CONGO: BALANCING BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 2, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
~/ L (- - _ 25X1
CcnU;~lntcll~Kncc A;rnq?
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
2 October 1986
Congo: Balancing Between East and West
Summary
Since gaining independence from France in 1960 and declaring itself the
first Marxist-Leninist state in Africa, growing economic problems and
disillusionment with the lack of Soviet development aid over the last two
years have caused Congo to moderate its policies and turn to the West for
more assistance. In recent years, under President Denis Sassou-Nguesso,
Congo has quickened the pace of its moves toward greater moderation and
closer Western ties. Nevertheless, we believe that Sassou still remains
committed to a Third World outlook, Marxist controls on political stability,
and the need to maintain Libyan and Communist bloc goodwill to ensure his
political position at home.
During his meeting with US officials, Sassou, as the newly elected
Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, will likely want to discuss
the conflicts in South Africa, Angola, and Chad, and recommend US support
for the UN Economic Program of Action for Africa. We believe Sassou will
urge Washington to adopt tougher sanctions to promote change in South Africa
and voice opposition to US assistance to UNITA forces in Angola. Sassou is
also likely to volunteer to serve as an interlocutor between Washington and
his close personal friend, Angolan President dos Santos. We believe
This memorandum was requested by Clark A. Murdock, Director, African
Affairs, National Security Council. It was prepared by west
Africa Branch, Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division,
F-iC.~`
DATE /~%3 ~ ~
OIR
P ~, PD I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
Sassou's ability to broker talks between Libyan-backed Chadian rebels and
Chadian President Habre will be limited by his inability or unwillingness to
curb Libyan activities in the Congo.
Mounting Economic Problems
Congo has suffered a significant economic downturn in the past three
years because of lower-than-expected oil revenues, poor performance of state
enterprises, and excessive short-term borrowing to finance development,
according to US Embassy reporting. The Embassy reports that Elf-Congo, the
mayor producer and marketer of the country's crude oil--which accounts for
90 percent of exports and about two-thirds of government revenues--has
halted all new exploration and development. Congo's current budget for this
vear has been reduced from about $915 million to $455 million.
state-owned enterprises in the manufacturing and
cons ruc on sec ors ave fallen up to three months behind in paying
salaries. Total GDP growth declined sharply to 2.9 percent in 1984 from an
average of over 19 percent from 1980-82. Moreover, high borrowing to
finance ambitious public investment programs in the early 1980s left Congo
with a heavy external debt burden, we estimate to have increased 55 percent
from 1979-83.
An urgent need to rein in the Congo's financial expenditures prompted
Sassou to devise a recovery program last year that called for major budget
cuts, streamlining inefficient state enterprises, and freezing the
government payroll. Foreign creditors criticized this program as
inadequate, and France--Congo's largest aid donor--told Sassou last December
that it would no longer bail the country out economically unless Congo
reached an agreement with the IMF on further economic reforms. Earlier this
month, officials of the IMF approved a $27 million line of credit that Congo
could draw on to support its reform program and paved the way for the
rescheduling of its debt by Paris Club creditors.
Brokering Between Moderates and Hardliners
Although Sassou came to power in a bloodless coup in 1979 with the help
of hardline leftists in the military, he has generally followed a more
moderate course than Congo's previous military leaders.
over the last several years he has strengthened the
hand of political moderates at the expense of pro-Soviet hardliners.
According to the US Embassy, Sassou's Cabinet is composed primarily of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
pragmatic technocrats who favor improved relations with the West and
diversification of military suppliers away from the Communist bloc. The
Embassy reports that Sassou was unanimously elected to a second five-year
term as President and Party Chairman at the party congress in 1984, where he
successfully engineered the ouster of several key leftist ideologues
Nevertheless, Sassou's efforts to strengthen ties to the West and
implement economic reform continue to face strong opposition from hardline
leftists. Pierre Nze, a senior party member with close ties to the Soviets,
probably is leading the hardline opposition to Sassou. The President
replaced Nze as Foreign Minister in 1984 because his views conflicted with
Sassou's policy of improving relations with the West. In our view, however,
Nze has support in the Politburo--the party's principal decisionmaking body,
and the US Embassy reports that last year Nze held a private strategy
meeting with fellow hardliners in the party and Cabinet that was attended by
the Cuban Ambassador.
last November Congolese soldiers re use o crac own
on students who were rioting over austerity--probably sympathizing with
their protest.
