JOURNAL OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000300050009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 16, 1971
• Content Type: NOTES

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JOURNAL
OEFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Friday - 16 July 1971
1. Called Walt Rostow in Texas, in response to
his call to the Director, and provided him with information on certain
Agency congressional briefings relating to the North
Vietnameae_during the spring and summer of 1964. Rostow said this was
exactly the information he wanted and was most appreciative.
3. Attended a meeting in the State Department to
discus how to handle Senator Symington's 7 July letter to the Secretary of
stater
See Memo for
Record for details.
4. Mr. Wymberley DeR Coerr, Deputy to Ray
Cline, INR, State Department, called to say he was preparing some views for
the Department on the Cooper and Church bills and wanted to coordinate with
us on the approach to be taken. We expect they will be placed on the agenda
for LIG discussion, but it was agreed we would keep in touch as we prepare
responses on these measures.
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lf
j
) us. iis over-all conclusion, con-!
On f;l1.2'10'gY in C.-0 Pnris; I eieed in the first paragraph of"
'11.2 i'ilteliL*C!13Ce \,\ Lite -10USe spekeaman,1 the document, said:
..
'Bruce .was attemptim; CO staet
the new Viet Cong mace pro- '
"meaningiul negotiations."
. posal is aimed at embarrassing,
tics, a TY T.
Cf 11"S told p11? Ial, Gerald L. Warren, said that "The Viet C011if's new Senn
-
the United States "both at hoine The State Department press
officer, Charles 'W. Bray III,
said: "We regret that the Noeth
Vietnamese and the Viet Cong
did- not respond affirmatively to
this suggestion, but centintie to
hope that they will do so."
? and overseas" and encouraging
the opponents of President
Nguyen Van Mien in South
Vietnam, officials say.
Other negative comments on
4.. the plan were contained in a
detailed analysis submitted to
Nixon and other top administra-
tion officials last Friday, a day
after Mrs. INgitt,?en Binh, the
chief Viet Cong delegate, offered
her proposale et the Paris talks.
The agency's evaluation, ac-
cording to senior administration
officials, was one of several
top-level studies of Lie Commu-
nist plan on Welch Nixon and t,:'? '''eg3talt?1-1s. They 1.cc'.'?cd
Secretary of t.;:itte vtittiam R taat last year he waited ret- rly
Rogers based their Cecision to
instruct the ? U.S. delegelion in
Paris to seek further elaeifica-
tions yesterday from be Com-
munist side in 'rcstt atted scs-
? sions,". or- private talks.
ilighly placed officials indicat-
ed their belief that the President'
would refrain from publicly ex-
pressing his viet.vs on the devel-
opments in the talks until the
situation becom'es "much clear-
er" through public or private
exchanges in Paris.
They said that only after Fetch
clarifications would Nixon ad-
dross the nation ?it the stz...e of
The evaluation and parallel
stddies prepared in eeeeat days
by the State and Defoe-. .t depart-
? 1/1011tS and the Ne , iota., Security
Council staff have expressed nu-
merous s eri ous reservations
about the Viet Cong plai.
force weeks after the Cori.l.a.d-
riists presented their peace p!tin
on Sept. 17 before making his
counterproposal on Oct. 7, -
"At this stage, we are not pre-
pared to reject or to accept any-
thing as a package," a senior
official said. "We are looking
and we are probing because this
is
,e business of diplomacy."
, The negotiating situation will
be reviewed again when Henry
:Kissinger joins Nixon and EA.,-
ers in San Clemente early next
? But all the studies elso found ,
anick. The next scheduled ses-
sem of the Paris talks is Thurs-
day. ?
'Kissinger, the President's spe-
cial assistant for national securi-
ty affairs, visited Saigon last
weekend and is to confer with
Bruce in Pari S this weekend.
new elements in the plan.
The CIA paper, for example,
!noted , that "it softens" the Com-
munist position on the American
prisoners of war and presents
"two new nuances" on the South
Vietnamese political settlement.
For this reason, senior officials
said, the administration chose toC ILS
Joins ?in Talks
seek to engage in what officials
here terined ''meaningful" eear?Helms, director ef tlm
tiations." Central Intelligence Agency ?
