NICARAGUA: PROSPECTS FOR THE INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000901210013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

Director of
Central
Intelligence
Nicaragua: Prospects
for the Insurgency
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Se
SNIE 83.3-4-85
July 1985
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RET
S N I E 83.3-4-85
NICARAGUA: PROSPECTS
FOR THE INSURGENCY
Information available as of 17 July 1985 was used
in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved on that date by the National Foreign
Intelligence Board.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
The Status of the Insurgency ........................................................... 7
The Insurgent Groups ................................................................... 7
Insurgent Strategy and Tactics .................................................... 9
Potential for Cooperation ............................................................. 10
Foreign Support ............................................................................ 11
Sandinista Counterinsurgency Effort ............................................... 11
Strategy and Tactics ..................................................................... 11
Foreign Support for the Regime .................................................. 12
Military Outlook ............................................................................... 12
Insurgent Prospects ....................................................................... 12
Sandinista Response ...................................................................... 14
Alternative Scenarios ........................................................................ 14
Insurgent Gains ............................................................................. 14
Insurgent Decline .......................................................................... 15
Future Soviet-Cuban Role ................................................................ 15
Impact on Sandinista Policy ..:.......................................................... 16
Implications for the United States and the Region ........................ 16
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SCOPE NOTE
The prospective renewal of US financial support for the major anti-
Sandinista insurgent groups, along with the ability to share intelligence
on Sandinista military subjects, is likely to provide a major boost to
insurgent force expansion and effectiveness in the coming months. At
the same time, however, Managua has been gradually increasing its own
counterinsurgency capabilities, with significant Soviet and Cuban sup-
port, and it has demonstrated greater willingness to attack anti-
Sandinista forces inside Honduras and Costa Rica. As a result of these
trends, there is likely to be a continued escalation of the conflict unless
outside pressures force a cease-fire and movement toward political
accommodation between the two sides.
This Estimate examines the prospects for the insurgency over the
next year or so, looking first at recent trends in the conflict and the for-
eign support provided to both sides. In looking at near-term prospects
for the insurgency and the Sandinista response, it identifies alternative
scenarios, as well as the likely future Soviet and Cuban role in the
conflict. Finally, it discusses the impact of the insurgency on Sandinista
policy, as well as the regional impact and the implications for the
United States.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Nicaragua's anti-Sandinista guerrillas have evolved into a relatively
large and viable rural insurgent force which, although currently not
regime threatening, has forced the Sandinistas to commit an increasing
amount of resources to contain it. Guerrilla forces have grown to over
15,000 combatants, and we believe they will continue to grow over the
next year. This force growth will be assisted by the resumption of US
aid and by the fact that the guerrillas have demonstrated significant
staying power in the field. Thus, the Sandinistas face the prospect of a
prolonged and damaging war with little end in sight.
Nevertheless, the insurgents continue to be hampered by a number
of major weaknesses that limit their ability to threaten the Sandinista re-
gime seriously. Their failure to develop an integrated political-military
strategy that would attract widespread popular support for their cause
remains a key weakness, and thus far they have been unable to build an
urban network able to convert passive antiregime sentiment into active
support for the insurgency. The lack of effective cooperation between
insurgent groups has precluded the creation of a viable multifront war
and has allowed the Sandinistas to concentrate their military resources
on the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) in the north, which
Managua considers the most serious threat. Militarily, the FDN remains
the largest, best equipped, and most proficient of the insurgent groups.
However, it continues to suffer from the lingering image-especially
internationally-that it is an extension of former President Somoza's
National Guard.
For their part, the Sandinistas have substantially improved their
counterinsurgency capabilities in the last year, increasing defense
expenditures from 25 percent to over 40 percent of the national budget
and expanding the numbers of frontline units devoted to the war. The
special counterinsurgency battalions, which the Sandinistas are now
employing to spearhead the war, have been generally successful in their
efforts to neutralize insurgent forces in the south and to contain the ex-
pansion of guerrilla operations in the northwest. Despite tactical
improvements, the Sandinista Army continues to be plagued by com-
mand and control problems, inadequate training, and limited close air
support, as well as uneven leadership and combat performance among
units. Moreover, shortages of food, medicine, and ammunition continue
to cause morale problems and desertions, especially among the new
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conscripts, who form the bulk of the frontline counterinsurgency
battalions.
We believe the level of fighting in Nicaragua will continue to
escalate over the next year, although neither side is likely to gain a stra-
tegic advantage despite improvement in the capabilities of both. The
insurgents will probably continue to pursue a war of attrition, emphasiz-
ing mobility, hit-and-run tactics, and attacks against "soft" targets.
They may also succeed in a few spectacular sabotage attacks to provide
a psychological boost, but they are unlikely to attempt more than a few
major operations because of continued logistic problems. The insurgents
probably will expand their areas of operations and improve tactical
coordination between the various groups, although they are unlikely to
create an effective two-front war over the next year. Nor are they likely
to create an effective urban support network to significantly increase
their operations in more populated areas. They probably could not hold
a major town for more than a short period of time, and any attempt to
establish a "liberated zone" would be difficult to sustain logistically
without considerable outside support and would pose tactical risks for
the insurgents.
Sandinista military strategy will probably continue to focus on
containing the FDN in the north and neutralizing Eden Pastora's forces
and Indian groups in the south and east, respectively. The Sandinistas
are likely to launch a major new counterinsurgency effort late this year
in order to weaken insurgent forces and block infiltration of personnel
and supplies into Nicaragua from Honduras and Costa Rica. This will
increase the probability of more frequent clashes with Honduran and
Costa Rican security forces. We believe that Nicaragua will remain
wary of launching a large-scale cross-border offensive for fear of
provoking a potential US military response, but Managua may be
willing to provoke small-scale clashes with Honduras and Costa Rica in
an effort to pressure them into reducing support for the insurgents. The
Sandinistas are well aware that use of Honduras and, to a lesser extent,
Costa Rica remains critical to the insurgency.
