PROJECT PLANNING IN SOVIET R&D

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00280R000300380003-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

Project planning in Soviet R&D *
Stephen FORTESCUE
CREES, University of Birmingham, PO Box J lfirmin9W4_m. U.K.
Science in the USSR has not escaped the general commit-
ment of the authorities to centralized planning. But they have
Tong been dissatisfied with the degree of de lie to decentraliza-
tion and isolation from production of the traditional science
planning process. as well as the laci, of flexibility of an institu-
tion-based system. This article examine, the recent response to
these problems - comprehensive goal-oriented programme
methods of science planning and management. apparently de-
rived from both Sos let and US defence R&D management The
problems of the approach are resealed. primarily in terms of
the excessive bureaucratization of science invoked and the
continuing isolation of R&D from production. The article
concludes by speculating on the significance of the 'en-
trepreneurial revolution' in Western R&D for the Soviet sys-
tem.
1. Introduction
Centralized planning is a fundamental principle
of Soviet economic management, with the central-
ized planning of scientific research considered an
important part of it. Scientific research was in-
cluded in the preliminary work on drawing up the
First Five Year Plan in the late 1920s. However
the relatively. low priority given science by the
industrial planners and the reluctance to cooperate
of many scientists meant that science was not in
fact included in the national plan. Nevertheless the
Academy of Science and the branch institutes as
individual institutions quickly found themselves
subject to detailed central plans. whether on a
yearly or a five-yearly basis. 126, Ch 7: 36] Since
that time the planning grip has been applied ever
more tightly.
From the beginning science planning has had
three characteristic feature:,: formally a high de-
gree of centralization accompanied by a consider-
This article was first presented a a paper u) the Special
Interest Seminar of the Australasian Association for the
Study of the Socialist Countries at the 54th Congress of the
Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advance-
ment of Science. Canberra. Mas 19t'4.
Research Police 14 (1985) 267-2S2
North-Holland
able degree of de facto decentralization: planning
based on institutions rather than projects or re-
search problems: and a general lack of integration
into production plans.
Centralization. The centralization of they plan-
ning process has als ays been a matter of cc icern
to mane scientists. The fact that most research
they do must be set out in a plan that in advance
determines the nature of tfe work. the completion
date, the amount it will cost and the source of the
funds, and that the plan will be compiled and the
confirmed by high-level government agencies - a
ministry, the Academy. the State Committee for
Science and Technology (GKNT). or Gosplan (the
State Planning Committee) - creates concern that
their academic freedom and creativity will be sti-
fled.
The concern of the party authorities is the
opposite. They complain that the planning system
is in fact not sufficiently centralized. and that
scientists are able to determine what goes into the
plan to an excessive degree. Because of the lack of
expert staff in the planning departments of higher
agencies. science plans are all too often simple
compilations of the 'pet projects' of individual
researchers. The consequences of this 'planning
from below' are: the difficulty that leading author-
ities have in establishing priorities among different
research projects: the unresponsiveness of the s\ s-
tem to attempted changes in priorities: and a
tendency for projects to be of a minor character.
with little thought being devoted to their final
practical use or the financial parameters that might
determine that use. This means that all too often
they are not used at all.
Institution-based planning. The Soviet planning
system has traditionally been based on institu-
tions. Plans are drawn up for a ministry. the
Academy. an institute or a laboratory, rather thae
for a particular research project or problem. This
reinforces the problems -aused by the de fu(ru
AnAV -7111 'r -ez 7n . rocs vi--or Crirnre Publishers B.~'. (s.orth-Holland)
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decentralization of the planning process. A new
field of research will he investigated only by an
existing laboratory or institute changing its field of
work, not always easy to achieve. or by the setting
up of a new institute. The proliferation of highly
specializedinstitutes and laboratories indicates that
the latter course is often chosen. Nevertheless.
setting up a new organization is difficult. The
result is an inflesihility and unresponsiveness to
new scientific demands. Further, an institution-
based planning process is seen as contributing to
over-specialization and a lack of cross-fertilization
between the scientific disciplines.
Lack of integration with production plans. Fol-
lowing the failure to build scientific research into
the First Five Year Plan research plans have been
kept quite separate from production plans. It was
only in 1966 that the main Five Year Plan had a
science and technology section included for the
first time. and yet this section as still entirely
separate from and not coordinated with the pro-
duction sections of the plan. (There has been a
science and technology section in annual plans
since 1949). This separation is seen as being at the
bottom of Soviet R & D's greatest problem.
vnedrenie (the process of the results of R& D being
adopted and put into regular use or production by
production enterprises). It reflects the lack of in-
terest of each side. research and production. in
what the other is doing: it greatly increases the
probability that research work will be undertaken
for which no use will ever he found. or that the
user will he unable to use the finished work be-
cause of incorrect specifications or scheduling
problems: and it simply drags out enormously
unedrenie lead times by increasing bureaucratic
delays.
The Soviet authorities saw these features of the
traditional planning system as producing serious
problems for Soviet R&D - difficulty in de-
termining and enforcing priority area, of research:
inflexibility and unresponsiveness to important
new areas of research: a lack of cross-disciplinary
and inter-branch communication: and poor and
wasteful rnedrenie. of research results in produc-
tion.
The maturing of the Soviet economy. the reduc-
tion in investment and labour resources. and the
diminishing rates of return from technolog% im-
ports made the costs of these shortcomings in-
creasingly hard to bear. The Khrushchev regime is
credited with the first realization that the Soviet
economy now had to rely on domestic techno-
logical development rather than as before entirely
on Stalinist methods of industrialization and im-
ported technology. That change in Soviet policy is
usually dated from Bulganin's speech at the July
1955 Central Committee plenum. But in this paper
me will he more concerned with changes following
Brezhnev's 'conversion' to science as the saviour of
the Soviet economy. usually dated from his adop-
tion of the scientific-.echni.cal revolution at the
24th Party Congress in 1971.
Under the influence of the systems theory which
has become so fashionable in the Soviet? academic
world since the 1960s [6]. a dual solution was
developed for the problems of science planning.
The first aspect of the solution was koanpleksnost'
(comprehensiveness), the idea that plans should
co\ er all stages of a particular research problem
from the basic research through to series produc-
tion. By removing the separation of research and
production plans. many of the problems of
tnedrenie would be removed. particularly as at the
same time steps would be taken to integrate scien-
tific and production organizations into single as-
sociations.
The second aspect of the solution was tsel'noct'
(goal-orientatiiDn). the idea that plans would he
drawn up for projects rather than organizations. I f
a project was to be 'comprehensive' it would inevi-
table he worked on by a number of institution,
often in different branches of the economy. and
even institutions such as the Academy and univer-
sities outside the branch R&D network. The work
done by all these different institutions would be
fitted into a single goal-oriented project. This
mould make 'planning from below' a much more
difficult proposition and give the higher planning.
authorities considerably greater power in de-
termining priorities and allocating resources. Th:s
protect approach will usually require some restruc-
turing of science institutions and management pro-
cedures. If science planning is project based. the
management and implementation of research plans
must also be based on project groups rather than
the more usual single discipline and highly special-
ized institutes, departments and laboratories.
