CARLUCCI LAUNCHED CIA OPERATION IN YEMEN THAT COLLAPSED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100160007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 10, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100160007-7
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100160007-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100160007-7
?
pera Uo
.~arlt~ccl Launched
n, Yemen, That Collapsed
By Bob Woodward
W.,.J,w ttilll trout Malt Writer
Frank C. Carlucci, who was appointed Tues-
day as President Reagan's new national secu-
rity,adviser in the midst of controversy over
White House covert operation's gone awry,
once supervised one of the Central Intelligence
Agency's unpublicized failures in the Third
World, aceordin informed sourn4s;.
An j979, ,as deputy CIA director, CarluO -.
was Urged' by pfesident ji,piu ;1; sitar's t t_'
up atop secret CIA p ry efforrfT
'tAgainst &outth,Yemen a Matt
a Arabian p la
to
? hbormgo-
topple , wig
;k %
d:
a
i
Yemen,.ttie .souroee s
? Arm
Workitl8, with &itish and, Saudi
telligence agents,rlucci set thee dPerat*
motion to harass South Yemen and thwart any
expauiist ambitions. But the plan ended.
>,,disastet about :a year -into-..the " Leagan ndmin-
istratii n, 'after_Carltic~ci'-had become. deputy
- ,~ - rist,r k" team
tiopal security adviser, Zbtgmew Brzezrns
g
to blow up a their CIA
torture, team members betrayed
,SponjDfj-before' they were executed. which
~ the`operation in 1982,aoureeli said..
The episode provided 'Carlucci with a f list-
hand Understanding of the hazards of secret
undertak hgs: according to sources who
worked *ith. Carlucci at the time. ~onse-,
quently,'-the? sources said, the new ,national
security.adviser 'supports covert operations
but is aware of the potential for disastrous
consequences.
Carlucci had no comment yesterday.
e in South Yemen. Under
brid
accordil)g to a
The South Yemen operation,
number of sources familiar witits lation to
study of CIA covert action. a House
the political agenda of sniot Vs el national. security
officials, in this instance,
adviser Brzezinski.
In the wake of the furor over selling National Se-
s
curity Council officials isec etly s to aid
ms
to Iran and diverting the
contra rebels fighting the government tofoNic-
aragua , five senior sources directly 61 the South Yemen affair said the case has a
Mondale evidently agreed, be-
cause he not only supported the
covert operation and military ship-
ments to North Yemen, but also at
one point during a White House
meeting pounded the table and de-
clared, "We've got to get aid into
special meaning in retrospect. As North Yemen."
one of the sources put it, "There Carter signed a second secret
were unrealistic grand strategic finding, authorizing the operation.
goals that the White House thought Partly because of Turner's skepti-
could be accomplished through a cism and partly because the CIA
covert action. And they were trying director was preoccupied at the
to fix a lot of things; many, too time with negotiations over the
many, that had nothing to do with SALT R strategic arms limitation
South Yemen." treaty, "Brzezinski wanted Carlucci
As pieced together by numerous to run it .... Brzezinski structured
sources, both in and out of the gov- it so he could get Carlucci to do it,"
ernment, the Yemenis became a )ne source said.
on And so Carlucci traveled over-
iorit
l
i
S
y
ona
security pr
. nat
U.
Feb. 23, 1979, when South Yemen seas to begin setting up the oper-
ma e an unsuccessful three- ation. In an effort to maintain se-
P Bed attack against North t curity, Carlucci and his assistants
Yemen in an effort to seize airstrips ! from the CIA directorate of oper-
and roads in a bid to overthrow the ations attempted to decree that the
government. Almost immediately, ' 30 Yemenis trained for the oper-
Carter notified Congress that he ation were not to know -that the
would ship .$390 million in planes, agency was behind the effort.
tanks and other arms' to North But once the training began,
Yemen. sources said the Yemenis apparent-
About the ? same time, Carter ly were told in an effort to give the
signed an intelligence order, known operation credibility by reassuring
t the United
h
a
as a "finding," secretly calling for a the operatives t
it
i
study of possible operations against
South Yemen. Brzezinski pushed for
a covert mission in part because he
felt the United States had been too
passive in responding to Cuban ac-
tivities in 1977 and 1978 in Zaire
and Somalia.
