WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5
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S
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22
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December 22, 2016
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February 22, 2011
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49
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Publication Date: 
November 14, 1975
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SUMMARY
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86TOO608ROO0300020049-5 Secret Weekly Summary Secret No. ^046/75 November 14, 1975 Copy N4 1399 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86TOO608ROO0300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 flu: WED"l Y SUMMARY, is:,uc d every Friday morning by the Office of Current lntelligencr-, reports and analyzes signifi- cant devolorinwn , of 1h40 w,:,ok ihruuyh noon on Thursday. It frequently includes nl:Jic'rial cootdinnicd with or prepared by the Office of FFcorlon?iic Research, the Office of Strategic f~ as an:F, the C'ffico of Geographic and Cartographic Res? arch, and the Directorate of 'icicnce and Technology. Topics requiring more comprohrrnsive treatment and there- fore published seponotr:l?y cr; Spacial Reports are listed in the r;>fltents. CONTENTS (November 14, 1975) MIDDLE EAST AFRICA WESTERN HEMISPHERE 1 Spanish Sahara: March Canceled; Soviets 3 India: Gandhi Exonerated 4 Angola: Two Regimes; Soviets 6 Bangladesh: Another Coup 7 Israel: Economic Problems Exaggerated 8 USSR: Anniversary Waltz 10 Economic Summit 12 MBFR: Problems for the West 13 EC: Farm Policy Worries 13 Finland: New Government Likely 15 Argentina: Impeachment Motion 16 Ecuador: A Shaky Presidency Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 SPANISH SAHARA MARCH CANCELED On November 9, Morocco's King Hassan call- ed off his "green march" into Spanish Sahara after receiving new proposals on the disposition of the territory from a high-level emissary sent by Madrid. The King's action relieved Spanish con- cern that the march would lead to hostilities between the two countries. If Rabat and Madrid have struck a deal that will transfer the territory to Morocco, they will still have to contend with Algeria, which opposes any direct annexation and insists that a self-determination referendum be held under UN auspices. In a speech from Agadir that was studded with conciliatory remarks about Spain, Hassan stated that the mass march, which began on November 6, had "accomplished its mission." Hassan strongly implied that Morocco's claim to the territory would be successfully resolved through negotiations. His optimism was clearly based on talks he held with a senior Spanish of- ficial on November 8. Although Hassan did not reveal any specifics of an understanding or a framework for future negotiations, he had too much personal prestige at stake to have backed down empty-handed. When Hassan called the marchers back, the main body of Moroccans had advanced only a few miles into a sector of the territory south of Tarfaya. A second column had crossed the border some 50 miles to the east. Spanish troops had pull- ed back from both areas. The Moroccan marchers, who had been fired up for their venture by nationalistic and religious propaganda, reluctantly began to withdraw on November 10. In general, the Moroccan public has adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward the King's speech. He will be under mounting pressure, however, to demonstrate with more than implications that progress is being made toward a settlement favorable to Morocco. On November 11, a Moroccan delegation led by Prime Minister Osman went to Madrid to nail down a firm agreement based on the apparent understanding reached between Hassan and the King Hassan Spanish emissary. The inclusion of the director of Morocco's national phosphate company suggests part of the talks will deal with arrangements to assure Spain a share in the profits from the rich phosphate deposits in northern Spanish Sahara. Mauritania, with which Morocco is willing to par- tition the territory, is also participating in the talks. Both Rabat and Madric' are being tight-lipped about the new talks. Press reports from Madrid, however, suggest Spanish officials are less optimistic about hammering out a final agreement than are the Moroccans. Although Spain is eager to get out of the territory and will- ing to see it go to Morocco and Mauritania, Madrid still wants the UN to play a role-possibly by establishing a temporary trusteeship. Moroc- co, however, wants to negotiate a settlement first and then seek the UN's blessing. Algeria, which condemned the Moroccan march as an aggressive act, has continued to lam- bast Hassan through its media. The Algerians have also been playing up and probably exaggerating clashes that have occurred this week in northeastern Spanish Sahara between Moroccan irregulars, reinforced by some army units, and guerrilla forces of the Algerian-backed Polisario SECRET Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 lassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 SECRET Front. The Front, which has signif6cant support among indigenous Saharans, demands in- dependence for the territory. Spanish troops have pulled back to a defense perimeter that leaves the northeastern region