The task of this paper is to describe the imple-
mentation and problems of the new approach in
Soviet science plann ng. Its two aspects have not
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regime is
he Soviet
techno-
entirely"
and im-
policy is
the J
hit:E
folic
,aviour''bf
his adop-
in at the
ir% which
academic
Lion was
planning.
ileksnost'
,s should
problem
produc-
arch and
-lems of
as at the
ate scien-
,ingle as-
tse!'nosi'
vould be
ations. If
aid inevi-
titutions.
)MV. and
univer-
the work
A ould be
-ct. This
ich more
planning
in de-
ces. This
restruc-
:tent pro-
ased. the
ch plans
her than
special-
ies.
ie imple-
,roach in
have not
always been treated together. but when they are
they are most simply and briefly referred to as
progrumnino-tselerv nietodr (PTsM. programme-
goal methods. The word 'programme' expresses
the essence of kemtpleksnos-'. while t.selerve V. the
adjective from tsel'nost'.) I will usually refer sim-
ply to PTsM.
2. New approaches
I will begin by briefly speculating on the possi-
ble origins of the neu Soviet approach. ' Soviet
commentators claim a long domestic tradition of
PTsM. going right back to the GOELRO pro-
gramme of electrification of the 1920s. and even
Lenin's 1918 'Outline of a plan of scientific-tech-
nical work'. Each compete as the 'first scientific
programme in history' 122. p 21; 741. The 'Outline'
is nothing more than a scrap of paper of less than
200 words. primarily recommending self-suf-
ficiency in energy and resources for the ness Soviet
state [68. pp. 100-101]. GOELRO was a more
substantial undertaking. and yet it too seems to he
treated as no more than one of those things that
must be given a token reference. mainly because
Lenin was involved in it. It is rare that Soviet
research management theorists describe the lessons
of GOELRO in detail. Those features that are
mentioned are the GOELRO commission under
the All-Union Council for the National Economy
(VSNKh), that is. a body with special responsibil-
ity for all stages of the electrification project. and
its integrated. single-source funding (the commis-
sion had a credit of 20 million roubles to be
disposed of as it Wished) [52 p. 237].
A few Soviet writers mention in the same list of
precursors, with equal lack of detail, the military
tasks that faced the USSR after the Second World
War, specifically the development of nuclear
weapons and delivery systems. as well as the space
programme [45]. It seems probable that the experi-
ence gained from these programmes has had a
considerable effect or. Soviet research management
theory and practice. Many of the participants still
occupy senior positions in the Soviet scientific
communit'. while the histories of some of those
programmes are reasonably well-documented. even
I ignore here the prohabl important interaction hetween the
Soviet Union and other CMEA countries in the de\elopment
of project planning. I will leave it to someone with a greater
knowledge of CMEA and East Europe than I have to cover
this point.
in the open press. 1 etc history of the deselopment
of the Soviet atom bomb, for example. reads not
unlike that of the Manhattan Project. While the
role of the USSR's Oppenheimer, Igor Kurchatov.
might be exaggerated at the expense of Malvshev.
Vannikov and Zaveniagin. the Soviet equivalents
of General Groves, one gets the impression of a
very clear goal with all necessary resources being
devoted to its achievement; the encouragement of
work on competing approaches, but all under the
strict overall control of a single person. the closest
possible cooperation between science and produc-
tion. with indeed stern subordination of the former
to the latter; a good understanding of the need to
work towards the final goal stage by stage while
integrating an enormous number of discrete
processes; and a project structure, in this case
based on a special organization just for this pro-
ject. the famous Laboratory No. 2. but with other
established institutions contributing according to
the requirements set by Kurchato . [13.15].
These lessons have presurably had an im-
portant long-term effect on the way Soviet defence
research is managed. It is generally considered to
have always had a strict goal orientation. con-
centration of resources and close researcher-pro-
duc:,r-user links that ensure that it. while not
necessarily cost-efficiently. does at least produce a
usable and wanted product. Western commenta-
tors claim that Soviet defence research makes use
of not just its own experiences, but also makes
considerable use of Western defence research ex-
perience. [6] This includes the general principles to
be learnt from accounts of the Manhattan Project
[14. vol. 4. pp. 395-396], the nuclear submarine
and Polaris developments, the work of NASA. as
well as specific and detailed management systems
such as PERT. PATTERN, Delphi methods. ma-
trix structures. etc.
It appears. although the evidence is circumstan-
tial. that American research methods adopted by
the Soviet defence research sector were. as in the
US. picked up by the civilian sector. Fes Soviet
sources on civilian research acknowledge that the
military acted as go-between in this transfer. but
that is presumably the result of censorship rather
than a reflection of the true situation. Meagre as
they are, such clues as the fact that pioneers of the
civilian application of PTsM such as G. Pospelov
have a defence research background [2. p. 478],
that the first published translations of the L IS
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literature, wets 'done by the Sin erchoee radio pub-
lishing house, tht`only Soviet publishing house to
list its address as a post-office box (generally
considered a sign of a high-securit\ organization).
and the interesting detective work of Robert
Campbell. suggest that civilian PTcM owe a lot to
defence research procedures. In particular.
cess h\ ha\ing the most important projects centr-
alh determined sonic time in advance. and haying
them integrated in state economic plans: to cover
the entire 'research-production' cycle: and to ex-
tend these principles through all levels of the R& D
system. on both a vertical and regional basis.
Campbell s?eculates on the military. origins of _ _The determination of projects and their inclusion in
setevoe planiroranie i uprat'lenie (network planning
and management). a Soviet version of PERT. which
some Soviet writers claim was the prototype of
PT.sM 16. pp. 602-608) 118. p. 1381.
Whatever the route taken. US models did reach
Soviet theorists on civilian research management.
and a reasonahh extensive literature now exists
135, Ch 7] 162. Ch 3]. Some of these Western
methods. particularly matrix structures and prob-
ably Delphi methods, are used in Soviet science
planning within the framework of PT.s.M.
The first calls for a nest' approach were heard in
the early 1960s. primarily from scientists. See. for
example. the calls for problem-oriented project
planning from Topchiey. former chief scientific
secretary of the Academy of Sciences. in 1961, and
Paton. director of the Paton Institute of Electrical
Welding. in 1962. This could have been part of an
effort on the part of senior Academy scientists to
regain for the Academy an important coordinating
role after the setbacks of the 1961 reorganization
[12. p. 14]. [41] 164. p. 131. Soviet management and
economics specialists were already at this stage
taking a keen and public interest in Western meth-
ods [56]. But no changes were made until after the
fall of Khrushchev. In 1965 the State Committee
for Science and Technology (GKNT) was set up,
with extensive powers in the coordination and
planning of scientific research. and in 1966 for the
first time a section of the nes Eight Five Year
Plan was set aside for scientific and technical
developments. The section listed 240 particularly
important R&D problems [14. vol. 3. p. 981.