Senior officials emphasized ?ivil was reported to Iteve
ich
that. they did not consider the "ailed the' first analysis of the
Viet Cong plan ? participated in
fact that the Communists """ the discussions on the U.S. ea,-
not responded -immediately to
the proposal Inc nt.ostriotei,, sponse to the Communist propos-
sessions, made in Paris by Am-
as after he flew to San Clemen-
i L
bassador David K. E. Bruce, tile e. ,te with the President and Rogers
chief' U.S. negotiator, as an out- '-'1-lesaaY?
right rejection.
Ofpcials familiar with various
administration evaluations of
They said that "sorieething re-,
Viet Cong plan said the CIA
.sembling a negotiating process "I?
e 3110S
analysis was "perhajm. tile t'
pese.imistic ? but also the most
may be in the making."
At San Glemente, Calif., where
Nixon and Rogers yesterday ? of the lot." ?
conferred for the third.' Lime this
point proposal softens the Com-
munists' position on the prison-
er-of-war release but retains and
amplifies a very tough line on
United States disengagement
from the war. In addition, it
repackages Ilanoi's demands foe
a political settlement in South
Viitinam in a superficially more
attractive form."
The analysis recognized, how-
ever, that "there are two new
nuances in the Communist posi-
tion on a political settlement in
South Vietnam."
?
What Reds Offered
Tho principal features of the
Viet Cong Dian were the Com-
munist readiness to start releas-
ing U.S. prisoners of war as
American troops begin with-
drawing from Vietnam after a
date "in 1971" is set by Washing-
tort, and the dropping of the
Communists'. long-standing in-
sistence on a Coalition regime in
Saigon as tile condition for a po-
litical settlement.
But -after analyzing the plan,
the CIA offered this assessment
of the Communist motives 40
presenting their July 1 propos-
als:
`"The Communists doubtless
, hone -that their initiative on the
prisoners ? coupled as it is with
a .restatement if their basic po:
sition on United States with-
drawals ? will make things
awkward for the United States
government both at home and
overseas,"
"They may also believe that
their political proposals will ap-
peal to many in the United,
States who are looking for a
face-saving way out of the war.
"They probably are also hop-
ing that the new proposal will
fuel woreies in Saigon 'about
1,Yeasltington's longer-terra sup-
poet.
"TrIC: IleAv formula for a politi-
cal settlement in South. Vietnam,
by its fuzziness and air of rea-
scniableness, is designed both to
encourage Individuals in South
Vietnam whose support of: the
war is wavering and to give
some ammunition to those who
-are already working to build anL
anti-Thieu, anti-war constituen-
c
y
"
14:letti ?iit in Oetulter ?
This eispcat of the analysis
was know I be in line with the
belief in o her .ticlininistration
quarters 'het the Communist
peace plan was latieched, at
least in 1.? eie, to influence -the
outcome of the October elections
in Smith Vu nam?when Presi-
dent Thieu will sack. re-election.
In this ecatext, the -analysis
noted that "among other things
the Commtaii. 5feem intent on
creating tit ienpression that the
election of .2,ie Minh could prove
an initial step toward peace."
"Big Minim,' is Gen. Duong
Van Minh, a potential but unde-
clared presidential candidate
upon whom Ilemoi and the Viet
Gong had bioked with favor in;
the past.
1st "New I-aiance" Eyed .
The analysis, said that the
Viet Cong pl cm's first "new nu-
anco" Was dint instOad of do-
mantling ? a coalition regime, it
"simply den.nrals that the Unit-
ed Stat.:s 'cc is hacking the bel-
licose ;trolly heLitled by 'aim"
'enciether t nee, it said, is
. . . ,
that the Conmin.insts no longer
ask a "three-seement' regime,
including Cern munists, but .a
broad "goveytte ant of notion al
concord" to be Lert.otiated by the'
Viet Cong with tt "post-Thieu ad-
ministration."
ts- )revieusly 're nth Vietnamese
and Viet Cong leaders had insist-.
cd that nut oidy Thieu, but Vice
President Ngi yen Cao Ky and
Prime Minis or Trait Thin
Khicm, as well, would be unac-
ceptable in a post-war govern-
ment.
