INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE 1990S STUDY GROUP REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93M00781R000700880001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 29, 1991
• Content Type: MISC

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Intelligence Community in the 1990s
Study Group Report to the
Director of Central Intelligence
29 May 1991
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE 1990s
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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Introduction ....................................... 1
-- Scope and Methodology ......................... 1
-
Future Intelligence Architecture ................... 2
--
Key Intelligence Issues .....................2
--
The Intelligence Community of the Future--A
Conceptual Framework .......................... 3
-
Findings and Conclusions ........................... 5
--
General Observations ....... ..... ............5
--
DCI Authorities and Responsibilities .......... 7
--
Functional Intelligence Issues ............... 19
--
Summary of Conclusions ....................... 27
-
Appendices
Appendix
A:
Study Group Members
Appendix
B:
Interviews
Appendix
C:
Principal Background Documentation
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In March 1991, the Director of Central Intelligence
commissioned a Study Group comprised of eight former and current
senior intelligence officers to examine the mission, function and
organizational structure of the Intelligence Community, and to
identify alternatives for strengthening its ability to meet the
substantive intelligence challenges of the 1990s and beyond. In
addition, the DCI directed the Study Group to examine existing
DCI authorities and responsibilities and recommend alternatives,
if appropriate or necessary, for enhancing his role in managing
and directing the Intelligence Community. The DCI further
directed that the results of this study be made available to him
no later than May 1991. A list of the Study Group members is
included at Appendix A.
Scope and Methodology
The Study Group concluded early in its deliberations that it
would be impractical to conduct an extensive, in-depth assessment
of current Intelligence Community operations and activities, or
to try to develop an ideal organizational plan for the
Intelligence Community of the future. Instead, the Group focused
on identifying and understanding the major substantive national
security issues that will challenge the Intelligence Community in
the future and, from that, developing alternatives--both
functional and structural--that would enhance the Community's
ability to meet these challenges.
The findings and conclusions contained in this report are
based largely on anecdotal evidence derived from substantive
interviews of some 70 former and current senior officials, both
within and outside the Intelligence Community, as well as the
extensive knowledge and experience of the Study Group members
themselves. The Group also reviewed a wide variety of background
materials, including ongoing reorganization plans underway in
various parts of the Intelligence Community, strategic planning
documents prepared by the CIA and NSA, and previous studies on
the Intelligence Community structure dating to the mid-1970s. In
addition, the Group examined existing enabling legislation
concerning DCI authorities and responsibilities, including Public
Laws, Executive Orders, National Security Council Intelligence
Directives (NSCIDs) and Director of Central Intelligence
Directives (DCIDs).
A list of the individuals interviewed by the Study Group and
a bibliography of relevant background documentation can be found
at Appendices B and C, respectively.
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S E C R E T
Future Intelligence Architecture
Over the past four decades, the Intelligence Community has
undergone continuous evolutionary change in response to the
increasingly complex challenges it has faced in support of US
national security policy. The next decade is likely to present
even more dramatic challenges for the Community, and be less
predictable. This section summarizes the Study Group's findings
on the key issues that will drive intelligence in the next
decade; and outlines a conceptual framework for considering the
changes in the Community we believe are necessary to accommodate
them.
Key Intelligence Issues
The beginning of
the
last decade of the twentieth century
will be recorded as a
time
of significant change in the world
order, with the demise
of
communist regimes in Eastern Europe,
growing instability in
the
Soviet Union, and a resurgence of less
traditional political
and
economic issues that will dominate
international relations for some time to come. These changes
have broad implications for US national security policy and, by
extension, for the focus and direction of US intelligence in the
1990s and beyond.
The traditional military threats of the past 40 years have
been largely replaced by a host of new security threats emerging
from the less predictable nature of the world order. These
include:
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Findings and Conclusions
This section describes the key problems identified by the
Study Group, and, where appropriate, suggests alternatives for
correcting them. This section is divided into four parts:
--General observations.
--DCI authorities and responsibilities.
--Functional intelligence issues.
--Summary of Conclusions.
The Study Group has concluded that, on balance, the current
Intelligence Community organizational structure is working
reasonably well; and that major restructuring is not necessary to
meet the challenges we foresee. Indeed, based on all of the
evidence presented to us, we do not believe there is a
persuasive--or valid--case for reorganizing the Community.