But the first serious step in the direction of
PTsA1 was the September 1968 Central Committee
and Council of Ministers decree which dealt in
some detail es ith hors projects for inclusion in the
Five Year Plan should he chosen. From then on a
Whole series of changes Were introduced in typi-
calls incremental style. but with the effect of grad-
ually strengthening and broadening the appli-
cation of PTs.11 to science planning. The changes
Were designed to get control of the planning pro-
the planning process . A number of decrees, start-
ing in September 1968, set up an elaborate system
of scientific forecasting and long-term planning.
The 1968 decree directed GKNT. the Academe of
Sciences and Gosplan to work out forecasts ( prog-
no_t) of scientific and technical developments for
the next ten or more years. On the basis of these
forecasts GKNT and the Academy would work
out the major R&D problems to be listed in the
science and technology section of the Five Year
Plan (38. para 2].
Long-term planning was broadened to include
the whole economy. not just science and technol-
ogy. in 1972. Following Kosygin's call for the
development of a long-term plan for economic
development at the 24th Party Congress in 1971.
in August 1972 a Central Committee and Council
of Ministers decree'On developing long-term per-
specti'e and five year (1976-80) plans for the
development of the economy' was duly issued h
called for a plan covering the period 1976 to 1990
It appears that no such plan appeared before 1976
and eventuall a period from 1980 to 1990 vv,,
adopted [2. pp. 480-481]. This followed the ~I,-
pearance of the July 1979 decree 'C1n impro%ing
planning and strengthening the influence of the
economic mechanism on raising the effecti\eo;
of production and the quality of work.' Of intere,i
to us is that an important input into the long-term
plan is the 'Complex programme of scientific and
technical progress for the next twenty years ' I t
was originally intended to cover the period from
1976 to 1990. but was only completed in 1979.
with the period extended to 2000. Recent ref-
erences have appeared to a programme to 261
and even 2010. indicating that as intended the
programme is being updated in five year pen.)ds
The programme includes two sections. for sci-
entific and technical problems, work on \shich is
headed by GKNTs S.M. Tikhomirov and con-
ducted by 16 special commissions. and for socio-
economic problems. directed by the Academy's
N.P. Fedorenko working with 11 commissions A
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S J,.rtevue? .' Pr,gti t plumttnj; in Sup to Rd /t -'1
special joint scientific council of GKNT and the
Academy. headed by Academy vice-president V.A.
Kotel'nikov. osersees the whole project. About
2000 scientists and specialists have been involved
[44. pp. 113-114). 157. pp. 41-48).
The programme itself has not been published
but scattered reports suggest that it is based on
fusion in desirable and hopefully feasible changes in the
el,
ewnnmy and sc icjy. although it presumably_ also
e s lists the new technologies and products which are
Yom"
technol-
for the
in 1971.
:rm per-
for the
sued. It
to 1990.
)90 was
the ap-
proving
of the
tiveness
interest
fic and
ars.' It
1979,
nt ref-
o 2005
ed the
,eriods.
for scl-
hich is
d con-
socio-
demv's
ons. A
to bring about those changes [57. p. 36]. The
following goaln are examples of those apparently
contained in the Programme:
? Accelerate the rate of growth in labour produc-
tivity throughout the economy:
? Significantly reduce the consumption of metal in
industry (between 1981 and 1990 the metal con-
tent of machinery can be reduced by approxi-
mately one-third. and in construction work by
15-20 percent);
? Raise in the next ten years productivity in land
use and livestock production by 20-30 percent.
which should alloy, in conditions of reduced
production losses, the resolution of the agricult-
ural problem even with some reduction in agri-
cultural land and a stabilization of herd size (21.
p. 46].
Once the Complex Programme. divided into five-
year periods, is drawn up - it should be ready in
up-to-date form two years before the beginning of
each new Five Year Plan - Gosplan uses it. plus
other long-term goals set by the party. to de-
termine the basic direction the economy is to take
over the next ten years. The ten-year long-term
plan for economic development is then drawn up.
On the basis of the long-term plan the regular
Five Year Plan is put together. It includes a Five
Year Plan for Scientific and Technical Develop-
ment, which in turn contains to sections - a
section for basic scientific and technical problems.
for which GKNT is responsible. and a section for
t'nedrenie under the control of Gosplan. The
Eleventh Five Year Plan was foreseen as contain-
ing 160 programmes. of which 38 would be con-
cerned with the broad application of already exist-
ing technology (these are called 'goal-oriented
complex f,cientific-technical programmes'). while
122 would he concerned with developing ne- tech-
nologies (these are called 'programmes for major
scientific-technical problems) [57. p. 30]. [76. p.
961. It appear. that in fact 170 programmes sere
eyentualh included. These programme are ap-
parently quite detailed. They might he expressed
in terms of achieving a particular economic goal or
of developing particular technologies or products.
As an example of the former we can take the
grain programme' of the Eleventh Five Year Plan.
Its goal was to raise the gross harvest of cereal.
pulse and maize grains by not less than 25 percent
and raise the productivity of labour 20 to 30
percent. The programme set out the areas in which
work was to be done to achieve these indicators. It
set out stages and periods for fulfilment and named
lead and other institutions. Over 250 scientific
organizations from nine ministries and agencies
were involved [70, pp. 48-49] As an example of
the latter type of programme. aimed at specific
technologies and products, we can mention the
programme for the development of 'blocks of
machinery for automated large-scale chemical pro-
duction'. It contains five basic tasks (_udaniiu ).
divided into 16 jobs (rahoti ). 61 stages and 120
substages. One task is 'to establish the equipment
for production lines for the production of am-
monia with a unit capacity of 1200-1500 tonnes
per day.' [33. p. 115].
Another important plan, but one which is not
included in the state Five Year Plan. is the fixc
year plan for natural and social science research.
drawn up and supervised by the Academy of
Sciences. It is concerned with fundamental re-
search for which no practical application is fore-
seen in the plan period (1, pp. 158-164].
'Research-production' cycle. It is intended that
the programmes that make up the Five Year Plan
for Scientific and Technical Development corer all
stages of the 'research-production' cycle. The first
programme. introduced in 1976. included funding
and equipment allocations and generally took pro-
jects up to prototype stage. From 1981. the begin-
Wing of the Eleventh Five Year Plan. programme.
were expected to take a project through to the
organization of series production and large-scale
vnedrenie.
