MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM E. K. WRIGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000900070043-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: October 30, 1946
• Content Type: MF

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900070043-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -GROUP
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
30 October 1946.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.
Attached hereto for your information is an
analysis of Mr. Molotov's recent speech prepared by
Mr. George F. Kennan,.State Department, Special Con-
sultant to the Central Intelligence Group on Russian
affairs. The opinions expressed in the subject memo-
randum are concurred in by the Central Intelligence
Group.
FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELi2IGENCE :
E. K. W RIGHT
Colonel, GSC
Executive to the Director.
cc= The Secretary of State
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of Navy
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900070043-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
30 October 1.946.
Molotov's speech becomes comprehensible only if it is borne
in mind that the Soviet leaders generally speak in algebraic symbols.
When Molotov speaks of plans for "world domination" on the
part of others, what he means is this: in the type of world which
American and British statesmen are seeking, i.e. a world in which
individual nations would bow to the will of the majority, the Soviet
Union as things now stand would be out-numbered and therefore condemned
to submit to the will of others. Since Soviet leaders would be reluctant
to believe that the exercise of political wil could ever be modified
by a sense of moral responsibility and by the restraints of self-imposed
decency and moderation, they view such a prospect as equivalent to rworld
domination" by others. When they speak therefore of "world domination"
what they mean is the fact that they do not have the preponderance of
political power in the world today and therefore can not risk a political
showdown. They are equally conscious of the fact that they can not afford
a military showdown at this time. For that reason, they react with
pathological over-sensitiveness to any suggestion of international
association for the exercise of armed power in which they do not have
full veto power. They are so feverishly preoccupied with the possible
applicability of-such arrangements in ways detrimental to themselves
that they have probably never even given serious attention Lo any other
aspect of such proposals.
Aware, therefore, that they can afford to risk neither the
intimacy nor the hostility of the western world at this j*cture, they
are compelled to play for time and to seek-a period of what Molotov
calls "peaceful competition of states and social systems'r during which it
might be possible for them to increase their relative military and political
potential. They are confident of their ability, given time and freedom
from outside disturbance, to bring about this increase. They are skeptibal
of the ability of the western countries to emerge from the morass of
internal difficulties which face them in the coming period. They suspect
that one of the reasons for the reluctance of western circles to face
a future in which there is no intimate international collaboration lies
in a lack of confidence that by their own domestic efforts they can main-
tain their previous position in the world; and Mr. Molotov chides us
sardonically on this lack of confidence which his agents and admirers
in this country are doing their utmost to promote.
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 %7 L P" -Mm"-N.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900070043-3
What he is saying in effect is this: "The type of political
to thrust upon us is one intolerable
intimacy you westerners are trying
to us. Why are you so alarmed over the fact that we can not accept it?
Do you fear free competition with. us? If so, why do you blame us? Blame
yourselves."
Molotov's proposals on disarmament z,.nd atomic energy are merely
tactical moves, within the framework of this major strategy. They repre-
sent no departure from Gromyko's previous proposals except that they
endeavor to put on the higher plan of general disarmament the Soviet
demand that the manufacture and use of atomic weapon, be banned. Soviet
tactics are still based on the reflection that the freedom of action of
the Soviet Government in its own territory can not be effectively restricted
by any international agreement to which it becomes a.party and which does not
provide for international controls, whereas the freedom of action of demo-
cratic governments can be genuinely restricted by international engagements
which they may enter into, by virtue of the force of public opinion and the
subordination of governments to the law. Thio provides a convenient tactical
position for the Russians. And as long as there is no deterioration in
their real security with respect to atomic weapons--a security which rests on
the peaceful spirit of our people and on our failure to take real measures
to reduce our vulnerability to atomic attack or to increase our retaliatory
powers--there is no reason for the Russians to move from this position.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900070043-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900070043-3
COY7L ,~,.
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
Washington 25, D. C.
30 October 1946
Lt. Gen..Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Director of Central Intelligence
Room 2166, War Department Building
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear General Vandenberg;
I enclose a brief analysis of the speech delivered by Molotov
yesterday in the United Nations Assembly.