"For years Gemmunist dele-
gates at the Po--is peace talks .
have boon calliet? tar removal of
the 'Thiele-Ky.-I LThl clique,' one
diplomatic infe.t nant told the
Associated Press. "They practi-
cally pr ono e e e d Mien-
liy-ichiem' as 0...1 word..Now
they've 'begun .Ittnkirig only of
Thieu."
Le Due 't'ho, smior North Viet-
namese reeircse itiitive in Paris,
gave an IiiterV ow to the New
York Times and hammered
away at Thieu?and Thieu only.
?-?
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U JUL 1W1
? IA.SaysPlan Seeks to Ethbarras UeS0
upon whom Iianoi and the Viet-
By TAD SZULC
'
Special to The New York Times .
WASHINGTON, July 8?
!The Central Intelligence
Agency has told President
Nixon that the, new Vietcong
peace proposal is aimed at
embarrassing-the United States
, "both at home and overseas"
and encouraging the opponents
of President Nguyen 'Van Thieu
in South Vietnam.
Other negative comments on
the plan were .contained in a
detailed analysis submitted to
Mr. Nixon and other top Ad-
ministration officials last Friday
a day after Mrs. Nguyen Thi
Binh, the chief Vietcong dele-
gate, offered her proposals at
the Paris talks; ,
The agency's evaluation, ac-
cording to senior Administra-
tion officials, was one of
several top-level studies of
the Communist plan on which
President Nixon and, Secretary
of State William P.?. Rogers
based their decision to in-
struct the United States dele-
gation in Paris to seek further
clarifications today from the
Communist .side in "restricted
sessions," or private talks.
Reservations Expressed
. The evaluation as well as tile
parallel studies prepared in re-
cent days by the State and De-
fense Departments and the Na-
tional Security Council staff
have expressed numerous seri-
bus reservations about the Viet-
cong plan.
But all the studies also found
new elements in the plan. The
C.I.A. paper, for example, noted
that "it softens" the Commu-
nist position on the American
prisoners of war and presents
Iwo new nuances" on the
South Vietnamese political set-
tlement. For this reason, senior
officials said, the Administra-
tion chose to seek to engage in
what officials here termed
"meaningful negotiations."
Senior officials emphasized
that they did not consider the
fact that the Communists had
not responded immediately to
the proposal for "restricted"
sessions, made today in Paris
by David K. E. Bruce, the chief
United States negotiator, as an
outright rejection. .
They said that "something
resembling a negotiating proc-
ess may be in the making."
At San Clemente; Calif.,
*here President Nixon and Mr.
Rogers conferred for the third
time this week on strategy in
the Paris talks, a .White House
spokesman, Gerald L. Warren,
said that Mr. Bruce was at-
tempting to start "meaningful
negotiations."
The State Department press
officer, Charles W. Bray 3d,
said here about the Bruce pro-
posal that "we regret that the
North Vietnamese and the Viet-
cong did not respond affirma-
tively to this sugeestgon but
continue to hope that they will
do so."
Nixon Expected to Wait.
Highly-placed officials indi-
eated their belief that-President
Nixon would refrain from pub-
licly 'expressing his views on
the developments in the
talks until the situation became
"much .clearer" through public
or private exchanges in Paris.
They said that only after
such clarifications would Mr.
Nixon address the nation on
the state of the negotiations.
They recalled that last year he
had waited nearly three weeks
after the Communists presented
their peace plan on Sept. 17
before making his counter-
proposal on Oct. 7.
' "At this stage, we are not
prepared to reject or to accept
anything as a package," a
senior official said. "We are
looking and we are probing
because this is the business of
diplomacy."
Other officials said that the
negotiating situation would be
reviewed again when Henry A.
Kissinger joins Mr. Nixon and
Mr; Rogers in San Clemente on
Sunday. The next screduled
session of the Paris talks is
next Thursday.
