S&T INTELLIGENCE: THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S CAPABILITY TO MEET NEW AND EVOLVING NEEDS OF NATIONAL POLICYMAKERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01137R000400010067-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: September 17, 1980
• Content Type: MISC

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17 SEP 1980
S&T Intelligence: The Intelligence
Community's Capability to Meet New and
Evolving Needs of National Policymakers
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CONTENTS
Preface/Tutorial on SST Intelligence
I. Introduction
I.I. STAP Findings and Recommendations
A. overall Findings and Recommendations
B. Specific Findings and Recommendations
1. Identification of National Issues with
Major SET Content
2. Intelligence Production Planning and Tasking
3. Collection Tasking
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4. Collection:
- H umint
- Technical
5. Processing of Cvert Intelligence rata.
6. Analysis and Production
7. Consumer and Analytical Feedback
STAT
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O Introduction
In late 1978 the STAP, with the DCI approval, undertook a
wideranging review of the Intelligence Community's capability to meet
the contemporary needs of national policymakers for foreign
intelligence concerned with international scientific and technological
developments. This review stemmed largely from STAP's belief that
foreign developments in science and technology in the decade ahead
would become major determinants in the formulation of US foreign
policy, national technology strategies, and national security
planning. of particular concern was the rate at which future
developments in SET are expected to take place, with corresponding
impacts on international pclitical, social, industrial, and economic
systems. While the use of foreign SET intelligence* in the US defense
planning was considered straightforward and generally adequate, its
use in political and economic contexts called for new and innovative
approaches, in both collection and intelligence production. STAP was
not sanguine about the IC's ability to identify such evolving policy
needs and to effect the sutstantive and organizational changes needed
to meet those future intelligence requirements in a timely fashion.
STAP, although restricted in its charter from dealing with
nuclear matters and with technology when it passes from the "6.2 to
6.3" stage, i.e. when it appears in weapons systems,'" recognizes the
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large grey areas of overlap and taken a broad view.of SET intelligence
philosophically and a narrower view for organizational reasons. From
the broad point of view SST intelligence includes a spectrum for early
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Q scientific thoughts and developments, through their technological
Q
development and production cf hardware, to appearance in new systems.
It includes, in addition to military SST, SET which may become in the
future more important than military, e.g. SET related to food,
population and energy.
STAP also observed that shifts in the national level consumer
community were already under way, i.e., there are increasing numbers
of policymakers and decisionma.kers requireing foreign SET intelligence
for non-military and diplomatic affairs. The applications ranged from
the United States' SET agreements with China and the USSR, to energy
and space policy decisions and the world Administrative Radio
Conference WARC) of 1979. The collection and production of national
intelligence in support of these new policy needs required new forms
of analysis--often multidisciplinary,
i. e. ,
techno-eccuomic and
techno-political--and development of new consumer relations and policy
support mechanisms.
STAP was concerned that the IC was not structured or oriented
toward the provision of multidisciplinary analysis and that production
positions BW/CW assessments) based on poor technological
understanding of how civil-military industrial capabilities
interrelate. The significance of SET developments and their
relationship to the achievement of the--.political, economic, and
military objectives of foreign nations are exceedingly complex issues
of traditional political or economic intelligence on international
issues containing significant SET content (e.g., energy) might result
in oversimplified one-dimensional assessments or in political-military
%,.. 4-1 Tr vnnlri rannire 'considerable improvement
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in both the intelligence data base and the analytical techniques in
order to make the appropriate policy-related technology assessments.
And in the future analysis STAP was not convinced that the existing
consumer-producer relationships between national policymakers and the
IC would support or guarantee the effective communication of consumer
requirements and intelligence Production in areas not already well
established.
STAP initially undertook the review of the SET intelligence
cycle* with the objective cf completing it (on a part-time basis) in
about one year. However, due to the burden of other tasks the,project
stretched out to about two years. Even at that, not all aspects of the
cycle were looked at. in as much detail as would have been desirable.
C The approach taken, both functional evaluation of individual cycle
elements and contemporary case studies (dynamic), permitted an
assessment of the IC's current capabilities to meet the new and
!evolving needs of policymakers; STAP used its best judgment in the
extrapolation of those capabilities to meet future needs. The study
results, of course, have their limitations. The recommendations made
are functionally oriented and not organizationally specific.