Moreover, budget cu s,
lack of spare parts, and mismanagement has reduced military capabilities
over the last several years and demoralized some officers
Limits to Moderation? Relations with Libya and the Communist Bloc
Although Congo clearly wants to remove some socialist impediments to
development and foster closer economic relations with the West, we believe
movement will continue to be slow and incremental, and will not entail
fundamental abandonment of Congo's self-styled "revolutionary" ideology.
Sassou's need to placate domestic leftists, who favor close ties to the
Soviets and Libyans, almost certainly will limit Congo's turn toward the
West.
Soviet Influence. In our view, the USSR has both political and military
aims in Congo, one of the few African states to have a formal treaty of
friendship and cooperation with Moscow. We believe the Soviets' principal
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
objectives are to limit Western and Chinese influence, to keep Brazzaville
on a socialist path, and to garner its support in international forums. In
addition, Embassy reporting indicates that, despite repeated refusals by
several Congolese presidents, Moscow still hopes to acquire naval base
rights at Pointe Noire and conclude a mutual defense treaty under which it
could intervene at Congo's request. We believe the Soviets seek base rights
as a contingency should Moscow lose access to neighboring Angola, where
Luanda serves as the primary support site for Moscow's small West African
naval patrol and periodic Soviet TU-95 naval reconnaissance in the south
Atlantic.
Moscow's influence in Congo, as in other African countries, rests on its
military assistance program. After establishing diplomatic relations in
1964, Moscow quickly displaced France as Congo's principal arms supplier.
We estimate that, since the mid-1960s, Moscow has delivered $200 million in
military equipment, including at least 23 MIG-21 fighters and eight MI-8
helicopters. We estimate that the Soviets have 340 advisers assigned to
Congo's military and security organizations. The USSR also provides
military training for the Congolese in the Soviet Union and in Congo,
according to the US Embassy.
In addition to military assistance, the Soviets have an active political
and cultural exchange program that includes the frequent exchange of party
delegations. According to the US Embassy, the Soviets provided
approximately 80 scholarships last year, down from a high of 150 in 1983?
Over 1,200 Congolese are studying in the Soviet Union, according to the US
Embassy.
Communist economic aid and trade with Congo is minimal. The US Embassy
estimates there are about 300 Soviet civilian technicians, mostly in the
health and education sectors. East Germany and Bulgaria also provide some
civilian technicians. We estimate that the Soviet Union has provided some
$12 million in economic aid over the past five years. Bilateral trade over
the past five years has been fairly stable at $5-8 million annually.
Cuban Ties. The Congolese sympathize with Castro's revolutionary
philosophy, and support many of Havana's views on international issues.
Cuba has provided technical assistance to the Congo Government in key
economic sectors such as agriculture, animal husbandry, public works and
construction, industry, mining and energy, transportation, and trade. Many
of these projects are presently stalemated, however, as a result of
Brazzaville's financial problems.
For Havana, Congo's importance lies in its role as a support base for
Cuba's Angolan involvement. Since 1975, the Congolese port facilities and
airfield at Pointe Noire and Brazzaville have served as key logistic
facilities for resupplying and reinforcing Cuban forces in Angola's Cabinda
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
Province. The US Embassy reports that the Cuban military camp in Pointe
Noire is used as a holding area for troops waiting to be transferred to
Angola. This camp is also r creation area for Cuban
troops serving in Angola.