Mr. Kissinger, the President's
special assistant for national
security affairs, visited Saigon
last weekend and is to confer
with Mr. Bruce in Paris on
Saturday.
Richard Helms, the Director
of Central Intelligence, whose
agency was reported to have
drafted the first analysis of
the Vietcong plan, participated
in the discussions on the United
States response to the Commu-
nist proposals after he flew to
San Clemente with President
Nixon and Mr. Rogers last
-Tuesday
Officials familiar with various
Administration evaluations of
the Vietcong plan said that the
C. -I? A. analysis was "perhaps
the most pessimistic?but also
the most realistic?of the lot."
Its over-all conclusion; con-
tained in the first paragraph of
the document, said:
"The Vietcong's new seven-
point proposal softens the
Communists' position on the
prisoner-of-war release but re-
tains and amplifies a very
tough line on United States dis-
engagement from, the war. In
addition, it repackages Hanoi's
demands for a political settle-
ment in South Vietnam in a
superficially more attractive
[min." ? . ,
New Nuances Recognized
The analysis recognized, how-
ever, that "there are two ,new
nuances in the Communist posi-
tion on a political settlement in
South Vietnam."
The principal features of Mrs.
Binh's plan were the Commu-
nist readiness to start releasing
United States' war prisoners as
American troops begin with-
drawing from Vietnam after a
date "in 1971" is set by Wash-
ington, and the dropping of the
Communists' long-standing
sistence on a coalition regim
in Saigon as the condition for
political settlement.
But after analyzing the plan,;
the C. I. A. offered -this assesse
merit of the Communist motives
m presenting their July 1 pro-
posals:
"The Communists doubtless
hope that their iniatiative on
the prisoners?coupled as it is
with a restatement of their
basic position on United States
withdrawals?will make things
awkward for the United States
Government both at home and
overseas."
"They may also believe that
titeir political 'proposals will
appeal to many in the United
States who are, looking for a
face-saving way Out of the war.
They probably are also hoping
that the new proposal will fuel
worries in Saigon about Wash-
ington's longer-term support.
; "The new formula for a po-
litical settlement in South Viet-
nam, by its fuzziness and air
of reasonableness, is designed
both to encourage individuals
in South Vietnam Whose sup-
port of the war is waverin
and to give some ammunitio
to those who are already work
ing to build an antisThieu, anti-
war constituency."
Coincidence of Beliefs
This aspect of the analysis,
was known to coincide with
the belief in other Administra-
tion quarters that the Commu-;
fist peace plan was launched,
..at least in part, to influence the
outcome of the October 'elec-
tions in South Vietnam, where
'President Nguyen Van 'Thieu is
seeking re-election.
In this context, the analysis
noted' that "among other things
the Communists seem intent on
creating the impression that the
election of Big Minh could
prove an initial step toward
peace."
"Big Minh" Is Gen. Duong
Van Minh, a potential but un-
declared presidential candidate
cong had looked dtli favor in
the past.
The. analysis si id that the
Vietcong plan's ill st "new nu-
ance" was that instead of de-
manding a coalition regime in
Hanoi, it "simply c,emands that
the United States 'cease back-
ing the bellicose gsoup' headed
by Thieu."
The other nuance, it said, is
that the Communis ts no longer
ask a "three-segment" regime,
including Comnitni.sts, but a
broad "goveinment of national
concord" to be negotiated by
the Vietcong with t "nost-Thieu
inistration."
"The Communists eeem to be
trying to leave the impression
that the form of gi vet nment is
open to negotiatior," the docu-
ment said. "Moreaner, the -lan-
guage of this secter,--and
in-
deed much or the tAstement?
is cast to convey image of
!conciliation and reasonable-
ness without committing Hanoi ?
to anything specific."
The analysts also warned
against ? pitfalls in he Commu-
nist proposal for releasing the
American prisoners in exchange
for the withdrawal of United
States troops from Vietnam
under a set deadline. This has
appeared to be the Joust attrac-
tive aspect of Mrs. !3lith's peace
package.
But the analysis said that;
while "the formulation on the
prisoner-release question is
new," the Comnutrist demand
on total United States military
disengagement "is as firm as
ever." ?