_ - Implementation of those recommendations will require elaboration to
make them specific. STAP is prepared to provide assistance in this
II. STAB FINDINGS AND RECGI!MENRATIONS
*The SST intelligence cycle studied by STAP comprises the
identification and prioritization of problems, collection aganist
them, processing of collected data fcr analysis, the analysis itself,
the publication and disseminsation of results, and, very important,
feedback from consumers to the producers of-SST intelligence.:.
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A. OVERALL FINDINGS AND RECCMME! EATIONS
As a result of numerous briefings, interviews, and reading, STAP
concluded that SET intelligence, by itself, is a naked product. Few
high-level consumers need or appreciate foreign intelligence products
solely devoted to the technical aspects of foreign SET developments.
In order for SET intelligence to be meaningful and relevant, it must
be properly interpreted in terms cf its political, economic, and/or
military implications.
STAP feels SET intelligence is key to anticipatory analysis in
the military and economic areas and can be of importance in US foreign
0 policy initiatives that seek to obtain US political objectives by
using US science and technology.
Further, SET intelligence becomes increasingly important as SST
advances are made in countries cther than the United States. We note
that in the mid-50s, the United States contributed three-quarters of
SET advances, but now contributes less than one-third.
It also becomes important as natural rescurce constraints limit
economic growth; as economic competition or as some term it economic
warfare intensifies among industrialized countries; and as Western
tehcnology developments--paced by commercial not military needs--widen
the gap between the West.and both Communist and LDC4 countries and
0 access to Free World sources becomes easier for'foreign military
planners.
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to achieve foreign policy objectives, particularly in cases that
conflict with US national security and economic interests, the need
for SET intelligence increases.
STAP feels that the structure of the Intelligence Community (IC)
must be improved if it is to meet the new and evolving SST
intelligence needs of policymakers, as well-as anticipate their future
needs.
Lastly, the collection means of (principally HUMINT) and analysis
of SET intelligence has progressed little over the last 20 years. STAP
feels the IC analytical community is not well prepared to meet the new
complex and sophisticated needs of contemporary policymakers.
Recommendations
With respect to the above overall findings, STAP makes the
following recommendations:
o A dedicated effort must be made by the NSC and NFIB to
increase the level of awareness within the IC of the increasing,
importance of SST intelligence tc broad US national security and
foreign policy needs.
o -SST intelligence should be collected and produced as an'
0 integral part of political, economic and military intelligence.
0 The responsibility of identifying priority national S.ST
intelligence issues. coordinating IC collectio.a.,and. SET intelligence
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0 production on national issues, and serving as the DCI's principal
adviser on S&T intelligence matters should be assigned by the DCI to
an NIO/SET, STIC, STAP or a combination, with clear lead
responsibilities.
o In order to fully realize the IC S&T collection capabilities,
a small, dedicated, technically qualified tasking element should be
established in the National Collection Planning Office (NCPO); SET
collection guidance on national-level issues should be provided by
STIC, and, where relevant, in coordination with WSSIC,. JAEIC and EIC.
STAT
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o STIC, in consultation with the DDS&T and STAP, should
systematically identify totally new areas for technical collection,
STAT
o The IC must develop a program and, if necessary, an
organization comparable to NPIC and NSA, to process open source
information for subsequent use by the analytical community.
o NSA and NPIC should be encouraged__t.o participate in analysis
that involves the merger of COMINT, HU INT,.PHOTINT, and open source
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o The IC needs to develop a general approach or methodology for
assessing the long-range implications of foreign SET developments that
will provide the basis for anticipatory analysis in the economic and
political areas.
o The IC should estaflish a mechanism to assess the quality of
community SET intelligence products, both in terms of consumer values
and substantive merit; outside assistance from academe or
knowledgeable contractors should be sought on the latter
B. SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECCMMENDATIONS
The fcllowing more detailed findings and recommendations indicate
0 the steps .needed to 1) organize the IC's S&T elements and processes,
2) organize for a given task, and 3) package in an integrated way SET
intelligence of importance in the military, economic and political
areas.
