EUROPEAN REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200640002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 14, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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'm Intelligence
European Review
Seeret
EUR ER 86-007
14 March 1986
copy 341
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European Review
Sweden: Economic Policy After Palme
Canada: Playing the EUREKA Card I
For Moscow's East European allies, the best news from the 27th
Party Congress of the CPSU was the lack of major new policy
initiatives by the Gorbachev team that could sow confusion or force
near-term responses at home. Although Soviet speakers cited the
need for "radical reform" of the Soviet economy, they offered
neither general recommendations nor concrete prescriptions that the
East Europeans had not heard before. Nor did the congress specify
anything but vague constraints on how its Bloc allies should conduct
relations with the West.
Signals emanating from Vienna and Prague suggest that their
traditionally cool relations may be warming. On the Czechoslovak
side, however, this trend can go only so far.
The Syrian Prime Minister's visit to Turkey in early March was the
latest in a yearlong series of high-level contacts between the two
countries. Both sides have used these exchanges to confine
potentially explosive bilateral issues to diplomatic channels. This
approach appears likely to contain but not resolve their differences,
which center around border security concerns as well as water rights
and are aggravated by Soviet military support for Syria along with
latent Syrian irredentism. Ankara has not had an ambassador from
Syria in three years, however, creating uncertainties about the
prospects for routinized diplomatic dialogue.
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L LR FR 16-007
14 march 1956
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.r !s,l : s as lgncd tc the `\ vst German '\a\ in the \orNNegian
Sea nvtt- 111"av tt future diversion i11 it,, forces fr;ri; the Baltic.
uulsiti r; of r;e trig tees arld larger ;uloniarine for the e\t_anded
;).r:,tions ni.c, come, however. at the expense of more strike
aircraft and fast patrol boats needed to meet the Soviet threat to
Denmark and German's Baltic Coast.
_A debate over whether to develop Sweden's first indigenous tactical
air t i air missile system \5111 be influenced heaslly by var}ing
pc crptlu ; of E;S policy on exporting weapons to Sweden. The
government and industr} are intent on reducing Sweden's reliance
on the United States for critical missile components, but they face
s,tifT opposition from the military. which prefers to buy US systems
because of their proven technoiogv and relatively lower cost.
The Jaruzelski regime apparently relies heavily on public opinion
pons to gauge popular attitudes. The government publishes some of
the more revealing data and publicly challenges underground polls
in order to lend credibility to its domestic and foreign policies-
tactics unique in Eastern Europe. The polls show, among other
things, that few Poles have much confidence in government
management of the economy.
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will be designated as uncoordinated views.
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
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ILLEGIB
Ingvar Carlsson, Olof Palme's successor as Sweden's Prime Minister, is likely to
continue the government's tough stance on wage increases and budget policy in the
near term. The architect of these policies, Finance Minister Kjell-Olof' Feldt, had
Palme's backing and remains the government's key economic policy maker.
During the past several years, Feldt has made a vigorous effort to reduce the
central government budget deficit. which has been blamed for Sweden's low
growth rate, chronic inflation, and persistent current account deficit. Feldt belies es
that the key to better long-run economic performance is reducing taxes, holding
the line on already high labor costs, and arresting the growth of' local government
spending.
Sweden's economy is likely to turn in a lackluster performance this year, with any
growth coming from lower oil prices and expanding export markets. Some Social
Democrats may use the excuse of a sluggish economy to push for a return to
expansionary policies, and with Carlsson's authority not yet established the
advocates of reflation are in a stronger position to urge their views on Feldt.
Secret
Ft R I R Y)_0()7
1.1 War,/? 1956
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ability to win contracts in the EUREKA program than in SDI.
Prime Minister Mulroney is attempting to demonstrate his commitment to high-
technology development while diverting public attention from Canada's role in
SDI. On a state visit to Paris last month, Mulroney pledged $2i million in
government assistance to Canadian firms participating in the French-initiated
EUREKA program for technological cooperation. The ostensible reason for a
Canadian role in EUREKA is to ensure long-term access to West European
technology and markets and use this access to develop Canada's own high-
technology capabilities. Moreover, Canadian firms may be more confident of their
the more controversial SDI program.
Mulroney's open support for EUREKA contrasts with his arm's-length policy
toward Washington's SDI program. Last September. the Prime Minister stated
that the Canadian Government would not formally participate in SDI, but soon
after authorized the Defense Ministry to provide help for firms negotiating for
SDI-related contracts. By emphasizing financial assistance to Canadian
companies looking for a role in EUREKA, Mulroney probably hopes to show
across-the-board backing for high-technology development --thus diffusing
criticism of Ottawa's role as "friendly helper" for private-sector participation in
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ILLEGIB
minimum.
National Economy Minister Simitis has called for strenuous efforts to revitalize
Greece's state-owned transport, industrial, and utility companies, which sustained
record losses of some $970 million last year. The government's goal is to cut their
deficits by 75 percent in 1986. Some of the measures include setting up a special
management group in Simitis's ministry to monitor the ailing companies, strictly
applying a tight incomes policy for 1986-87, devising five-year plans for each of
the more than 50 affected firms, and improving productivity. In addition, the
public sector which is the largest employer in Greece is to reduce hiring to a
turnover, according to press reports.
We believe Athens is unlikely to meet its optimistic targets without an actual
reduction in the bloated work forces which is unlikely with unemployment
approaching 9 percent. In fact, government officials recently stated their intention
to hire new employees to fill vacancies created through retirement and normal
The government also would need to implement a more market-oriented pricing
policy for most of the firms. Although the state raised prices in December for a
number of goods and services including oil products, electricity, postal services,
transportation, and pharmaceuticals Prime Minister Papandreou probably will
find it difficult to force through the further price increases needed to make the
firms profitable. Inflation currently is running in the 25-percent range, and the
real incomes of workers are expected to fall significantly over the next two years.
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Eastern Europe-USSR: Results
of the Soviet Party Congress
From the perspective of Moscow's East European
allies, the best news from the 27th Soviet Party
Congress was the absence of any dramatic policy
initiatives by the Gorbachev team that could sow
confusion or force near-term responses at home. This
dispelled earlier speculation among some East
Europeans that the congress would rival in
importance the controversial and destabilizing 20th
Congress of 1956. Although Gorbachev and Ryzhkov
spoke of "radical reform" of the Soviet economy,
neither they nor other speakers offered general
recommendations or concrete prescriptions that the
East Europeans had not heard before. More
disquieting may have been the repeated emphasis on
the need to remove party bureaucrats who are
opposed to change, which, by extension, could be
applied by Moscow to allied leaders should they fail to
respond to Gorbachev's policies.
