U.S. GOAL WITH CONTRAS SHOULD BE LIMITED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000403850021-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: February 11, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

WASHINGTON TI"1ES
11 February 1985
U.S. goal with Centres should
Sen. Richard Lugar on foreign policy.
The new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Sen. Richard Lugar, R.-Ind., discussed
foreign policy with The Washington Times' editors
and. senior reporters.
Q: In Nicaragua, where we have been aiding the
anti-government guerrillas known as the Contras, the
Nicaraguans, believe that we might invade their
country. We currently have a treaty of friendship and
commerce with Nicaragua. Under the circum-
stances, should we withdraw from that treaty?
A: I suspect that each of our activities with regard
to Nicaragua has to be framed in terms of how we're
piing to bring pressure on the Sandinista government
to arrive at conclusions that we think are very impor-
tant. Basically, I think that ... they will not try to
destabilize their neighbors, and ... they will not
become a Soviet base.
I think for the moment, as Secretary [of State
George] Shultz has expressed it to me. the negoti-
ations in which we were involved in a bilateral way
with the Nicaraguans are dead in the water. Our
negotiator has retired from the field momentarily
because he's making no headway. We're back to
square one.
The Nicaraguans also apparently have contempt
for the Contradora group [which includes representa-
tives from most Central nations who are trying to
develop a regional peace plan] altogether and see no
point in dealing with any of their neighbors. That
being the case, there has to be some reason, some
pressure, to get the Nicaraguans back to negoti-
ations.
That is the approximate cause for the administra-
tion, at least momentarily, saving they plan to renew
their request for $14 million more for the Contras,
while at the same time also saying that we may need
to explore other avenues. And I've encouraged that,
though I would probably vote again in favor of more
aid for the Contras.
Although the Senate Intelligence Committee might
vote for the #14 million, there is little chance it could
bass the House Intelligence Committee so some other
means must be found to keep pressure on the Nicara-
?uan;.
I'm going to continue to explore with both the
Naticnal Security Council and the State Department
what other options we may have in pressuring the
Nicaraguans.
Q: What are some of the options you see?
A: I'm not going to surface any until I think we've
got something that makes a difference. Every time I
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get into this - and if there's a group of reporters
present - they'll say does it involve money, does it
involve third countries, does it involve changing
treaty obligations or maybe all of the above, or some
combination. This is not very useful or responsible to
get into until you know what you want to do. '
All I'm saying is that I think we'll have to find ways
to apply pressure on the Sandinistas if there is to be
movement in the negotiations with us or with others.
But the formula isn't at hand. If it were, I suspect the
administration would have adopted it more freely as
opposed to continuing on the current tack.
Q: Judged strictly in military terms, do you think
the Contra program was a success while we were
backing it?
A: It was successful at meeting the original find-
ing that led to the activity and that finding was that
Nicaragua's supplies to the rebels in El Salvador
ought to be interdicted - or, for that matter, Nicara-
guan efforts to destabilize Costa Rica or Guatamala
ought to be stopped. And I think clearly they were.
Of course, the opponents' argument used to be,
well, how much is actually going in? Those who were
sort of apologists for Nicaragua said barely a
trickle - the odd person or piece of equipment and
so forth.
Then you very rapidly get into the question of how
do we know and all the rest of it. In my own judg-
ment, the aid by Nicaragua to the guerrillas was sub-
stantial and essentially it was stopped.
Nicaragua became preoccupied with defending its
own situation, that is, the Sandinistas did, as opposed
to having the option of going out and causing trouble
willy-nilly everywhere else.
The dilemma of our policy always came down to
this: that critics even within the intelligence commit-
tee - quite apart from when we got out to the floor of
the Senate - said that although your purpose is
interdiction, in your heart of hearts you really have
overthrow of the Nicaraguan government in mind.
CIA Director [William P. Casey and others said
"No, we on't. It's interdiction, that's the finding,
that's what the President has said and we're not
involved in overthrow"
Democrats were co-opted in the Intelligence Com-
mittee - [Sens. Daniel] Moynihan, D-N.Y, Sam Nunn,
D-Ga., Lloyd Bentsen, D-Texas, and others - to sup-
port the program based on a goal of interdiction. It
was a bipartisan thing on the Senate side but it
became very partisan on the House side.
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'' But things became fuzzy when there were reports
that some administration figures indeed did see just
th ,~ odd chance that the Sandinistas might topple -
you know, we might pick up one on the cheap.
That was always, I think, a forlorn hope, militarily.
The Contras just didn't have the numbers. They were
not of a status to march on Managua. They were nib-
bling around the fringes and burning crops and
harassing people and what have you, and that was
about what they could do.
Q: Do you agree that to date the impact of the Con-
tras has mainly been psychological rather than
actual?
A: Well, yes, although the actual part has come now
into play pretty heavily in terms of the economy of
Nicaragua - which is always in bad shape but is
apparently getting much worse. There are just
enough disruptions in an economy that was already
fragile.
