COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A003300040001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 15, 1954
• Content Type: SNIE

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SNIE 10-4-54
15 JUNE 1954
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SNIE 10-4-54
COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN
US COURSES OF ACTION WITH
RESPECT TO INDOCHINA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the ,Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 15 June 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-
telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Direc-
tor for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Director of Intelli-
gence, AEC. The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of the
jurisdiction of the FBI.
OCCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSWIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
HR 70-2
(2q6. 9 636 DATE: REVIEWER'. Ar.AS
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
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within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES
OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet reactions to the courses of action and
consequent situations indicated below.'
THE ESTIMATE
PART I
ASSUMPTIONS
A. The treaties of independence between France and the Associated States will
have been signed. ?
B. A regional security grouping including at least the Associated States, Thai-
land, the Philippines, Australia, France, and the United States, and possibly including
also New Zealand and the United Kingdom, will have been formed.
C. The Associated States will have publicly requested the direct military partici-
pation of members of the regional grouping in the war in Indochina.
D. The French will have undertaken to continue at least the present level Of
their military commitment, in Indochina.
REQUIREMENT 1
To estimate the initial Chinese Communist
and Soviet reactions to the participation of
US air and naval forces with French Union
forces and token Thai and Philippine forces
in coordinated ground, naval, and air opera-
tions designed to destroy the Communist mili-
1 The assumptions and estimative requirements
stated herein were furnished to the intelligence
community for the purposes of this estimate.
We interpret the hypothetical action as occur-
ring within the next twelve to eighteen months.
tary forces in Indochina. Air operations
would be limited to targets in Indochina.
Nuclear weapons would be employed if their
use were deemed militarily advantageous but
nuclear attacks on the Indochinese civil pop-
ulation as a target system would be avoided.
Chinese Communist Reaction
1. The intervention of US and allied forces
in Indochina probably would cause the Chi-
nese Communists to believe that sooner or
later they would have to decide whether to
M )16 !ft gg
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1
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AltimilistkomarP'
accept the defeat of the Viet Minh or to in-
tervene in force in order to try to prevent such
defeat. Their decision would probably rest
mainly, though not exclusively, upon their
weighing of the risks and disadvantages aris-
ing from the Viet Minh defeat against the
likelihood of involvement in major war with
the US and the probable consequences of such
a war for Communist China. Available evi-
dence gives no unmistakeable indication of
what the Chinese Communist decision would
be. On balance, however, we believe that the
chances are somewhat better than even that
the Chinese Communist would decide to take
whatever military action they thought re-
quired to prevent destruction of the Viet Minh,
including when and if necessary, open use of
Chinese Communist forces in Indochina.2 3
2. The nature of the assumed US action is
such that ample warning would almost cer-
tainly be given in advance of actual opera-
tions. The Chinese Communists have the
capability now to intervene quickly and in
such force as to drive French Union forces
out of the Delta. The Chinese Communists
might choose to exercise this capability before
US intervention could be effected.
3. We believe it somewhat more likely, how-
ever, that even if the Chinese Communists
had determined not to accept the defeat of
the Viet Minh they would not intervene open-
ly immediately following the assumed US in-
tervention. They might estimate that US air
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, recommends deletion of the last sentence
of this paragraph and would substitute the fol-
lowing:
"However, their decision would be largely de-
termined by the Chinese estimate of the probable
extent and effect of US initial action."
3 The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that
the last sentence of this paragraph should read
as follows:
"Communist China will probably not choose
knowingly any course of action likely to expose
its fundamental national strengths in war with
a major power. However, we believe that Com-
munist China's strength for conducting various
kinds of warfare is such, and the motives and
judgment of its leaders are such as to make
Communist China's courses of action dangerously
unpredictable under outside pressure of any ap-
preciable magnitude."
2
and naval forces could not, in the absence of
US ground forces, decisively alter the course
of the war. They might therefore consider
their intervention unnecessary at this point
and might postpone final decision as to their
course of action until they had observed the
initial scale and success of the allied military
operations and had estimated the probable
nature and extent of US aims in the conflict.
