MILITARY THOUGHT: THE QUESTION OF INCREASING THE STABILITY OF TROOP CONTROL: , BY MAJOR-GENERAL OF ARTILLERY V. ILINYKH AND LIEUTENANT-GENERAL OF COMMUNICATIONS TROOPS P. KUROCHKIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029500250001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 12, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Question of Increasing the. Stability of
Troop Control
In the article by Major-General M. Ivanov, extremely
urgent questions of increasing the effectiveness and stability
of the control of troops are raised.' In analyzing the exist-
ing structure of operational staffs and the requirements
levied on them, the author reaches the conclusion that there
must be a radical reorganization of control organs, the
essence of which consists of the elimination of staffs of
arms of troops and certain directorates and the creation-in
their place of several centers for planning and for troop
control. Specifically, he proposes the creation of a
nuclear/missile center as the organ for controlling all
nuclear means of destruction, i.e., missile troops and the
appropriate types of aviation.
In our opinion, it is impossible to agree with the
organizational structure of operational staffs proposed by
General Ivanov. He. bases his thoughts mainly on the necessity
for planning and only partially on control, losing sight of
the other side of the activities of the chiefs of arms of
troops and their staffs,which is training and thoroughly
providing for the constant combat readiness of their
subordinate units and large units. Even the control of,
for example, the missile troops of a front, represents an
involved complex of a number of measures.
In addition to this, the consolidated combined arms staff
with various centers, which is proposed by the author of the
article to replace the presently existing directorates and staffs
of arms of troops, is also unwieldy and still does not
eliminate the division of duties, and consequently,
unavoidably requires appropriate coordination among the
centers.
1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought", First Issue, 1961.
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It is perfectly correct that the element of time has
assumed an extremely important significance and that time-
ly collection of the most complete data on the situation,
a comprehensive analysis of these, adoption of decisions
and transmission of these decisions to the troops, and
also control over the execution of these decisions, is
required of staffs. However,,,all of these tasks can be
successfully accomplished with the existing organization
of the staffs if certain modifications are introduced.
Preservation of the duties of the chiefs of arms of
troops with their appropriate staffs or directorates
conforms to the principle of single command and strengthens
responsibility not only for planning but also for the
training and education of personnel and for the support
and thorough training of the appropriate arms of troops.
Modern combat equipment is complex and in order to handle
it specific know-how is necessary.
In itself, the idea of control of means of mass
destruction, i.e., missile troops, aviation, and chemical
troops, from a single center is not new. It was implement-
ed in training exercises of the American Army, where a
similar center was headed by the artillery commander.
Perhaps, such a system contains certain positive
aspects, but to unify the control of missile troops and
atomic bomb-carrying aviation is not appropriate.in our
view, because control of the latter has its own specific
characteristics and is the prerogative of the commander
of an air army.
In the practice of combat training,fairlyc definite
views have been worked out for organization of the control
of missile troops and atomic-bomb-carrying aviation; they
consist of the following.
The commander of the troops of a front determines the
target:.:and the procedure for the use of nuclear weapons,
allocates missions among the missile troops and aviation
and establishes the bases for coordinated action among
them, and during the progress of the operation makeS?~,
decisions concerning the delivery of nuclear strikes.
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The staff of a front jointly with the staffs of the
missile troops and artillery and of the air army develops
the plan for the use of nuclear weapons, organizes
intelligence, determines the objecti for destruction,
determines the yield of the nuclear warheads to be used
against them and the types of bursts, and also the time
for delivering the strikes.
The chief of missile troops and artillery and his
staff must, on the basis of the decision -made by the
commander of troops of the front, plan in detail the
combat use of the missile troops to be used to'carry out the
o rail tvask~ cif ..the =front, and in an army thew e all
tas`k's-.4f the, army,,, allocate fire missions and assign
them to those who are to execute them and must organize
the tour of duty of launch batteries, the timely delivery
of missiles to units and also the preparation of these
for launching. During the course of an operation, they
execute maneuver by trajectories and the movement of
missile units and their supply bases.
In order to control missile troops, it is necessary
constantly to know the situation and condition of the
missile large units and units and also the availability and
degree of readiness of the missiles for launching. Control
of missile troops and their fire must be carried out
continuously, which can be achieved by means of constant
readiness for thO1r'_eontto1.from presently existing
forward command posts (peredovoy komandnyy punkt PKP)
and command posts (komandnyy punkt -- KP) with high
operational and technical training of generals and
officers, a clear-cut distribution of functional
responsibilities with the existence of interchangeability,
and also uninterrupted and reliable communications.
As a rule, the control of troops will be conducted from
two points; these can be PKP or KP. In this, the personnel
must be available at the PKP who are necessary to the
commander of troops of the front in the process of working
out a decision and in the control of troops, namely
generals and officers from the combined arms staff and
chiefs of arms of troops,including the chief of missile
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troops and artillery of the front with a small group of
well trained officers. The remaining personnel of the
staff and the field control headed by the chief of staff
of the front are located at the KP. A constant reciprocal
exchange of information between the PKP and KP must be
implemented.
