A BASIS FOR SOVIET CONCERN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000100010001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 8, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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CONFIDENTIAL
February 8, 1979
INFORMATION
SUBJECT: A Basis for Soviet Concern
In reading a book on United States industrial production
during World War II last weekend, I came across some
statistics that suggest why the Soviets at the end of the war
regarded the United States with a mixture of awe and fear --
a reaction that I believe still affects the present Soviet
leadership. Those statistics reflect the industrial might
of a mobilized United States even 35 years ago when our
industrial capacity was relatively primitive by today's
standards. (U)
To put the following table in perspective it is useful to
note that in 1940 when the Wehrmacht invaded the Low Countries
and France, the German blitzkrieg was supported by 3,000
aircraft, 2,600 tanks, 10,000 artillery pieces and 4,000 trucks.
During the following 5 years the United States produced: (U)
Warplanes
296,429
Tanks (including self
propelled guns)
102,351
Artillery
pieces
372,431
Trucks
2,455,964
Warships
87,620
Cargo ships
5,425
It must still be as disconcerting to the Soviets as it was
then to the Germans that a country they regarded as so soft
could, by the end of its second year in a war, field an army
of 12 million men, fight two awesome empires at the same time,
build a Navy larger than the combined fleets of its enemies and
allies -- and still record a 20 percent increase in civilian
spending over the last pre-war year. (U)
Review on February 8, 1985
COIRF ENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL 2
A more recent experience that still inspires Soviet awe is
how quickly the United States developed, produced, and
deployed its 1,000 Minuteman missiles in the mid-1960s. They
understand, based on our performance in World War II -- still
familiar to these aged leaders -- and our rapid deployment of
Minuteman, the incredible military potential of the United
States. (U)
I believe these memories have served as an incentive for the
Soviets to negotiate and conclude arms control agreements
with the United States and to avoid a serious protracted
worsening of bilateral relations such as might provoke us to
mobilize our industrial military capacity and undertake a
massive United States arms buildup -- which the Soviets know
they could never match. The real challenge for us in dealing
with the Soviets is to take better advantage of their memories
and respect for our potential military power -- to make more
credible to them the notion that their unconstrained actions
abroad (in the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa, the Horn, etc.)
risk triggering the kind of military buildup in this country
they already have seen twice in the last 40 years. The 3 per-
cent defense spending increase is a start in this direction.
Other demonstrations of our will to act are necessary. (C)
CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
X
INFORMATION January 2, 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: ROBERT GATES I
SUBJECT: US-PRC Normalization: Soviet Reaction (U)
I believe we are entering a period of an abnormally great Soviet
paranoia, fed by a growing sense of isolation and Moscow's per-
ception of a US-PRC-Japanese-NATO cabal against the USSR. This
situation derives from three major developments in international
life in 1978 which -- as Soviet leaders recognize -- adversely
affected long-term Soviet security interests and represent
serious setbacks for Soviet policy. (S)
US-PRC Normalization
Recent analyses by CIA, Embassy Moscow, and the press with
respect to Soviet reaction to US-PRC normalization have been
much too sanguine in my view. While the Soviets doubtlessly
regarded normalization as inevitable, they must have been stunned
-- as was much of the world -- by the suddenness of the announce-
ment. They also understand the significant qualitative change in
US-PRC relations that normalization means. Moreover, the Soviets
are very alert to the fact -- largely ignored by Western com-
mentaries -- that the act of normalization took place almost
immediately after the US said it would not oppose Western arms
sales to China. (And Soviet concern with that development was
made clear by Brezhnev's letters to Callaghan and Giscard warning
against arms sales to the PRC as well as Ponomavev's statements
that such sales could wreck detente.) (S)
Thus, the fact of normalization and its strategic/security con-
text almost certainly is considered by the Soviets as a serious,
even dangerous long-term development. Indeed it represents the
failure of Soviet efforts since 1969 to build a special relation-
ship with the US that would isolate China for a long time. (S)
PRC-Japan Treaty
In recent years, Japan has been courted by both the PRC and the
USSR to develop closer relations and make a major commitment to
economic development and trade as well as closer political ties.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Review on January 2, 1999
Classified by Z. Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(f)
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SECRET/SENSITIVE 2
This year, in one of the major developments of the post World
War II period (and one of the most underreported), Japan finally
decided to cast its lot with China. In signing the Treaty of
Friendship with Peking, Tokyo cold-shouldered the USSR and
indicated its willingness to forego a potentially massive role
in the development of Siberia. In broad terms, Asia's greatest
economic power and its largest country put aside more than a half
century of official hostility and declared their desire to work
together -- explicitly for economic cooperation and mutual bene-
fit and implicitly to prevent Soviet "hegemony." The long-term
implications of Japan's decision, especially for the USSR in
Asia, are enormous and, for the Soviets, entirely negative. (S)