bordering Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania outside Spanish lines. Algiers opposes a Spanish deal to divide the territory between Morocco and Mauritania and can be expected to remind Madrid of the Algerian position. During a round of talks in Madrid in late October, stern warnings against such a deal conveyed by an Algerian delegation helped persuade Spain's wavering government to stand by previous Spanish promises to seek a UN role involving a referer:durn `or the disputed territory. Meanwhile, President Boumediene is trying to persuade Mauritanian President Ould Daddah to accept Algeria's view. On November 10 the two leaders met at Bechar; two days later Ould Dad- dah flew to Morocco for further talks with King Hassan. SOVIETS TILT TOWARD ALGIERS Moscow's shift to a pro-Algeria-, position on the Spanish Sahara dispute ha& brocght a deterioration in Soviet-Moroccan relationv,, In the UN Security Council, the Soviets sided with the Algerian view that the Spanisiti Sahara question !;houid be resolved by the cc'any's in- habitants. !'ravda also weighed in on behalf of Algiers, pointing out that the G:neral Assembly had twice approved sett-determinatir,n for the territory's inhabitants and voicing Moscow's op- position to any effort to deny hear this right. Soviet UN representative Malik-with an eye on King Hassan's mass march-urged ra!;traint and moderation on the concerned paitir:-. Until a few weeks ago, the ~ :viets looked benignly on King Hassan's irredentism. They had tried to make a few points in Rabat by privately suggesting sympathy for Moroccan annexation. They had agreed in October 1974 to sell Rabat $30 million in arms, even though they were aware that King Hassan would use the new equipment to bolster his territorial claims. The recent Soviet tilt toward Algiers may have stemmed from: ? A Soviet decision to revert to their long-standing position calling for self-deter- mination. ? A desire to utilize ti-.e crisis to mend their frayed ties with Algiers. ? Concern that endorsement of King Hassan's mass march might give ideas to countries-particularly China-with territorial claims against the USSR. ? Interest in forestalling a Moroccan stranglehold over the rich ph^.sphate deposits in Spanish Sahara, which would give Rabat nearly 80 percent of the world ex- port market for the rock. SECRET Page 2 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 SECRET King Hassan has reacted strongly to the Soviets' actions. He canceled the visit of a Soviet delegation that was to put the final touches on a new agreement expanding the USSR's involve- ment in development of Moroccan phosphates. Hassan also has dispatched an emissary to Moscow to make his displeasure known. Soviet diplomats in Rabat have displayed their discomfort and are trying to make amends. They are now suggesting that self-determination for Spanish Sahara does not necessarily equate with independence. The USSR will probably make further attempts to repair the damage so it can continue to buy Moroccan phosphates. The Soviets have been importing substantial quantities of this basic fertilizer ingredient ;n order to supplement their sagging production. Moroccan phosphates may take on even more importance to the USSR in view of the crop failures this year. INDIA: GANDHI EXONERATED The Indian Supreme Court on November 7 overturned Prime Minister Gandhi's conviction last June by a lower court for relatively minor violations of India's election law during her 1971 campaign. Gandhi, now freed from the threat of being barred from office for six years, may soon take new political initiatives designed to con- solidate her position further. All five members of a Supreme Court panel that heard Gandhi's case upheld election law changes that retroactively eliminated the legal basis for her conviction. The changes were enacted by parliament in August after efforts by Gandhi's political opponents to capitalize on the lower court ruling h= led her to impose a state of emergency on June 26. In another decision, the Supreme Court struck down a constitutional amendment that had exempted the election of a prime ministc- from challenge in the courts. This ruling, however, does not affect Gandhi's case, in view of the court's approvvwl of the election law changes. With her court case out of the way, Gandhi might decide to ease some aspects of the emergency, though she claims the emergency was decreed because of a conspiracy against her government and not because of her troubles in the courts. This week she released J. P. Narayan, one of her principal opponents, reportedly because of his failing health. Narayan is the first major political leader to be released from jail since the emergency began. Gandhi may also make some constitutional changes to further strengthen her control. In recent months she has talked about reducing the powers of the judiciary and enhancing those of parliament, which her Congress Party domi- nates. Her interest in taking such action may have been heightened by a Supreme Court deci- sion this week not to reconsider a ruling by the court in 1973 that barred parliament from amending the "basic structure" of the constitu- tion. Parliament is expected to convene this month, and changes aimed at weakening the judiciary may be on the agenda. Gandhi could also decide to call a general election when the present parliament's five-year term expires next