Although then-CIA Director
Stansfield Turner approved the op- .
eration, he pronounced it "hare- ;1
brained." But others in the agency
were more enthusiastic, and wanted
to bind the CIA closer to Saudi in-
telligence with a joint operation.
Furthermore, as one source put it,
some senior officials in the Carter
White House held "almost a 'comity
of nations' view that our allies, par-
ticularly the conservative ones that
distrusted and were suspicious of
Carter, needed a joint operation to
prove we would be tough."
Because Vice President Walter
F. Mondale, while a U.S. senator,
had been a member of the Church
committee that investigated CIA
excesses in the 1970s, Mondale
was widely viewed as anti-CIA and
Brzezinski believed "it's important
for the CIA to see Fritz Mondale
take a stand for some sort of para-
military action," according to
sources.
.
ve
Stales was support
After the preparations, one team
of Yemenis was secretly sent into
South Yemen. But the operation
ended tragically with capture and
confession. A second team that had
been inserted" into South Yemen-
for a similar paramilitary operation
was withdrawn and the operation -
was ended.
In late March 1982, prosecutors
in the South Yemen capital of Aden
demanded the death penalty for 13
Yemenis on trial for alleged involve-
ment in a sabotage conspiracy.
Eleven members of the group, the
prosecution alleged, had been
trained by the CIA in neighboring
Saudi Arabia with the intent of pav-
ing the way for "reactionary and
imperialist military intervention" in
South Yemen.
Three weeks later, the govern-
ment in Aden announced that all 13
members of the "gang of subver-
lion" had pleaded guilty to smug-
gling explosives to blow up oil in-
stallations and other targets.
Three had been sentenced to 15-
year prison terms, the government
added, and 10 had been executed.
Staff researcher Barbara Feinman
i?n,rl ri llv lPi~ to Ih IQ ri'hnrt.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100160007-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100160007-7
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100160007-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100160007-7
WASHINGTON POST
4 December 1986
Carlucci Launched CIA Operation in
By Bob Woodward
W,i.hmgton Post Staff Writer
Frank C. Carlucci, who was appointed Tues-
day as President Reagan's new national secu-
rity adviser in the midst of controversy over
White House covert operations gone awry,
once supervised one of the Central Intelligence
Agency's unpublicized failures in the Third
World, according to informed sources.
In 1979, as deputy CIA director, Carlucci
was urged by President Jimmy Carter's na-
tional security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
to set up a top secret CIA paramilitary effort
against South Yemen,. a Marxist nation an the
Arabian peninsula trtat was threatening to
topple neighboring, pro-Western North
Yemen, the sources said.
Working with British and Saudi Arabian in-
telligence agents, Carlucci set the operation in
motion to harass South Yemen and thwart any
expansionist ambitions. But the plan ended. in
disaster about a year into the Reagan admin-
istration, after Carlucci had become deputy
secretary of defense, when a CIA-trained team,
of about a dozen Yemenis was captured trying
to blow up a bridge in South Yemen. Under
torture, team members betrayed their CIA
sponsors before they were executed, which
ended the operation in 1982, sources said.
The episode provided Carlucci with a first-
hand understanding of the hazards of secret
undertakings, according to sources who
worked with Carlucci at the time. Conse-
quently, the sources said, the new national
security adviser supports covert operations
but is aware of the potential for disastrous
consequences.
Carlucci had no comment vesterdav.
The South Yemen operation, according to a
number of sources familiar with it, is a case
study of CIA covert action and its relation to
the political agenda of senior White House
officials, in this instance, national security
adviser Brzezinski.