Managua will try to exert diplomatic as well as military pressure on
Tegucigalpa and San Jose. The Sandinistas will attempt to attain a
diplomatic solution-preferably in the form of bilateral deals or,
alternatively, within a Contadora regional agreement-that would
result in the cessation of Honduran and Costa Rican support to the
insurgents. So far, however, Managua has been unwilling to make
significant concessions in the Contadora negotiations that would threat-
en its consolidation and seriously undercut broader Sandinista
objectives.
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We believe it is less likely that the continued escalation of the
Nicaraguan conflict over the next year will result in a major shift in the
strategic balance to either side. A critical variable will be the degree of
popular support the Sandinistas or the insurgents are able to mobilize to
their advantage. Another critical factor is the amount of foreign support
that each side is able to obtain to sustain its efforts. In particular,
insurgent loss of support bases in Honduras would be likely to result in a
significant setback.
We believe the Soviets will continue to provide the necessary
military and economic support to sustain the Sandinista regime despite
the increased costs this is likely to entail. This may include more tanks
and new air defense missiles, and we cannot rule out the delivery of
L-39 or other subsonic jet fighter aircraft in the coming year. Moscow
will continue to maintain a low profile in Nicaragua, however, prefer-
ring that the Cubans play a more direct role in the counterinsurgency
effort. If the security situation in Nicaragua were to deteriorate
significantly, Cuba would be likely to commit additional military
advisers who might assume a more direct combat role. However, we do
not believe Havana would risk the threat of a possible US military
response against either Cuba or Nicaragua by sending Cuban combat
units to fight against anti-Sandinista guerrillas within the next year or
We believe that the continued escalation of the fighting in
Nicaragua will place greater strains on the Sandinista leadership while
posing additional problems for the United States and the region.
Managua may take greater risks of provoking a US response by sending
forces more frequently across the border in an attempt to force Costa
Rica and Honduras into either a bilateral agreement with Managua or
international supervision of their frontiers. Internally, forthcoming
elections in both Honduras and Costa Rica may impel both govern-
ments to impose greater limitations on anti-Sandinista force activity
before the end of the year, particularly if the insurgent presence grows
substantially. Finally, the continued buildup of Nicaragua's military
strength and greater Cuban involvement in the war effort is likely to
further upset the regional military balance and complicate US force
planning. Honduras and Costa Rica, although encouraged by prospec-
tive renewal of US funding of the insurgents, are likely to seek a firmer
US commitment to their defense and a clearer definition of US policy
regarding the future of the Sandinista regime.
We judge that the insurgency will remain a major obstacle to the
Sandinistas' full consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist one-party state. The
demands of the war and the need to maintain Western support have
forced the Sandinistas to tolerate nominal political dissent and have
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driven them to pursue negotiations with the United States and in the re-
gional context of the Contadora process. Nevertheless, the Sandinista
leaders are unlikely to make significant concessions to the domestic
opposition as long as they can count on continued Cuban and Soviet
support and are able to contain internal dissent at acceptable levels. A
further growth in the insurgency, coupled with rising military casualties
and higher economic costs, may induce the Sandinistas to accept a less
advantageous Contadora treaty. Sandinista concessions might include
nominal progress in national reconciliation while continuing to avoid
direct talks with the FDN.
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DISCUSSION
The Status of the Insurgency
1. The level of fighting in Nicaragua has intensified
over the past year as insurgent forces have continued
to improve their military capabilities despite the sus-
pension of official US aid to the guerrillas and in-
creased Sandinista military pressure. Guerrilla forces
have demonstrated considerable resourcefulness in se-
curing alternative sources of foreign assistance and
significant staying power in the field-despite the
largest Sandinista counterinsurgency campaign to
date. Their ranks have swelled to over 15,000 armed
combatants (see inset on this page)-mostly disaffected
peasants, Indians, and former Sandinista supporters.
Recently, some urban youths also have begun to join
the armed opposition. The guerrillas nevertheless con-
tinue to be hampered by the lack of an effective
political-military strategy, an inadequate logistic sys-
tem, and limited cooperation between the insurgent
groups. (See inset and map on ensuing pages.)
2. The US Congressional vote to supply renewed
aid to the insurgents is having a major impact both on
the prospects for the resistance and on the Sandinistas'
perceptions of the conflict. For the insurgents, it is a
driving force behind increased unity efforts among
disparate-often rival-forces, and it portends more
sustained guerrilla operations inside Nicaragua. More-
over, it is bolstering the confidence of Nicaragua's
neighbors in the continued US commitment to oppose
the regime in Managua. For the Sandinistas, the
reversal in US policy is apparently forcing them to
face the prospect of a prolonged and damaging war
that cannot be won by the end of 1985 as they once
predicted.
The Insurgent Groups
3. The Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN).
The FDN is the largest, best equipped, and most
proficient of the insurgent groups challenging Sandi-
nista rule. Based in Honduras, the FDN operates
primarily in the mountainous regions of northwestern
and central Nicaragua, where it apparently enjoys
considerable local support and is able to recruit among
the traditionally independent peasant population. This
force appears to have doubled over the past year from
its previous strength of 8,000 combatants, and it
continues to grow by several hundred each month.
We believe our estimate that total insurgent strength
numbers at least 15,000 armed troops is conservative.
The FDN appears to have about doubled over the past
year from its previous strength of 8,000 despite the US
aid cutoff, and this group shows the most potential for
sustained growth. The two Miskito Indian groups have
declined in strength to some 1,300 over the past year,
but they could grow rapidly with sufficient foreign
support. We believe that Eden Pastora's Sandino Revo-
lutionary Front has fallen to about 1,000 active combat-
ants in the wake of battlefield reverses, extreme supply
shortages, and desertions because of disenchantment
with Pastora's leadership. This group has perhaps the
least potential for rapid growth should aid resume.