Although a different order of historic magnitude than the "two
normalizations," NATO's concern over the Soviet military buildup
in Central Europe, new Soviet weapons systems and Soviet behavior
in Africa, has'resulted in new efforts to strengthen the alliance
militarily, a development contrary to Soviet interests. At the
same time, domestic pressure in the US for unilateral troop
withdrawals from Europe virtually has disappeared and there is
no pressure to conclude an early MBFR agreement. NATO's defense
spending is back on the upswing. This development spells the
failure for at least a time of Soviet efforts through detente to
weaken NATO, increase opposition in the West to defense spending,
and loosen ties between the US and Western Europe. (S)
Conclusion
The three developments cited above represent major strategic
setbacks which threaten Soviet long-term security interests. The
Soviet Union faces a China which, in Soviet eyes, is allied to
the US, Western Europe and Japan. Simultaneously, it faces a
reinvigorated NATO alliance, the military strength of which is
growing again and several members of which are on the verge of
major arms sales to the PRC. In short, I believe the Soviet
leaders see themselves as isolated for at least the foreseeable
future among the powerful nations of the world -- although bilateral
ties with the US and Western Europe will continue. All the USSR's
principal enemies are collaborating now, in many ways explicitly
antagonistic to the USSR. (S)
That the Soviets view this situation in this way and with alarm
is substantiated by a December 17th article in Red Star which
included the following passages: (U)
"Everyone is free to choose an ally for himself as he sees
fit. The Fuehrer once boasted that he was prepared to enter
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE 3
into an alliance even with the devil himself in order to
achieve victory." (U)
"It was K. Marx who warned that 'a nation, like a woman, can-
not be forgiven a moment's negligence when the first adventurer
who comes along could commit rape against it, or her.' Unfor-
tunately, in some gentlemen, reason often yields to lust,
whereupon they cannot control themselves." (U)
"Supporters of creating 'a NATO for Asia' occupy the same
anti-Soviet and antisocialist platform. The only difference
is that Washington and Tokyo call the Soviet Union the 'most
likely opponent,' while Peking calls it 'enemy No. 1.' But
both dream of liquidating the people's revolutionary gains,
recarving the borders and establishing their ascendancy in
Asia and see the Soviet Union as the chief obstacle in their
way." (U)
"The alliance of American imperialists, Japanese revanchists
and Chinese great-power chauvinists (emphasis added-RG) is
directed against the vital interests of all peoples. It has
and can have no future." (U)
"The attempts by the enemies of detente to knock together a
new military bloc and thereby to render the situation in the
Far East more complicated requires that we display unremitting
vigliance and a constant readiness to protect the motherland's
interests and security." (U)
The Soviets have always been paranoid about being isolated and
facing enemies on two flanks. The "potential" of such a combina-
tion in the past -- with the PRC-Japanese treaty and PRC-US
normalization -- has become a "reality." Accordingly, in my view,
we face a much more dangerous USSR now than in recent years. (S)
Soviet options are limited. To disrupt the new "correlation of
forces" arrayed against them (or at least with their principal
enemy, China), they must either reach a genuine accommodation
with Japan by ceding at least some of the Kurile Islands or allay
Western fears by putting an end to their support for Cuban opera-
tions in Africa. I do not expect them to do either. While they
will continue to try to break up the US-NATO-PRC-Japanese align-
ment by blandishments and bilateral overtures (such as the con-
clusion of SALT), I believe we will see more threats (especially
directed toward Western Europe) and offensive/subversive action
in Africa, Persian Gulf, Middle East, and Southeast Asia. We are
in for some tough times ahead with the USSR and should expect no
restraint from Moscow in South Asia, the Persian Gulf or the arms
race. (S)
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SECRET July 17, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI xl~
r
FROM: ROBERT GATES 5. U
SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Relations q\,
The "spy war" and recent dissident trials ensure that the
atmosphere of U.S.-USSR relations will heat up further in
coming weeks and months. U.S. retaliation for the trials
through denial of licensing for Sperry-Univac computers, the
Dresser drilibits and placing of export controls on petroleum
technology, together with possible other measures, certainly
would accelerate this deterioration in relations. In light
of the pessimistic prospects for the near future, a few basic
propositions are worth keeping in mind:
-- The Soviets will continue to work for a SALT agreement,
regardless of the extent of public polemics or their perception
of Carter's political weakness. They signed the SALT I agree-
ments two weeks after Nixon bombed and mined Hanoi and Haiphong
(including hits on a Russian ship, with casualties); they nego-
tiated through the crisis and alerts growing out of the Yom
Kippur War; they negotiated and signed the Vladivostok agree-
ment even while Ford's political standing plummeted because of
the pardon; and they continued to negotiate seriously throughout
1976 when it seemed Ford would lose the nomination and then when
he seemed hopelessly behind Carter. In sum, the Soviets take
the long view and keep their interests clearly up front. While
they obviously are aware of Carter's political troubles, if
they have learned. anything in recent years, it is the changeable
nature of American politics. They will continue to seek agree-
ment and worry about U.S. ratification when the time comes.