On foreign policy issues, the East European allies may
have been somewhat surprised and pleased at the
relatively low-key treatment Gorbachev accorded the
Bloc in his speech. They were probably also reassured
by the standard treatment Gorbachev gave to CEMA
integration and "unity and cohesion" in the Bloc.
They may have been relieved, with the exception of
the East Germans, that Moscow did not spell out
specific directions on how to conduct their relations
with the West beyond the vague guidelines of the
party program endorsed by the congress.
Of immediate concern to the East Europeans will be
personnel changes in the Soviet party Central
Committee apparatus. Their interest will focus
primarily on who succeeds Konstantin Rusakov as
head of the Bloc Relations Department.
The East Europeans Speak
All the Soviet Bloc allies echoed common themes in
their formal speeches to the congress. Each heaped
praise on the congress itself as a significant event,
supported closer economic ties and CEMA
integration particularly the science and technology
program announced in December and dutifully
voiced support for Gorbachev's arms control policies.
But each approached these subjects from a slightly
different angle, bringing different emphasis, style,
and tone to his remarks.
Polish party leader Jaruzelski went to great lengths to
curry favor with his hosts. Uncharacteristically for a
Pole, he devoted unusual attention to ideological
issues. He also sought Soviet approval of his party
program by including portions of it in his
presentation. Jaruzelski may have sought to
demonstrate to Moscow that he has put rebuilding of
the party at the top of his agenda, as the Soviets have
demanded, and, also, to defuse criticism of the
program at home. Jaruzelski's private agenda also
included a special plea for the plight of the Polish
economy. His recitation of problems, blamed to a
great extent on the West, seems part of a continuing
effort by the Poles to extract more economic aid from
Moscow. The same special pleading was notable in
the remarks of Polish Prime Minister Messner, who
was in Moscow on an official visit just prior to the
congress. Jaruzelski did not dwell greatly on the
theme of integration and gave only minimal attention
to arms control issues.
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'
fZ R ER R6-00
14 Afar( /1 1Q 6
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In contrast, East G'errna arty ci
placed more emph asE o toe arms con nd ~cac
issues tan did his C l ie:: ucs, a tlti,ugn he did not.
i~.~nt?oil W t Gelt,i lie ma, ha t sped to shor+
i crhachev that he caii be tough on such issues despite
his developing ?nt a. is with the West Germans. fie
a`,so the most , ;f' cant;d nt to the point of
br, fging, in his di cusston of Fast German economic
ucces=es. Honed .r ,r:+.~Labiy believes t! tat hiss pant;
has ahead', found ,.loons to sr ;,.e of its nagging
economic problems that .were the fiscal point of the
congress. He devoted even less attention (along ,with
Kadar to thr theme of socialist integration than did
'11,-c presen~ ttion by Hungarian Party leader Kada
was most notable for its general!\ lower tone in
rr si_r.g Soviet !chiever]ents and his references to
different roads tf ?alis xi. Ka ii.r clear)v wanred to
_, _ on record the iegitirr ,cy of Iiungnrian ref or;,
efforts ai;s consistent with the 'ran- es ork of broad
universal mentioned this theme
far more delerea tally and ~rtainls not in the bold
language of the once touted "Polish Road to
Socialism." Only Ceause- a was more open),
insistent on the theme than Kadar. Husak. Zhivkov.
L11116 Iionecker did not touch the issue. Kadar gave
onto mn Pima) attention to the arias control issue and
very short shr`t to he theme of integration,
t.;zechoslovak parts cod, tftt. ii;. as might he
:speeted. v is ion or ter i',e of the Soviets.
extensivei} supporteu then an the arms control issue,
and plumped for economic cooperation. Even though
he discussed it only briefly. Ilttsak sought to persuade
Gorbachev that the Czechosloyak party is "firm and
united," closely ltnk-,od to the people. and has scored
portant succes?es in tt c: economy. In the face of
widespread speculation it,, Pra;p+r0 i;at the leadership
is ripe for renewal, Husak undoubtedly sought to
der .onstrate that his team has kept the situa Wa ,lei)
under conical
Bulgarian p !Ladder Z/+tko seemed determined to
project total fealty to the Soviets even to the point of
touting a "ne,s1 state.. in Soviet- Bulgarian economic
cooperation. Zhivkov was subjected last gear to se'.erc
criticism from Gorbe.chc?v and other Soviets for
Bulgarian economic mismanagement and clearly
wanted to impress his hosts that he had gotten the
mess - ge Even though Zhivkov mentioned "great
difficulties' facing the Bulgarian economy (a bit of
humility that Moscow may appreciate), he also
claimed that the Bulgarians have developed a
"comprehensive strategy" to achieve a "turning
point." In fact, the Bulgarians recently have done
more by way of tinkering with their bureaucracy than
n other of the East European countries and have
proceeded in the direction of superministries already
sanctioned by the Soviets under Gorbachev.
Romanian party leader Ceausescu, in a carefully
balanced speech, nevertheless highlighted his
country's independent posture. He praised Romanian-
Soviet friendship, but in lukewarm terms. He was the
most explicit of all the East European speakers in
expounding on the different roads to socialism. He
pledged his support for close collaboration (but not
integration) among CEMA members. On arms
control. he supported Gorbachev's proposals but
conditioned this by saying agreement must be reached
based on proposals from "both sides." Finally, he
showed little indication of having taken on board
Gorbachev's emphasis on the need for economic
reforms. His high praise for Romanian economic
performance probably will further erode his
credibility in Moscow, which is well aware of the
deplorable state of the Romanian economy.
The Winners and the Losers
Jaruzelski apparently emerged from the congress with
the most improved image, at least from Moscow's
perspective. He was met at the airport by the CPSU's
second in command, Yegor Ligachev. Among all Bloc
members, he sat closest to the Soviet leaders on the
podium and spoke a day earlier than the other East
European party leaders He was the only East
European leader allowed by the Soviets to have a
press conference and appeared on television going to a
concert ,pith Gorbachev. As a further sign of Soviet
trust in his leadership. Moscow allowed him to visit
former Polish territory in Lithuania, a tribute well
received back in Warsaw.
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On the economic front, however, everything may not
have gone so well. His private talk with Gorbachev
was said to have taken place in an atmosphere of
"fraternity, cordiality, and mutual understanding."
Missing was any reference to "unity" in contrast to
reports of talks with all the other leaders except
Ceausescu. We believe that Jaruzelski may have been
pressing for more economic assistance and the Soviets
refused.