Interhrunch cooperation. It is inevitable that such
programmes involve many organizations. often
from differznt branches of the economy. For ex-
ample. the ammonia programme mentioned aho\ e
involves 17 ministries and agencies. about 75 re-
search and design organizations and over 60 in-
dustrial enterprises [33, p. 115]. Up to 1976, before
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S r,,r1t,, u,' Pr,gr, i p/annrni.. m Sur,rI RA /)
scientific problems were listed as programmes in and attempting to consciously develop integrated
the scientific and technical Five Year Plan. the complex' plans [1. pp. 175-176]. Then in 1972 a
necessary cooperation was supposed to have been major new experimental form of science manage-
abtained through coordination plans. These plans ment was introduced into a number of ministries.
were drawn up after the publication of the Five particularly the Ministry of Chemical Industry and
Year Plan. on the basis of direct contacts between the Ministry of Instruments. Means of Automa-
the organizations. involved. They were to bring tion and Control Mechanisms. The experiment .
z-nariady system
,
about apoper-division ofiasTcs an integrate introduced t e woo -or er za a
scheduling. The plans were confirmed by GKNT, meaning that resources for R&D work were no
which also nominated a lead organization. usually longer allocated by the ministry to individual in-
a ministry. which would take on the operational stitutes. but rather to particular projects. All the
management of the work and which was also details and stages of each project, including its
espected to find the necessary funding. economic justification. are included in the work-
The Coordination plans came to he seen as order. Usually a head institute is put in charge of
in-sufficiently goal-oriented, in that implementa- operational management of the project. At the
tion of a project listed in the Five Year Plan same time funding of R&D work within the
depended on the interpretation given it by the ministry was centralized, with a `unified fund for
cooperating organizations. There was also the the development of science and technology' being
problem that they could be arranged only after the established in each ministry. usually financed from
Five Year Plan and the individual plans of the the ministry's planned profits or planned volume
organizations involved had been determined. Also of sales. Once the state Five Year Plan included
the\ apparently did not include complete funding programmes in its science section. those for which
and supply details. Thus a call was made at the -- --a -particular -rftinistry-was-head organization cod
25th Party Congress in 1976 for the introduction be transferred to the ministry plan as a work-order
U d t be done
o
h
of national goal-oriented research programmes
\yith priorit\ access to funding. personnel and
resources. The relevant changes were made to the
new Tenth Five Year Plan. The programmes listed
the part to be played by all participating organi-
zations. while as with the coordination plans, a
lead organization would be designated to exercise
operational control. (Coordination plans continue
to exist. apparently either covering specific pro-
jects involving a simple bilateral relationship. with
the Academy often on one side, or as part of
research programmes. In 1982 the head of the
scientific-technical administration of the Ministry
of Chemical Industry referred to 365 joint projects
contained in coordination plans with the Academy,
for the Eleventh Five Year Plan, of which 239
were part of goal-oriented programmes [40. para
7][51. pp. 37--39]).
PTs Al at loiter levels. If the new programmes
being determined at higher levels were to he ef-
ficiency implemented. it was considered that a
centralization was needed of science management
within the branch ministries. Changes in this area
had begun quite early, with in 1969 the Ministry of
Elect rotechnical Industry on an experimental basis
giving greater control of the science planning pro-
cess to the central apparatus and head institutes,
at a
with little difficulty. V1 ork t
outside the lead ministry would be done on a
contract basis. financed from funds allocated in
the work-order [9] [39].
By the beginning of 1978 a further ten industrial
ministries had been transferred to the new system.
with another five being transferred in that year. B\
1981 all industrial ministries had at least formal]\
been transferred, although in practice the situation
seems to be somewhat different [55].These change'
meant not only that it would be easier to include
the all-Union programmes listed in the Five Year
Plan in the plans of the ministries, but that b,-
lateral and intra-branch research would also he
done according to PTsM. Programmes are now set
up between branches. including between the
Academy and ministries [42] or within single ,e-
publics, branches and even institutes [47] This
required not only changes in planning and funding
arrangements. but also organizational changes. The
existence of programmes cutting across institu-
tional boundaries. with the selection of head in-
stitutes and project managers. meant that the old
institutional hierarchies had to be modified. The
need to combine the traditional linear-functional
hierarchies with a project approach produced a
great interest among academic students of mana-
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niegrated
r, 1972 a
manage-
tinistries.
u.try and
Automa-
per]
w
iduaF-n-
All the
uding its
he work-
:harge of
At the
thin the
fund for
being
ced from
I volume
included
or which
on could
-rk-order
he done
.?Ieon a
cited in
ndustrial
system,
year. Bti
formally
situation
changes
include
've Year
that bi-
also be
now set
xn the
ngle re-
7]. This
funding
aes. The
institu-
lead in-
the old
ed. The
nctwnal
luced a
f mana-
gement in US matrix structures. Some Soviet in-
stitutions indeed claim to have introduced matrix
systems. 12. pp. 464-465114. pp. 72-74. 167] (34.
Ch. 4] while throughout the Soviet R&D system
dehatc continues about the proper powers to he
given to lead institutions and project managers.
Regionulism. The final aspect of PTsM is its
use at the regional level. The 1970s saw_a great
new emphasis on territorial management of the
economic system. Following the fall of Khrushchev
and his chaotic sornarkhoz system there had been
a strong reaction back in favour of a powerful
branch system. But by the 1970s patience with the
'sectional' (redomstt?ennve) tendencies of the
ministries aas nearing thin, and moves were made
to increase territorial power, which means to a
large extent regional party power, as a counter-
weight to the ministries. This was happening at the
same time as Siberia and the Far East were being
developed, something which needed a regional ap-
proach.
A new system of territorial planning was intro-
duced in 1973 and 'territorial-production com-
plexes' were set up, particularly in Siberia and the
Far East. The new trends were discussed at the
25th Party Congress in 1976, which was followed
by the setting up of regional science centres with
very heav\ local party involvement [12. pp. 52-54];
the working out under the supervision of local
party leaders of regional 'plans for socio-economic
development'. and the establishment in the union
republics of republican councils for scientific and
technical progress,. responsible for supervising re-
publican research programmes.
The July 1979 joint decree gave further impetus
to these developments with a call for greater terri-
torial planning. It was followed by a great burst of
publicity for the Ukrainian regional science centres
and the setting up of new ones, increasing calls for
the establishment of new regional economic coor-
dinating bodies. and greater use of regional and
republican programmes. Since the death of
Brezhney the emphasis has continued, although
without major administrative charges.
.All the indications are that PTsM have been
adopted formally on a large scale. Large numbers
of programmes exist at all levels of the system and
covering a wide range of industries and technolo-
gies. Official administrative procedures have been
published. while party leaders make their commit-
ment clear. About 25 percent of research funding
in both the Tenth and Eleventh Five Year Plans
was said to have been allocated to research pro-
grammes at the all-Union level [50, p. 182]. It is
claimed that 39 billion roubles were spent on such
programmes in the Eleventh Five Year Plan. a hich
were to produce about 25 percent of new products.
machinery, techniques and fuel savings (44. p.