4. In this connection, US use of nuclear
weapons in Indochina would tend to hasten
the ultimate Chinese Communist decision
whether or not to intervene. It would prob-
ably convince the Chinese Communists of US
determination to obtain a decisive military
.victory in Indochina at whatever risk and by
whatever means, and of the consequent dan-
ger of nuclear attack on Communist China.
Whether this conviction would precipitate or
deter Chinese Communist intervention would
depend on the military situation in Indochina
at the time, the observed military effect of the
use of nuclear weapons, and the observed
political and psychological effect of such use,
particularly its effect on the coherence of the
regional security grouping and the Atlantic
alliance.
5. In any case, the Chinese Communists
would almost certainly greatly increase their
logistic support, delivery of arms and equip-
ment, and technical assistance to the Viet
Minh. The Chinese Communists would prob-
ably increase their deliveries of AA weapons
and might send in Chinese AA gun crews.
Moreover, the Chinese Communists would
probably deploy ground and air units near
the Indochina border in order: (a) to warn
the US and its allies, and (b) to have forces
ready either to intervene on behalf of the
Viet Minh or to defend the southern border
of China.
6. While maintaining a posture of military
readiness, the Chinese Communists would in-
tensify political and propaganda activities de-
signed to exploit anti-Western and anticolo-
nial feelings of the indigenous population of
Indochina and the, war-fears of neutralist
Asian nations and of certain US allies. They
would also seek to label the US as an aggres-
sor. In the meantime and throughout the
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period of military operations, the Commu-
nists would almost certainly agitate and prop-
agandize for a "cease-fire" and political settle-
ment, which would preserve the Communist
position and prospects.
Soviet Reaction
7. In the assumed situation, the USSR prob-
ably would estimate that the US action,
though limited to air and naval forces, would
considerably increase the risks of unlimited
war between the US and Communist China.
The USSR would probably prefer that such
a war not develop out of the Indochina situa-
tion. Nevertheless, the USSR would assure
Communist China of continuing military
assistance. The USSR would also give com-
plete diplomatic and propaganda support to
Communist China and the Viet Minh regime.
REQUIREMENT 2
To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet
reactions to the success of the operations en-
visaged in the assumptions above (i.e., to the
impending effective destruction of the Com-
munist forces in Indochina) .4
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of
the Army, believes ,that the results in this re-
quirement could not be achieved by the unbal-
anced and insufficient forces envisaged.
5 The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that
this paragraph should read as follows:
"Communist China will probably not choose
knowingly any course of action likely to expose
its fundamental national strengths in war with
a major power. However, we believe that Com-
munist China's strength for conducting various
kinds of warfare is such, and the motives and
judgment of its leaders are such as to make
Communist China's courses of action danger-
3
Chinese Communist Reaction
8. As stated in Paragraph 1, we believe that
the chances are somewhat better than even
that the Chinese Communist, in the assumed
situation, would intervene militarily to pre-
vent the destruction of the Viet Minh. If
they decided to do so, we believe that the
exact timing and nature of their action would
depend on various factors, but principally on
the scope and character of the US/allied oper-
ations they were seeking to counter.5 6
Soviet Reaction
9. In this assumed situation, the USSR would
probably continue to support the Chinese
Communists. If the Chinese Communists
intervened openly in support of the Viet Minh,
the USSR would rapidly increase military
assistance to Communist China. The Soviet
diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against
the US would continue full-scale, and the
USSR might ask the UN to condemn the US
as an aggressor. Thinly veiled threats of So-
viet involvement in the fighting and refer-
ences to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 would
multiply.
ously unpredictable under outside pressure of
any appreciable magnitude."
The Deputy Director for Intelligence', The Joint
Staff, believes that paragraph 8 should read as
follows:
"Communist China would conclude from the
assumed impending destruction of Communist
forces in Indochina, by limited forces employing
nuclear and conventional weapons, that its open
military intervention would invite an extension
of similar action to Communist China, and
would, therefore, probably not intervene mili-
tarily."
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PART II
4
ASSUMPTIONS
A. The treaties of independence between France and the Associated States will
have been signed.
B. A regional security grouping including at least the Associated States, Thai-
land, the Philippines, Australia, France, and the United States, and possibly includ-
ing also New Zealand and the United Kingdom, will have been formed.
C. The Associated States will have publicly requested the direct military partici-
pation of members of the regional grouping in the war in Indochina.