Despite an air of "cordiality and unity of views on all
questions under discussion" during Honecker's talks
with Gorbachev, the East German took a slap on the
wrist for his policy toward West Germany. The two
leaders, according to press coverage, criticized the
West Germans for supporting the "destructive policy"
of the United States on nuclear disarmament.
Gorbachev may have felt called upon to remind the
East Germans to be cautious in their approach to
Bonn as a result of the extensive positive publicity
accorded the recent visit to West Germany by the
head of the East German parliament, Horst
Sindermann. Sindermann's trip has stimulated
increased speculation that Honecker may visit the
FRG in early summer. But it is not yet clear whether
Moscow has firmed up its policy toward West
Germany or decided how much leeway to give its
allies. As in 1984, the East Germans may have
miscalculated Soviet tolerance for their intra-German
policy.
Kadar may feel he came out of the congress ahead of
the game as a result of Gorbachev's references to
reform. According to the US Embassy in Budapest,
Gorbachev's comments on economic reform are being
read there as something that could have been lifted
from Hungarian pronouncements. The Hungarians,
however, may be indulging in some wishful thinking.
Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov, in his speech on
Moscow's five-year plan, made it clear that
Gorbachev's "radical reforms" referred chiefly to
improving the work of central economic organs and
gave no hint of a need to expand private or
cooperative activities. Gorbachev is known to be
critical of reliance on the West and extensive
emphasis on market mechanisms, both of which are
key to Hungary's economic experiments.
The Soviets were clearly trying to keep Ceausescu at
arm's length. His host at the airport reception,
Kunayev, had the lowest status of any of the Soviet
leaders sent to greet the East Europeans. Ceausescu
was the last to speak, and coverage of his private chat
with Gorbachev spoke of an atmosphere of
"friendship, frankness, and mutual understanding"
a clear signal of disagreement. As he did in 1981.
Ceausescu left for home before the end of the
congress. Problems between the two probably focused
on economic as well as disarmament issues. If
Ceausescu hoped for any signs of Soviet willingness to
provide him desperately needed economic help, he
must have been disappointed. On the other hand, his
emphasis on Romanian independence probably will be
useful to him both at home and in the West.
As for Zhivkov and Husak, whether their status in
Moscow has changed remains unclear. Soviet leaders
did not go out cf their way to indicate displeasure, and
Husak even was interviewed on Soviet television.
Nonaligned Yugoslavia apparently irritated the
Soviets with the pro forma speech to the congress
given by its delegate, second-ranking party leader
Dimce Belovski. According to US Embassy sources in
Moscow, an unnamed high-ranking Soviet official
reportedly complained to Belovski that his speech.
which stressed Belgrade's independence, failed to give
Moscow credit for adopting what he termed a more
liberal and pragmatic approach to diversity in the
Communist world. Gorbachev showed his lukewarm
attitude toward Belgrade by belatedly receiving
Belovski.
Implications and Prospects
The East Europeans probably calculate that
Gorbachev's lode-key treatment of Bloc affairs at the
congress was only a respite while he concentrated on
domestic policies. But they are keenly aware of police
differences within the Soviet leadership over intra-
Bloc relations as well as dealings between Bloc
members and the West. The notoriously hardline
"Vladimirov" article that appeared in Pravda last
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June, and, to a lesser extent, an unsigned article in the
Soviet theoretical journal Konrmunist in January this
year, displayed strong Soviet arguments for tighter
Bloc political and economic integration. Occasional
articles in the Soviet media, such as the Pravda article
on Hungary in January, are reminders to the East
Europeans that Moscow is closely watching them. The
East Europeans may also be aware that a post-
congress article dealing with relations with the
socialist countries is reportedly being prepared for
Pravda. As a Pravda editor told a US Embassy
officer in late January, this subject is a difficult one.
With his own party congress out of the way,
Gorbachev now may have more time to devote to Bloc
policies. He apparently plans to attend the East
German party congress in April. But the
Czechoslovak and Bulgarian congresses, scheduled for
March and April, respectively, may offer more fertile
ground for exercising Soviet influence. Both countries
have troubled economies and both have witnessed
widespread speculation about personnel shakeups at
the very top. Unless the Soviets weigh in heavily,
however, neither Husak nor Zhivkov face a coherent
opposition that could force dramatic shifts. Honecker
and Jaruzelski, whose congresses will probably come
in late June, seem much more secure. In the
meantime, the East Europeans will continue to wait
for clearer signals of what the Soviets expect from
them.
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Improving Relations
Signals emanating from Vienna and Prague suggest
that their traditionally cool relations may be
warming. On the Czechosolvak side, however, this
trend can go only so far.
Ties between the two states-chronically troubled by
the burdens of history and ideology-reached a nadir
in October 1984 when Czechoslovak guards pursued
and shot a would-be emigre on Austrian soil. But
Austrian outrage subsided after a few months, and
Vienna embarked on a diplomatic offensive with the
intent of winning an official apology, defusing the
border situation, and establishing a more cooperative
relationship in cultural, economic, and environmental
affairs. Since then, the two sides have established a
mixed commission to settle border-related disputes,
trade has grown, and prospects for a joint
hydroelectric power plant and an environmental
agreement have brightened considerably. The most
public sign of improving relations came this January
when Austrian President Rudolf Kirchschlaeger met
his Czechoslovak counterpart Gustav Husak in
Bratislava, the first such meeting since 1982.
The View From Vienna
For the Austrians, the benefits are obvious.
Cooperation in the environmental and energy fields
helps relieve pressure on the Sinowatz government to
produce more and cheaper energy while protecting the
Austrian countryside. Two previous attempts by the
government to construct new energy facilities-at
Hainburg and Zwentendorf-faltered in the face of
environmental protests. Perhaps more important,
Vienna hopes that a better relationship will relax
tensions along the border and improve opportunities
for increased trade and travel. This fits in with its
general policy of serving as a bridge between East and
West by providing a meeting place and dialogue
between the two camps. This probably explains
Austria's seeming readiness to settle for less in
disputes with its East European neighbors. For
example, Vienna received only an expression of regret
rather than an apology for the October 1984 incident.
As Prague Sees It
Czechoslovakia apparently now is willing to improve
its relations with Austria, partly because the latter
appears ready to resolve two important bilateral
issues. First, the Austrians are likely to scrap the
Hainburg hydroelectric project, which is opposed by
Czechoslovakia because of fear that it will disrupt the
Danube's flow downstream. Instead, Vienna probably
will cooperate in the construction of a hydroelectric
power plant at Wolfsthal in Czechoslovakia, which
Prague has long favored. The Husak regime will be
gratified by Austria's willingness to finance the cost
of the project in return for guaranteed electricity
deliveries for several years.