118]. About three times this amount has been
allocated in the Twelfth Five Year Plan (32). We
have no data on the extent of use of PTs.M at
branch. regional and institute levels. One guesses
that another 2517 of research funds might go on
research programmes below the all-Union level.
(In 1971-75 in Czechoslovakia goal-oriented re-
search took 60 percent of all science funding and
in Poland 70 percent [17, p. 2601.)
Despite these signs of a strong commitment to
PTsM, what we do not have are detailed descrip-
tions of the new processes actually at work. This
might be a matter of official secrecy. although
outside the defence sector one can see no reason
for such secrecy: it might be because the final
results of programmes have not yet begun to work
through; it might be because in practice nothrq
has been done or has been done purely formalisti-
cally.
If PTsM were being applied seriously one ssould
expect to find greater centralized control. exerLlsed
primarily by Gosplan and GKNT, of the R & D
process and of technological change in general.
and therefore a greater emphasis on major ne'.'
technological breakthroughs rather than an 'in.rc
mental' approach. One would also expect to find
an easing of the perennial Soviet problem of c\cc-
sive and inefficient capital investment. Finali' 'kc
would expect to find more interbranch cooper
ation in R&D and a reduction in the overspecial-
ization and autarchic tendencies of the ministrie'
Of course these are precisely the things that on-
tinue to attract the critical attention of So%iei
leaders, Gorbachev's speech to the June 19S'
Central Committee conference on scientific-te.hni-
cal progress being a good example.
How far then has the rather complex PT% %1
system succeeded in either being implemented or
achieving its goals of establishing firm prix-:icl
for Soviet R&D. ensuring the efficient inves:merit
of resources for the achievement of these
and ensuring the necessary integration of different
branches of the economy and all the different
stages of the 'research-production' process'
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1 will approach the question by looking in turn
at the two main features of PTsM, kompleksnost'
(comprehensiveness) and tsel'nost' (goal-orienta-
tion).
As far as kompleksnost' is concerned. the first
thing to strike one is how un-comprehensive and
unintegrated the programmes are. if a particular.. -
project is to traverse the whole 'research-produc-
tion' cycle it will find itself in three different major
plans with different supervising agencies. The plan
for fundamental research is the responsibility of
the Academy of Sciences; the applied R&D stage
is the responsibility of GKNT: while Gosplan
draws up the vnedrenie programmes. Belorussian
data show that the distinction between the differ-
ent stages can be made in terms of the working
institutions as well as the supervising agencies.
Academy institutes and universities concern them-
selves with the first stage. while branch institutes
concentrate on the latter two stages. Onl\ 14 per-
cent of programme projects worked on in Belarus-
sia during the Tenth Five Year Plan were worked
on jointly by more than a single institute, and only
11 percent involved interbranch cooperation [47.
p. 72].
It might make sense to keep the fundamental
research stage separate - there is little point in
mapping out a whole development and production
programme if the basic scientific problems have
not been ironed out. However, such separation is
likeh_ to make more serious the problem of 'creep-
ing sophistication', the habit scientists have oT
ignoring or putting off the final goal in order to
pursue interesting but perhaps distracting and
non-essential scientific enquiries.
The separation of the development and
vnedrenie stages, and more importantly. their sub-
jection to different agencies, would seem to be a
more serious shortcoming. There is a strong suspi-
cion that Gosplan tends to be more interested in
output than innovation, and is likely to protect
branch ministeries from excessively innovatory de-
mands. There are indications that programmes,
even those listed in the Five Year plan. do not
always include the rnedrenre stage. In the
Ukrainian Ninth Five Year Plan 21.4 percent of
R&D listed was considered completed at the end
of the research stage; 64.6 percent once experi-
mental (oTntno-konstruktorskuia) work had been
finished; and 14 percent following production test-
ing (3. pp. 105-106], [54, p. 158]. (55]. It i!, not
impossible that this is the result of Gosplan's
refusal to include projects in the vnedrenie section
of the Fi\e Year Plan. Gosplan and GKNT do not
have a record of good relations. and they would
seen to represent very different interests within
the Soviet system.
_--Even if a programme. is. included in the Five- Year Plan through to the vnedrenie stage. there is
considerable evidence that Gosplan and the
ministries are able to give programme fulfilment
decidedl\ second-priority status. This is made easy
by the fact that eventually even the most im-
portant national programmes have to he broken
up and included in the regular plans of ministries
and institutes, where they have to compete with
plans containing projects of purely branch and
institute priority, and finally in the production
plans of enterprises. A deputy chairman of GKNT
recentl\ criticized Gosplan for failing to include in
ministries' yearly plans the programme tasks that
had been included in their five year plans (75]. The
ministries are also subjected to regular criticism
for these faults [30. p. 67]. [44, p. 80]. [46], [57, p.
76].
The problem seems to be two-fold. First]y. the
lead ministry, which has responsibility for funding
the entire project, is interested in the programme
only to the extent that it furthers its own sectional
interests. It has no interest in spreading the be-
nefits of the research done to other ministries. It
also has no interest in extending the programme
into fields which will not directly benefit it. In
such cases the programme will become little more
than the personal R& D project of a single ministr\.
with funding allocations reflecting that fact. Alter-
natively. the lead ministry will have no particular
interest in the programme at all. in which case
funding will not be allocated to the programme or
be diverted from it to non-programme tasks. while
the necessary capital investment and supply plans
are left unfulfilled. The lead ministry has no power
to force other ministries to contribute to the fund-
ing. which increases its incentive not to fulfil pro-
gramme-funding targets. Increasing the formal ~c-
sponsihility of the lead ministry without giving it
extra power does not help. It onl\ produces what
one Soviet commentator calls 'a liberal attitude' to
accounting procedures. that is, faking the figures
[58. p. 123]. As summarized by Ronald Amann:
If the attempt [to apply defence methods to the
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP05T0028OR000300380003-2
Gn'plan's
one section
NT do not
hey would
ests within
n the Five
ge. there is
made ea
most im-
he broken
ministries
npete with
ranch and
production
of GKNT
include in
tasks that
is (75]. The
r criticism
4r). [57. p.
Firstly, -the
or funding
)rogramme
n sectional
ng the be-
.nistries. It
)rogramme
refit it. In
little more
le ministry,
fact. Alter-
particular
which case
gramme or
asks. while
ppl% plans
s no power
the fund-
fulfil pro-
formal re-
it giving it
luces what
ittitude' to
:he figures
.4kntann:
? W
S. Fortescur / Pr(tnt, i plunn;nc in S;' ic; Rd I)
civilian sector) is half-hearted. it is almost cer-
tain that traditional malpractices will begin to
re-establish themselves. This stricture applies
with particular force to the introduction of pro-
grammed planning which without real resource
priority and support from the centre is likely to
remain a toothless administrative superstructure
laid upon a base of departmental rivalries. 12. p.