There is, nevertheless, some uncertainty about our
estimates of insurgent troop strength. It derives partly
from fluctuations in insurgent manpower because of
supply difficulties. For example, Miskito Indian guerril-
las of the Misura organization reportedly were forced to
demobilize over half of their men last year as a result of
the US aid cutoff, but the manpower is still available
should the aid be resumed. Second, it often is difficult
to distinguish effective armed strength as opposed to
total strength, as each group appears to have reserves of
unarmed personnel, some of whom accompany combat
units. An additional reason for caution is that insurgent
commanders may overstate their groups' force levels,
and it is difficult to verify the figures.
4. Over the past year, the FDN has attempted to
prepare its forces better for a guerrilla-style war. To
this end, it has established 13 regional commands,
which are generally broken down into several 300- to
400-man task forces. This organization has facilitated
small-unit tactics, but at some cost to coordinating
activities of subordinate units operating in widely
dispersed areas. The FDN rotates its combat forces in
and out of Nicaragua, normally maintaining several
thousand troops in Honduras for refitting and training.
It is operating in greater strength farther east and
south, and it increasingly coordinates activities with
the Indian guerrilla forces operating on the Caribbean
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United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO)
Insurgent leaders from the FDN and ARDE and
exiled opposition leader Arturo Cruz announced forma-
tion of the new umbrella organization UNO in June
1985. The organization replaces an alliance formed in
1984-the Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation
(UNIR)-in which Miskito Indians of the Misura organi-
zation also participated. UNO plans to give the Indian
insurgents a role in the organization following unity
talks between rival groups but reportedly does not
intend to give them a decisionmaking role.
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN): Headed by
Adolfo Calero, former president of Nicaragua's largest
opposition party, the FDN operates out of base camps
in Honduras into northwestern and central Nicaragua.
Formed in 1981, it is the largest and best equipped of
the guerrilla organizations, with perhaps 15,000 armed
combatants.
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE): Al-
fonso Robelo, a former Sandinista junta member and
head of an opposition party that opposed Somoza, leads
this political group. The organization discontinued its
alliance with Eden Pastora's forces in mid-1984, and its
small military wing now operates with the FDN.
Other Political Leaders: Arturo Cruz, the third
principal UNO leader, also served on the Sandinista
government junta, and last year was the presidential
candidate of a coalition of opposition political parties.
Several other political organizations also signed the
UNO unity document. Most of these were exile wings of
Nicaraguan opposition parties.
Nicaraguan Indian Insurgents
Miskito and other Indian leaders and black Creole
leaders announced formation of a unity committee in
June 1985. To overcome their personal rivalries, Indian
leaders of the main groups have agreed not to contest
the leadership of a unified organization.
Misura Revolutionary Front: This group of Indian
insurgents receives arms and other support from the
FDN. Misura's estimated 1,000 combatants operate on
Nicaragua's Caribbean coast, principally in the north-
east, and maintain base camps in eastern Honduras.
Steadman Fagoth has been one of its prominent leaders.
Misurasata: This Indian organization of some 200 to
350 combatants operates in the central and southern
parts of the east coast. Leader Brooklyn Rivera's negoti-
ations with the regime for regional autonomy earlier
this year produced a rupture in the organization's
alliance with Eden Pastora and divisions in insurgent
ranks.
Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS)
Eden Pastora, a Sandinista revolutionary hero, is the
most charismatic and best known insurgent leader. He
has refused to unify with the FDN because of his
opposition to the presence of former Somoza Guards-
men in the FDN military leadership and his desire to be
given what other insurgent leaders consider an excessive
share of power. The FRS has suffered battlefield set-
backs from government offensives and defections due
to Pastora's erratic leadership, but its estimated 1,000
troops continue to mount small-unit actions in Nicara-
gua's southeast.
coast. Despite its growing strength, the FDN still
suffers from the lingering public image-especially
internationally-that it is merely an extension of
former President Somoza's National Guard.
5. Misura-Misurasata. The Misura and Misurasata
insurgent groups are composed of Miskito and other
Indians who have rebelled against Sandinista repres-
sion in their traditional homelands along the Caribbe-
an coast. The Misura group is based in Honduras and
probably numbers about 1,000 men, half of whom are
armed and active in northeastern Nicaragua at any
given time. The Misurasata, which may still have 200
to 350 armed militants, operates along the southeast-
ern coast and maintains base camps in Costa Rica. The
Indian groups enjoy strong local support and know the
terrain where they operate. (s NF)
6. The Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS). Led
by former Sandinista commander Eden Pastora, the
FRS has been badly battered by two major Sandinista
military campaigns during the past year. The FRS,
numbering perhaps 1,000 active combatants, conducts
ambushes and small-unit actions in southeastern Nica-
ragua. While the charismatic Pastora still enjoys broad
appeal among the Nicaraguan working class, his errat-
ic leadership and his failure to garner sufficient
foreign logistic support have created disaffection with-
in the FRS, and some of his followers have defected to
other insurgent groups. A recent Sandinista offensive
against Pastora's forces has succeeded in driving them
out of many of their bases along the Costa Rican
border. It has undoubtedly worsened morale among
FRS forces, which already lack adequate food, weap-
ons, and ammunition.
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Areas of Heaviest Insurgent Activity
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Insurgent Strategy and Tactics
7. Militarily, the guerrillas have evolved into a
viable rural insurgent force that has forced the Sandi-
nistas to commit an increasing amount of resources to
contain it, although it does not currently threaten the
overthrow of the regime. The insurgents' failure to
develop an integrated political-military strategy able
to attract active and widespread urban support for
Cabezas
Caribbean
Sea
their cause remains a key weakness. They have been
able to forge informal ties with some opposition
political leaders inside Nicaragua, but they have taken
only tentative steps toward developing an attractive
political program of their own. The guerrillas also
have so far been unable to build an urban support
network to convert passive anti-Sandinista sentiment
into a major political-military challenge to the regime.