Press reporting over the past year indicates that Cuba and Congo have a
warm political relationship. During 1985, a large number of top Congolese
officials visited Cuba, including the National Assembly President, Minister
of Education, Forestry Minister, Justice Minister, and Foreign Minister. In
December, Cuban politburo member Jorge Risquet--Castro's chief African
advisor--met with the Congolese President in Luanda to discuss the struggle
of the South African people against the apartheid regime.
The relationship between the two countries, however, has been
characterized by occasional frictions. The US Embassy notes that the poor
behavior of Cuban troops stationed in Pointe Noire has alienated the local
population. In addition, according to press reports, Sassou occasionally
displays annoyance at Castro's messianic view of socialism, charging that
the Cuban leader's attitude does not foster genuine solidarity and harmony
among socialist nations.
The Embassy reports that exclusive of the Cubans at Pointe Noire, the
Cuban presence in Congo now stands at six diplomatic and consular personnel
and about 55 civilian technicians, with an additional 10 to 15 Cubans
advising Congolese security forces.
In addition, approximately 1,000 Congolese s u en s a e
primary, secondary, and university levels are studying in Cuba.
The Libyans. We believe that the Congolese, who are well aware of
Libyan leader Qadhafi's proclivity for subverting his opponents in black
Africa, will continue to try to avoid offending Tripoli.
Qadhafi has used Congo as a base or'
operations against Chad, Zaire, and other moderate central African regimes
ever since Libya opened a diplomatic mission in Brazzaville in 1982?
Tripoli has used Congo as a base of operations to support Chadian insurgents
and several rounds of reconciliation talks have failed following Libyan
intimidation of the participants. The US Embassy estimates the Libyan
presence to be at least 50, substantially more than needed to administer its
small bilateral aid program
In addition, Qadhafi apparently has sought to increase his leverage with
Brazzaville by offering military and economic aid.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
The US Embassy reports that Libya and Congo
are developing a joint forestry project,
Turn Westward: Closer Ties to France and the United States.
Sassou's pragmatism, in our judgment, is motivated by his belief that
increased Western investment and aid are critical to economic development,
particularly after oil resources are depleted--which could occur as early as
1990. Moreover,
(have complained about the poor
quality of equipment, long delays in the delivery of spare parts, and
Moscow's recent insistence on advance payments for services. The Congolese
have told US Embassy officials that they are unhappy with the quality of
Soviet military training, which they said emphasizes political
indoctrination at the expense of practical skills.
Growing French Economic Role. In recent years, Congo has further
strengthened commercial ties to France, traditionally its chief economic
partner and benefactor. France and other European Community states supply
over two-thirds of Congo's imports and purchase 20 percent of its exports as
well as providing almost all of Brazzaville's development assistance. The
Embassy reports that since 1981 France alone has accounted for slightly more
than half of Congo's total annual imports. There are some 500 French
technicians in positions throughout the Congolese Government, in addition to
the 7,000, private French citizens who, as expatriates and emplo ees of
~~
French multinational corporations, dominate the private sector.
Improved Relations With the United States. Congo's commercial dealings
with the United States have increased significantly during Sassou's tenure.
Total Congolese-US trade grew in 198 to a record $1 billion, making the
United States one of Brazzaville's leading trading partners and Congo the
third largest US trading partner in black Africa, according to the Embassy.
Over 95 percent of this trade consists of Congolese crude and refined
petroleum products purchased on the spotmarket by American oil companies,
which bought four-fifths of Congo's total oil exports in 1984. Congo
recently agreed to accept modest food assistance and military training for
Congolese officers that supplement US development, which the US Embassy
reports, has averaged $2 million a year since 1981.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
According to the US Embassy, diplomatic relations with Congo have
improved. US officials now have greater access to the media and to senior
officials, leading to a greater exchange of views on mutually important
issues such as Chad. In addition, Sassou has appointed a resident
Ambassador to Washington for the first time, and senior Congolese officials
visited Washington several times last year. Brazzaville also has assumed a
more balanced position on some foreign policy issues. For example, the
Congolese press printed a US response to Soviet disinformation over
responsibility for the Korean airline shootdown incident and participated in
the Los Angeles Olympics, despite Soviet pressure.