In his article, General Ivanov argued aufli:ciently
convincingly for the advisability of having in the
composition of the field control of a front and army
two independent elements of control. Without raising
an objection against this method of resolving the
problem of control, we add that, in our opinion, the
chiefs of the basic directorates of the staff and arms
of troops with small groups of subordinate officers must
be located with the commander of troops of a front in
all cases, thus permitting rapid evaluation of a situation,
adoption of a decision, and issuance of commands.
The opinion of the author of the article concerning
the elimination of parallelism in requesting data on a
situation is also perfectly correct. Obviouslyithe
introduction of automation into the control of troops
will eliminate such defects but even under the given
conditions this system needs revision. All information
received from the troops must be concentrated in one organ
and represented on an overall map or map-screen.
This proposal does not exclude, of course, the necessity
for interested command echelons to receive certain special
information from directly subordinate troops (for example,
for the staff of the missile troops and artillery to
receive data on the movement of missiles and their degree
of readiness for launching).
As is known, in view of the use of nuclear/missile
weapons, the significance of intelligence has increased
sharply, especially the timely receipt of reliable data.
And in this regard we are in full agreement with General.
Ivanov, that the accomplishment of all tasks facing
intelligence, primarily those on behalf of the use of
nuclear/missile weapons, requires its centralization.
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Does the necessity for the staff of the missile
troops and artillery to have its own intelligence
department no longer exist? No, it still exists. In
our view, it is needed in small complement, in particu-
lar for the organization and execution of preliminary
reconnaissance of targets prior to delivery of a
nuclear strike, and also for the organization of control,
topographic-geodetic support, and other work. But its
activities must be coordinated by the chief of
intelligence of the front.
As a whole, in our opinion, the questions raised
by General Ivanov regarding the reorganization of
methods of control of troops merit further discussion.
Major-General of Artillery V. Ilinykh
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In our opinion, the article by Major-General M. Ivanov
reflects correctly the deficiencies in the organizational
structure of the staffs of operational formations, in the
methods of control of troops, and in the organization of
control points, and the author's practical proposals do
not raise any fundamental objections.
However, in our view, one can approach a resolution
of the problem of increasing the stability of troop
control most correctly not from an examination of the
organizational structure of staffs as does General
Ivanov, but from a thorough analysis of the methods of
control of troops and combat weapons, upon which in turn
wi depend the structure of the control organs.
New weapons of armed combat, and the nature of
conducting combat operations corresponding to them,
have a strong influence on the methods of control of
troops and combat equipment, and the latter in turn makes
definite, perfectly specific demands on the organizational
structure of the organs and means of control. The anti-
aircraft defense of troops, for example, requires such
methods and means of control as to ensure the timely
transmission of data on current aerial targets directly
to the combat weapons, the instantaneous aiming of these
weapons at targets which have been discovered, putting
the combat weapons into action, and effectively destroying
the target. As we see it, the main role belongs to the
actual method of control.
The requirements on the organs of control which are
listed in the article amount, in essence, to control
over the readiness of combat means, regulating the
activities of the commanders of arms of troops and the
chiefs of special troops, and ensuring more purposeful
work by appropriate departments in the collection and
processing of operational information. These requirements
are correct,but they do not include the main condition
emanating from the use of modern combat weapons and from
the nature of the conduct of combat and operations.
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The main element, in our view, is the fact that the
control of troops, weapons, and equipment must ensure
effective results from the use of all weapons of armed
combat, primarily of nuclear/missile' weapons, antiair-
craft missile weapons, and the system of antiaircraft
and antimissile defense as a whole. On this basis,
particular requirements for the control of troops are
determined. Besides those indicated by General Ivanov
in his article, we should like to bring up some new ones
in addition, such as:
-ensuring speedy reaction by the commander and
staff to events (phenomena) as they occur, which
depends, on the one hand, on the use in combat and
operations of rapid-fire combat weapons and troops
possessing high speeds of movement and, on the other
hand, on the necessity for counteracting an enemy who
has similar forces and weapons;
-ensuring maximum expediency in decisions and
precision in the operations, especially of nuclear/
missile weapons, the system of antiaircraft and anti-
missile defense, airborne troops and radio countermeasures
means;
-ensuring thorough control over the timely readiness
of nuclear/missile weapons, means of antiaircraft and
antimissile defense, and also over the operations and
situation of friendly troops and their materiel and
technical support.
In our opinion, the requirement for control organs
advanced by the author in regard to the concentration
of data on the situation in one point (center) should be
broadened. It is necessary to ensure the timely
collection and processing and the reliability of informa-
tion on the condition of combat weapons, troops, materiel
and technical reserves, intelligence information on the
enemy (in the first order, on objectives for nuclear
strikes), and data on the radiation and chemical situation.
Under modern conditions, the versatility and volume
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of the information which characterizes the combat
situation, the increased number of directions from which
it is received, and the sharp expansion of the area
within which it is necessary to collect this information
is noted. In addition, the collection and processing of
information must be accomplished in very limited periods
of time, consisting,in many cases,of minutes and even
seconds.