March, although she can legally postpone the election under the state of emergency. Gandhi and her party would enter any election as heavy favorites. Most Indians appear satisfied with-or at least reconciled to-her authoritarian rule, largely because it has coincided with an improvement in the nation's short-term economic prospects caused by good rainfall this year. Moreover, the opposition par- ties, which in India's 28 years of independence have never done well enough in a national elec- tion to supplant the Congress as the country's rules, have been further weakened by the government's repressive measures under the emergency. Whether the opposition leaders still in jail would be released in preparation for an SECRET Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14; 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 0 SECRET ~;';r1'~ +SOe1M1 '. OreuivIH ANGOLA aI earw a he eu.e tedoede R;iilrw d ` Q;nreyhdA ~4- Al.uee In pun a IIvI Porto evo Llehee r-" ar -"~ 1IPi Serle ere SOUTN?WtST AFRICA .? IIAMIIIAI After almost 500 years of Portuguese rule, 13 years of national insurgency, and more than six months of sluggish civil war, Angola drifted into independence on November 11 with the leadership of the state still being contested on the battlefield. The three warring liberation groups immediately set up two rival governments that are now vying for international recognition. The Portuguese left without transferring sovereignty to any of the liberation groups, simply announcing that it was being turned over to the "Angolan people." The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola lost no time in asserting, from its Luanda stronghold, that it was the sole legitimate heir of the Portuguese. Movement leader Agotinho Neto was proclaimed president of the country. Simultaneously, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of ,oigola jointly announced the establishment of theii, . wn government in Nova Lisboa, which they renamed Huambo. Both sides have published constitutional structures for their governments. The National Front - National Union coalition has not officially released its leadership slate. There is friction between the two groups, however, and their partnership is not as firm as their joint announce- ment implied. In the race for international recognition, the Popular Movement took an early lead by receiv- ing almost immediate recognition from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and four African states-Mezam- bique, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Congo-whose leaders have long had ties with the Popular Movement. A number of East Euro- pean governments have expressed their "readiness" to establish diplomatic relations with the Neto regime. So far, the National Front - National Union regime has not been recognized by any country. Zaire, Holden Roberto's long- tir.e backer, and the rest of Africa are observing the Organization of African Unity's request to re- main neutral pending formation in Angola of a government of national unity. As long as the OAU position remair; un- changed, neither Angolan claimant seems likely to win enough support to gain general inter- national acceptance. Soviet and Cuban recogni- tion is important for Neto, however, since the two countries can now assist the Popular Movement directly and with greater ease and will not have to channel their military assistance through in- termediaries such as Congo. The three groups did not let independence ceremonies impede the military campaigns they have been pressing for some weeks. The Popular Movement dispatched troops and equipment southward to meet a combined National Front - National Union force advancing toward Luanda. SECRET Page WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 The force is still some 300 miles from the capital, however. In the north, the National Front is still trying without success to break through Popular Movemcnt defenses at Quifangando. This week Front troops may even have been pushed back a short distance. In Cabinda, fragmentary information suggests that heavy fighting is taking place between the Popular Movement and forces of a Cabindan separatist group that have moved into the enclave from Zaire. The inability of the separatist group's troops to achieve a quick vic- tory in what was supposed to have been a surprise attack suggests that the Popular Movement may well continue to hold the upper hand at the pre- sent time. Neither the Popular Movement nor its adver- saries are likely t;' win a decisive military victory any time soon. The fighting will probably settle into a seesaw war of attrition with the staying Power of the opposing forces being determined by the amount of external military assistance each can obtain. SOVIETS MOVE QUICKLY The USSR, as expected, moved quickly this week to recognize its Angolan client-the Popular Movement-as the sole legitimate gover- ning authority in the former Portuguese territory. A communique establishing diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level between the Soviet Union and the "People's Republic of Angola" was issued in Luanda on Wednes -.v. The move will almost certainly lead to more direct and overt Soviet military assistance to Agostinho Neto's forces. The USSR undoubtedly calculates that it could provide more effective and timely support for the Popular Movement-par- ticularly in view of its