"Moreover, by .including for
the first time as well as
military prisoners, the Commu-
nists are opening the whole
thorny problem .of the Com-
munist civilian cadre who are
now held by Saigon," it said.
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17;t$Illi7CTON. 11051
9 APR ON ?
The Wasbingten Merry.Go4Lionn11
Intelligence ills Have Fatal
By ',Toth Anderson
FAULTY INTELLIGENCE
and military leaks have caused
heavy casualties, Contributed
to the .Mylal massacre and
triggered other tragedies in
Indochina.
- Because intelligence reports
are highly classified, the mis-
takes have been swept under
the secrecy label. The public
is entitled to know, however,
abotrt the terrible cost of intel-
ligence errors.
By monitoring enemy radio
transmissions, for ? example,
the Defense . Intelligence
.Agency learned that Hanoi
had advance knoWledg,e of
both the Cambodian and Laos
invasions.
Intercepted enemy me&.
sages, - called "gamma .- con-
trolled items," revealed that
the Vietcong had overheard
two U.S. officers discuss the
Cambodian invasion plan, The
eavesdroppers learned .cnough
to alert Communist forces in
Cambodia.
Before-the Labs invasion, al-
lied Commandos made re-
peated, hit-and-run raids
against the Ho Chi Minh infil-
tration routes. It became evi-
dent in ihe'fall of 1.970, how-
ever, that these surprise raids,
planned under the secret code
name 'Prairie Fire," were no
longer surprising anyone.
Raiders Ambushed
- Someone began tipping off
the enemy exactly where and
when to expect the raids, with
disastrous results for the raid-
ers. More than once, helicopl The tragic result was that
ters had to be rushed in to res- three companies, including Lt.
cue the so-called MACSOG
teams from ambush.
The South Vietnamese inva-
sion to cut off the Ho Chi
Minh trails, similarly, was an-
ticipated by the North Viet-
namese. Intelligence estimates lagers.
placed only 11/2 divisions in
the area. These were expected
to fade back, avoiding any Intelligence goofs have been
concentrations that could be responsible for other, unpubli-
blasted from the air. cized massacres. U.S. pilots,
Instead, the South. Vietnam- guided by wrong intelligence;
ese ran into four divisions, have bombed and strafed
which defied withering air at- friendly Montagnard villages.
tacks to drive the invaders out We will document these
of Laos. The Communists also charges in future columns.
threw more tanks into the bat- Of course, the celebrated
tie than the intelligence ex- Sontay raid, which sent daring
ports had thought in the area. Americans ? into the outskirts
In earlier columns, we also of Hanoi to rescue war prison-
detailed how 'Hanoi has been ers, was a dangerous wild
alerted in advance of B-52 goose chase thanks to poor in-
raids. Plans for the raids, oh- telligence.
tamed from GIs for stashes of Brig. Geri. Leroy Manor, correct, may still he possible,
marijuana or caps of heroin, who directed the operation,
had been delivered to a Soviet admitted to the press after-
trawler off Okinawa's Minita- ward that the American pris-
gouwa Point. The trawler's oners had been gone from the
high-powered transmitters camp for "several weeks." His
would radio the informalion 'secret message to the Penta-
to Hanoi in time for the North gon, stamped "FLASH-PREC-
Vietnamese to move their EDENT," reported that the
trucks off the Ho Chi Minh camp hadn't been occupied for
"three or four months."
The price for these intelli-
gence goofs has been paid in
blood. Should those who were
responsible be allowed to i-c-
William Jr. and his
men, surged into Mylai with
guns blazing. They didn't stop
When the expected Vietcong
turned out to be unarmed vii-
Unpublicized Massacre
Hanoi planned to drive across
South Vietnam to the sea in
'August, thereby disrupting
South Vietnamese elections
and turning the American
withdrawal into a retreat. The
assault upon the Ho Chi Minh
trail complex was ordered
largely to head of this antici-
pated offensive.
, But unhappily, the latest in-
telligence reports show that
the truck traffic down the Ho
Chi Minh trails hss picked up
dramatically since the South
Vietnamese pullout. Truck
sightings have-been running
as high as 1,000t.o 1,200 a clay..