At the same time, Soviet leader Gorbachev's
willingness to engage in discussions with Western
statesmen has probably encouraged Prague to be
more forthcoming in its relations with the West. In
particular, Gorbachev's relatively positive assessment
of his meeting with President Reagan may have
caused the Czechoslovak leaders-who are always
careful to read the signals from Moscow to
moderate slightly their stance in international affairs
and deal more reasonably with the Austrians.
Prospects
Despite the warming trend, however, we believe it will
be a long time before relations between the two
countries move from "normal" to "friendly." Even
Vienna appears to recognize this. While Austrian
officials have confided to US diplomats that they
expect relations to undergo a steady, albeit modest,
improvement, they quickly add that this will require
long and steady effort. In Prague, the Husak
regime and especially its more orthodox members.
such as party secretary for ideology and foreign
affairs Vasil Bilak-continues to view Austria as a
troublesome neighbor whose freedom and prosperity
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EL R ER 86-DO'
14 March 1986
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are a challenge to the stability of Czechoslovak
society. It is unlikely, therefore, that Prague will
permit relations to improve significantly unless some
leadership changes alter the character of the
Czechoslovak regime.
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Turkey-Syria: Maintaining An
Unstable Equilibrium
Syrian Prime Minister Kasm's visit to Ankara in early
March followed discussions between foreign ministers
at the United Nations last fall, a ministerial-level
economic commission meeting in Damascus in
October, and a visit to Syria a year ago by Under
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Tezel. Syrian President
Assad had proposed the Turkish under secretary's
visit in response to a warning in late 1984 from
Turkish President Evren, which reportedly stressed
Ankara's suspicions of Syrian support for anti-
Turkish especially Armenian and Kurdish-
terrorists. Evren's inspection of the Turkish-Syrian
border area in January 1985 apparently marked a low
point in bilateral relations, which had been worsening
steadily since 1982. Since the border tour, both sides
have made efforts to keep their differences confined to
diplomatic channels but with no expectations of an
early resolution of any outstanding issues. Syria has
not had an ambassador in Ankara since 1983, and the
rumor that a new envoy would arrive with the Prime
Minister's entourage turned out to be false.
Sources of Tension
Tensions between Turkey and Syria, rooted in
historical antagonisms, continue to be fed by more
current frictions:
? The Turks regard Syrian irredentism as a potential
threat to Turkey's territorial integrity. Syria does
not acknowledge Turkish sovereignty over the
Province of Hatay, which the French colonial rulers
of Syria ceded to Turkey, and Syrian maps continue
to show it as part of Syria.
? These concerns are deepened by Syria's willingness
to serve as a haven for Turkish terrorists.
? Syria's military relationship with the Soviet Union
arouses Turkish fears. The Turks believe that
Moscow is arming Syria far beyond its needs, worry
that these arms could be turned against Turkey, and
suspect that the Soviets are supporting a buildup on
the border.
? Quarrels over water lights :ti,.says a serious rssuc
in the Middle Fast further complicate relations
between the two countries. A huge Turkish dam
project, as currently designed, s+ili pcrntanentl_S
lower water levels in Syria, and the Turks. are _tvsarc
of Syrian resentment.
The Military Threat
The Turks are convinced that Syria is strengthening
its forces on its border with Turkey. The Turkish
Foreign Minister charged publicly in November that
Syria had deployed one or two battalions along ti;e
border. The Turks' unpublicized suspicion is that the
buildup has been considerably greater and that the
Soviets are directly involved. The Turks have claimed
to US representatives on several occasions that the
Soviets have pre-positioned equipment for an entire
division in Syria and begun to reinforce Russian units
near the Turkish border with missile and airtillcrr.
batteries.
These concerns appear exaggerated. A\ e have seen no
evidence of any Soviet presence along the border.
and -in view of Syria's reluctance to permit the
Soviets a free hand on their territory sse doubt that
this is likely to happen. The Syrians havc little
military capacity to spare for deployments on the
Turkish border because of their continuing
confrontation with Israel and their involvement ssith
Lebanon.
=the Syrians normally monitor the border vaith one
regiment of about 1,500 border guards equipped with
jeeps and small arms.
In theory, the Syrian Army's eight regular divisions
constitute a formidable threat to Turkey. In practice,
they are committed to Lebanon and defense of the
Golan Heights and Damascus against Israel. The
Syrians would be hard pressed to send even two or
three brigades to the Turkish border. Nevertheless.
the Syrians have responded to Turkish interest in
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border security with concerns of their own: in
February 1985, the Syrian Minister of Information
referred to the need-unmet so far to restation
Syrian troops in Lebanon along the sparsely defended
frontier with Turkey.
The Terrorism Problem
The Turks are convinced that Syria is supporting anti-
Turkish terrorists-primarily Kurds and Armenians,
but also Turkish Communists with training,
equipment, and help in infiltrating into Turkey. They
believe that Syrian camps used for training
Palestinians with Soviet support are also used to
train anti-Turkish operatives.
On the terrorism issue, we see some justification for
Turkish suspicions. The Syrians openly harbor anti-
Turkish refugees and tend to turn a blind eye to
terrorist activities directed against Turkey. Syrians
strongly support Kurdish rebels in Iraq and would
find it difficult to prevent Iraqi Kurds from helping
their Turkish cousins even if they were inclined to do
The Water Usage Issue
Talks between Syria and Turkey over the use of water
from the Euphrates River, first begun in 1962, have
not involved any serious discussion of the matters in
dispute. Annual talks which also included Iraq
ceased in 1972, and, since then, ad hoc discussions
among the riparian partners to coordinate present
projects or future plans have failed. As a result, if all
currently planned projects are completed, their
combined water requirements would exceed the
capacity of the river during certain times of the year.
Syria's concern about the effect of Turkey's water
schemes on its own Euphrates development plans
arises primarily from the Turkish plan to channel
irrigation water back to the river below the Euphrates
Darn. This would drastically diminish downstream
water flows to northwest Syria and Lake Assad.
Turkey focuses returning irrigation runoff to the
Euphrates via the Khabur River in eastern Syria-a
move that will effectively circumvent major Syrian
water projects upstream of the Khabur-Euphrates
confluence.