Nevertheless, Congo's actions in international forums have shown no
decisive move away from its longstanding alignment with the Soviet bloc and
radical African countries. According to the US Embassy, Congo voted against
or abstained on every issue of importance to the United States at the United
Nations in 1984. In addition, Congo's foreign minister periodically uses
harsh "anti-imperialistic" rhetoric and indirectly attacks the United States
on issues relating to apartheid, Israel, and Nicaragua in the UN General
Assembly.
Prospects
Despite Congo's pragmatic overtures toward the West, hardliners in the
government and military almost certainly will continue to exert influence to
limit Sassou's strategy. In our view, periodic outbursts of anti-Western
rhetoric by leftist officials in international forums--such as the recent
anti-Israeli statement made by the foreign minister at the UN--will probably
continue, despite efforts by Sassou and other relative moderates to prevent
it. In our view, Congo will remain dependent on the Soviets, Cubans, and
Libyans, who are prepared to tolerate a certain amount of Western
involvement in Congo. We believe that Moscow's attitude could change,
however, if events in Angola were to result in the loss of Soviet access to
Luanda. Congo's importance almost certainly would increase significantly,
and we would expect Moscow to expend substantial resources to encourage the
emergence of a more radical regime in hopes of gaining military access.
Nonetheless, we believe Sassou will continue recent efforts to attract
more Western economic aid and investment needed to help weather the current
recession. We expect to see continued emphasis on private-sector
initiatives to promote development, some limited reforms of the state
enterprise system, and further efforts to reduce the influence of ideologues
who seek to block Western investment proposals. At the same time, we
believe Sassou will continue to appease ideologues by continuing the
military supply relationship with Moscow, close ties to Cuba, and Libyan
access.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
25X1
25X1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
In our ,judgement, Sassou's election as OAU chairman may forestall
further challenges to his moves Westward over the near term. Although he
will not be immune to attempts to unseat him during his tenure, we believe
hardliners probably recognize that Sassou's new role brings international
recognition to Congo and could reap economic dividends. Nevertheless, given
Congo's turbulent past and the military's penchant for removing leaders, a
coup could occur with little warning. Although we believe that, on balance,
key military and security leaders still back Sassou, this support could
erode rapidly if living standards continue to fall or if the President shows
signs of losing control. Should Sassou's political position deteriorate, he
probably would attempt to reach a compromise with hardliners, perhaps by
offering to slow Congo's move Westward. An increase in hardline influence
proably would result in improved relations with the Soviets, diminish US
access to senior Congolese officials, and lead to increased anti-Western
rhetoric.
In our judgment, Sassou would probably be replaced by a more hardline
leftist and be excoriated for betraying revolutionary goals through his
moderate policies. Although Congo's moves toward the West might be slowed
or even reversed, we believe whoever rules in Brazzaville would still have
to deal with the United States and Western Europe to preserve essential
trade, aid, and investment links.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8
SUBJECT: Congo: Balancing Between East and West
Original -- Clark A. Murdock, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 -- Ambassador James K. Bishop, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs
1 -- Charles Freeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs
1 -- Anthony Dalsimer, Director, Office of Analysis for Africa,
Department of State
1 -- Mark L. Edelman, Assistant Administrator for Africa,
Agency for International Development
1 -- James L. Woods, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense for
African Affairs, ISA
1 -- DDI
1 -- 0/DDI
1 -- NIO for Africa
1 -- Chief, Africa Division, DDO
1 -- PDB Staff
1 -- Chief, PES
1 -- DDI/CPAs/ILS
1 -- D/ALA
1 -- CPAs/IMC/CB
2 -- ALA/PS (one clean copy; one sourced copy)
1 -- ALA Research Director
3 -- Africa Division, ALA
1 -- Africa Division (Analyst Production File)
6 -- West Africa Branch, ALA
ALA/AF/ (2 October 1986)
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP86T01017R000707440001-8