I will be happy if you can make any use of this. In case you
are not going to give it any distribution, I would appreciate it if you
would have someone on your staff inform me to this effect by telephone,
because in that case I would like to send the document direct to several
people here in Washington.
I am leaving for New York at 2:30 p.m. and will return tomorrow.
It would be all right, therefore, if the answer can be given to my secretary,
Miss Hessman, here at the War College,
Sincerely your;,,
/s/
George F. Kennan
Deputy for Foreign Affairs
Enclosure:
Analysis, as
stated.
(General Vandenberg informed Mr. Kennan that we would distribute as written.
Copies were forwarded to the President and the three secretaries. 1605 - 30 Oct.)
/s/ Wright
((Mr. Kennan's original letter and copies of our memo to the President and
attached analysis forwarded to OHE--31/Oct.))
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900070043-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900070043-3
THE NATIONAL WAR UOLLECsI
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
30 October 1946
bI e ''v
Molotov's speech becomes comprehenslaw only if it is
borne in mind that the Soviet leaders generally speak in
algebraic symbols.
When Molotov speaks of plans for "world domination" on
the part of others, what he means is this: in the type of
world which American and British statesmen are seeking, i.e.
a world in which individual nations would bow to the will of
the majority, the Soviet Union as things now stand wotE be
out-numbered and therefore condemned to submit to the will of
others. Since Soviet leaders would be reluctant to believe
that the exercise of political will could ever be modified
by a sense of moral responsibility and by the restraints of
self-imposed decency and moderation, they view such a prospect
as equivalent to "world domination" by others. When they speak
therefore of "world domination" what they dean is the fact that
they do not have the preponderance of political power in the
world today and therefore can not risk a political showdown.
They are equally conscious of the fact that they can not afford
a military showdown at this time. For that reason, they react
with pathological over-sensitiveness to any suggestion of inter-
national association for the exercise of armed power in which
they do not have full veto power. They are so feverishly pre-
occupied with the possible applicability of such arrangements
in ways
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900070043-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900070043-3
i'n?ways detrimental to tbmselves that they have probably
never even. given serious attention to any other aspect of
such proposals.
Aware, therefore, that they can afford to risk neither
the intimacy nor the hostility of the western world at this
juncture, they are compelled to play for time and to seek a
period of what Molotov calls "peaceful competition of states
and social systems" during which it might be possible for them
to increase their relative military and political potential.
They are confident of their ability, given time and freedom
from outside disturbance,'to bring about this inrease. They
are skeptical of the ability of the western countries to emerge
from the morass of internal difficulties which face them in the
coming period. They suspect that one of the reasons for the
reluctance of western circles to face a future in t ich there
is no intimate international collaboration lies in a lack of
confidence that by their own domestic efforts they can maintain
their previous position In the world; and Mr. Molotov chides us
sardonically on this lack of confidence which his agents and
admirers in this country are doing their utmost to promote.
What he is saying in effect is this: "The type of political
intimacy you westerners are trying to thrust upon us is one
intolerable to us. Why are you so alarmed over the fact that
we can not accept it? Do you fear free competition with us?
If so, why do you blame us? Blame yourselves."
Molotov'S
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900070043-3
,
Molotov's proposals on disarmament and atomic energy are
ne'ely tactical moves, within the framework of this major
strategy. They represent no departure from Gromyko's
previous proposals except that they endeavor to put on the
higher plane of general disarmament the Soviet demand that the
manufacture and use of atomic weapons be banned. Soviet tac-
tics are still based on the reflection that the freedom of
action of the Soviet Government in its own territory can not
be effectively restrictedt& any international agreement to
which it becomes a party and which does not provide for inter-
national controls, whereas the freedom of action of democratic
governmets can be genuinely restricted by international engage-
ments which they may enter into, by virtue of the farce of
public opinion and the subordination of governments to the law.
This provides a convenient tactical position for the Russians.
And as long as there is no deterioration in their real security
with respect to atomic weapons--a security which rests on the
peaceful spirit of our people and on our failure to take real
measures to reduce our vulnerability to atomic attack or to
increase our retaliatory powers--there is no reason for the
Russians to move from this position.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000900070043-3