The Keban, the fir.st of Turkeys Euphrates River
dams and the farthest upstream, was completed in
1974 and has a reservoir capacity of 30 billion cubic
meters (bcm) of water. The Karakaya Dani, about
170 kilometers downstream is scheduled to be
completed in 1987. It will have a reservoir capacity of
9.5 bcm and a production capacity of 7.3 billion
kilowatt-hours (kWh) annually.
The Ataturk Dam, located 180 km downstream of
the Karakaya Dam near the city of Adiyaman, will he
one of the largest dams in the world when completed
in 1993. It will have an estimated production capacity
of 8.9 billion k Wh per year and a reservoir capacity
of 48 bcm. Two smaller dams downstream at Birecik
and Karakamis are still in the planning stage.
The Syrians also began their Euphrates water
program in the 1960.s in order to expand their
hydroelectric capability and fulfill a Bath Party
commitment to land reform. The Euphrates Pam,
completed in 1975 with Soviet aid, has an estimated
production capacity of 2.6 billion kWh per year and a
reservoir capacity of 11.6 bcm. A smaller dam about
50 kilometers downstream at Raqqah is scheduled to
be completed this year, while a third dam to be
constructed at the head ofLake Assad is still in the
planning stages.
There are indications that Syria may consider
indirectly threatening Turkish security through
dissident Armenian and Kurdish groups unless
Turkey shows some willingness to decrease its usage
of Euphrates River water. So far, however, Turkey
has not shown much interest in responding to Syrian
water usage concerns and has attributed currently low
water levels in Syria to drought conditions rather than
to the operation of the Keban Dam. During Kasm's
visit, Turkey reportedly agreed to increase 1986 water
flows in return for Syria blocking terrorist border
crossings, but the practical impact of this informal
understanding probably will be minimal.
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Outlook
In spite of their differences, both Ankara and
Damascus have a clear preference for handling their
differences in diplomatic channels. Both sides
apparently want to avoid a confrontation, and both
have greater concerns elsewhere. Still, the differences
dividing them are great and unlikely to be overcome
any time soon. Under these circumstances, a serious
escalation of tensions is always possible -a situation
hardly alleviated by the continued absence of a Syrian
ambassador in Ankara. Syria reportedly has
appointed-and Turkey has accepted a new
Ambassador to Turkey, but no date has been
announced for his arrival.
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West Germany: Implications of
New Naval Missions I'
New missions assigned to the West German Navy in
the Norwegian Sea may mean a future diversion of its
forces from the Baltic. In 1984 the Ministry of
Defense revised the Bundesmarine's mission
statement, expanding its operational area to include
the southern 'orwegian Sea in addition to its
previous mission areas in the North Sea and the
Baltic. In the Norwegian Sea the Bundesmarine
envisions participation in antisubmarine barrier
operations and offensive patrols forward of the
barriers. Acquisition of new frigates and larger
submarines for expanded "blue water" naval
operations, however, may come at the expense of'
different naval assets (more strike aircraft and fast
patrol boats) needed to meet the Soviet threat to
Denmark and Germany's Baltic coast.
Evolution of a New Mission
As West Germany rearmed after World War II, its
new Navy's missions were established as participation
in defense of the German coast, control of the Baltic
approaches, and protection of NATO's North Sea
lines of communication for reinforcement and
resupply. Beginning in the late 1970s, the
Bundesmarine began to develop proposals for
expanded missions in the eastern Atlantic and the
Norwegian Sea to counter a coming manpower and
budget crunch. The Bundesmarine saw a growing
Soviet naval threat to NATO's Northern Flank as
rationale for obtaining additional resources. But
several allies opposed expanded missions for the
Bundesmarine. Norway, for example, voiced concern
about increasing forces in the Norwegian Sea in
peacetime (but had agreed as early as 1964 to let the
Bundesmarine pre-position material in Norway). The
United Kingdom, probably anxious to preserve its
special relationship with the United States, cited
complications in command and control among other
objections to closer cooperation between the US Navy
and the Bundesmarine. The Royal Navy may also
This article is based largclc on defense attache reporting and
discus,ions with iS \avc analysts.
have seen an expanded German naval presence as
weakening its arguments to maintain its current force
structure in a time of increasing pressure on British
defense budgets. Denmark was concerned that a nes'
Bundesmarine mission might divert German attention
and resources from the Baltic. where the Danes aa'a
budget constraints reducing their own forces. Such
resistance, particularly from the British, led West
Germany in 1981 to drop its proposals for the eastern
Atlantic, but it has continued to push for an expanded
role in the Norwegian Sea.
Status of the Broader Mission Proposal
Agreement by several NATO commands is required
before Bundesmarine elements can be incorporated
into the force structure of the Supreme Allied
Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). Pending such
agreement, West Germany considers that its naval
units can be used in the Norwegian Sea within the
framework of the existing NATO command structure.
The Bundesmarine would, however, like a flag officer
billet in the policy division at Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to offset a perceived
lack of maritime influence on the SHAPE
policymaking process.
The new West German maritime strategy will not
begin to affect NATO's naval capabilities until new
Bundesmarine combatants come into service in the
1990s. The Bundesmarine's existing destroyers and
frigates already operate in the North Sea and most
are now based on the Federal Republic's North Sea
coast. Although West German naval fuel, mines, and
torpedoes are already pre-positioned in Norway, the
Bundesmarine only gradually will expand its ability to
operate in the Norwegian Sea. It is doing so in three
phases:
? Phase one involves completing the new Type-122
Bremen-class frigate program. Six of these ships.
each carrying two Sea Lynx ASW helicopters, arc
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Novaya
Zemiva
0 300 Ktlooieters
0 330 Nau3Ca1 Mies
Norwegian
Sea
Trondheim
Oslo* Stockholm
Jutland
North Copenhagen
Sea
Baltic
Sea
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now operating in the North Sea. Two more frigates
of this class and five more Sea Lynxes, funded in
1985 and coming into service in 1988 and 1989,
could be deployed in the Norwegian Sea. The
Bundesmarine has programed for the 1990s another
new class of frigates specialized to provide more
complete air defense at sea.
? The Bundesmarine's Tornado aircraft are another
important naval resource currently committed to the
Baltic. The development of Tornado missions
outside the Baltic potentially double-tasks these
Bundesmarine assets. They might not then always
be available to meet a threat in the Baltic.
? Phase two may involve development of missions
beyond the Baltic for the two wings of the German
naval air arm that are currently replacing their US
F-104s with the naval strike version of the European
Tornado. These air wings are scheduled to complete
their acquisition of I l l Tornados in 1989.