This means the North Viet-
namese are making a mighty
effort to replace the supplies
that the invasion force de-
stroyed. The August offensive,
if ? the original reports were
trails before the big bombers
arrived.
It's also no secret that the
Mytai massacre was the direct
result Of faulty intelli!!.ence.
The attackers were told that main in their shadowy world
the whole area was infested safe from public exposure?
with Vietcong, that two Viet- Footnote: Intelligence re-
cong companies and a field ports, based on captured docu-
headquarters were lOcated in meats and intercepted mes-
Mylai and that the villagers sages, led to the Laos inva-
would be away. sion. The reports claimed that
-
Diplomatic Grapevine.
U.S. intelligence officers
say the Chinese party organiz-
ers have run up against a wall
of apathy among the Chinese
people on communism, just as
the Russian people are turn-
ing off on the same subject
Rumors have been whip-
ping through Karachi that the
Central Intelligence Agency is
behind the rebellion in East
Pakistan :The whispers charge
that the U.S. scelv: to establish
a more friendly,- independent
government in East Pakistan.
The rumors 'undeubtedly will
be believed although they are
absolutely false.
? 1971, Bell-McClurs SyAnicate, Inc,
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4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540
STAT
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAI"Jack Anderson Reports
DATE'
March 27, 1971
6:40 PM
CIA MONEY BEHIND PROJECT
STATION WTOP Radio
Syndicated
CITY Washington, DC
JACK ANDERSON: The United States has taken pains to keep out of
South Vietnamese politics. We can report, however, that CIA money has been
secretly chaneled into South Vietnam to build up a political organization
in the countryside that counteracts the Viet Cong political apparatus.
? Some of its month is funnelled through the AFL-CI0 to South Vietnam's
Confederation of Labor.
. The South Vietnamese labor organization has used the money to build
up an anti-cbmmunist farmer-labor party.
An AFL-CIO spokesman denied that its contributions came from the
CIA but acknowledged that the money is being used to buil an anti-communist
political system in South Vietnam.
Competent sources tell us, however, that CIA money is behind the
project,
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON. D. C. ? LOS ANGELES ? NEW YORK .? DETROIT ? NEW ENGLAND ? CHIC?' GO
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STAT
ry
41 EAST 42N0 STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017, a97-10o
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF.
PROGRAM NEWSRADIO 88 STATION WCBS
. DATE MARCH 18, 1971 4:20 PM CITY NEW YORY
SPECTRUM ON THE CIA AND THE MAO TRIBES
MURRY KEMPTON: Before they were picked up as a bargain by
the Central Intelligence Agency the Mao tribes lived in the mountains
near the border between northern Laos and North Vietnam. They
were just what most mountaineers are thought to be -- proud, stubborn
and Suspicious of lowlanders, and they disliked what we call the
Democrats of Laos almost as much as they did the Communists of
North Vietnam.
In 1963 our CIA's comparison shoppers recognized the convenience
of the Mao as a human wall against North Vietnam. As one sorrowful
witness to their subsequent fate said later, you can always get
a Mao to fight. The CIA trained, equipped and sent them to war.
By 1969 their commander felt forced to tell the American Enbassy
that his troops were so bloodied by then that he'd have to withdraw
them from the front and move all the Mao to northwest Laos.
The CIA answered if they would stay and hold their line we
would reward them with air support. We kept that promise so well
that the Mao took the offensive, and they were beaten again by
an infusion of North Vietnamese troops and they have been wandering
ever since.
A year or so ago Ronald Rickenbach, an American refugee relief
officer, reported to a Senate committee that the Mao are now all
destitute as a result of the battles we encouraged them to fight.
They fought because we armed them, and we had no moral right to
encourage the Mao into protracted battle against such overwhelming
odds.