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United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO)
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)
Miskito Indian Insurgents
Misura Revolutionary Front
Misurasata
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not necessarily ameontaeue.
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8. Politically, the insurgency has become a key
obstacle to Sandinista consolidation by challenging the
regime's claim to legitimacy, hindering its ability to
govern, and sustaining a potential focus for active
opposition to it. The Catholic Church and opposition
political parties have continued to call for a national
dialogue that includes the armed opposition despite
adamant Sandinista refusal to negotiate with the FDN.
Many opposition leaders believe that the continued
growth of a viable insurgency is the most effective
means of pressuring the regime into meaningful nego-
tiations that would guarantee the existence of demo-
cratic pluralism and private enterprise in Nicaragua.
9. Insurgent forces are generally pursuing a war of
attrition designed to erode the domestic support and
economic base of the Sandinista regime. To this end,
the guerrillas have successfully adopted small-unit hit-
and-run tactics that emphasize mobility and surprise
attacks against "soft" targets, such as state-owned farm
cooperatives, bridges, and small military outposts. To
avoid pitched battles in which the Sandinistas' superior
numbers and firepower would be decisive, the guerril-
las generally have avoided large-scale conventional
battles and attempts to overrun major towns or mili-
tary garrisons. They have been able to inflict increas-
ing casualties on Sandinista forces and to cause consid-
erable disruption to the coffee crop in northwestern
Nicaragua and the lumbering and mining industries in
the east.
10. The FDN-in contrast to the smaller insurgent
groups, which generally have lost manpower as a
result of the US aid cutoff-has doubled in . strength
over the past year. It has been able to maintain a
strong presence inside Nicaragua despite logistic prob-
lems and increased Sandinista military efforts against
its base camps and supply lines. The FDN has lost
some ground in the northwest because of supply
shortages and intense Sandinista pressure, but it has
been able to increase its activities farther east and
south and now is seeking to return to the northwest in
strength.
11. The insurgents can operate freely in much of
north-central and eastern Nicaragua, but these areas
are generally lightly populated and lack major strate-
gic value. Thus far, the guerrillas have not conducted
operations in the western "core" region around Leon,
Managua, and Granada, where most of the population
and strategic installations are located. This area is
mostly heavily cultivated lowlands, and guerrilla
forces would need to hide among the population by
day and operate at night to avoid detection.
12. The insurgents have developed a good support
base in Honduras, but logistic problems related to
erratic supply deliveries by international arms dealers
and extended supply lines over difficult terrain inside
Nicaragua continue to limit insurgent combat effec-
tiveness. Aerial resupply is severely limited by lack of
cargo aircraft, equipment failures, and improving
Nicaraguan air defenses. Until these logistic problems
are overcome, the insurgents are unlikely to engage in
major sustained operations and probably will continue
to operate on a cyclical pattern of combat followed by
resupply activities.
13. The insurgents' capabilities for major operations
are further constrained by their lack of firepower-
particularly of crew-served antiarmor and air defense
weapons. As a result, they are unable to confront the
Sandinista Army in setpiece battles or seize and hold
territory. The guerrillas' lack of an urban infrastruc-
ture also prevents them from conducting sabotage
operations in the cities, which might force the Sandi-
nistas to divert security personnel from the country-
side. Moreover, Pastora's forces in the south and the
Misura and Misurasata Indian groups on the Caribbe-
an coast continue to suffer from factionalism, poor
leadership, logistic shortages, and command and con-
trol problems. The steady erosion of capabilities within
these groups has allowed the Sandinista military to
concentrate the bulk of its firepower and manpower
on FDN forces in the northwest without having to face
major insurgent activity simultaneously throughout the
country.
Potential for Cooperation
14. The three main insurgent groups-the FDN,
Pastora's FRS, and the Miskito Indians-are united
only in their opposition to the Sandinista regime. They
remain divided by intense rivalries and personal ani-
mosities that limit the potential for effective coopera-
tion. Another impediment to collaboration is the fact
that these groups have different operational and tacti-
cal procedures, and they appeal to different constitu-
encies. The FDN recently helped to form an umbrella
political-military organization-the United Nicara-
guan Opposition (UNO)-but Pastora has thus far
refused to join except on his own terms. More recently,
the Misura and Misurasata Indian groups formed a
joint committee as a first step toward alliance with the
FDN. The successful unification of these Indian fac-
tions probably would reinvigorate the guerrilla efforts
on the east coast and might relieve pressure on FDN
units in the northwest.
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Foreign Support
15. Honduras and, to a lesser extent, Costa Rica
remain critical to the anti-Sandinista insurgents, pro-
viding sanctuaries and staging points for insurgent
operations. The Honduran military also provides di-
rect logistic support to the FDN by repairing roads to
insurgent base camps, carrying supplies to the camps,
and transporting rebel troops to infiltration points
along the border. Tegucigalpa has also provided more
limited assistance to the Misura Indian groups operat-
ing from Honduras's Caribbean coast. Costa Rica has
provided no direct materiel support to the insurgents,
but there has been free movement of insurgents in and
out of the country. While most Costa Ricans apparent-
ly are sympathetic to the insurgent cause, the govern-
ment has periodically cracked down on guerrilla activ-
ities when they have become too blatant.
16. El Salvador and Guatemala have at various
times served as regional middlemen for anti-Sandinista
rebels, transshipping materiel, providing end-user cer-
tificates for the purchase of munitions from third
parties, and donating limited amounts of their own
war materiel. The FDN has been the most successful
insurgent group in securing foreign assistance. It has
raised an estimated $12-15 millon since the May 1984
suspension of official US aid and has been able to
make extensive arms purchases in the international
market.
Sandinista Counterinsurgency Effort
17. The Sandinistas have substantially improved
their counterinsurgency capabilities in the last year.