D. The French will have undertaken to continue at least the present level of their
military commitment in Indochina.
E. The Chinese Communists will have openly intervened with military forces in
Indochina in order to counter US direct participation as defined in Requirement 1.
REQUIREMENT 3
To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet
reactions to an extension of allied offensive
air operations to include military targets in
Communist China directly supporting Com-
munist military operations in Indochina or
directly threatening the security of Allied
forces in the area:, Nuclear weapons would
be employed in these operations if it were
deemed militarily advantageous to do so, but
nuclear attacks on the Chinese civil popula-
tion as a target system would be avoided.
Chinese Communist Reaction
10. We consider it probable that before inter-
vening in Indochina the Chinese Communists
would have accepted the likelihood of US air
attacks against military targets in China.
Consequently, they would not feel compelled
to withdraw their forces from Indochina solely
as a result of the initiation of the air opera-
tions assumed above. At the same time, we
In this requirement we interpret targets "direct-
ly supporting" Communist military operations to
be generally south of the Yangtze River and to
consist primarily of transport lines, troop con-
centrations, and air fields in the area.
believe that the Chinese Communists, in order
to prevent further destruction to this area of
China and particularly to avoid the spread of
unlimited US attacks to the whole of China, '
would intensify efforts to induce the US to
enter negotiations for a settlement which
would preserve the Communist position and
prospects in Indochina.
11. Meanwhile the Chinese Communists, to
the full extent of their capabilities, would
prosecute the war on the ground in Indochina
and attack allied air bases, aircraft carriers,
and other installations directly supporting
allied operations in the area. They would,
however, probably try to keep the war cen-
tered in Indochina and, as a consequence,
probably would confine their attacks to such
directly supporting bases and installations.
12. The use of nuclear weapons under the
restrictions given above would greatly in-
crease Chinese Communist concern about US
intentions but probably would not by itself
cause them to adopt new courses of military
action at this time. However, they would
threaten nuclear retaliation. They would
also exploit to the fullest resultant psycho-
logical opportunities and in particular would
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charge that the US was using weapons of
mass destruction on the civilian population.8
13. The 'Chinese Communists would attempt
by all means possible to convince other Asian
nations that the US had undertaken to de-
stroy the Chinese Communist regime in order
to thwart its efforts on behalf of an indi-
genous independence movement. If the Chi-
nese had not previously done so, they would
probably appeal to the UN to brand US action
as a threat to the peace.
Soviet Reaction
14. In this assumed situation, the USSR
would greatly increase its military assistance
to Communist China, especially supplying
modern aircraft and small naval vessels, pos-
sibly including submarines, with Soviet per-
sonnel to train and advise the Chinese and
probably to participate in air defense opera-
tions. The USSR would probably not openly
commit combat units of the Soviet armed
forces and probably would not release nuclear
weapons for Chinese Communist use.
15. The Kremlin would also continue its diplo-
matic and propaganda campaigns against the
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, believes this paragraph should read:
"Nuclear weapon attacks on Communist China
would undoubtedly result in a much greater Chi-
nese Communist reaction than nuclear attacks on
the Indochinese battleground. In addition, such
attacks would probably indicate to the Chinese
Communists a US willingness to exploit its supe-
riority in nuclear weapons and delivery capa-
bility to force them out of Indochina. Since the
nuclear attack contemplated in this requirement
is of a limited nature, the Chinese Communist
rulers would retain control of the government
and country and, with the initial attacks, they
would probably make urgent appeals to the USSR
for nuclear weapons and additional military
assistance. They might also increase the tempo
of their military operations and would undoubt-
edly endeavor to induce the United States to
,enter negotiations in the hope of forestalling
further attacks. A Chinese Communist decision
to withdraw or not would be dependent primarily
upon continued or increased US nuclear attacks
and other US action as well as upon Soviet reac-
tion. It is believed, however, that the Chinese
Communists would be willing to withdraw from
Indochina rather than be subjected to further
destruction of their homeland."
5
US, undertaking in the UN to brand the US
as an aggressor if this had not previously
been attempted. The USSR would support
Chiriese charges concerning the use of nuclear
weapons against civilian populations. At the
same time, the USSR would probably advise
the Chinese Communists to negotiate for a
cessation of hostilities on the basis of the ?
status quo at the time and would try to
establish a position as peacemaker.