Rather, we believe that the Community as it is configured today
has the flexibility to respond effectively to the changing world
order, and that its ability to do so remains largely a function
of the caliber of its people and the leadership, initiative and
creativity they demonstrate. In addition, we believe that the
DCI's authorities are generally adequate to enable him to fulfill
his responsibilities, although in certain areas it may be useful
to clarify or strengthen them.
The Study Group did identify a number of problems in the way
the Intelligence Community functions today, but believes that,
for the most part, they can and should be resolved through
management initiatives rather than major restructuring. Chief
among these are:
--Community management.
--Proaram evaluation and resource decisionmakina.
The Study Group notes that the ability of the Community to
perform its mission successfully depends heavily on the strength
of the personal relationships among its principal leaders. Some
have argued that the Intelligence Community needs a more formal
structural arrangement that does not rely on personal
relationships. While there are clearly valid arguments for this
point of view, the Group believes that it is unrealistic to try
to institutionalize a structure that is "personality-proof."
The Study Group also notes that a number of significant
organizational changes are in the process of being implemented in
certain parts of the Intelligence Community. The Group believes
strongly that it is incumbent upon the DCI and the Secretary of
Defense to ensure that the results of these efforts are as
intended, and that appropriate steps to modify and refine them
are taken as circumstances warrant. Of particular relevance are
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S E C R E T
DCI Authorities and Responsibilities
The Study Group believes that, in general, the DCI's
authorities are adequate to fulfill his responsibilities. These
authorities emanate primarily from Executive Order, supplemented
by NSCIDs and DCIDs, and are thus subject to change and
interpretation by the President. In the final analysis, the
effectiveness of any DCI will be primarily dependent on his
relationship with the President and, to a significant extent,
with the Secretary of Defense; and legislation cannot dictate
those relationships.
Director of National Intelligence
Over the years, a number of proposals have been made for
creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who would
function as the head of the Intelligence Community and serve as
the President's senior intelligence advisor; but, would not
manage and direct the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sen. Arlen Specter (R PA) has recently proposed such
legislation (S-421), the essential element of which would split
the current DCI's responsibilities between a DNI and a Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA). Each would have a
deputy authorized to act in the absence of the principal. All
four positions would be appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate.
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of Defense may wish to examine options for consolidating
these units and exercising them periodically with the
military commands they would likely be called upon to
support in a crisis.
--Selection of NRO/NSA/DIA Directors. Some interviewees
believe that the DCI should have a stronger role in the
selection of these individuals. The issue here seems to be
one of clarifying/strengthening the DCI's command authority
over these major elements of the national intelligence
community to enhance accountability and the decisionmaking
process.
DCI Science Advisory Board
A recurring theme that emerged during the course of the
Study Group's interviews was the effectiveness with which the
Intelligence Community uses technology. Some cited perceived
weaknesses in technical surveillance countermeasures. Others
noted shortfalls in the application of ADP technology, especially
in the intelligence production area, where analytic tools have
not kept pace with recent technological advances.
n er o
alternatives were suggested to remedy these shortfalls, including
reconstituting the Intelligence R&D Council.
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S E C R E T
Open Source Collection and Exploitation
Open source information is an exceptionally rich source of
data that is now readily available from previously denied areas
of the world, in an increasingly diverse array of visual, print
and electronic media. While the increased availability of open
source information will provide additional opportunities for
intelligence, the sheer volume will pose significant challenges
in the years ahead. Our ability to exploit it fully will have a
pervasive effect on the quality, timeliness, and relevance of
intelligence collection, processing, and analysis. Today, the
capabilities needed to do that lack strong advocacy and well
coordinated management and control.
The Group believes that the Community has thus far attacked
the open source problem in piecemeal fashion. In our view, the
Community needs to develop a comprehensive plan for collecting
and exploiting open source information, factoring this
development into its overall program plans for the future. For
example, the Community's clandestine collection strategy will
need to be revised as will the way in which requirements are
formulated, bearing in mind that a great deal of information that
could only be obtained clandestinely for the past 40 years is now
in the public domain. Moreover, accommodating open source
exploitation will require additional resource investment to
expand in an orderly fashion the skeletal capabilities that exist
today.
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Counterintelligence
A number of steps have been taken in recent years to improve
US counterintelligence, with positive results. Nevertheless, the
Study Group found strong consensus that further improvements are
needed. Of particular concern are the Community's analytic
capability to identify and counter hostile threats, and the
effectiveness of the vaious mechanisms that have been established
for managing and directing the counterintelligence effort. Some
believe that the creation of the Counterintelligence Center has
been a step in the right direction; others believe more needs to
be done, especially in the military services.