In the wake of the furor over National Se
curity Council officials secretly selling arms
to Iran and diverting the profits to aid the
contra rebels fighting the government of Nic-
aragua, five senior sources directly involved
in the South Yemen affair said the case has a
special meaning in retrospect. As
one of the sources put it, "There
were unrealistic grand strategic
goals that the White House thought
could be accomplished through a
covert action. And they were trying
to fix a lot of things; many, too
many, that had nothing to do with
South Yemen."
As pieced together by numerous
sources, both in and out of the gov-
ernment, the Yemenis became a
U.S. national security priority on
Feb. 23, 1979, when South Yemen
made an unsuccessful three-
pronged attack against North
Yemen in an effort to seize airstrips
and roads in a bid to overthrow the
government. Almost immediately,
Carter notified Congress that he
would ship $390 million in planes,
tanks and other arms to North
Yemen.
About the same time, Carter
signed an intelligence order, known
as a "finding," secretly calling for a
study of possible operations against
South Yemen. Brzezinski pushed for
a covert mission in part because he
felt the United States had been too
passive in responding to Cuban ac-
tivities in 1977 and 1978 in Zaire
and Somalia.
Although then-CIA Director
Stansfield Turner approved the op-
eration, he pronounced it "hare-
brained." But others in the agency
were more enthusiastic, and wanted
to bind the CIA closer to Saudi in-
telligence with a joint operation.
Furthermore, as one source put it,
some senior officials in the Carter
White House held "almost a 'comity
of nations' view that our allies, par-
ticularly the conservative ones that
distrusted and were suspicious of
Carter, needed a joint operation to
prove we would be tough."
Because Vice President Walter
F. Mondale, while a U.S. senator,
had been a member of the Church
committee that investigated CIA
excesses in the 1970s, Mondale
was widely viewed as anti-CIA and
Brzezinski believed "it's important
for the CIA to see Fritz Mondale
take a stand for some sort of para-
military action," according to
sources.
Mondale evidently agreed, be-
cause he not only supported the
covert operation and military ship-
ments to North Yemen, but also at
one point during a White House
meeting pounded the table and de-
clared, "We've got to get aid into
North Yemen."
Carter signed a second secret
finding, authorizing the operation.
Partly because of Turner's skepti-
cism and partly because the CIA
director was preoccupied at the
Yemen That Collapsed
time with negotiations over the
SALT II strategic arms limitation
treaty, "Brzezinski wanted Carlucci
to run it .... Brzezinski structured
it so he could get Carlucci to do it,"
one source said.
And so Carlucci traveled over.
seas to begin setting up the oper-
ation. In an effort to maintain se-
curity, Carlucci and his assistants
from the CIA directorate of oper-
ations attempted to decree that the
30 Yemenis trained for the oper-
ation were not to know that the
agency was behind the effort.
But once the training began,
sources said the Yemenis apparent-
ly were told in an effort to give the
operation credibility by reassuring
the operatives that the United
States was supporting it.
After the preparations, one team
of Yemenis was secretly sent into
South Yemen. But the operation
ended tragically with capture and
confession. A second team that had
been "inserted" into South Yemen
for a similar paramilitary operation
was withdrawn and the operation
was ended.
In late March 1982, prosecutors
in the South Yemen capital of Aden
demanded the death penalty for 13
Yemenis on trial for alleged involve-
ment in a sabotage conspiracy.
Eleven members of the group, the
prosecution alleged, had been
trained by the CIA in neighboring
Saudi Arabia with the intent of pav-
ing the way for "reactionary and
imperialist military intervention" in
South Yemen.
Three weeks later, the govern-
ment in Aden announced that all 13
members of the "gang of subver-
sion" had pleaded guilty to smug-
gling explosives to blow up oil in-
stallations and other targets.
Three had been sentenced to 15-
year prison terms, the government
added, and 10 had been executed.
Staff researcher Barbara Fein man.
contributed to this report.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100160007-7