ASAT TEST COULD ALTER ARMS RACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807470035-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: August 22, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807470035-1
ARTICLE AF? AR,EED
ON PAGEx
ASAT Test
Could Alter
Arms Race
Reagan 's Decision
Viewed as a Gamble
By George C. Wilson
W. gw. Pot Si w,x.r
President Reagan's decision to
demonstrate decisive American su-
periority in antisatellite weapons is
a gamble that could alter the course
of the superpowers' arms race, spe-
cialists said yesterday. Critics said
the move could unravel arms-con-
trol efforts and jeopardize numer-
ous American military operations,
while supporters defended the de-
cision as prudent in the face of So-
viet programs.
The administration announced
Tuesday that it plans to test an an-
tisatellite (ASAT) weapon this fall.
If the test succeeds, it will mean the
United States has a capability far
superior to the Soviet Union's, ac-
cording to official assessments by
the Central Intelligence Agency and
others.
John Steinbrunner, director of
foreign policy studies at the Brook-
ings Institution, yesterday assailed
Reagan's decision to go ahead with
an ASAT test shortly before the
November summit meeting with
Mikhail Gorbachev as a "gun to the
head approach" that will drive both
superpowers into a military space
race that "will leave both sides
worse off."
"The whole strategic relationship
of the United States and Soviet
Union depends on getting some
kind of antisatellite agreement,"
Steinbrunner said, referring to the
superpowers' dependence on space
satellites to observe what each oth-
er is doing with its strategic mis-
sbes and for many more mundane
military missions.
Controlling weaponry in space
the linch pin for all arms-control
agreements," Steinbrunner said,
WASHINGTON POST
22 August 1985
because the Soviet Union is deter-
mined to try to head off an arms
race in space.
Reagan's rebuttal to such attacks
was contained in his report to Con-
gress on Tuesday. He said the Unit-
ed States must develop the capa-
bility to combat "a growing threat
posed by present and prospective
Soviet satellites which, while not
weapons themselves, are designed
to support directly the USSR's ter-
restial forces in the event of con-
flict " The president added that the
Soviets have at least one operation-
al ASAT weapon.
The Soviets' operational antisat-
ellite weapon threatens only U.S.
military satellites that orbit at rel-
atively low altitude over their
launching sites.
Military satellites now at rela-
tively low altitudes include several
that watch Soviet facilities, collect
intelligence data or help U.S. Navy
ships,#avigate. Far in space, out of
Soviet ASAT range, are others that
control defense satellite communi-
cations and positioning of U.S.
forces, including submarines.
Even in such small operations as
the Grenada invasion and the bomb-
ing of Lebanon in 1983, satellites
were used to provide reconnais-
sance and communications. The
Pentagon is working on many ways
to protect them, including parking
them in deep space until needed
closer to Earth, increasing their
maneuverability and shielding them
from attack.
U.S. ASAT critics, such as Stein-
brunner, say the Soviets would be
compelled to match a perfected
U.S. weapon, ensuring a costly
space arms race. If arms-control
agreements halt competition, the
strategic balance will be more eas-
ily stabilized, they say.
ASAT proponents say Soviet abil-
ity to destroy some U.S. satellites
means America must develop a de-
terrent capacity.
According to a recent CIA re-
port "While the Soviets seek to be
able to den enemy use of space in
wartim current Soviet antisate-
lite capabilities are limited and fall
short of meeting this apparent re-
Paul B. Stares wrote in "The Mil-
itarization of Space" that the Sovi-
ets conducted 20 tests with their
antisatellite vehicle between 1968
and 1982, of which 11 failed. The
Soviets have not tested the weapon
since June 1982, according to mil-
itary officials.
The Soviet weapon is launched
by a relatively primitive liquid-fuel
rocket and cannot be used on short
notice. It follows its target through
space in Earth orbit, blowing up
when it approaches the target sat-
ellite.
The U.S. antisatellite weapon, by
contrast, is a sophisticated hunter
and killer that is highly mobile, be-
cause it can be launched from an
F15 fighter plane that carries the
two-stage boosting rocket to the
edge of space. This Puts Soviet sat-
ellites on different orbital routes at
risk, a tremendous advance over
the Soviet weapon.
The U.S. weapon, designated
MV for miniature vehicle and built
by the Vought Corp., appears to be
a wonder of miniaturization and
computerization, with a Gatling gun
arrangement of infrared sensing
devices to home in on the heat of
the enemy satellite. The MV is de-
signed to collide with the satellite
going the orbital speed of 17,500
miles an hour, a crash that needs no
explosive charge for sure destruc-
tion.
Concerned about the impact on
arms-control talks of a successful
test of the MV, Congress has re-
peatedly restricted its testing. The
compromise fiscal 1986 military
authorization bill pending in Con-
gress allows three tests in the com-
ing fiscal year.
The administration apparently
concluded that a successful test this
fall would strengthen rather than
complicate Reagan's negotiating
hand at the summit.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807470035-1