the operation. In a message dat-
ed Oct. 6, the day after the plane
went down, Dutton said: "Advise
Ramon [~fedinaJ that [Rodriguez) is
not part of this organization. He is
passing incorrect information di-
rectly to high-ranking officials,
wrong names of crew members .. .
and [Rodriguez) appears to be using
info provided him to make himselt
look like central figure. Please stop
all further info to anyone other than
Ralph (Quintero) or me, or [CoI.J
Steele. Thanx Bob.'
The documents contain no infor-
mation about who the "high ranking
officials" ?.vere.
Dutton was kept apprised of the
schedule and often sent back sug-
gestions. ASept. 19 message said,
"Be sure we are getting the right
materials to troops. [understand
DZ 3 needs AK-41," a reference to
rifles made in the Soviet bloc. "Let
me know how we do today."
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The operation's fleet of five air-
craft consisted of two small cargo
planes (DHC-4A Caribous) that
could go 600 to 700 miles without
refueling and carry 4,000- to
5,000-pound loads, a smaller Maule~
plane used for takeoffs on short air-
strips, and two large C123K cargo
planes that could go 1,000 miles
and carry up to 10,000 pounds.
The Caribous and the Maule
were the first planes bought. In
March, the first C123K was pur-
chased with a check drawn on an ac-
count listed as Southern Air's, ac-
cording to one source familiar with
the transaction. The second C123K
was purchased in July in a transac-
tion handled by Cooper.
The aircraft were taken fre-
quently to Miami so that Southern
Air maintenance crews could do
major repairs, including replacing
an engine in one of the C123K
planes in August. Crew members
also complained about the lack of
survival equipment such as para-
chutes, compasses and other gear
that would allow them to live in the
jungle if downed.
Concerned about the operation's
continuing problems, several crew
members turned to Col. Steele, who
as the top U.S. military adviser in
EI Salvador was asked by the U.S.
ambassador there, Edwin Corr, to
"keep track" of the operation, ac-
cording to a knowledgeable source
outside the resupply operation.
The source said Steele was care-
ful not to become actively involved
in the running of the operation. But
crew memoers said they thought
Steele had influence in the opera-
tion, and they consulted with him,
according to references in the doc-
uments.
In August, as Congress had given
tentative approval to lifting the ban
against military assistance to the
contras as part of a new $100 mil-
lion aid package to the contras, the
operation found itself in a serious
money pinch that threatened to
shut it down for good, according to
the documents.
On Aug. 8, Rodriguez and Me-
dina met with the crew members to
discuss the operation's fate. Ac?
cording to one account of Rodri-
guez's remarks, he praised the
group: "[t was very brave for you to
get into these old airplanes. Not
do Whapt you did ~"1He a ked them ~o
try to ride out the financial prob-
lems, perhaps work for free for a
few weeks until more money could
be found, pointing out that the re-
supply was crucial until the $100
million could start flowing.
"As you know," he was quoted as
saying. 'with the release of the
$100 million there will be some
changes. Maybe a new organization.
I hope they will let you continue be-
cause it will take at least a month,
even if they have all the money."
New funds were found, and
flights into Nicaragua resumed at
an even greater pace. Flight logs
show 19 flights between Aug. 25
and Oct. 5.
The last flight left from Ilopango
at 9:50 a.m. with a load of 70
AKAMs rifles, 100,000 rounds of
ammunitions, seven RPGs grenade
launchers, bound for a drop into
southern Nicaragua. Cooper was
flying the plane, with a crew made
up of Hasenfus, an unidentified Ni-
caraguan and Wallace B. Sawyer, a
former Southern Air pilot.
At 9 p.m.-5~/s hours after the
plane was scheduled to return-a
coded message was sent to Dutton
in the United States.
"Bob, here is what we know so
far," it said. "The route was the
same as usual, down the coast, in-
bound at the Plantation [code name
for a Costa Rican airfield used by
the operation. The only thing dif-
ferent was the point of border
crossing. The coordinates are ap-
prox. N 11.00 W84.30. Intended DZ
was 11.27N 84.32W.
"ETA Ilopango was 1530 local.
No show and no word."
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THE ADMINISTRATION'S SECRET ARMS DEAL: THE DETAILS EMERGE
I n ehs rnsrly Nw weeks s/nee k was
Nnt disc/osed that the Unked States
had secretly sh/pped arms ro Iran, the
scandal has become the most serous
crisis o/ the Rsagsn pnsMency.