We saw the same thing in El Salvador during the
guerrilla activities there. It's hard to get a handle on
these, but the GNP of El Salvador may have gone
down by 25 percent a year or two ago, which is pretty
bad given the fact it was pretty low to begin with.
Now Nicaragua may be undergoing a similar
situation because the Contras are at least effective in
disrupting.
Q: Is there a dilemma for the United States that if
we drop support for the Contras we will be perceived
as having used a group then dropped it when our par-
ticular interest was over?
A: That could be a valid perception. Our policy
early on was never one of in any way giving the Con-
tras a feeling that we were going to march with
them into Managua. Now they were making
statements to the press on occasion that that's what
they were all about. That was not our view of
them, and this is the dilemma, I suppose, when covert
becomes debated on the floor of both houses of Con-
gress - that it is no longer covert.
Further more, if we get into a more overt situation,
we could be skirting around our obligations under
international law, whatever they may be. Do we want
to control the situation? Or do we say to the Contras,
here is sort of a sum of money lying out here, you can
p:ck it off the table and do with it what you want
because we have a feeling whatever you do with it will
be helpful.
But we haven't really decided that, I think, in
policy terms. Is this something over which we really
want to maintain control, and are we prepared to take
the liabilities of the Contras?
Contras have done a lot of things that are not very
tidy, and once you get into a probe of the internal
workings of the Contras you may find that they have
killed various people who were out of sorts with
them, maybe committed an atrocity or two in the pro-
cess of going about their work.
And the question is: How much of this do we coun-
tenence, how much are we responsible for and do we '
'.want to control it?
Q: You said earlier that the flow of Nicaraguan aid
to El Salvador had been successfully interdicted.
Does that mean that the insurrection, rebellion, what-
ever you want to call it, in El Salvador presently is
domestic, self-sustaining, etc?
A: Pretty much so. I think that's one reason that
the Salvadoran army is doing better. There are other
reasons: Training has gotten better; the confidence in
the [President Napoleon] Duarte government prob-
ably has increased over time; the fact that there
could be a government at all and that it commanded
some respect and made conciliatory overtures.
The El Salvador economy has gotten not well, but
it's gotten better. There is at least some basic hope on
the part of a lot of poor people that the government
may be able to produce, and they're less willing per-
haps to care and feed for the guerrillas that are in the
hills.
Q: What is your feeling about the negative effects
of America's secret war? Isn't there a flip side to the
Contra program - that it has given the Sandinista
government a wonderful excuse for all it's economic
woes; that it has unified the Nicaraguans, under an
otherwise very unpopular government, against an
external foe?
A: There are negative effects, just about as you've
stated them. But even after you say that, our policy is
still one of trying to make sure Nicaragua doesn't
destabilize its neighbors and become a Soviet base.
Q: So on balance, you think the program is prob-
ably worthwhile?
A: I think so.
Q: Do you think it advisable to consider a security
pact or a permanent base there or any of these
options?
A: Well, it might be useful to consider them, but
whether we want to come to that in light of our other
negotiations ... in other words, we've been trying to
take a point of view with the Central American coun-
tries that we would agree that nobody ought to be
having bases in Central America so that it's clear that
there's grounds for keeping Soviets or Cubans or
somebody else out of there, that we have not sought
bases but we want to make sure nobody else is seek-
ing them either. It's more of an even-handed
situation.
Q: It's relatively easy for a revolutionary regime to
go acquiescent and in a sense it would be relatively
easy to cooperate on the first two goals in the face of
a hard-line administration. Do you think that the cur-
rent regime could be trusted, and how do you think
an agreement could be structured?
A: Both the verification problem and the reaction
to violation are important, and this is why the United
States has insisted upon a Contadora group process
or a multi-lateral process involving the neighboring
nations, because they have the most at stake initially
if Nicaragua decides to take a different tack after
acquiescence, and we must have their cooperation in
any event if we are to be successful in the interme-
diate, quite apart from the long, run.
I don't know, in terms of these negotiations, [if]
we're talking about what sort of trigger points or
check-offs that you have. I think they're important,
however, as a part of that, as opposed to just simply a
pledge that they're going to cease and desist.
The Nicaraguan ambassador wrote to me about a
month ago, following some speech in which I made
similar points, that they would be fully prepared
to pledge to cease and desist harm to their neighbors,
and under no circumstance would they become a
Soviet base and saw no problems - he agreed to both
of those things. By the way, this leaves logically the
question that you've raised because maybe they'll say
that to our negotiators sometime, too.
What's the problem? They're all ready to do this,
but somehow we don't know whether that's the
change of heart that's merely temporary until we
cease and desist whatever the pressures are that led
to this frame of mind. All I'm. saying is we're having a
hard time right now even getting to the contents of
the letter the Nicaraguan ambassador wrote to me in
the field.
2,
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