? Phase three probably will involve deployment of the
first six of the new class of large Type 211 diesel
attack submarines beginning in 1991. They have
been designed for deepwater ASW, will have a
minelaying capability, and may carry torpedo tube-
launched antiship missiles.
Implications for NATO
Control of the Baltic is critical to the defense of
NATO's Northern Flank particularly the Danish
islands and Jutland. The primary issue raised by the
Bundesmarine's adoption of an expanded mission in
the Norwegian Sea is the future adequacy of forces
allocated to the Baltic:
? West Germany's obsolescent Type 205 coastal
submarines are now committed to the Baltic with
minelaying, ASW, and coastal-defense antiship
Once Admiral Wellershof replaces General Altenburg
as Inspector General of the Bundeswehr in October
1986, the Bundesmarine's share of the defense budget
may grow. The Bundesmarine, however, will still face
hard choices on allocation of future funds between
missions on the Norwegian Sea and the Baltic.
NATO's Baltic defenses are all the more important
now that the Soviets are developing new rail-ferry
capacity in the Baltic that will give them a partial
alternative to moving ground forces across Poland.
The Bundesmarine has programed the upgrading of
its 22 search-and-rescue helicopters (Sea King
MK41s) with the Sea Skua antiship missile between
another key element for defense of the western Baltic,
have been upgraded with improved antishipping
capability, but still lack a good air defense.
The uncertain future size and force structure of the
Royal Navy is another key factor in evaluating the
Bundesmarine's expanded mission. Even though
NATO's Baltic defenses remain a concern, West
German procurement of Bremen-class frigates and
Type 211 submarines for operations in the Norwegian
Sea could benefit NATO if British funding for
conventional naval forces declines in the I 990s. The
Royal Navy will be particularly vulnerable to budget
cuts in the late 1980s and early I 990s because of its
The Bundesmarine's fast patrol boats,
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planned large-scale construction of warships,
including a new class of diesel attack subs, more
frigates, and a new class of minehunters
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Sweden: Fate of Indigenous
Missile Industry in Doubt
A debate over whether to develop Sweden's first
indigenous tactical air-to-air missile system will be
influenced heavily by varying perceptions of US
policy on exporting weapons to Sweden. The
government and industry are intent on reducing
Sweden's reliance on the United States for critical
missile components, but they face stiff opposition
from the military, which prefers to buy US systems
because of their proven technology and relatively
lower cost. Should the Swedes opt for a domestic
program, they still will need foreign components in
the near term and probably would have to reallocate
defense funds, cut back other weapons programs, or
increase the defense budget. If they choose foreign
procurement, the future of indigenous land and naval
missile programs could be in jeopardy because fewer
available jobs could induce missile engineers and
technicians to seek opportunities abroad.
Sweden's Missile Industry
Missile research and development in Sweden is
controlled by the government. Saab-Scania and
Bofors, the prime contractors for all current missile
R&D projects, receive guidance from the Defense
Materiel Administration in the Ministry of Defense.
In 1978, the government set up the Saab-Bofors
Missile Corporation to pool resources for R&D,
production, and marketing of air-to-air missiles. But,
since then, the corporation has existed largely on
paper because of a government decision to emphasize
foreign purchases over domestic production in order to
avoid the long development time and high cost of
designing and building air-to-air missile systems. The
government canceled the RB-72 air-to-air missile
then under development, although Saab continued
working on the missile's infrared seeker, and, today,
there are no Swedish-designed air-to-air missile
systems in production. The Swedish missile industry
can and does produce, however, several other state-of-
the-art missile systems, including the RBS- 15
antiship missile, the RBS-70 surface-to-air missile,
and the AT-4 and B
The Air-to-Air Missile Requirement
The Air Force's current inventory of air-to-air
missiles consists of foreign systems built under license
by the missile division of Saab. These include variants
of the US infrared-guided AIM-4D and the radar-
guided AIM-26B, of which the Swedes have about
1,000 of each. In 1984, the Swedes contracted for 800
US AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles-for which Saab
will produce a proximity fuze --to replace older
models as the primary armament for the Air Force's
Viggen fighter aircraft, with delivery scheduled
between 1987 and 1988. The Swedes also told US
officials in March 1985 that they were considering
buying 800 additional AIM-9Ls for delivery in 1990.
They also are buying the British Sky Flash missile. ILLEGIB
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As these deals were being negotiated, the Swedish ILLEGIB
Government tentatively decided in early 1985 to
reverse its policy favoring procurement of foreign air-
to-air missile systems. As a start, parliament
earmarked 100 million kroner (about US $13 million]
for missile R&D, and the Defense Materiel
Administration commissioned the firms of Saab.
Ericsson Radio Systems, Bofors, Philips Electronics.
and the National Industries-Corporation to conduct
feasibility studies on radar guidance and infrared
homing. These companies contributed an additional
100 million kronor.
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Debate Over New Air-to-Air Missile:
Domestic or Foreign?
According to the Swedish press and the US Embassy.
the current debate among politicians, industrialists.
and the military focuses on planning for a new air-to-
air missile for the JAS-39 Gripen fighter-expected
to be operational in 1992 and will culminate in a
May 1987 "Defense Decision" on the defense budgets
and procurement plans for 1987-92. The choices
include producing a domestic missile, buying an
imported model, or modifying a system already in the
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inventory. The Defense Minister, many members of
parliament, and missile industrialists want to continue
state funding of R&D for domestic missiles in general
and especially for air-to-air missiles. Squaring off
against this group are the Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces and members of the defense
material and air staffs, who prefer to buy cheaper
foreign air-to-air missiles.
Argumentsfor Designing Missiles in Sweden. One of
the basic elements of Swedish defense policy has been
its commitment to an indigenous weapons production
capability in order to lessen the danger arising if
access to foreign equipment were cut off. Advocates of
domestic programs acknowledge that the escalating
costs of advanced technology and austere defense
budgets have increased Sweden's reliance on the
United States for certain high-technology equipment,
which the Swedes cannot afford to develop. But,
according to the US defense attache, proponents of
domestic programs believe these disadvantages are
offset by other factors:
? Some government officials have estimated that the
missile program would preserve jobs by contributing
at least US $385 million to the economy through the
turn of the century.
? Proponents of building a domestic missile capability
also argue that the United States will never sell
Sweden its top-of-the-line air-to-air missiles because
of US suspicions that US technology would be
transferred to the East Bloc via Sweden.'
? Some Swedes also are concerned about US
restrictions on subsequent reexport of missiles that
have US components or were originally purchased
from the United States, which would limit Sweden's
ability later to recover some of its costs by selling
older missiles to secondhand buyers. They prefer
choosing their arms customers without a de facto
US veto.