1. Identification - National issues with Major S&T Content
STAP found that no one is assigned primary responsibility for
identifying such issues. There is nc NIO/ST. or NCOP/ST, the.DCI's STIC
is only partially responsible, and there are no requirements on STAP.
The current NITs and DCID 1/2 are not adequate, as they lack
specificity, require analytical interpretation for which no one has
0 responsibility, and they are not appropriate for time-urgent issues.
STAT
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STAP found that key policymakers (NSC, OSTP, State, Defense,
Commerce, Treasury, etc.) must seek their own channels to the IC.
There are few, if any, identified points of contact. Only the NSC
staff and OSTP have used NIT's or equivalents to ccmmunicate their
needs concerning key S&T issues. High-level ccnsumers who have had
prior experience with the IC use their own private channels--a form of
"old boy network. "
Most consumers do not know or understand the IC or how to use it,.
but those few with intelligence officers on. their staffs (e.g., OSTP
and Energy) can make better use of the community.
the DCI's STIC, to STAP, or to a
STAP recommends that responsibility for identifying priority
national issues for S&T intelligence action!be assigned to an NIO/S&T,
comti.n,ation of the above, with clear
lead responsibilities identified. A multilevel approach is required
with interaction between the IC and consumers at high and middle
2. Intelligence Production Planning Tasking
STAP found that there is no IC mechanism or designated official
responsible for translating high-level consumer,-needs for SST
intelligence into IC production guidance. --The task apparently is left
to individual production units and these efforts are uncoordinated.
mot. nmTn .. ,.. uTr /VTn? -rctir:fnrm thi S task and STAP Dlavs no role. The
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principal consumers tend to make direct production/support requests to
various IC producers. Products tend to be reactive ;not all bad) and
not. anticipatory. Products are usually drawn. from single production
units, not the IC as a whole.
Current production planning does not realize the full potential
of SET intelligence as a multidisciplinary element. SET contributions
to economic and political, as well as military, assessments are not
being fully considered. The lcng-range anticipatory nature of SST
intelligence is mainly being used in making military assessments and
only on a sporadic basis. SET intelligence could provide long-range
input for some political and economic assessments as well.
STAP recommends that the national SET production planning
responsibility be assigned to a technically qualified central
authority--an NIO/S&T, STIC, or other entity. STAP should play an
active advisory role.
3. Collection Tasking
STAP feels that national tasking on SET issues requires both
substantive expertise on a variety of issues and detailed knowledge
concerning IC collection systems. In this area, the NCFC has requested
STIC to provide substantive expertise.
STAP found that national tasking on SET topics continues largely
to focus on military, rather than politico-economic, threats. Present
tasking tends to result in the collection of a large but not always
usable data base on.::...military SET, whereas in the non-military SET
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O area, issues are not as well defined or are undefined. Technical
collection tasking (PHOTIN'I and SIGINT) is generally well organized
and responsive to military S&T intelligence tasking, but is on an "as
available" basis for non-military tasking.
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HUM.INT collection tasking is much less well crganized and even
though it is recognized as a potentially significant source of S?,T
intelligence, there needs to be even more effort by the analysis and
production community to exploit it more fully.
There is too little interaction. between HUMINT collectors and SET
analytical organizations--feedback has been nearly nonexistent so that
collectors have little incentive and analysts are unaware when their.
requests are not feasible for one reason or another.
STAP recommends that a small but dedicated SET tasking element be
established within the -NCPO which could also serve as a link to the
principal SET consumer crganizaticns. In addition special SET
collection priorities and collection guidance should be developed by
the IC--under STIC leadership--for HUMINT tasking, particularly for
clandestine collection.
4. Collection: HUMINT
STk2 feels that HUMINT offers extremely high potential for
Q foreign SST intelligence collection. While overt,c`ollection could
satisfy more SET intelligence requirements, it.-is not adequately
tasked nor guided on national issues, and clandestine collection
cnfforc from=.... t:he .absence of national SET priorities and collection
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O To solve these specific problems, STIC, in consultation with
guidance.,
Few HUMINT collectors are trained concerning SET intelligence and
HUMINT collectors often do not realize their full potential because
consumers, particularly analysts, are not fully exploiting what they
are now collecting.
