NICARAGUA: THE ARMS BUILDUP AND INCREASING CUBAN SUPPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00302R000500870021-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: June 10, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
NICARAGUA: The Arms Buildup and
Increasing Cuban Support
Castro' s Determination
Once the Sandinista forces ousted the Somoza government, the
Castro regime set about the task of creating a totally new
professional military establishment in Nicaragua, one that would
help consolidate the revolutionary victory by maintaining
internal order and defending the country from any attempts to
launch a counterrevolution from abroad. Havana, sensitive to the
history of US intervention in the region, gave the task high
priority because it expected that, at some point in the
development of the Sandinista regime, the US might try to reverse
This memorandum was requested by the Director of Central
Intelliqence. It was prepared by
American Analysis an of the
Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the Office of
Soviet Analysis and the Office of Near East and South Asia
Analysis. Information as of 10 June 1983 was used in preparation
of this paper. Comments and questions are welcome and should be
addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division,
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the revolutionary process in Nicaragua by organizing another Bay
of Pigs-type operation.
Consolidation of the Nicaraguan revolution is extremely
important to the Cuban leadership because it is the only
success--as opposed to many defeats--that Cuba has had in two
decades of promoting armed struggle in the hemisphere. The
success of the Sandinista regime is, in the eyes of the guerrilla
elite in Havana, a vindication of the activist foreign policy lit
has been advocating for so long and an outstanding precedent that
justifies the continuation of that policy. Castro, and probably
many other guerrilla veterans in the Cuban leadership, got
tremendous vicarious satisfaction out of seeing a repetition of
their own Cuban experience in Nicaragua. He and his clique are
wedded to the Nicaraguan revolution psychologically as well as
ideologically, and a reversal of the political process there
would be a shattering blow to them.
Cuba originally saw its military role in Nicaragua as bne of
advice and technical support and has had some 1,500 to 2,000
military and security advisers and technicians in the country for
several years. Although some military hardware has been shipped
from Cuba, Havana looks to the USSR and other suppliers as the
primary sources of Nicaragua's weapons and military equipment.
Nevertheless, the Cubans recognized the possibility that the
fledgling Nicaraguan armed forces might be compelled to defend
the country prematurely, and entered into a mutual defense pact
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with the Sandinista government that paved the way for the
introduction of Cuban troops should they ever be needed.
Havana has been seriously concerned since late 1980 that the
US might resort to direct intervention as a result of events in
Central America and since then has undertaken a number of
precautionary defensive measures--forming a territorial militia;
digging trenches, bunkers, and revetments for personnel and
equipment; arming to the teeth--in Cuba to prepare for an
attack. Little was done, however, to bolster the Cuban military
presence in Nicaragua until Washington's close links to the anti-
Sandinista insurgents became apparent. Castro seems to have been
confident that, without US help, the insurgents could be handled
easily by the Nicaraguan security forces. Washington's decision
to help the insurgents, however, was a signal to Castro that the
US was finally prepared to act. The evidence suggests that he
suspects the US is using the guerrillas as bait, hoping to tempt
the Nicaraguan military into attacking Contra bases in Honduras
and thus providing an excuse for the introduction of US military
forces.
Evidence of acute Cuban concern over the turn of events in
Central America is substantial. Our Interests Section in Havana
was told last month by several Western diplomatic missions that
high Cuban officials had been sounding them out since late April
as to what they thought the US would do if Cuba sent troops to
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Nicaragua. At the time, the process of increasing the Cuban
military presence there was already under way.
Our Interests Section in Havana reported that when Castro
and other top Cuban officials met with visiting advisers to
President Mitterrand and the French Prime Minister in early May,
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the Cubans gave the impression that their preoccupation with the
Nicaraguan situation overshadowed even their concern over the
developments in El Salvador. The French Ambassador subsequently
told our officials that the Cuban leadership was extremely
concerned about Washington's reaction to the situation there.
French officials here in Washington relayed the same message to
US officials, and added that Castro had admitted getting signals
from the Soviets warning him that if he precipitated a milita
confrontation with the US, Moscow would not come to his aid.
SY
While the Castro regime obviously has reason to mislead the
the concern the Cubans expressed over the turn of events in
Central America is genuine.
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as of mid-April, high Cuban
and Nicaraguan officials did not believe press reports that ex-
Sandinista leader Eden Pastora had entered Nicaragua. They were
concerned about the possibility, however, because they believe he
has great popular appeal and could cause them a great deal of
trouble. Now that more evidence has surfaced about his presence,
those fears presumably have increased.
Cuban's determination to support the Sandinista governIhent
is strong. Havana has delivered this message to many diplomatic
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prepared to become even more involved in Central America,
especially Nicaragua, but is following Moscow's lead and
restraining its activities in the region.