-- Nothing the Administration can do short of military force
will induce Soviet restraint in Africa or any other target
of opportunity. They cannot be expected to play a helpful role
in southern Africa and probably will work against peaceful
resolution in the area. Watergate and Vietnam have left a
legacy in American political life that gives the Soviets con-
siderable confidence that there is virtually no chance of mili-
tary confrontation with the U.S. over Soviet activities in the
Third World. They will not forego the opportunity this provides.
The Soviets recognize no linkage with SALT and, I believe, would
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SECRET 2
not forego their active role in places like Africa even at
the expense of SALT. It is fundamental to Soviet foreign
policy and ideology.
-- Similarly, the Administration is helpless to halt Soviet
actions against the dissidents. It has been clear since the
early '70s that the dissidents would pay a heavy price for
"detente." In the Soviet view, any relaxation of tensions
and/or opening of the USSR to Western business, tourism, etc.
requires renewed vigilance against subversion. Accordingly,
strict action against the dissidents began long before January
1977. The Administration might be able to arrange less harsh
treatment or expulsion by quiet diplomacy -- and by stilling
its public condemnations, just as this approach worked in the
case of Jewish emigration. But, as Jackson-Vanik showed, any
effort to rub the Soviets' noses in their evil practices will
be counterproductive to those we seek to help. In fact, the
timing of the trials this month was intended to make plain in
the starkest possible way to Carter and the world that the USSR
would brook no outside interference in its treatment of Soviet
dissidents. It is our decision whether our policy should be
to hold the Soviet government up to the world for the dicta-
torship it is or to forego this general point in the hope of
helping specific individuals.
-- The succession process in Moscow, including Brezhnev's
fitness or lack thereof, is probably not yet significantly
affecting Soviet internal or foreign policies. Common wisdom
today is that the hardliners are coming to the fore, as witness
the dissident trials and the spy war. I see no evidence of
this so far. On arms control, the Soviets continue to show
interest and movement in SALT, MBFR and CTB. In all areas
outside of the rhetoric of "detente," Brezhnev himself has
always been a hardliner. With respect to Africa, Afghanistan
and the Arabian peninsula, I believe Soviet actions have been
in response to opportunities presented and their perception of
American inability to counter them rather than a new hard line.
We need to keep in mind a history of Soviet involvement in
Africa (Congo, Ghana, Guinea, etc.), especially their inter-
vention in Angola in 1975 -- all predating Brezhnev's "decline."
On internal affairs, Brezhnev has always realized that
a hard line internally was essential to ensure support for
his detente policies. The treatment of dissidents since the
mid-60s -- Sinyavsky, Daniel, Medvedev, Litvinov, General
Grigorenko, etc. -- bears out the assertion that the current
harsh policy and trials do not derive from Brezhnev's health
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or the succession. Those developments -- not to mention
the Soviet system itself -- simply ensure that the policy
will not change in the foreseeable future.
-- The Soviet leaders probably believe they are not respon-
sible for the "snv war_"
e pu ici y an i
ail accompanying the arrests in N.J. both were outrageous to
the Soviets, who saw this as an effort to embarrass the USSR
and humiliate their Ambassador (the judge's remarks). They
decided to respond in a way which they thought -- mistakenly --
would bring maximum pressure on the U.S. Government (from
business and the press) to drop the charges or get a trade.
To an extent, the above propositions are truisms. But, as
things get a little rougher for a while with the Soviets, some
of the analytical points ought to be freshly restated. We,
like the Soviets, need to keep our long range interests in the
forefront and resist political pressures to take short term
actions that jeopardize such interests. Thus, the decision to
go ahead with Geneva was exactly right. As the atmosphere
heats up in coming days, we need to be equally clear-sighted.
In this connection, I believe action to deny export licenses
to Sperry-Univac and Dresser and to put petroleum equipment
on the COCOM list serves both our short term and long range
interests.
cc: David Aaron
Reginald Bartholomew
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