THOUGHTS IN THE STATE OF ANALYSIS FOR YOUR PRESENTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01478R000100030013-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 14, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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14 July 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: C/NIC
FROM: Acting NIO/NESA
SUBJECT: Thoughts on the State of Analysis for Your Presentation
1. In considering where the intelligence community stands with regard
to the quality of analysis, four general categories come to mind: the
analysts themselves; the information being used; new approaches and
methodologies; and information handling. Taking all categories into
account, I think we have made some real progress, but are also encountering,
new problems.
2. Analysts: In my experience, the individuals who have been hired to
do analytic work at CIA in the 1980s are better educated than those hired in
the 1970s, and perhaps more importantly, they are more worldly than those in
the preceding age group. They understand instinctively the importance of
knowing the policy context of their work and bring to their jobs a more
sophisticated understanding of US officialdom, politics, and the
interrelatedness of the government they serve than was previously the case.
We do not have to spend nearly as much time tutoring them on the importance
of integrated analysis. To a large extent, the restructuring of the DI in
1981 advanced this cause; economists, military experts, political analysts,
and the like sit together now, and they all want to make their input. Nor
do we have to work so hard as managers to make analysis policy relevant.
Although we still have problems keeping abreast of policy-makers' thinking
and needs, we no longer have to convince analysts that they must consider
policy issues in structuring their analysis. They do this, not always
successfully, but they try without excessive prodding.
3. Now, this considerable improvement in the raw abilities and
sophistication of the analyst of the 1980s comes with a price, in my view.
Most of those I have dealt with have a fairly shallow commitment to the
profession of intelligence. I think personnel statistics would illustrate
that this new crowd is much more inclined to leave the profession after
several years, when the opportunities for rapid advancement become harder
and harder to seize. This pattern has. two subsets. Most analysts come to
us with strong area or functional expertise, but one category is willing to
abandon that area of work to get a promotion or management post elsewhere,
and the other much smaller category is determined to stay very narrowly
focused on his country or issue, does not wish to move around even within an
office, and is likely to leave when the GS 13 or 14 barrier proves
impossible to break. The problems here are obvious; the Agency is unlikely
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to have a large core of dedicated, long-term employees in this crowd and
management faces real problems in husbanding and directing its human
resources in the most efficient manner. Even Security must worry about the
long-term implications of more rapid turn over
4. The Agency has always had a split view about the value of the
generalist verses that of the specialist, but it has generally encouraged
the generalist. Given this bias, the employees of the 1980s may fit very
well with the Agency's longstanding disposition. However, the increasing
complexities of. this world, the rapidity of change, and the mobility of our
analytic cadre may not combine well in the not too distant future. I can
foresee analsyts grappling with extremely difficult issues without having
the rich contextual knowledge necessary to make accurate, useful judgments.
Success with the senior analyst career track has been spotty at best. Young
analysts learn early on that success here means management and probably
abandonment of their field of expertise. Among the best, many will leave
and those who stay will give us only about 5 to 8 years of analytic
excellence.
5. This brings me to my final point on analyst shortcomings--the lack
of intelligence memory. Too many of the individuals I work with, for
example, view the 1973 Arab-Israeli war as ancient history. They know only
the bare bones and none of the details that are instructive in making
today's judgments. This is in part explained by the rapid expansion of the
DI during the Casey era when most analysts had only about two years of
experience under their belts. Under normal circumstances, this situation
would correct itself over time, but the attitude of getting ahead or getting
out is likely to dramatically slow this corrective process. ADP has also
made it more difficult to school new analysts on their accounts; they review
"old" judgments but not "old" data. These people are quick studies, good.
writers, and savvy, but their "get ahead" mentality, the pressures of
current intelligence and a "publish or perish" research program give their
work an historical and sometimes intellectual thinness.
6. Information: We have done well in the DI managing the deluge of
information in the past decade. The advent of ADP, the creation of OGI, the
expansion of the ranks of analysts, and a more serious collection
requirements system, CRES, have all helped. We can bring to bear on any
subject more information than we had a decade ago, and the variety of
collection systems makes the process of verification and confirmation that
much easier. Greater appreciation of open source material and outside
expertise are new attitudes which have emerged since I arrived at the Agency
in 1970.
7. Our HUMINT, however, has not kept pace with advances in technically
collected intelligence. So often, the major complaint of the analyst is his
lack of information on intentions, decision-making, and personal
relationships. The best example of this in my recent experience is the
paucity of information on Iraqi intentions in the war with Iran. We
generally find out what the Iraqis are planning when they start deploying
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troops and hardware--and only then. We have had to take a piecemeal
approach to analysis of Iraq's use of chemical weapons--and gotten into
plenty of arguments in the process--largely because we know little about the'
planning and attitude side of the equation. The upshot of lag in HUMINT is
growing dependence on technically collected data. I worry about the day
when room-temperature superconductivity, its applications in communication,
and other new technologies at least temporarily kill off SIGINT, and we have
to scramble to fill the void.
8. In my view, the DO needs major rennovation. Too many COSs have no,
repeat no, knowledge of the countries in which they serve.