There are two popular approaches to solving
this problem. Firstly. give more power to the lead
ministry. Even Marchuk. chairman of GKNT, has
demanded that a special section of state plans be
set aside purely for research programmes, and that
lead ministries be given all necessary resources and
powers for the fulfilment of these programmes [30.
pp. 67-68). This is presumably a sign that he
recognizes that GKNT itself is not in a position to
take over the management of all programmes.
Nevertheless. fears that giving lead ministries
greater powers will only encourage them to use
programmes and any priority funding they might
attract for their own sectional interests have led to
demands that greater programme management
powers be given to GKNT [1, pp. 166, 213-2151.
[30. p. 71] [31] [46] [65, p. 99]. Most suggest that
GKNT would exercise these greater powers
through interbranch councils of outside experts.
although some consider it necessary that GKNT
have considerable 'in-house' research capacity of
its own [67. pp. 58-68]. There has also been con-
siderable support for a greater role for (he
Academy of Sciences in R&D management, with
references to its greater 'objectivity' derived from
its lack of branch subordination [12).
However. these changes have either not been
implemented or implemented so irresolutely that
the signs of non-integration of R&D programmes
remain. The programmes tend to be limited to a
specific part of the 'research-production' cycle and
be divided into overly independent stages; sec-
tional interests are still too strong to make possible
a common commitment which might lead to de
facto coordination and cooperation; which makes
it almost inevitable that the proper balance of
power and responsibility for lead organizations is
impossible to find.
Turning now to tsel'nost'. there are signs that
PTsM programmes are also lacking in this virtue.
We are hampered in our evaluation by lack of
access to the full detail of the programmes. but the
goals and designations that \--e do know are alarm-
ingly \ ague. The goals of the higher-level pro-
grammes appear to be impro\ements in usually
vague economic indicators ('accelerate the rate of
growth of labour productivity throughout the
economy'). Only occasionally are they more
specific ('reduce metal used in construction work
15 to 20 percent'). Lower level programmes have
such blunt designations as `Labour', 'Energy com-
plex'. 'Metal'. etc. and such vague goals as 'build
and introduce into production new catalysers to
replace imported ones.' [21. p. 46). One assumes
that the programmes are therefore made up simpl\
of collections of any or all research projects that
could contribute to such goals. Soviet commenta-
Ors admit that programmes often take such a
form. and indeed suggest that some programmes
are no more than the invention of institutions and
individuals interested in the priority funding for
their own 'pet' projects they might get as a result
[55]. [57. P. 90].
Another factor leading to lack of tsel'nost' is
.he continuing fragmentation of funding of pro-
grammes. As we saw above, lead ministries are
expected to provide funding for interbranch pro-
grammes. If this expectation is enforced they are
reluctant to give the programme a truly inter-
branch character. To overcome this. multiple
sources of funding appear to be still the rule [50. p
253]. This leads to complaints of a dissipation of
goal-orientation and further demands for the
granting to GKNT of the exclusive right to fund
major interbranch programmes [50, p. 2821.
There is certainly nothing about the goals of the
programmes as we know them that suggest,. 1;1\
thing of the urgency, clarity, excitement and
single-mindedness of 'build a bomb within fi'e
years' or 'get a man to the moon by 1970'. Both
Soviet and Western experience suggests that theme
are the kinds of goals that are needed for a mayor
R&D programme if it is to meet with success.
Given these limitations it is perhaps not surpri"-
ing that PTsM programmes show every sign of
usually being little more than compilations of pr-N-
jects that would have been undertaken any a'
with funding coming in the usual wa'. While the
PTsM process might improve communication" and
therefore lead to a voluntary increase in inter-
branch cooperation, there is nothing about PTs'tl
as reported publicly that suggests that significant
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W
changes have been made in R&D planning and
management procedures. Certainly there are few
signs that the Soviet Union is having any more
success than it has in the past in resolutely pursu-
ing radical new technologies at the expense of
' incrementalism' or in reducing the overspecialized
autarchism of the branch structure and the waste-
ful investment practices it produces.
However it would seem too early to write off
PTsM. The commitment still seems to be there.
with the changes that Gorbachev suggests are to
conic all being compatible with PTsM, particu-
larly increasing the powers of the central agencies
at the expense of the ministries. If Gorbachev is
able to change the balance of power within Soviet
R&D and economic management - a very big if -
PTsM could well come to have a more substantial
effect on R&D planning than it seems to have had
so far. This would seem to require at the very least
the granting of true administrative powers to
central agencies with some commitment to techno-
logical change. and providing PTsM projects with
obligatory status over and above the tasks set out
in regular branch production plans.
So far the talk has been of problems of imple-
mentation. However it is worth considering the
more general question of whether there might be
some problem of conception, firstly, that there are
inherent problems of the Soviet R&D system
which receive no attention; secondly, that there
are aspects of the approach which are misguided.
User incentive. One of the biggest problems of
the Soviet R&D system is the lack of involvement
of the customer. the end-user, in the process. PTsM
aimed to attack this problem by integrating the
R & D process from beginning to end as much as
possible. But. as we have seen, success has been
limited. Programmes remain far from integrated,
with the vnedrenie section often left out altogether.
But the problem goes deeper than simply poor
implementation. Firstly, one has to ask whether
the end-users are given sufficient opportunity to
involve themselves in the setting of the goals of the
PTsM process. As American commentators have
pointed out in connection with their country's
experiences. goal-oriented research is just as likely
to he taken down blind alleys as freely chosen
research, if it is still the scientists who determine
the goals [23, p. 153]. They state, therefore, that
end-users should be involved in project selection
[29, p. 17]. From what we know of the Soviet
s\-stem of forecasting and long-term planning on
which the major PTsM programmes are lased. the
scientists there are very much in charge. with them
seemingly dominating the Academy and GKNT
councils and commissions which draw up the top-
level programmes.
US commentators further stress that end-users
.must. be ,intimately. involved in the R &D process
throughout if the innovation process is to succeed.
In the case of large-scale. government-funded pro-
jects the project manager is very often the end-user,
or at least very close to that end of the chain (the
Navy's Bureau of Ships in the case of nuclear
submarines, the Special Projects Office in the case
of Polaris, and NASA in the space programme): in
private industry new products are often developed
in close collaboration with customers and some-
times even on their premises [43, Ch. 6). Soviet
reports of successful innovation show that those
involved there also well understand the impor-
tance of the close involvement and interest of the
end-user. But there the formal customer
(zaka:chik) for the biggest programmes is GKNT
. or GospTan, Tau is, a bureaucratic agency [40,
para 8-9]. and the project manager is more likely
to be one of the developers of the project that one
of the users. Even in programmes which go through
to the vnedrenie stage, the 'producer' organiza-
tions involved are likely to be the machine tool
ministries that develop and make a new product or
the equipment for a new process. rather than the
user of the product or process (for example, the
Ministry of Machine Tools (Minstankoprom) is
more likely to be involved in developing NC mac-
hine tools then, say, the Ministry of Automobile
Industry in whose factories the machine tools will
be used). The problem is often. therefore. as much
the gap between the producer and the user as
between R&D and the producer. This long ne-
glected aspect of the problem is clearly entering
into the consciousness of Soviet writers. as we see
from the appearance of a nea slogan 'science-tech-
nology-production-use', with 'use' being a recent
addition to the sequence [44. p. 132].