The most significant and alarming indicator of Cuba's
dedication to the defense of the Sandinista regime is the
bolstering of the Cuban military presence with Division General
Arnaldo Ochoa in charge. Ochoa's previous experience suggests
that he is on the scene to supervise a major buildup of Cuban
forces in Nicaragua. He is probably also under orders to
restrain the Nicaraguans from some precipitate action--such as a
military invasion of Honduras to destroy insurgent bases--that
could be used by the US to justify US military intervention'.' -The
Cubans apparently have a low regard for the professionalism of
the Nicaraguan military and do not want to be dragged into a
confrontation with the US that resulted from some rash Nicaraguan
military operation.
Nevertheless, the posting of Ochoa--one of the most highly
regarded and experienced of Cuba's top military officers--to
Managua underscores Cuba's alarm over events there as well as
Cuba's determination to fulfill its commitments
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We believe that only a clear and unpublicized
signal to Castro--either direct or through the Soviets--that the
US is prepared to intervene militarily would dissuade him from
establishing a Cuban military presence in Nicaragua on the scale
of the Cuban military presence in Ethiopia or even Angola, should
he decide that it was required to maintain the Sandinistas in
power.
Arms Buildup
The Sandinistas continue to acquire military materiel at a
rapid rate.
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The impact of the buildup over the last few months has been
to provide the Sandinistas with increased conventional and
counterinsurgency capabilities. The equipment will probably be
used against the anti-Sandinista insurgents as well as to
strengthen conventional defenses on the Honduran border.
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Reported Cuban Troop Buildup
since mid-March Cuba has
increased its military presence in Nicaragua by introducing as
many as 1,500 combat troops.
these new troops included both Cuban Army regulars and reservists
with combat experience, in addition to Special Troops from the
Ministry of Interior.
1,000 combat l
troops were sent to Nicaragua by sea in late April or early
May. These troops were reportedly sent to counter the expected
offensives by anti-Sandinista forces and, once in Nicaragua, were
integrated into Nicaraguan units.
500 Special Troops had been sent since mid-
March to supplement the contingent of 150 that had been present
in Nicaragua for about two years.
Prior to the reported troop augmentation, Cuba had an
estimated 1,500 to 2,000 military advisers and security forbLe.-
personnel in Nicaragua, helping the Sandinistas build their
military establishment and assisting them in the
counterinsurgency campaign. Included in this total are an
estimated 150 to 300 Special Troops--the only true combat
contingent that was present before the reported buildup. The
bulk of these Cuban military personnel were present strictly in
an advisory or training role, but in recent months
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been attached to Nicaraguan units involved in combat operations
against anti-Sandinista forces.
one of Cuba's top field commanders, General Arnaldo
Ochoa, has now arrived in Nicaragua to take command of both Cuban
and Nicaraguan forces. Ochoa is a highly respected military
officer who previously served as commander of the Cuban
expeditionary forces in Ethiopia and, prior to that, led a Cuitan
combat brigade in Angola. In both cases, Ochoa's arrival
presaged the major buildup of Cuban combat forces in those
countries. Posting of Ochoa to Nicaragua may have been done to
once again pave the way for the introduction of Cuban combat
forces. His presence would also give Havana a greater degree of
control over Nicaraguan military actions and policy. The
reported integration of the newly arrived Cuban troops into
Nicaraguan units lends credence
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command of joint forces in Nicaragua.
Ochoa's presence in
Nicaragua is an indication of Cuban intentions to defend the
Sandinista regime at all costs.
military activity and policy in Nicaragua is being closely
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supervised by Cuban Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro. Castro
reportedly has set up a command center in the Armed Forces
Ministry to keep track of what is going on in Nicaragua and
coordinates closely with Sandinista military commander Humberto
Ortega.
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Cuban Forces Available for Nicaragua
Cuba has the largest military in the Caribbean Basin
littoral and would be able to commit substantial combat forces
should it decide to intervene on a major scale in Nicaragua
A potential Cuban military intervention in Nicaragua
would differ from their operations in Africa in two important
respects. First, Cuban forces would be primarily engaged in
guerrilla warfare operations in difficult terrain and would not
be able to use their conventional force superiority and training
to full advantage. Second, such an operation would probabl~`be
beyond the capabilities of Cuban logistic capabilities and might
require Soviet materiel support. The Soviets might be reluctant
to provide the kind of highly visible support that was noted
during the height of Cuba's African deployments for fear of
provoking a US reaction. During the African buildups, the
Soviets not only provided combat equipment and supplies, but also
transported troops and increased their naval presence in the
area.
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The types of Cuban combat forces available for operations in
Nicaragua each have particular strengths and weaknesses, and,
therefore, would have varying suitability for the potential
missions required of them.