Managua has diverted greater resources to the war
effort, increasing defense expenditures from 25 per-
cent to over 40 percent of the national budget and
expanding the number of frontline units devoted to
the war. Sandinista military leaders are relying less on
militia and reserve forces to fight the insurgents and
more on regular Army units, special troops, and
draftees. They are also making increased use of artil-
lery and aircraft to improve firepower and mobility
and prevent the massing of guerrilla forces. Sandinista
commanders have excellent intelligence about insur-
gent plans and operations, probably as a result of
improved collection capabilities, including agents
within insurgent ranks.
18. Managua continues to make increasing use of its
counterinsurgency battalions to spearhead the war
effort. These 800- to 1,000-man units, which were first
formed in 1983 and have now increased to at least 13,
are about twice the size of regular Sandinista Army
battalions. Because of their better training, improved
small-unit mobility, and increased air and artillery
support, they have performed better than the militia
and reserve units that previously bore the brunt of the
counterinsurgency effort.
Strategy and Tactics
19. The Sandinistas are pursuing, in essence, a four-
pronged, "divide and conquer" strategy toward the
insurgency. Managua is seeking to decimate the guer-
rillas in the south, further divide and isolate the Indian
rebel groups along the eastern coast, concentrate the
bulk of Sandinista military resources on the FDN in
the northwest, and, finally, force Honduras and Costa
Rica to reduce or halt support for the insurgents.
20. The Sandinistas have made significant progress
in their efforts to neutralize Pastora's forces in the
south, but they have not eliminated this threat entire-
ly. They have been less successful in combating the
Indians in eastern Nicaragua, and have attempted to
create new schisms within Indian guerrilla ranks by
offering limited concessions in negotiations with sever-
al dissidents over the issue of regional autonomy.
Prominent Indian leaders have broken off the talks,
however, and they are trying to close ranks to
strengthen the armed struggle. Nevertheless, the San-
dinistas are continuing to implement their own auton-
omy plan, including resettlement of Indians in their
traditional villages.
21. The Sandinistas view the FDN as the most
serious military threat, and they have been relatively
successful in containing the expansion of its operations
in the,mountainous areas of the northwest. To this end,
Managua began saturating this zone earlier this year,
deploying over two-thirds of all active-duty forces
backed by artillery, armor, and aircraft. At the same
time, the Sandinistas launched a major resettlement
program to move some 40,000 civilians from the
immediate border area. This move was designed to
eliminate the guerrillas' local base of support, hinder
infiltration, and create a "free fire" zone to allow the
Sandinistas to bring the Army's superior firepower to
bear against insurgent concentrations. The Sandinistas
also have developed local defense plans and strength-
ened border guard units to further deter insurgent
infiltration into Nicaragua.
22. To disrupt insurgent supply bases inside Hondu-
ras, the Sandinista Army units initiated a series of
cross-border raids, beginning in March and escalating
in May 1985. However, unlike past Sandinista border
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incursions, which were primarily for reconnaissance or
hot pursuit, we believe these recent efforts were
designed to probe the FDN's defenses, disrupt its
logistics, and weaken Honduran resolve to support the
insurgents. These ground attacks and artillery barrages
prompted the Honduran military to order the FDN to
relocate its camps farther from the border area and to
demand restrictions on its operations in Honduran
territory. While this movement temporarily disrupted
insurgent command and control and logistics, FDN
units are again infiltrating into northwestern Nicara-
gua in strength despite the presence of Sandinista
forces.
23. The Sandinista counterinsurgency campaigns,
despite some success, have revealed continuing weak-
nesses. The Sandinistas continue to be hampered by
command and control problems, limited close air
support, spotty leadership, and uneven combat perfor-
mance among Army units. Likewise, even frontline
units often suffer shortages of food, medicine, and
ammunition. As a result, the Sandinista Army contin-
ues to have morale problems, including desertions,
especially among the new conscripts, who form the
bulk of the counterinsurgency battalions.
24. Managua has employed political as well as
military pressure in trying to undercut Honduran and
Costa Rican support to anti-Sandinista forces. Thus
far, the Sandinistas have failed to undermine this
support through negotiations-either a regional Conta-
dora security agreement or separate bilateral deals
with Honduras and Costa Rica. Recent Sandinista
cross-border raids into Honduras and Costa Rica,
however, have heightened concerns in Tegucigalpa
and San Jose about Managua's intentions and have
again fueled debate within these countries over the
level and nature of support to anti-Sandinista forces.
Foreign Support for the Regime
25. Soviet Bloc and Cuban military assistance re-
mains critical to Managua's counterinsurgency effort,
allowing the Sandinistas to train and maintain an
active-duty force of some 65,000, with a potential of
120,000 if fully mobilized. We estimate there are
currently some 2,500 to 3,500 Cuban and perhaps 200
other foreign military/ security advisers in Nicaragua,
including Soviets, East Europeans, North Koreans,
Libyans, and a few PLO members. The Cuban pres-
ence in Nicaragua, combined with the large-scale
Soviet Bloc equipment deliveries, has enabled the
Sandinistas significantly to improve their capabilities
both to combat the insurgents and control internal
dissent.
26. Soviet Bloc military assistance has markedly
increased Sandinista firepower and mobility. The San-
dinista armor inventory has doubled since early 1984,
and at least eight MI-24/25 Hind helicopter gunships
(see photograph) were delivered to Nicaragua last fall.
While there have been no deliveries of major new
weapons so far this year, shipment of additional
MI-8/17 Hip helicopters and trucks has continued to
enhance Sandinista mobility. The Soviets also have
agreed to fill the bulk of Nicaragua's petroleum
requirements at least through the rest of this year.