Arguments Jor Purchasing Foreign Missiles. The
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the
defense materiel and Air Force staffs object to the
government's intention to fund additional R&D on
air-to-air missiles. They argue that:
? US missiles offer proven technology at a reasonable
cost.
? Swedish defense planners can ill afford to spend vast
outlays on development of an indigenous system,
especially when vital components still would have to
be imported from the United States for an extended
period.
? Experience demonstrates that older air-to-air
missiles can be imported and their target seekers or
propellant adapted to meet Swedish requirements.
The issue for proponents of a foreign purchase is not
whether Swedish industries are capable of
development and producing advanced missiles, but
whether the Swedish defense budget can afford it.
Off-the-shelf buys from foreign--largely US-firms
generally prove to be cheaper because of large
production runs and lower unit costs and are available
sooner than domestically developed missile systems.
Furthermore, the export market for Swedish-designed
missiles probably would be narrowed by Sweden's
restrictive arms sales policy,' which would limit the
size of the production run and keep high the cost of
each missile.
Prospects
We believe the chances are better than even that the
Swedes will decide to continue funding their air-to-air
missile R&D program, especially if the United States
cancels its Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air
' Swedish neutrality policy includes a requirement to sell weapons
only to states not currently at war or not likel% to go to war in the
near future. This usually has meant that arms exports have gone
mostly to Sweden's Nordic neighbors (Norway. Denmark, and
The AIM-9L, for example, is an older missile not as versatile as I inland) and to nonaligned countries such as India and Singapore.
the more current version in the US inventory, the AlM-9M. which Consequently, the Swedish export market is relativel% small,
has an improved guidance system and resistance to infrared forcing the Swedes to bear almost all of the R&D costs rather than
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Possible Foreign Missiles for the
New Swedish Fighter Aircraft
In planning for the JAS-39 Gripen, the Swedes did
not include R&D funds for an indigenous air-to-air
missile as part of the aircraft's budget package.
Rather,
are watching closeh, how
the House Armed Services Committee votes when
AMRAAM funding is addressed.
asked the Air Force last summer to
consider updating its British Sky Flash missiles
(based on the US AIM-7 Sparrow) as an alternative
to buying the AMRAAM. JAS program managers,
however, reportedly had insufficient funds to study
improvements to the Sky Flash, expected problems in
adapting it for the JAS, and, quite simply, preferred
US missiles.
Nevertheless, other evidence indicates the Swedes
may be hedging their bets should the AMRAAM and
ASRAAM programs be canceled.
that the Air Force, in fact, was
investing money in an improvement program for the
Sky Flash, not as a final choice but as a "gap filler"
through the mid-1990s until a domestic or foreign
would be in doubt as well, since Sweden then would
have fewer job opportunities for its highly trained
missile engineers and technicians, who might
therefore leave Sweden for foreign firms. F_
Missile (AMRAAM) program. They probably also
would be capable of developing a missile competitive
with the US AIM-9 series if given sufficient funding.
They could, for example, build on the RB-72
program.
that a consensus in parliament led by the
Center Party seemed agreed to go ahead on missile
R&D in the hope of ending reliance on foreign
suppliers. This political support was echoed by
Swedish industrialists, who optimistically assessed
their in-house capabilities to make reliable and
accurate air-to-air missiles.
Indeed, the government's decision in 1982 to build the
new JAS fighter aircraft, despite consensus that
cheaper off-the-shelf foreign aircraft were available.
could serve as a precedent. In the JAS case, the
Swedes decided that the higher costs of an indigenous
lighter program were justified since it would preserve
their domestic aerospace industry and prevent layoffs
of workers, technicians, and engineers. Similarly, the
Swedes may decide to fund a domestic air-to-air
missile program despite its high costs estimated to
be up to 5450 million in order to maintain their
domestic missile industry as well as vital jobs in the
electronics industries.
Should they opt for a domestic program, the Swedes
still will need foreign technology and components in
the near term and probably will have to fund it by
reallocating nonprocurement defense funds, scaling
back or canceling other weapon programs, or
increasing the defense budget. If, on the other hand,
they decide in favor of foreign procurement, the
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Poland:
Polls-What's Behind the
Numbers?
(f 1'ou can present confusion with figures, then the
government Center for Public Opinion Research will
he happy to employ you:
? Polish press spokesman Jerzy Urban in response to a
reporter's question on public reaction to Solidarity's
Lech Walesa being awarded the Nobel prize.F_
The Jaruzelski regime apparently relies heavily on
public opinion polls to gauge popular attitudes. A
special organization headed by an army colonel-
conducts opinion polls on a variety of issues. The
government publishes some of the more revealing data
and publicly challenges underground polls in order to
lend credibility to its domestic and foreign policies---
tactics unique in Eastern Europe. The polls show,
among other things, that few Poles have much
confidence in government management of the
economy. Although the polls do not seem to have
great impact on regime policy, Jaruzelski is likely to
continue supporting the polling efforts, partly just to
show that he is attentive not only to public attitudes
but also to monitor reaction to continuing economic
policies.
The Regime's Motives
General Jaruzelski places great emphasis on
monitoring public opinion because he believes the
country's periodic crises have been caused partly by
the party's failure to pay close attention to popular
complaints when weighing policy options. He is
reluctant, however, to rely solely on party assessments
of public attitudes-a traditional function of a ruling
Communist party hierarchy-because he believes
such reporting is skewed to emphasize what local
party leaders think the central authorities want to
hear. To supplement party reporting, Jaruzelski relies
on sometimes elaborately staged social consultations
and intensive public opinion polling work.
Center for Public Opinion Research
Soon after the imposition of martial law, Jaruzelski
created the Center for Public Opinion Research, a
special national public opinion polling organization.
He appointed as its director Stanislaw Kwiatkowski.
an active duty colonel and political scientist, who
reportedly is close to him. The center was charged
with conducting surveys on significant political and
economic issues in advance of major government
policy decisions. Previously, most public opinion data
had been collected by the Center for Public Opinion
Studies in Warsaw, the Press Research Center in
Krakow, academic institutions, and local Communist
party bodies. The polls were primarily sociological
surveys and were often used to support social welfare
programs. There was no centralized government
apparatus or coordinating mechanism.