STAP, should prepare specific SET collection guidance on national
issues for UUMINT collectors; special SET intelligence training should
be developed for HUMINT ccllectcrs; SET collection priorities and
collection guidance should be prepared for clandestine IfUMINT
collectors;
Collection: Technical
STAB found that technical collection (PHOTINT and SIGINT) against
military and nuclear targets receive high-priority coverage but
O non-military targets, with the possible.--exception of agriculture,
receive far less attention.
STAT
STAT
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STAP believes that NSA and to a lesser extent NPIC have
analytical capabilities that are not effectively used because of rigid
interpretatins of roles and missions. Also,. there is not enough effort
to develop or use new technical collection means--other than national
PHOTINT or SIGINT systems--to collect SST intelligence.
STAP recommends that NSA and NPIC be encouraged to participate in.
analysis that involves the merger of COMINT, HUMINT, PHOTINT and open
source literature.
Further, STIC, in consultation with DDS&T and STAP, should be
tasked to identify promising new areas of technical collection
5. Processing of overt intelligence Data
STAP found that the processing, of overt source SET information
0 within the IC tends to be haphazard, as there is nothing comparable to
NSA or NPIC in this area, and such processing- is mainly left to
individual analysts. Also, the storage and retrieval of foreign open
c nest well ora.anized or managed withi.rv.;,the IC.
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STAT
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The IC's use, with the possible exception of ETD, of commercial S&T
information systems is poor, and analysts generally are ignorant of
the potential. Further STAF found that the SAFE system at one stage
did not plan to utilize open source information.
Lastly, the -IC does not effectively use open source evaluation
conducted by other parts of the government, by industry, or by
academia.
STAP recommends that the IC develop a program, and if necessary
an organization, comparable to NPIC and NSA to process open source and
overtly acquired information for subsequent use by the analytical
community. STAP points out that open source analysis would be feasible
0 for a contractor operation.
6. Analysis and Production
STAP found that the analysis of SST intelligence, as opposed to
weapon system analysis, for instance, continues principally to be a
"desk top" process. Few new analytical techniques are developed or
used, there is little systematic effort to assess the long-term
implications of SST developments, and there is. little effort to tap
into outside analytical ccmmunities (industry, banks, think tanks,
universities, etc.)
STAP sees little interdisciplinary use bejng made of SST
intelligence in IC products and little effort to use SET intelligence
projections as the basis for conducting anticipatory analysis in
.. anA nn 7;*;-?aI arnac._- +.h nn nh..? antic-inatnrv a na1vsis in
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0 military areas is quite active and makes consideratle use of SST
intelligence.
There is little coordination or planning of S&T.analysis and
production within the' IC and too few efforts to incorporate SST
intelligence in other IC products. The IC tends to produce too much of
its SET intelligence in formal publications, while pclicymakers also
desire to receive oral briefings and to interact with the intelligence
expert. STAP feels that for SST intelligence collection, feedback from
the analytical community is crucial; a mechanism should be developed
by the NCPO for this purpose.
STAP believes that selected SET analysis should become an
integral part of military, economic and political analyses. The NIC,
or possibly STIC, should have the responsibility for coordinating SST
intelligence analysis across the IC. In support of the three areas,
military, economic and political, STAP feels there should he dedicated
SET efforts on anticipatory intelligence analysis; a general approach
or methodology should be developed to assess the long-range
implications of foreign SET developments.
7. Consumer and Analytical Feedback
STAP found no organized effort to evaluate. the quality of the IC
finished intelligence product. Analysts tend to be evaluated on
performance rather than value of the product. STAP feels that feedback
from the analytic community is critical to improved collection
performance as HUMINT collectors need but receive very little
...A.. -nA nrca+ar att.,Pntion is -.needed to monitor unnecessary
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O technical collection. Ccnsumers want and need feedback. The
development of the NIT's (or any similar national consumer list)
depends on such feedback and consumers' need to know if they are
asking the right questions (e.g., PRC Petrochemical case).
STAP recommends that greater attention to given to .
consumer/analyst interaction, including more frequent personal
discussions. The IC should establish a means of evaluating the quality
of its finished SET intelligence products. STAP could be used in some
fashion for this purpose. Consumers should be kept informed regarding
these evaluations. Also, an effort should be made to better understand
how analysis is currently carried out, how it is evaluated, and how
good analysts are identified.
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