27. The number of Soviet military advisers in coun-
try is estimated at 50 to 75, most of whom appear to
serve as advisers to the Nicaraguan General Staff and
concentrate on strategic planning and administrative
matters. The Cubans, on the other hand, play an
important advisory role at the tactical level. Cubans
are involved in planning and supervising counterinsur-
gency operations, sometimes down to the company
level. of Cubans involved in
combat with the insurgents, and as many as 100 may
have been killed so far. Cuban personnel also are
involved in the collection and analysis of
Military Outlook
28. In our judgment, while the level of fighting will
continue to escalate over the next year, the most
probable outcome is that neither side will gain a
strategic advantage despite improvement in the capa-
bilities of both. With renewed US funding and increas-
ing numbers of volunteers, the guerrillas can continue
to upgrade their military hardware and expand their
tactical force deployments. Similarly, Soviet and Cu-
ban military assistance will enable the Sandinistas to
better sustain a vigorous counterinsurgency effort. The
insurgents' use of small-unit tactics should largely
offset growing Sandinista firepower, and the availabil-
ity of Honduran and Costa Rican sanctuaries probably
will allow the guerrillas to withstand a major new
Sandinista counterinsurgency campaign. Although the
guerrillas are unlikely to develop an effective two-
front war within the next year, we believe they will
remain capable of diverting Sandinista pressure on the
northwestern front by increasing their activities in the
east and in the central highlands.
Insurgent Prospects
29. The insurgents are likely to continue to employ
classic guerrilla tactics, emphasizing small-unit, hit-
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Hind Helicopter Deployment, Punta Huete, Nicaragua
14 May 1985
and-run attacks against vulnerable economic targets
and isolated Sandinista military outposts in an effort to
gradually wear down the Sandinista government.
They will try to exploit the current rainy season by
striking at the Sandinistas' logistic network and am-
bushing Army convoys and troop movements. The
insurgents may attempt spectacular sabotage attacks
against major military installations, which, if success-
ful, would provide a psychological boost and bolster
insurgent morale. The guerrillas will also attempt to
improve their logistic capabilities to better sustain
operations, but they are unlikely to attempt more than
a few large-scale attacks. Finally, to move into the
more heavily populated areas farther west, the FDN
will have to build a clandestine support network that is
not compromised by Sandinista counterintelligence
efforts. This is likely to prove extremely difficult even
if the FDN can develop covert links with opposition
religious, labor, and political groups.
30. Insurgent forces will continue to attack the
government-owned economic infrastructure in an ef-
fort to weaken the overall economy and heighten
popular discontent. Such attacks will probably raise
the economic cost of the war but not have a critical
impact as long as Managua gets sufficient aid from the
Soviet Bloc. Furthermore, insurgent attacks against the
economy run the risk of a popular backlash. The
regime is likely to use insurgent attacks as the excuse
for further deterioration of living standards and as a
pretext for a harsher crackdown on the private sector.
31. A principal insurgent goal will continue to be
the creation of a viable multifront war that would
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strain the Sandinistas' logistic capabilities and tax their
inadequate command and control system. Such a
scenario, however, is contingent upon closer strategic
coordination between the guerrilla groups and greater
sharing of FDN resources. While there is likely to be
some increased cooperation between the FDN and the
Miskito Indians, it is unlikely that rebel forces in the
south will be able to create a viable threat in the near
term. Pastora's forces lack the resources, and he still
appears reluctant to cooperate meaningfully with the
FDN unless he is given a leading role. The FDN
leadership apparently believes his capability for dis-
ruption offsets the potential value of his international
stature and charisma as an insurgent leader.
32. Assuming continued external support at least at
current levels, the guerrillas will try to further expand
their forces in rural areas. Insurgent strength may
grow substanially over the next year if the guerrillas
are able to capitalize on the increasing disaffection
with Sandinista policies and a rapidly deteriorating
economy. The insurgents need to develop a more
effective political strategy and new support networks
in order to channel generalized discontent in more
populated areas into active armed opposition to the
Sandinista regime. A key factor is likely to be the
willingness of the Catholic Church and opposition
political and labor groups to openly defy the govern-
ment and risk repression by the regime. While these
groups may become more outspoken in their political
support of the insurgency if it continues to grow in
strength, they are unlikely to be able to provide
effective clandestine logistic support within the next
year or so.
33. Thus, the insurgents are unlikely to increase
their operations significantly in the more heavily
populated Pacific coast region or in urban areas by
early 1986. They are also unlikely to be able to hold a
town of any significance for more than a short period
of time, even in the northwest, because of the superior
firepower and mobility of Sandinista forces. The
insurgents are likely to come under external pressure
to establish a "liberated zone," which would provide
them with a psychological and propaganda victory.
However, this would be difficult to sustain logistically
without considerable outside support, and would pose
tactical risks to insurgent forces.
Sandinista Response
34. Sandinista near-term strategy is likely to contin-
ue to focus on containing the FDN in the north,
neutralizing Pastora's forces and Indian groups in the
south and east, and isolating forward FDN units in the
central highlands. The Sandinistas are likely to launch
a major new counterinsurgency campaign late this
year, focused primarily on the northern and southern
border areas (see inset on page 15). They probably
hope to establish a more permanent presence in an
effort to block insurgent infiltration of personnel and
supplies into Nicaragua from Honduras and Costa
Rica. By cutting insurgent supply lines, the Sandinistas
would complicate insurgent planning, inhibit sustained
operations, and isolate those guerrilla units operating
deep within Nicaraguan territory. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that the Sandinistas have the logistic capabilities
to maintain adequate forces in these areas to fully
accomplish these goals.
35. The likely increased Sandinista military pres-
ence in the border areas will raise the probability of
more frequent clashes with Honduran and Costa
Rican security forces. While recent events suggest that
the Sandinistas may be willing to escalate the frequen-
cy and size of their cross-border operations against
insurgent base camps and staging points, we believe
that Nicaragua will remain wary of launching a large-
scale counterinsurgency drive into Honduras or Costa
Rica for fear of provoking a potential US military
response. Nevertheless, Nicaragua may be willing to
provoke small-scale clashes with Honduran and Costa
Rican units in an effort to pressure them into accept-
ing either a demilitarized zone or a multilateral
peacekeeping force, possibly under Contadora auspic-
es. For their part, both Honduras and Costa Rica will
attempt to avoid military confrontations with Sandi-
nista forces in an effort to reduce domestic political
controversy.