The Wash/ngton Post has
reconstructed he% to the extent that
!n/ormaNon !s known, s chronology o/
the secret tale and the subsequent
d/sc/osure that proNN wen /unreeled to
a!d the Nlcariguan contras.
May 1983
The Central Intelligence Agency proposes in a
secret document routed through the National
Security Counul that the U.S. government
consider easing its worldwide arms embargo
against Iran and encourage some allies to sell
military egwpment to Tehran. Defense Secretary
Caspar W. Weinberger later writes on the
proposal, "This is absurd." The CIA reportedly is
desperate to find ways to free William Buckley,
its 8evut station chief, kidnaped by pro?Iranian
extremists in Lebanon March 16, 1984.
June 14
TWA Flight 847 hijacked to Beirut. White House
comes to realize that Iran is key player in
hostage release.
July 8
In speech before American Bar Association,
President Reagan says Iran is part of
"confederation of terrorist states .. ,anew,
international version of Murder Incorporated."
JulyAugust '
Secret U.S.~Iranian contacts initiated through
Israelis. Nahonal security adviser Robert C.
McFarlane meets in Washington with Israeli
foreign ministry official David Kimche, who
proposes that Israel send U.S.?made arms to Iran
to encourage Tehran's help in freeing U.S.
hostages held in Lebanon.
August?September
first two planeloads of Israeli?ar-anged arms to
Iran. The shipments are brokerea by Israeli arms
merchants AI Schwimmer and vaacov Nimrodi,
close friends of then?ISraeh Prime Munster
Shimon Peres. Also involved as a middleman in
the 1985 shipments is Iranian businessman
Manucher Ghorbanifar. Reagan tells Israel
through Mcfarlane that he will approve sales
and replace Israeli stocks.
Sept. 14
The Rev. Benjamin Weir, a hostage, i3 released.
White House delays announcement until Sept.
18, hoping other hostages will be freed.
November
Shipment of missiles to Iran from Israel. The
arms are delivered on a plane fasciliated by C!A
officials at the urging of lt. Col. Oliver L. North,
an NSC staff member. It is not yet clear whether
Director William J. Casey authorized the activity,
McMahan, says there will be no more such
authorizations without formal presidential
approval. The shipment of missikis was
eventually returned because Israeli middlemen
had substituted obsolete materiel. The White
House subsequently stopped using Israeli
middlemen.
Dec. 4
Reagan announces resignation of McFarlane and
names Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter as his
successor.
Dec. 6
First known full-scale White House discussbn of
contacts with Iran and arms shipments, called at
the insistence of the State Department which
wanted to register its objection to the arms
transfers.
Dec. 8
Mcfarlane meets in London with Kimche and
Ghorbanifar and says Washington no longer
needs their services as a-ms brokers.
Wlnte-
Increased pressure on administration from
hostage families.
Jan. 7, 1986
White House policy review of Iranian role in
hostage situation. Secretary of State George P.
Shultz and Defense Secretary Weinberger oppose
sending arms to Iran to make contacts and help
gain release of hostages.
Jan. 17
White House says Reagan signs secret
document, called a 'finding," authorinng arms
shipments to Iran. The president directs Casey in
writing not to tell members of congressional
committees that have oversight responsibility for
intelligence activities.
February
First shipment of weapons directly from U.S.
military stocks to Iran. Pentagon transfers 500
TOW antitank missiles to CIA, which flies them
to Israel. They are then flown to Tehran.
Although no direct fink has been established to
the TOW transfers, at this time two Boeing 707s
operated by Southern Air Transport Inc. carried
45 tons of cargo each from an Air Force base in
Texas to Tel Aviv. Procedes from the sale are
deposited in a Swiss bank account established by
the CIA.
Spring
In Central America, a secret air resupply
operation begins to funnel guns and other
supplies to the contras. Crews for the operation
consist largely of former CIA employes;
eventually, the network's payroll and logistics are
handled largely by Robert C. Dutton, a retired Air
Force cobnel. Dutton works far Stanford
Technology International Trading Group Inc., a
Northam Virgirna?based company part owned
by retired mapr general Richard Y. Secord. who
is a friend of North's and is finked to the Iran
arms trade. Contra leaders later suggest that this
resupply operabon is financed wdh profits from
the Iran sales.
May
Two Southern Air 707s, again each carrying 45
tons of unknown cargo, make dehvenes from Air
Force bass in Texas to Tel Aviv.