The problem is not only that Soviet planners d(
not see the importance of the user. Rather it is that
the system has not been able to provide the pro-
ducer or user with the desire for new technology:.
There is nothing in PTsM to attack this age-old
Soviet problem. While recent decrees have made
R&D programmes part of the obligatory state
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planning on
re based, the
e. with them
and GKNT
up the top
to succeed.
funded pro-
he end-user,
e chain (the
of nuclear
in the case
gramme); in
n developed
and some-
1. 6). Soviet
that those
the impor-
erest of the
customer
-s is GKNT
agency [40,
more likely
:et that one
go through
organiza-
achine tool
product or
er than the
%arnple. the
koprom) is
g NC mac-
\utomobile
e tools will
re. as much
he user as
is long ne-
ly entering
as we see
dente-tech-
ig a recent
Manners do
er it is that
le the pro-
echnology.
his age-old
have made
:to)r> state
plan. indufal ministries and their managers have
long understood that there are parts of the plan
which can. indeed must. he ignored. if the most
important indicator. volume of output. is not to he
jeopardized. PT.01 have done nothing to remove
the second class status from new technology and
vnedrenie plans. Efforts to encourage a positive
attlmde 61movadon thrvagh the manipulation of
prices have also failed [5]. The ever greater reliance
on research bodies, particularly the Academy of
Sciences. to push forward new technology. is a
practical recognition of these failures. But such
policies seem inevitably destined for failure as long
as the problem of lack of producer or user interest
in innovation remains unsolved. Indeed. any ef-
forts to reform the R&D system are unlikely to
succeed while this problem remains.
Oyer-nianugement. It is interesting that American
versions of PT.01 gained their greatest popularity
in the US corporate world around the end of the
1960s. as a result of increasing financial stringency.
Earlier, with lots of money around (and new
markets more easily found and exploited). research
management theory and practice stressed the value
of independence for R & D personnel. "In the 1950s
and early 1960s. firms frequently did not try to
manage R&D in much detail. Subsequently, many
firms began to emphasize control, formality in
R&D project section, and short-term effects on
profit. This shift in emphasis has tended to reduce
the proportion of R&D expenditures going for
basic and risky projects." [29, p. 16). As a vice-pre-
sident for R&D of one major firm said:
At the high cost of R&D, we can no longer
afford to plan and manage it in a random
manner. It has to be very closely tied to stra-
tegic business planning. [71, p. 33].
Perhaps not coincidentally. PTsM became a major
strategy in the Soviet Union only a little later. at a
time when. firstly. technology was identified more
strongly than. ever as the USSR's hope for the
future. and secondly. when funding for research
was being squeezed by demands for military and
agricultural investment. The American experience
shows that the reflex is not peculiar to the Soviet
Union, but surely it is a reflex particularly well
developed there; if something is very important. it
must he highly managed. particularly if resources
are tight. PTsM. and indeed all recent develop-
ments in Soviet research management. seem to be
a classic example of such a reflex. As Eugene
Zaleski recognized. the purpose of the replacement
of coordination plans with complex goal-oriented
programmes, was simply to establish more control
over the R&IDi- planning-precess. 473r-p-39} The -- ---- -
present problems of PTsM are attributed in Soviet
sources to the lack of detailed documents setting
out procedures and the strict division of responsi-
bilities between the various organizations involved.
[1. p. 22] [19. p. 149] [66. p. 31] But one of the
common features of successful American versions
of PTsM has been the lack of strict definition of
responsibilities.
Soviet scientists regularly and publicly criticize
the over-bureaucratization of science. Many of
their arguments against over-centralized goai-ori-
ented planning are convincing and are supported
by an extensive Western literature. They complain.
or strongly imply. that too often the actual imple-
mentation of planning is in the hands of incom-
petent planning officials with no understanding or
knowledge of science; that an excessive concentra-
tion on management methods both stifles creativ-
ity and distracts attention from the final goal. this
being particularly so in systems with many stages
and strict hierarchies of responsibility through the
stages; that long-term goal-oriented plans tend to
be inflexible and difficult to cut off even when
success will clearly never arrive; and that if a
programme is overly self-contained that inflexibil-
ity is likely to be particularly great, and indeed the
over-specialization that PTsM were designed to
overcome will again become a problem.
It is interesting that in the last few years in the
US there has been a strong movement against the
overbureaucratization of science, particularly when
applied to project management systems. A suspi-
cion that a perceived slow-down in US innovation
can he blamed on the overmanagement of science.
the experience of the deregulation of a number of
industries, and the shifting of the focus away from
traditional highly concentrated industries to the
new 'entrepreneurial' industries have produced a
new emphasis on the values of small size. the
encouragement of competition and duplication
even within a single firm, a willingness to tr}
endless new products untill a winner is found, a
reliance on the personal skills of project managers
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rather than systems. and a commitment to 'en-
trepreneurial culture' to provide integrative mech-
anism within highly flexible organizational struc-
tures [43]. [53]. Those writing in this vein are at
pains to stress that they are not claiming that large
organizations cannot be innovative or that mana-
gement and planning systems should be aban-
doned completely. Techniques such as PERT can
be, and are still used to provide a broad view of a
programme, but their detailed and bureaucratic
supervisory functions should be ignored [7]. Large
films should try to behave as if they are small
firms. or more accurately a conglomeration of
competing small firms. The new entrepreneurs
should use. but not allow themselves to be stifled
by financial and marketing specialists. If they are
in a large firm they can be supported by the more
structured part of the firm. Strategic corporate
planning still has an important role to play. but as
the basis for building a 'corporate culture' rather
than the first stage of an elaborate bureaucratic
process. One wonders whether such a free and
easy approach will survive the drying up of the
easy profits that have-come from dramatic techno-
logical breakthroughs in very new industries. How-
ever at the moment the approach is dominant and
would seen to have a lot to recommend it.
Given that some Soviet scientists have ap-
parently long been aware of the value of this type
of approach [69]. and that today's research mana-
gement theorists clearly play considerable atten-
tion to American trends, one wonders whether we
shall find a similar reaction against over-
bureaucratized PTsM in the Soviet Union. While
influential members of the scientific establishment
are clearly less that happy with present Soviet
research management [31], there are no signs of a
serious opposition campaign such as was evident
in the second half of the 1950s. The one slight sign
of a move for greater flexibility and decentraliza-
tion, beyond the regionalization mentioned above.
is renewed interest in Fake/-type innovation firms.