36. Managua will continue its efforts to reduce
support to the insurgents by exerting diplomatic as
well as military pressure. The Sandinistas will attempt
to attain a diplomatic solution to their security prob-
lems-preferably in the form of separate bilateral
deals or, alternatively, within the context of a favor-
able Contadora agreement. So far, however, Managua
remains unwilling to make significant concessions in a
multilateral framework that would threaten its con-
solidation and seriously undercut broader Sandinista
objectives.
Insurgent Gains
37. A scenario we view as less likely but still
possible is a major shift in the strategic balance in
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Prospects for a Sandinista Dry-Season Offensive
The Sandinistas are likely to launch another major
military campaign against the insurgents during the
next dry season-beginning in November or Decem-
ber-when government forces are more mobile and can
better employ air and artillery support. The offensive
undoubtedly will focus on the FDN in the northwest
and is likely to be characterized by steadily increasing
tactical activity as the Army saturates this zone with
troops and equipment from other areas. The campaign
probably will build slowly and could be subject to
delays caused by logistic and other operational prob-
lems. In the past, such campaigns have been preceded
by a series of indicators, including:
- Widespread draft roundups.
- Truncated training of new recruits.
- Logistic preparations, such as road improvements
and increased resupply activities.
- Mobilization of reserve and militia units from
outside the area of operations.
- Large-scale troop movements as well as the de-
ployment of armor, artillery, and air assets to the
area.
- Establishment of fire-support bases and clearing of
"free-fire" zones.
favor of the insurgents. If the insurgents are successful
in raising significant levels of international financing
and support to complement renewed US assistance,
and if they garner greater support in populated areas,
guerrilla strength may grow considerably, perhaps
doubling over the next year. Successful insurgent
actions such as seizing and holding an important city
for a short period of time, inflicting large losses on one
or several counterinsurgency battalions, and overrun-
ning a military garrison or two would increase the
domestic and international stature and perception of
the guerrillas' military capabilities. Such a series of
insurgent tactical victories that resulted in heavy
government losses and major desertions would also
help to encourage domestic opposition to the regime,
including more widespread popular demonstrations.
This may result in increased questions about the
stability of the regime, but is unlikely to result in the
overthrow of the Sandinistas within the next year or
Insurgent Decline
38. Another less likely scenario is a major shift in
the strategic balance in favor of the Sandinistas that
- Small-scale "rehearsal" operations, followed by
large-scale sweep operations by the counterinsur-
gency battalions.
In addition to these past indicators, a renewed Sandinis-
ta military drive would probably be preceded by:
- Extension of military service for those conscripts
scheduled to be released in late 1985.
- Reinstitution of the draft and expansion in the
number of counterinsurgency battalions.
- Increased helicopter deployments, perhaps includ-
ing the Hinds, to the northern airfields.
The campaign would be likely to resemble the last
one in which the Sandinistas deployed over 40,000
troops backed by armor, artillery, and air support. The
Sandinistas will again try to deal the guerrillas a
decisive blow, but insurgent forces will probably be able
to withstand the offensive by increasing their activities=
in the east and in the central highlands and by with-
drawing when necessary to their sanctuaries in Hondu-
ras and Costa Rica. Thus, while the offensive is likely to
disrupt insurgent plans and logistics, it is unlikely to
diminish overall guerrilla capabilities seriously.
results in a significant decline in insurgent capabilities.
A series of Sandinista military victories or insurgent
loss of key sanctuaries and support bases in neighbor-
ing countries might result in a significant erosion of
insurgent morale and prompt increased desertions.
Similarly, domestic and international support for the
insurgent cause might be seriously undercut should the
insurgents commit widespread atrocities. While such
actions might greatly weaken guerrilla strength, they
would be unlikely to result in the insurgency's total
demise during the period of this Estimate.
Future Soviet-Cuban Role
39. The Soviets, in our judgment, will continue to
provide the necessary military and economic aid to
Managua to support its counterinsurgency effort and
prevent serious economic deterioration. In this regard,
President Ortega recently seized upon the prospective
renewal of US aid to the insurgents as a pretext for
lifting Nicaragua's moratorium on the delivery of new
weapon systems. We believe, therefore, that the num-
ber of foreign military advisers-principally Cubans
and, to a lesser extent, Soviets-will increase some-
what as the Sandinistas acquire more sophisticated
weaponry.
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40. Soviet Bloc arms deliveries over the next year
are likely to be directed toward:
- Further enhancing the firepower and mobility of
Nicaraguan ground forces by delivery of more
armored vehicles, artillery, and trucks.
- Acquiring a greater heliborne counterinsurgency
capability by delivery of more MI-8/17 and
possibly MI-24/25 helicopters.
- Developing an effective nationwide air defense
system by delivery of more radars and possibly
SA-2/3 surface-to-air missiles.
- Expanding the Sandinista Navy's coastal defense
capabilities by delivery of more patrol boats and
surveillance radars.
While Moscow may not want to exacerbate US-Soviet
relations at present by supplying MIG-21s, we cannot
rule out a Soviet-approved delivery of L-39s or other
subsonic jet fighter aircraft in the coming year. The
Soviets might believe that such a move not only would
circumvent the US proscription of MIGs, but also
provide aircraft easier for the Sandinistas to absorb
and employ in a counterinsurgency role.
41. The Soviets may be willing to increase slightly
the number of advisers providing technical and other
types of security assistance to the Sandinista regime,
but they probably would be unwilling to increase
substantially-at least in the near term-their pres-
ence in Nicaragua because of broader political consid-
erations. In our judgment, the Soviets will continue to
maintain a low profile in Nicaragua, preferring that
the Cubans play a more direct role in the counter-
insurgency effort.