May 28
On a plane carrying spare parts for Hawk anbair
missUe batteries, McFarlane, North and Amvan
Nu, counterterrorism adviser to IsraeU Prime
Minister Shimon Peres, secretly visits Tehran via
Israel.Mcfarlane has been told to expect that au
hostages will be released before he lands. After
several days of waiting in the Hilton hotel, and
fruitless talks with Iranians, McFarlane leaves
Iran. During the same week, North has arranged
to have E2 million in cash from Texas billionaire
H. Ross Perot flown to Cyprus in a futile attempt
to ransom the hostages,
July 26
The Rev. Lawrence Jenco is released. White
House again disappointed that additional
hostages are not freed, At about the same time,
the third U.S. arms shipments via Israel to Iran.
September
Frank Reed abducted in West Beirut Sept. 9.
Joseph James Cicippq abducted in West Beirut
Sept. 12. State Department specialists later
identify their abductors as an extemist group
with has to a pobtical faction in Iran.
October 26.27
Fourth U.S.?arms shipment via Israel to Iron.
Oct. 5
C 123K cargo aucraft ferrying guns and other
arms to the contras is shot down over Nicaragua.
Three crewmen are killed and a fourth, Eugene
Hasenfus, is captured and eventually treed on
terrorism charges in Managua.
Oct. 21
Edward Austin Tracy, last seen in a sidewalk
cafe m Moslem West Beirut, is abducted,
according to Revolutionary Justice Organuabon,
a group with pro?IraNan connecbons.
Nov. 2
Hostage David P. Jacobsen released. U.S. again
expects second and perhaps third hostage
releases.
Nov. 3
Pro?Syrian Lebanese magaane AI Shiraa
discloses that McFarlane had undertaken a
secret mission to Iran.
Nov. 4
Ab Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker Of Iranian
Parliament, confirms MCFarlane's visit.
Nov. 13
Reagan defends admirnstration's actions in
televised speech, says "we did not, repeat did
not, trade weapons or anything else for hostages,
nor will we."
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Nov. 19
Reagan, m news confeecnce, says "the
respons+b+bty for the derision and the operation
+s m+ne and mine abne." He asserts that no
th+rd country has been involved in the arms deal,
but 20 m+nutes alter the news conference the
White Flare acknowledges that that is
inaccurate.
Nov. 20
Attorney General Edwin Meese III reviews
testimony prepared of key administration officials
who have been summoned to Congress to
explain the arms shipments to Iron. Meese says
subsequenty he found troubling gape
Nov. 21
Casey tells Congress +n the morning that Iran
bought 2,000 TOW missiles and pa+d more than
S12 million +nto Sw+ss bank account for
American weapons. Casey says ne d+d not know
who had arranged the transaction or where the
money was transferred. Meese ,Heels with
Reagan and other senior aides at 11.30 a.m.
The pres+dent approves an invest+gation of the
operat+on.
Nov. 22
Meese and other Justice Department officals
hnd ev+dence m NSC documents that money
from the Iran sales was transferred to aid the
contras. North +nterviewed at length.
Nov. 2S
Reagan announces at noon that h+s national
security adviser, Vice Adm. John M. Po+ndexter,
has requested reassignment, and that North has
Veen fired from the NSC starf. Meese announces
that t10 mill+on to 330 m+"ion of Iran's
payments for U.S. arms were diverted to Sw+ss
bank accounts financing the contras.
Nov. 26
Justice Department launches the FBI into a
full?scale criminal +nvest+gatwn of Iran weapons
shipments. Reagan announces the apfw+ntment
of former senator John G. Tower (R?Tex.), former
secretary of state and senator Edmund S.
Muskie (0?Ma+ne) and former national security
adviser Brent Scowcroft to serve as members of
special review board to study the future role of
the National Security Counc+l.
Nov. 27
North den+ed entry to his White House office.
Dec. 1
North invokes fifth Amendment right agd+nst
self?incnmmation and refuses to testify before a
Senate comm+ttee about arms shipments to Iran
and divers+on of profits to aid the contras.
Dee. 2
In telev+sed statement Reagan says he has urged
Meese to apply fo- the appointment of an
independent counsel, and announces Frank C.
Carluca will be ha new national security adviser
Dec. 3
Po+ndexter invokes Fifth Amendment before the
Senate comm+ttee.
Dec. 4
House and Senate leaders agree to form
separate Watergate?style select comm+ttees to
investigate the scandal, w+th work expected to
begin +n January.
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