We fully agree with the opinion of General Ivanov
concerning the necessity for stricter centralization
of troop control as a whole, including centralization
of planning, control of fire weapons, and collection
and processing of operational information, but we do
not share his point of view on the composition of the
field control of a front (army).
In our view, the creation of two separate centers,
a main command-planning center and an operational
center, is contrary to the concept of centralization
of the control of troops. In essence, one center
plans, and another concerns itself with the collection
of data and directs combat operations. This can lead
to parallelism and to the necessity for coordinating
the work of these two centers and,in the final analysis,
to loss of time. Would it not be better to have one
center, an operational directorate (department), whose
functions have been broadened in the sphere of unified
planning, and the collection and analysis of all informa-
tion on the situation of friendly troops and on the
results of the use of nuclear weapons,and in the trans-
mission of all instructions based on the plan for the
operation, and on the progress of combat operations? In
this situation, the concept of centralization of
control will be effected more fully and the necessity
for coordinating the work of both centers will no
longer exist.
The designation "nuclear/missile center" also
warrants comment. In proposing the formation of such
a center, General Ivanov indicates that "the nuclear/
missile center will be a unified organ for controlling
the weapons of destruction of the front. All weapons
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of nuclear attack must be concentrated in the hands of
the chief of this center, i.e., missiles of all types,
bomber aviation and others, which will undoubtedly
improve and expedite their use". It appears to us that
it would be more correct to call such a center the "fire
and chemical center" which will more fully reflect the
content of its work.
In the composition of the field control of a front
(army) proposed by the author of the article, a highly
important organ is omitted, the communications
directorate (department). Without this organ, none of
the indicated centers can operate. To assign the
organization of communications to each or to any one of
them separately is impossible and moreover it is perhaps
harmful.
The organization and support of communications is
a completely independent branch of military affairs
directly involving the use of numerous communications
troops and various technical means. Therefore, it
appears to us that one of-the-most important organs in
a front's system of field control should be the
communications directorate.
Without dwelling on the organization of the
communications system of a front, let us examine the
problems which, in our opinion, are of fundamental
significance in determining the organizational structure
of the field control of a front, and which were not
touched upon in General Ivanov's article.
First of all, it is advisable to dwell on the
designation of the organs that are in charge of the
organization of communications. Taking into account
the future development of technical means of control,
it is advisable to have in the field control a
mechanism (apparat) for the chief of communications troops
and an automated system of control for the front. the
forces and means of communications, the automation of troop
control. processes and provision for secret communications,
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including cryptographic organs and means for making
electrical signal communications channels secure should
be concentrated in the hands of the chief of communica-
tions troops and automated control systems.
The chief of communications troops and automated
control systems must organize a single system of
communications for ensuring the control of the front's
troops as a whole. All means, available at the present
time to the chiefs of missile troops and artillery and
to the PVO troops, and designated for the organization
of an autonomous communications system, must be employed
for the creation of a single system of communications
for a front. It is also necessary to avoid using the
independent high frequency (vysokaya chastota -- VCh)
government communications units. The VCh government
communications organs must have only station secrecy
devices, operating on selected channels assigned from
the overall front system of communications.
The above listed measures permit, in our opinion,
a higher quality and more economical communications
system for operational formations especially if one
considers the development of multi-channel radio relay,
radio, and wire communications systems and also the
introduction of means of automating processes of control
and means of communications.
At the present time, a sharp increase is evident
in the requirement for communications channels for
ensuring troop control and direction of the operational
rear area. It appears to us that the basic direction
in the development of means of communications, which
permits most effectively provision for the increasing
requirements is the creation of a single centralized
system of communications with wide-scale use of
multi-channel radio relay and wire means.
The effectiveness of this approach can be demonstrated
by the following examples. The existing equipment for
the multiple use of heavy field cable lines will permit
receipt on one line of 4 or 5 telephone and one telegraph
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channel. Prospective means offer the possibility of
having 12 telephone channels on such a line and the
adoption of prospective voice-frequency telegraph
equipment will enable us to replace each telephone
channel with 12 telegraph channels. As a result, by
the adoption of multi-channel equipment, the effective-
ness of the communications system on telephone channels
can be increased by 3 or 4 times, and on telegraph
channels by several dozen times. A similar result will
be achieved by the adoption of multi-channel radio relay
and radio means.
Consequently, the widespread introduction of multi-
channel communications systems permit provision fort
the increasing requirements for communications channels
in operational control elements without an increase in
the number of communications troops.
And now the last of the questions touched upon by
Major-General M. Ivanov in his article. We fully
subscribe to his proposal concerning control points.
Actually, the existence of forward command posts along
with command posts does not promote the assurance of
stable control under present conditions, on the contrary,
it leads to a dissipation of forces and means, weakens
the capabilities of the main command post, decreases its
role in the control of troops and gives rise to complica-
tions in the organization of the communications support
of a front. The creation of two independent control
points, one of which is a reserve point, can in many
respects further ensure the stability of troop control
under the conditions of a nuclear/missile war.
Lieutenant-General of Communications Troops P. Kurochkin
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