This week Henry Cahem(?) of the New York Times remindee us
again of the troubling continued existence of the Mao. There
are 100,000 of them wandering about northern Laos, and there are.
no more mountains left there for them. Every year since 1967
25,000 of the young males have been killed in battle, a death
OFFICE IN: NEW YORK' ? DETROIT. ? LOS ANGELES ? WASHINGTON. D. O. ? NEW ENGLAND ? CHICAGO
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rate in action which is annually over fire per cent of their whole
population. Even their CIA sponsors now can see that they are
exhausted and of no further use as commodities on the war market.
Our allies in the Laotian government are indifferent to their
fate.
Americans, of course, are rather more sentimental, and the
CIA is casting about for a solution. The only available one seems
to be to move the Mao into an area under the control of Pathet-
Lao(?), the native Communist rebels, where perhaps it is hoped
they can find some accomodation. Having aroused the Mao to wear
themselves out in the struggle against Communism we can only advise
them now to find ways to get along with Communists. Since they
are of no more use to us, they will just have to make what accomoda-
tions they can.
This is Murry Kempton for Spectrum.
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OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Tuesday - 2 February 19 71
Discussed with Darrell St. Claire,
Chief Clerk in the Office of the Secretary of the Senate, the members
and organization of certain committees in the new Congress and certain
problems regarding some of the personalities involved.
2. Brief Ralph Preston, Staff Assistant, House
Appropriations Committee, on recent Soviet naval developments.
Preston said that in view of the new rules laid down by the
Democratic caucus, the group handling Agency affairs would probably
no longer refer to itself as a "subcommittee" but would probably be
spoken of only as "the group" or something of the sort. He said he
foresaw no changes in the membership or procedures.
3. Briefed Russ Blandford, Chief Counsel,
House Armed Services Committee, on recent developments regarding
the Soviet navy.
Blandford said no decision has yet been made on how the Committee
will handle Agency matters.
4. Met with Representative William E.
Minshall (R., Ohio), of the House Appropriations Committee, whom
I briefed on recent developments including Soviet naval activity in Cuba and
in the Atlantic, developments regarding advanced Soviet aircraft, changes in
the Soviet Military Districts in Central Asia and the Far East and the general
situation in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
Minshall said that, although Secretary Laird had tried to explain to
him what actually happened in connection with the ,Son Tay raid, he was
still confused. I told him about the very limited role of the Agency, and
said I couldn't throw much light on any other aspects of the operation. He
said he understood from Laird that Agency reports had indicated the presence
of American prisoners at the camp just six weeks before the raid.
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Congress and the W.r - 3
Dec., , y !GI )
Congress and the Indochina War: 1970 Chronology
Feb. 2. Senate Foreign Relations Committee made
public a report, "Vietnam: December 1969," criticizing
the Administration's Vietnamization policy. (Wed:ly
Report p. 336)
Feb. 18. The President issued a 40,000-word mes-
sage to Congress, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A
New Strategy tbr Peace." (Text and summary, Weekly
Report p. 509)
Feb. 25, 26, 27. House Appropriations Subcom-
mittee on Defense heard a report on the Vietnamization
progress from Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird.
(Weekly Report p. 684)
March 6. President Nixon lifted the official lid of
secrecy on U.S. military involvement, in Laos with a
3,000-word statement which drew sharp comment from
members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
(Weekly Report p. 761)
April 12. After a delay of more than five months,
a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee
released a censored transcript of closed hearings held
in October 1969 on U.S. military involvement in Laos.
(Fact sheet, Weekly Report p. 1243)
April 30. President Nixon announced that
American troops had been sent into battle in Cam-
bodia. (Weekly Report p. 1151)
May 2. Senators George McGovern (D S.D.),
Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa), Alan Cranston (D Calif.),
Charles E. Goodell (R N.Y.) and Mark 0. Hatfield (R
Ore.) announced plans to offer an amendment to elimi-
nate spending for military operations in Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia by the end of 1970. (Weekly Report p.