Fake! was the Novosibirsk prototype of a large
number of organizations which sprang up more or
less spontaneously throughout the Soviet Union
from about 1966. They were loose-knit groups of
specialists who in their spare time accepted con-
tracts from institutes and enterprises for develop-
ment work. Both the contracts and the work groups
involved were highly flexible, and the rapid growth
of the organizations indicated that they were meet-
ing a real need. However. despite the support of
senior scientists and regional party leaders. the
organizations were closed down in 19'11 on the
grounds that they failed to meet the Conditions
required to he treated as socialist enterprises and
therefore could have no legal status in the ekes of
the Soviet planning and financial authorities [28].
Even since, there have-VeenWmpTamfs abotif flieir--*
disappearance, complaints that have become
somewhat louder and more common in recent
times. [60] One 1982 publication even refers posi-
tively to the success of similar organizations in the
US as justification for their reestablishment in the
USSR [4. pp. 74-75]. These calls come at the same
time as economists concerned with economic
management in general are increasingly criticizing
the traditional 'command economy', the best-
known example being Academician Zaslavskaia's
leaked discussion paper. Other economists talk of
privatizing some service and light industries and
refer nostalgically to the economic decentralization
of the New Economic Policy of the 1920x. [8].159).
[61].. --- .
There are no signs of an ' official response to
such demands. The new engineering centres of the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences are described a,
having some of the features of Fake!-type firm,
[30], while recent decrees on research management
show some vague signs of bureaucratic relaxation,
such as encouraging temporary scientific-produc-
tibn associations and reintroducing one-off
bonuses. However all this is overwhelmed b\
primary concern with the bureaucratic refinement
of PTsM, tighter high-level party control. a greater
use of regional programmes (these are more su.-
ceptible to control by the party apparatus). and
the manipulation of plan indicators. prices and
bonus systems to encourage innovation [37]. The
disappearance of Fake! and its brothers for classic
bureaucratic reasons can hardly be considered
surprising. Such private and unplanned initiati'.e
threatens not only the positions of powerful
bureaucratic interests. but also the entire
bureaucratic basis of the party's post-terror con-
trol of the population and economy. If esen such
limited developments as Fake! are unac,.eptable.
one can only he very pessimistic about the possi-
bility of an 'entrepreneurial revolution' in the
USSR. There. big is still beautiful. duplication and
competition are signs of waste and inefficiency.
systems are still more reliable and controllable
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/04/19: CIA-RDP05T0028OR000300380003-2
he support of
leaders, the
1970 on the
he conditions
nterprises and
in the eyes of
than individuals, and the 'culture' tends to dis-
couragebdtb creativity'and innovation (25).
ithorities [28). It would he wrong to suggest that PT.t,1f has
its about their been or must he a complete failure. The historical
worst of bureaucratic control could he avoided. In
any system at any time. therefore, the approach
might he expected to he applicable to a very
limited number of big problems. One wonders
whether the approach. even if fully implemented.
will contribute any more than the traditional ap-
proach to the broad-scale and essentially pedestrian
tasks of innovation in the old-established in-
have became and foreign experience on which Soviet planners dustries, such as machine building, and whether
ion in recent have based the new approach is valid, while fie- tt i ureaucra-tic nature of PTsM if widely applied
?n refers posi- cently some successes appear to have been gained, will not in fact stifle development in the new
izations in the for example. if we can believe the reports. in 'sunrise' industries.
shment in the overcoming Western technological embargoes [72. There is something about PTsM which is typi-
ne at the same pp. 10-11). However, the general conclusions of cal of the situation in which the Soviet Union
ith economic the most detailed studies of the level of Soviet presently finds itself. Its social and policy sciences
tgly criticizing technology. 0 that Soviet technological perfor- are well enough developed to usefully analyse past.
iy', the best- mance is inadequate [2). Soviet commentators, in- present and foreign experiences and to arrive at
Zaslavskaia's cluding those most directly involved in the Soviet solutions that appear to offer hope of success. And
omists talk of implementation of PTsM, also express scepticism yet any such solutions are inevitably within the
ndustries and 110. p. 1451147, pp. 77-811. It is interesting to note framework of the old Marxist belief that socialist
'centralization signs of problems in a number of the most im- planning can guarantee 100 percent efficiency and
920s. [8]. [59]. portant hitech industries. The performance of the that any competition is 'wasteful' and must be
h
l
d
I response to
centres of the
described as
4e/-type firms
i management
tic relaxation,
ntific-produc-
cing one-off
helmed by a
tic refinement
itrol, a greater
are more sus-
paratus). and
s. prices and
on [3'l]. The
ers for classic
,e considered
fined initiative
of powerful
the entire
'st-terror con-
I f even such
unacceptable.
out the possi-
ution' in the
iplication and
'. inefficiency,
I controllable
wit a
e
Ministry of Radio Industry and the Ministry of avoided. This economic doctrine. coup
Instrument Making in the computer field had ap- desire for total political control. guarantees a com-
parently been so bad that the Academy has been mitment to overbureaucratized solutions.
asked to open a new Department of Computing That, of course, is assuming that PTsM are
and Information Sciences [11]. the microbiology actually implemented. But perhaps the most inter-
industry. the subject of a concentrated goal-ori- esting lesson to be learnt from the history of
ented programme emanating from the very highest PTsM for students of the modern Soviet state is
sources, is apparently in trouble [48], [49], Soviet the failure of implementation. Despite clear his-
fusion research appears to be bogged down [16], torical and foreign models which have been worked
[63]. while the Ministry of Energy has been sub- into complex but comprehensible modern manage-
jected to savage criticism for serious delays in the ment procedures. implementation shows two t\ pi-
nuclear power programme (although to be fair to cal problems.pf the Brezhnev and, as far as we can
the R&D people, the problems are mainly attribu- tell so far, post-Brezhnev era. Firstly. the leader-
table to long political indecision and then ship, with a pathological aversion to Khrushche,'s
catastrophic construction delays). It is even possi- 'hare-brained schemes' and a horror of upsetting
ble to find criticism of such pioneers of PTsM as established bureaucratic interests, approaches a
the Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry for not fashionable concept with a degree of caution that
being interested in the unedrenie of new technol- borders on half-heartedness. Secondly. the estab-
ogy and not fulfilling its new technology plan, and lished bureaucratic interests are able to treat these
of the Ministry of Chemical Industry for not being half-hearted measures with a disdain that borders
able to develop a unified policy of technological on contempt. with both the spirit and the letter of
development for the chemical industry [2. pp. the reforms being ignored.
205-206, 495]. [20], [27]. The history of PTsM shows that the USSR is
The true successes of goal-oriented research have now a modern industrial state, making use of
been cases where there have been very specific modern industrial and technological methods. But
tasks which have been given the highest priority the inevitable narrowness and inflexibility in im-
and for which a degree of enthusiasm has some- plementation of those methods ensure that it will
how been produced among the people involved. still for many years to come struggle to catch up to
As a result of having the very highest priority the its Western rivals.
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/04/1
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9: CIA-RDP05TOO28OR000300380003-2
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