Mechanized infantry units from the Army, which Cuba deployed
in both Angola and Ethiopia, would be more than a match for any
conventional forces the Cubans might face in Nicaragua. They are
most suitable for operations aimed at controlling major
population centers and lines of communication, and could also be
used effectively in a static defense role guarding airfields,
outposts, and key economic targets. Unless supported by troop-
carrying helicopters, however, they are neither trained or
equipped for search-and-destroy missions against insurgent-type
forces in rugged terrain. Their utility in combatting anti-
Sandinista forces, therefore, would be limited.
Cuba's two elite airborne and airmobile units--the Landing
and Assault Brigade and the Special Troops--would be the best
suited for counterinsurgency operations in Nicaragua. These
lightly armed and highly trained troops, transported by
helicopters and light transport aircraft, could react quickly to
counter irregular forces in isolated areas. They would be
ideally suited for search-and-destroy missions-to locate and
strike remote insurgent bases and for reconnaissance patrols to
locate insurgent positions for airstrikes~
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Cuba's naval infantry--an estimated 400- to 500-man force.,or
about a battalion--equipped with amphibious armored personnel
carriers and light tanks would be suitable for amphibious assault
operations in coastal regions. This force is capable of
conducting landing operations i
(sng the two Polnocny amphibious
assault ships provided, to Cuba last year. Each of these ships
can transport up to 180 troops or six armored vehicles and their
crews a distance of 1,500 miles. The naval infantry was noteA
conducting its first amphibious assault landing exercises with
the Rplnocnys in northwest Cuba during May. We do not know if
the naval infantry has yet had sufficient training to be able to
use this new amphibious lift capability for offensive purposes.
The transport of the entire battalion and its equipment would
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TABLE
NICARAGUA: Estimated Weapons Inventories
June 1983 June 1982
GROUND WEAPONS
Tanks
T-54/55 (USSR)
45
25
M-4 medium (US)
3
3
Other armored vehicles
81
38
4
BTR-60 armored personnel carriers
(USSR)
12
12
BTR-50 command vehicles (USSR)
1
1
BTR-152 armored personnel carriers
(USSR)
T-17 (Staghound) armored reconnaissance
cars (Israel)
BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance cars
(USSR)
Artillery/mortars/rocket launchers
(USSR)
105-mm howitzer (US)
4
4
122-mm howitzer (possibly Cuba)
8
8
152-mm gun/howitzer (USSR)
12
:. _
12
120-mm mortar (Cuba, France)
24
-24
82-mm mortar (Cuba)
10
10
60-mm mortar (France)
NA
NA
81-mm mortar (France)
NA
NA
BM-21 rocket launcher (USSR)
16
12
J arara rocket launcher (Argentina)
3
3
40-mm RPG-7 grenade launcher (Cuba)
100
100
57-mm ZIS-2 antitank gun (Cuba or
USSR)
Small arms
Various models (numerous suppliers) NA
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AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS
Surface-to-air missiles NA NA
SA-7 (Cuba, USSR, and/or Algeria) NA NA
Antiaircraft weapons 133 133
14.5-mm antiaircraft machinegun
(various types) (Cuba) 96 96
23-mm antiaircraft artillery (USSR) 31 31
37-mm antiaircraft artillery (Cuba
or USSR) 6 6
50 caliber antiaircraft machinegun
(US) NA NA
Aircraft
Transport
C-47 (US)
DC-6 (US)
HS-125 (UK)
Aviocar (Spain)
AN-2 (USSR)
AN-26 (USSR)
Arava (Israel)
Trainer/Counterinsurgency
28 20
14 1C
1 1
1 1
1 1
2 0
6 6
2 0
1 1
T-33 (US) 2 2
T-28 (US) 5 5
SF-260 (Libya) 4 4
Utility 8 8
Various (US) 8 \ 8
Helicopters 18-19 15-17
Sikorsky S-58 (US) 2 2
Hughes 500 (US) 2 2
OH-6 (US) 2 2
UH-1 (US) 1 1
MI-8 (USSR) 6 2-3
Alouette III (France) 2 0
MI-2 (Libya) 3-4 0
Major Aircraft Armament
Air-to-ground rocket launchers
(France) 40 0
Air-to-ground rockets (France)
2,000
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Naval craft
? Patrol boats (various types)
(Israel, USSR)
Medium landing craft (US)
11
1
11
1
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Military Forces in Nicaragua, June 1983
Army
Ministry of Interior forces
Air and air defense forces
Navy
Army reserves on active duty
Total
Militia (Organized)
18,000
1,500
1,500
504
4,000
25,500
21,000
25,000
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ILLEGIB
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