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Summary of Conclusions
--On balance, the current Intelligence Community
organizational structure is working reasonably well and major
restructuring is not necessary.
--The DCI's authorities are generally adequate to enable him
to fulfill his responsibilities, although some clarification may
be needed in certain areas.
--There are a number of problems in the way the Community
functions that can and should be resolved through management
initiatives rather than restructuring.
--Intelligence support to military operations needs to be
strengthened, but recent experience in Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm by itself ought not be the driving force
behind decisions on how the Community should be structured in the
future.
DCI Authorities and Responsibilities
--The liabilities associated with creating a Director of
National Intelligence far outweigh the potential benefits, and
neither the President or the Intelligence Community would be well
served by creation of such a position.
--A second DDCI position should be established to manage
Community affairs, and one of the three senior positions should
normally be filled by a four-star military officer.
--The Intelligence Community Staff should be strengthened
and colocated with the DCI at Langley.
--The NFIP budget should remain classified
--The DCI's budgetary authority should be strengthened by
giving him final authority for formulating and executing the NFIP
budget, including authority to reprogram funds.
--The NFIC needs to place greater emphasis on program
evaluation to ensure that scarce resources are invested wisely,
and that operational systems remain cost effective.
--The resource decisionmaking process should be strengthened
by creating an NFIC "executive committee" composed of three or
four key NFIC members; or by replacing NFIC with a senior
decisionmaking body, chaired by the DCI and composed of the
Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs.
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S E C R E T
Functional Intelligence Issues
--Policymakers continue to favor competitive intelligence
analysis, but in light of future resource constraints, the
Community should reassess its competitive analysis program to
determine how much is needed, in what areas, and at what cost.
--The existing National Intelligence Council structure may
no longer be the most effective means to develop long term
estimates and should be reassessed in light of future substantive
priorities.
--A comprehensive plan for collecting and exploiting open
source information needs to be developed; additional resources
will need to be devoted to this effort in the future.
--Clandestine support to military operations needs to be
strengthened and a dedicated focal point structure within CIA/DO
should be established for this purpose.
--Steps should be taken to clarify the role and
responsibilities of CIA and DoD in satisfying military
intelligence requirements and to strengthen DIA management and
coordination of DoD clandestine HUMINT activities.
--The Community's HUMINT collection strategy needs to be
reassessed to ensure that our clandestine resources are deployed
where the substantive contribution is the highest.
--The current imagery structure is working well for the most
part and major restructuring is not needed.
--The DCI should urge the Secretary of Defense to move
aggressively to establish a flexible and robust communications
architecture to accommodate transmission of imagery to the field;
and to develop and enforce strict standards of interoperability
within and among the military services for secondary imagery
distribution.
--A review of imagery exploitation activites should be
undertaken to identify and eliminate unnecessary duplication and
redundancy.
--The DCI and DIRNSA should undertake a review of existing
and planned SIGINT programs to ensure that scarce resources are
applied to the most critical substantive priorities and that they
are fully responsive to user needs.
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S E C R E T
Appendix B
INTERVIEWS
Former Government/Private Sector
Gen. Lew Allen
Norman Augustine
William Bennett
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Frank Carlucci
Dr. Raymond Cline
William Colby
Adm. William Crowe
John Deutch
Intelligence Community
Duane Andrews
Helene Boatner
RADM Thomas Brooks
MGen. James Clapper
LtGen. Charles Eichelberger
Fritz Ermarth
Martin Faga
Douglas Gow
Robert Guth
Charles Hawkins
Joseph Hayes
Leo Hazlewood
John Helgerson
Jimmie Hill
James Hirsch
Other Government
William Baker
LtGen. Michael Carnes
Arnold Donahue
Robert Gates
Richard Haver
Adm. David Jeremiah
Robert Kimmitt
William Hyland
Richard Helms
Evan Hineman
Adm. Bobby Inman
Robert Kohler
Barry Kelly
Donald Latham
John McMahon
LtGen. William Odom
James Schlesinger
Adm. Stansfield Turner
Fredrick Hitz
Rae Huffstutler
Richard J. Kerr
William Lackman
Col. James McKinney
Douglas Mulholland
Edmund Nowinski
LtGen. war oys er
Wayne Strand
Adm. William Studeman
I. Lewis Libby
James Locker
RADM Michael McConnell
Gen. Colin Powell
John Robson
Henry Rowen
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