1208)
May 5. A May 1 Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee report on a resolution (S Con Res 64) to repeal
the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution was recommitted to the
Committee. (Weekly Report p. 1207)
May 6. House passed a bill (HR 17123) authoriz-
ing $20.2 million for military procurement and research
in fiscal 1971 and rejected amendments that would have
restricted use of U.S. troops in Southeast Asia. (Weekly
Report p. 1209)
May 13. The Senate began debate on the
Foreign Military Sales bill (HR 15628), the vehicle for
an amendment offered by Senators Frank Church (D
Idaho) and John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.) designed to
prohibit U.S. military activities in Cambodia. (Weekly
Report p. 1272)
June 6. The Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee released a report, "Cambodia: May 1970," disput-
ing the military reason given by President Nixon for
ordering the intervention into Cambodia and indicating
that the military gains were outweighed by the risks of
a broadened war in Indochina. (Weekly Report p. 1534)
June 24. Senate adopted an amendment to repeal
Lhe 1964,..TIkin Gulf resolution. (Weekly Report p.
1615).
June 3l:k The Senate by a 58-37 roll-call vote
passed .a--modified Cooper-Church amendment and the
? ,Foreign Military Sales ..13-i1,17,-:(HR-15628)-Ifter seven
weeks of debate. (Weekly Report p. 1671)
President Nixon issued a statement on the 60-c..
U.S. operation in Cambodia stating it had been success
fully concluded and that no American ground personnel
would re-enter Cambodia in the future. (Neekl,
Report p. 1673)
July 6. A special House committee issued a report
on "U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia- (ii 91.
1276), after undertaking a two-week fact-fiodinp mis-
sion to the region.
July 9. The House rejected a_ motion ti,_ instruct
House conferees to agree to the Senate-pas .ed Cooper-
-church amendment. (Weekly Report p. 1779') -
July 10. The Senate Adopted by a 57-3 ri,I-li a concurrent resolution (S Con Res 64) reaffirn,Ing
the repeal of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution. (Week':.
Report- p:-7777)-----,.
(Aug. 20,_ 21. The Senate approved vinendmcnts
to the -defenSe procurement bill (1-1R-171:5i to n.
1:17S7.
allowances to allied troops in Sou: h Vietnan
to be any higher than those paid to American croons a.iu
to forbid use of U.S. funds to pay foreign troops fighting
for Cambodia and Laos. (Weekly Report p. 2172)
Sept. 1. The Senate defeated by a roll-call
vote the Hatfield-McGovern amendment io fIR 17123
which would have imposed a deadline for withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Vietnam. (Weekly Repor p. 2170)
Oct. 7. President Nixon in a televise peech pro-
posed a cease-fire in Vietnam and widened peace talks
to include nations not present at the Paris peace talks.
(Congressional reaction, Weekly Report p. 2-1b5)
Nov. 16. The House by a 288-39 roll-call vote
passed a joint resolution (H J Res 1355) defining the
war-making powers of the President. The bill tben went
to the Senate. (Weekly Report p. 2817)
Nov. 18. President Nixon sent a message to Con-
gress requesting $1 billion in supplementary foreign aid
including $65 million for Vietnamization and $255
million in military and economic aid for Cambodia.
(Weekly Report p. 2834)
Nov. 23. Debate over U.S. policy revived in the
aftermath of an attempt to rescue American prisoners
of war near Hanoi and large-scale air strikes over North
Vi narri.(Werk/y Report p. 2874)
Dec. 3,iThe Senate Appropriations Committee
added. i--prohibition against the entry 0: Lr.S. ground.-
combat "troops -inte::.Cambodia when it considered
$66ibillion fiscal 1971 defense approprialions,.bill (FIR
19590). The Senate p-as-Sed the bill Dee. 8. (Weekly
Report p. 2933)
Dec. 7. The House approved a resolution (H Res
1282) commending the courage displayed by the official :
command, officers and men involved in the Nov. 21 ,
attempt to rescue U.S. prisoners belie ed to be held
captive near Hanoi. (Weekly Report p. 2937)
Dec. 9. The House Appropriations Commitcc
reported HR 19928, a $990 million supplier.ental
aid bill for fiscal 1971 including $255 rnillion for C:::17
bodia. The House by a 249-102 vote pal,sed a bili ,1
19911) authorizing $550 million in foreign aid, incuic
ing $255 million for Cambodia. (Weekly Report p. 2937
um+ rnun?FC,ONAI GII.,A1ERLY INC
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