The only polling body that conducts nationwide
surveys, the center has conducted polls prior to price
increases, local and national elections, and the
amnesty of political prisoners in 1983 and 1984. Most
of the center's work involves direct polling, although it
occasionally analyzes the stream of letters sent to the
central authorities and conducts special telephone
call-ins. The polls are based on nationwide random
samplings ranging from 150 to 2,300 individuals with
an average sampling of 1,500. The center has a
coordinator in each province tasked with distributing
questionnaires and collecting the data, which are then
processed by the government's central computer
facility. The center has tried to adapt Western polling
methods, but the lack of telephones in rural areas has
limited the use of telephone surveys. The survey
results are disseminated to about 1,000 party and
government officials, although selected excerpts may
be released by the Polish media.
Some Polling Results
Reporting on the results of foreign policy polls
published in December 1983 and late last summer
showed general support of Soviet policies but also was
surprisingly open in revealing Polish antipathy toward
the USSR. For example, the poll conducted in 1983
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after Soviet withdrawal from the Geneva INF
negotiations showed that only 48 percent of the
respondents supported the Soviet walkout. To soften
the blow to Moscow's ego, an article on the poll
claimed that only 23 percent were opposed outright to
the Soviet action, whereas the rest were put in an
"undecided" category. Only 4 percent felt that the
United States had displayed sufficient good will about
reaching an agreement. Last summer's poll revealed
that less than 10 percent of those surveyed considered
CEMA and the Warsaw Pact significant factors for
world peace and that fewer than 50 percent supported
Soviet foreign policy. Somewhat contradictorily,
89 percent reportedly felt that the United States
constitutes the greatest threat to world peace.
Officially sponsored polls on attitudes toward the
United States have become steadily more negative. In
1981, 59 percent of the respondents considered the
United States friendly toward Poland. After the
imposition of economic sanctions in 1982. the figure
reportedly dropped to 35 percent and in 1985 stood at
10 percent. Although these numbers do not jibe with
the US Embassy's informal assessment of Polish
attitudes, the authorities continue to cite them to US
officials to show the consequences of Washington's
sanctions and to argue for a change in US policy.
Government-sponsored polls on the economic
situation reveal that after three years of economic
reform the general population has little trust in
government economic policies and doubts the regime
can prevent future crises. One survey conducted after
price increases in July 1985 revealed that 50 percent
of the public was critical of the government and
economic reform. Although two-thirds of those polled
doubted that government economic policy would help
overcome the economic crisis. Furthermore,
73 percent were dissatisfied with government price
policy (that is, continued price increases); 53 percent
complained about the lack of consumer goods; and
41 percent were unhappy about wages. A poll released
in January revealed that one-third of the respondents
consider their economic situation bad.
Several polls conducted last year tried to predict voter
turnout in the national parliamentary elections in
October, the first elections since the creation of
Solidarity. Survey results released in mid-August
projected an 80-percent voter turnout: perhaps not
surprisingly, the subsequent official tally claimed
79 percent of the voters went to the polls, compared
with a 75-percent participation in the 1984 local
elections. The government expressed satisfaction with
the turnout and claimed it was an important victory
that signaled the end of the Solidarity era.
Underground leaders, eager to show that their widely
publicized boycott had been effective, refuted the
regime's figures, asserting that their counterpolls
indicated a turnout of 61 to 66 percent. Solidarity
activists monitored polling stations in 1,865 of 21,649
precincts at least three times on election day, counting
the number of voters for five minutes each time.
Computers were used to analyze the sample and
develop a projection. The government claims that its
test of the underground's monitoring technique
indicates a margin of error of 10 to 50 percent,
whereas Solidarity concedes errors of only 2 percent
in urban areas and 12 percent in the country. The
argument over the voter turnout has continued into
1986. Solidarity leader Lech Walesa had to appear in
court for allegedly slandering officials handling the
election returns by issuing a statement that
challenged the government's figures. In the end, the
government dropped the charges.
How the Polls Are Used
The impact of public opinion polls on government
decisionmaking is hard to gauge. Surveys of popular
attitudes on economic issues are probably read most
closely because of the political sensitivity and the
difficulties previous regimes have encountered when
increasing consumer prices. Thus, worker complaints
in 1983 about poor living standards apparently helped
delay planned price increases and caused Warsaw to
freeze prices on some consumer goods. In 1984 the
government held three months of consultations on two
price variants that would have raised prices 10 to
15 percent. Public complaints prompted the regime to
implement a lower price variant and reduce planned
price increases on staple goods. Opposition to price
increases in 1985 again led to delays in implementing
some price hikes, a reduction of planned increases in
coal prices, and greater compensation for low-income
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workers. The government's reading of its polls may
have contributed to the various delays and the choice
of alternative price proposals. Partly to further the
impression that he listens to the opinions of average
Poles, Jaruzelski last August solicited suggestions
from the populace for issues to raise in his speech to
the United Nations and subsequently mentioned some
of these ideas to his UN audience.
Conclusions
The accuracy of Polish public opinion polls remains
suspect. Chief pollster Kwiatkowski recently admitted
to US Embassy officers that his center had made
some mistakes in polling practices but tried to dismiss
them as growing pains. We believe that a more
serious, continuing problem for Polish pollsters may
be a reluctance of Poles to speak honestly with any
government representatives. Moreover, there probably
is a tendency on the part of the pollsters to interpret
results in ways that are as favorable as possible to
Jaruzelski and his policies. Press reports on poll
results reveal a marked tendency in this direction. If
this is indicative of the confidential analysis of polls
that is passed to Jaruzelski, he simply may have
created another body similar to the party that tells
him what he wants to hear.
Despite these deficiencies, public opinion polls are
likely to remain a permanent part of the consultation
process, certainly for as long as Jaruzelski remains
party leader. He will not be willing to rely solely on
party reporting of popular opinions, even if he
succeeds in getting local leaders to make more honest
appraisals, and will remain keenly interested :n
popular attitudes toward continuing economic
problems.
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pity of London lifted restriction on 1 March to aalo
100-percent foreign ownership of stozk exchange
firms ... first major step in reform of British financial
markets ... several US firms e pccted to increase
various minority stakes to IPh percent, aith~}ugh mine
~Nill wait until deregulation is .i)rnr feted it October.
Bank of France has lowered key refinancing interest
rate by .25 percent to 8.5 percent ... pz?rtiafly o1',sei
by increased reservc requirements ... resserte
part of bank's gradual. move toxvard reserve "'i,ecl
mnetari control.
Spain has negotiated 526 million credit line with
Nicaragua ... maximum of i 1 h million for short-term
financing of cons.unoer good, and .`,4 r million for
medium- or 1. rig-tern : financing of capital -,ood,, .. .
follows previous credit line that exOircd last
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Li L7; en-;n
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