The DO has a post
WWII approach that still assumes the world is run by established elites in
neatly delineated states and colonies. Populism and its products, such as
Islamic fundamentalism, are simply off the collectors' scope, along with
many other transnational issues. The name of the game is in the capital
cities; and the villages, refugee camps, and countryside be damned.
9. The entire DO reward system is built around a classical approach to
espionage, in which credit is given only for agent reports on secrets. That
we need, but we also need much more and the system is not built to get it.
The DI has struggled with the issue of integrated, innovative analysis and
it had to go through the 1981 reorganization "revolution" to make any
headway. The DO has not gone through such a revolution and only a few
within it seem to think it even needs one. CTC is instructive here in that
to deal with an overarching issue such as terrorism, DO resources had to be
taken out of their normal structure. DO resources overseas have been able
to respond fairly well, but only because an eight year administration made
terrorism a top priority. I suspect that the response has been as good as
it is also because terrorism--while it has many unique features--fits fairly
comfortably as a classic espionage target--small groups hatching activities
in secret. But, what about the "mystery" as opposed to "secret" of
resurgent student activism, of the politicization of Palestinian youngsters
and women, and other broad based forces? Theoretically, these phenomena are
State's responsibility but certainly our collectors have a role to play too.
10. A final point on the HUMINT problem revolves around our shameless
dependence in some areas of the world on liaison. This dependency has
"bitten us in the back" viciously in Iran and at considerable expense
elsewhere. Liaison is tempting when resources are tight, but we need double
checks on what we hear in this channel and often don't have them.
11. Really good analysis will increasingly depend on the DO product
and-when we can get it--on the views and instincts of our "eyes and ears" in
the field. The demands on DO are growing and growing, the world is
changing, but DO appears to be doing basic business ever so much the same.
It is my impression that the number of field assessments has fallen off in
recent years. In my part of the world, we have very few sources outside the
military and political establishments. Where are we supposed to get our
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feel for the attitudes and inclinations of the burgeoning underclasses,
unemployed college graduates and disenchanted intellectuals? Perhaps it is
time to take a hard look at the following:
--rotating COSs less often and keeping them for the most part in one
region of the world.
--expanding the parameters of DO collection beyond controlled agent
reporting and experimenting with new collection techniques.
--changing the DO rewards system to encourage field assessments,
Washington tours, training, cross directorate assignments.
12. Information Handling: How well do we manage information and turn
it into good analysis? Certainly ADP has revolutionized that part of our
business. The profile in the SAFE system is in many ways like having an IA,
for every analyst. The computer allows us to search for facts and
relationships in information in ways that were simply impossible in an
earlier era. Are we making the best use of ADP or even keeping up with the
state of the art? Certainly not, but then no one else seems to be either.
Many of the problems are obvious; the Agency has too many systems and seems
to change its strategy regularly for bringing order to the hardware chaos.
The experts in OIR and OIT know alot about computers, but not enough about
the analytic business. Software is coming into analytic offices at a fast
pace, but only a few know how to use it. Managers are generally as far out
in left field as you can get. Just a few of the specific problems in
adapting the computer to our work are:
--the absence of physical files means that new or relatively
inexperienced analysts have no chance to learn the "history" of their
accounts through raw intelligence.
--the safe profile, although extremely valuable, often denies the
analyst the opportunity to see the anomalous but critical piece of
information or maintain it in a memorable way.
--electronic storage removes the visual triggers and housecleaning
processes that often brought about the discovery of patterns in
information--the "black hole" syndrome.
--standardized filing and retention of raw intelligence have gone by the
boards, making the transfer of accounts, "reading in," and double-checking
analytic judgments very difficult.
13. These problems are solveable but very expensive. In NESA, we are
experimenting with databases and programs directly linked to SAFE that would
ameliorate them, but the ultimate price tag is probably in the millions.
(ADP holds the potential to help analysis with the low-probability high
impact event But, until the computer
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14. New Approaches and Methods: The computer is essential to using
many of the new analytic methodologies coming on line, such as war gaming,
volume analysis, influence diagraming and the like. I gather that many
parts of the DI are doing very impressive work in these areas. Even more
tradition-bound subjects such as political instability are yielding to
computer assistance.
15. I think Bob Gates has done much to encourage innovation in analysis
with his emphasis on developing alternative scenarios. This has done much
to break down the analytic arrogance that allegedly permeated the DI at one
time. It has also liberated analysts to think the unthinkable. (In this
regard, I am sorry that the NIC apparently killed the so-called Delphic IIM
that apparently overloaded the appetite for looking for untoward events.)
OGI has also been a groundbreaker with NIE, which
pioneered the development of the "sign posts" or indicators list--now
standard features in DI work. Other useful new methodologies developed
inside the Agency include the militar coup and instability indicators
methodologies. Also OT&E have contributed with the
Intelligence Successes and Failures course, the Kennedy School seminar on
Intelligence and Policymakers, and the "Thinking In Time" presentation. The
FOA network itself is revolutionary and a real boon to stimulating analytic
excellence. That too has been brought to us by
and the computer.
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