42. Cuba's decision about whether to increase its
support to Nicaragua will depend largely on the
fortunes of the insurgents, the performance of the
Sandinista Army, the stability of the Sandinista re-
gime, the amount and type of popular resistance, and
the possible reaction of the United States. If the
security situation in Nicaragua were to deteriorate
significantly, Cuba would commit additional military
advisers who might assume a more active combat
support role. Cubans probably will help fly and
maintain the Hind helicopter gunships, and Cuban
personnel may also increase their intelligence support
role-particularly signals intelligence collection and
analysis-and their involvement in tactical planning at
the battalion level. However, we do not believe Ha-
vana would risk the threat of a possible US military
response against either Cuba or Nicaragua by sending
Cuban combat units to fight against anti-Sandinista
guerrillas within the next year or so.
Impact on Sandinista Policy
43. We believe the insurgency will remain a major
obstacle to the Sandinistas' full consolidation of a
Marxist-Leninist one-party state within the period of
this Estimate. Sandinista efforts to combat the insur-
gency-such as the military draft, imposition of state
emergency controls, and increased expenditures on
defense-have been key factors in determining Sandi-
nista strategy toward the domestic opposition. The
demands of the war and the need to maintain Western
support have forced the Sandinistas to tolerate nomi-
nal political dissent and have prevented a more repres-
sive approach toward the church and the private
sector. The insurgency has driven the Sandinistas to
pursue negotiations both with the United States and in
the regional context of the Contadora process.
44. Nevertheless, the Sandinista leaders are com-
mitted revolutionaries who are unlikely to make sig-
nificant concessions to the domestic opposition as long
as they can count on continued Soviet and Cuban
support and are able to contain internal dissent at
acceptable levels. The Sandinistas will probably con-
tinue to use a mix of incentives and repression to
defuse organized opposition. Pervasive security and
military forces will continue to have an intimidating
effect on potential dissidents, especially the urban
middle class, and selective repression is likely to
achieve the regime's objectives without pushing broad
constituencies into the armed opposition.
45. A further growth of the insurgency may prompt
Managua to make limited concessions in negotiations
with the Indians and may even lead the Sandinistas to
engage in a dialogue with Pastora's badly weakened
forces. Such a move would not threaten the regime's
basic interests and might drive a wedge between the
insurgent groups. This would allow the Sandinistas to
concentrate their military effort against the FDN,
which they consider the most serious threat. Rising
casualties and expenditures of scarce economic re-
sources may induce the Sandinistas to accept a less
advantageous settlement at Contadora as a tactical
move to stop the insurgency, or they may sweeten
their offers of bilateral deals to their neighbors. Sandi-
nista concessions might include nominal progress on
the issue of national reconciliation while continuing to
avoid direct talks with the FDN.
Implications for the United States and the Region
46. Although we do not expect the insurgency to be
able to topple the Sandinistas in the coming year, we
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judge that the prospect of a prolonged war of attrition
will place greater strains on the Sandinista leadership
and provide incentives to continue negotiations. As the
insurgency grows, it probably will be able to attract
additional external funding and draw increasing inter-
national attention. Insurgent pressure, coupled with
fear of direct US intervention, will continue to make
the Sandinistas willing to consider their support to
regional insurgencies as a subject for negotiation.
47. Nevertheless, the insurgency poses risks to US
interests in the region. The Sandinistas' aggressive
counterinsurgency effort over the next year is likely to
include frequent cross-border operations into Costa
Rica and Honduras. Although Managua's primary
intention will be to attack insurgent units and facili-
ties, there is some danger of escalating hostilities with
local military and security forces in both countries.
The Sandinistas' fear of a potential US military re-
sponse is likely to temper their actions to some extent,
but they are increasingly anxious to eliminate insur-
gent use of Honduras and Costa Rica as support bases
and sanctuaries. As a result, in recent months they
have demonstrated a willingness to take greater risks
by attacking Honduran and Costa Rican security
forces, without so far provoking a US response. Thus,
we cannot be certain that Nicaragua will not take even
greater risks in the future, sending forces across the
border more frequently in an attempt to force Costa
Rica and Honduras into either bilateral agreements
with Managua or international supervision of their
frontiers.
48. In the event of a serious escalation of border
hostilities, both Honduras and Costa Rica would seek
outside assistance to counter Nicaraguan military su-
periority. Tegucigalpa and San Jose might request a
firmer public pledge of US support as well as increased
security assistance, while Costa Rica would also be
likely to seek further support from its Latin American
neighbors, perhaps eventually invoking the Rio Trea-
ty. Honduras and Costa Rica might also curtail rela-
tions with Nicaragua, and may cut diplomatic ties in
an extreme circumstance. The perceived threat of US
intervention resulting from increased border hostilities
may revitalize Contadora negotiations and force Nica-
ragua to take a more favorable view toward the talks.
49. Increased border clashes and more frequent
Nicaraguan raids into Honduras and Costa Rica are
likely to fuel debate in Tegucigalpa and San Jose over
the issue of support to anti-Sandinista rebels. As
election campaigns in Honduras and Costa Rica heat
up, an escalation of border hostilities will almost
certainly increase pressure on both governments to
impose further limitations on the guerrillas, particular-
ly if the insurgent presence in these countries increases
substantially. The new Honduran government, to take
office in January 1986, may be even more reluctant
than the current administration to continue coopera-
tion with the anti-Sandinistas. Costa Rica, for its part,
may accept international supervision of its frontiers,
thus putting pressure on Honduras to do likewise.
50. As the insurgent conflict inside Nicaragua con-
tinues to escalate, the United States is likely to be
faced with increased Soviet arms deliveries and great-
er Cuban military involvement. This will further upset
the regional military balance and complicate US force
planning. Honduras and Costa Rica, although encour-
aged by the prospective renewal of US funding of the
insurgents, are likely to seek a firmer commitment to
their defense and a clearer definition of US policy
regarding the future of the Sandinista regime.
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