REQUIREMENT 4
To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet
reactions to the following additional allied
courses of action, undertaken subsequently to
those above:
a. Extension of allied offensive air opera-
tions to additional selected military targets in
Communist China, including the use of atomic
weapons under the same conditions as above.
b. Naval blockade of the China coast.
c. Seizz::e or neutralization of Hainan.
d. Chinese Nationalist operations against
the Chinese mainland.
Chinese Communist Reaction
16. As a consequence of this allied broaden-
ing of the war, the Chinese Communists
would probably conclude that the US was
prepared to wage unlimited war against them.
They would continue to defend themselves to
the limit of their capabilities and would prob-
ably make vigorous efforts to secure the full
participation of the USSR. At the same time,
they would intensify their efforts to end the
war by negotiations, and might eventually
indicate in some way their willingness to
withdraw from Indochina in order to obtain
a cease-fire 9 If unable to obtain a cease-fire
agreement, the Chinese Communists would
accept the fact of _unlimited war with the
US and would wage such war to the full ex-
tent of their remaining capabilities.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, and the Director of Intelligence, USAF,
suggest that the words "might eventually" in
this sentence should be replaced with "would
probably."
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Soviet Reaction
17. In this assumed situation, the USSR
would continue to provide military assistance
to Communist China as indicated above, but
would probably refuse Chinese Communist
demand for full Soviet participation in the
war. The Kremlin would strongly urge the
Chinese Communists to negotiate for a cessa-
tion of hostilities on the basis of withdrawing
from Indochina.n If the Chinese Commu-
nists could not obtain a cease-fire agreement,
the USSR would provide Communist China
with military assistance in every Way short of
openly committing combat units of the Soviet
armed forces in operations against US and
allied forces outside Communist-held terri-
tory. The USSR would provide military re-
sources and equipment for Chinese Commu-
nist attacks on US bases or US forces any-
where in the Far East. At this stage of the
conflict, the USSR might provide Communist
China with nuclear weapons and the tech-
nical personnel required for their use.1' 12
18. The USSR would continue its diplomatic
and propaganda campaigns against the US,
insisting that the Soviet aim was purely the
defense of China against outright aggression.
The USSR would also begin at least partial
mobilization of its own military forces on a
war basis. It would issue thinly veiled
threats of general war, suggesting attacks on
10
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department
of the Army, recommends the deletion of "on
the basis of withdrawing from Indochina," be-
lieving that at this state of the conflict the
Kremlin would not willingly acquiesce in the
surrender of any Communist-held territory in
Indochina or elsewhere.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff, and Director of Intelligence, USAF, be-
lieve that this sentence should read:
"We do not believe that the USSR would re-
lease nuclear weapons for Chinese Communist
use."
Western Europe and on the continental US,
but would probably confine its operations to
the defense of China so long as the US did not
attack Soviet territory.
REQUIREMENT 5
To estimate Chinese Communist and Soviet
reactions to the success of the foregoing oper-
ations (i.e., to the impending effective destruc-
tion of the Chinese Communist capability to
conduct military operations outside the bor-
ders of Communist China).13
Chinese Communist Reaction
19. Unless the USSR was willing to _make an
unlimited commitment of Soviet forces to
prevent the success of the assumed US and
allied operations, we believe that the Commu-
nist Chinese, under the assumed circum-
stances, would accept any US terms for a set-
tlement which preserved the integrity of
China under the Chinese Communist regime.
Soviet Reaction
20. In this assumed situation, we believe the
USSR would urge the Chinese Communists to
accept any US terms for a settlement which
preserved the integrity of China under the
Chinese Communist regime.' 4 So long as the
fighting continued, however, the USSR would
continue its aid to China.
" The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of
the Army, substitute for the last sentence:
"It is also believed that the USSR would give
serious consideration to making a substantially
greater military contribution including nuclear
weapons and the technical personnel required
for their use."
" The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department
of the Army, believes that the results assumed
in this requirement could not be achieved by the
unbalanced and insufficient force envisaged.
" The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of
the Army, would add "and retained a Commu-
nist foothold in Indochina."
'VOW/04W
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