client's sagging military for- tunes-by direct flights to Luanda than by con- tinuing to rely on the more cumbersome Congolese supply route. Meanwhile, the Soviet press campaign on Angola continues unabated, with Moscow blasting "foreign interventionists" for their sup- port of the Popular Movement's rivals-the National Front and the National Union. The most recent authoritative Soviet commentary appeared last weekend in a Pravda article signed "Observer," which indicates Kremlin endorse- ment. The "Observer" article reserved its heaviest brickbats for the "racist" regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, apparently as part of an intensive effort to elicit additional support for the Popular Movement from other Black African states. This effort apparently is needed because in other areas of Africa, heavy-handed Soviet involvement with the Popular Movement has backfired. In addition to the break in diplomatic relations with Uganda, Nigeria has publicly criticized the Kremlin's "flagrant interference" in the affairs of Angola. "Observer" also made the usual charges against the Chinese but, in contrast to earlier Soviet comr"antary, did not directly mention US support for the Popular Movement's opponents. This could mean that Moscow intends to play uowi-. its earlier line that the US and China are supporti;ig the same side. Despite tha Soviets' strong military and diplomatic support for the Popular Movement, they are apparently not closing their Angolan op- tions. The "Observer" article, like other recent Soviet commentaries, suggested growing ner- vousness in the Kremlin over the deteriorating military position of Neto's forces. Moreover, in a recent conversation with US embassy officials, the Angolan desk officer of the Soviet Foreign Ministry refused to rule out the possibility of relations with the Popular Movement's adver- saries if they ultimately il in the current struggle. reva 25X1 SECRET M Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 BANGLADESH: ANOTHER COUP In the second violent change of government within a week, enlisted men loyal to Major General Zia ur-Rahman on November 7 overthrew the five-day-old regime of General Musharraf and made Zia the country's new strong man. Zia apoears to have a better chance of stabilizing the situation than did his predecessor, but discipline has not yet been completely restored in the army's enlisted ranks, and he could face a challenge from some other officer seeking to take advantage of the delicate balance of power in the military. The continuing instability in Bangladesh has deepened concern among In- dian officials wF:zi are keeping a vigilant watch on the situation. Musharraf early last week antagonized Zia's many supporters in the army by displacing Zia as chief of staff and having him arrested. Widely cir- culating allegations that Musharraf was pi o-India and that New Delhi had supported his bid for power also probably played a part in spurring the enlisted men to action; anti-Indian sentiment runs deep among the ranks. There is nc evidence available to confirm either allegation. On gaining power, Zia reclaimed the positioh of chief of staff. He retained President Sayem, the former chief justice who was appointed president by Musharraf, and turned over to him he title of chief martial law administrator. Zia and the other service chief are to act as deputy martial law ad- ministrators, but real power apparently will re- main in Zia's hands. Since becoming the new Bengalee leader, Zia has had to cope with a mutiny that broke out on November 8 among enlisted men in the main Dacca base. The troops sought to take advantage of the confused situation following the second coup to settle old scores with their officers or de- mand redress of various grievances. Several of- ficers and dependents were, killed ; nd others detained. As the mutiny unfolded, it became evident that a far-left political group, the National Socialist Party, had become a force among the enlisted men. The party, which never developed much support arr,e,ng civilians, seems to have been able to capitalize on the gc?ievances of the troops. Major General Zia ur-Rahman W 3y midweek the revolt appeared to have abated. Most of the arms held by the rebels had been returned to the base armory, arid a majority of the mutineers had rejoined their units. Officers at the base apparently persuaded the noocon- missioned officers to join them in efforts to restore discipline. Their effort is complicated by contention in the office- corps between those who fought in the 1971 war of independence and those who v~ere held in Pakistan until 1973. SECRET Page WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 : This week's events in Dacca may have in- creased chances that India will try to influence the situation in Pangladesh. New Delhi's uneasiness was probably heightened by the fact that it was once again caught off guard by a change of government in Bangladesh and by anti-Indian demonstrations that accompanied Zia's assump- tion of power. ISRAEL: ECONOMIC PROBLEM EXAGGERATED Public pronouncements in Israel in recent weeks lamenting Tel Aviv's deteriorating. trade situation and sounding the need for further belt- tightening exaggerate the country's short-term difficulties. The government's austerity program, implemented in the summer of 1974, has achieved its goal of lowering consumption in the civilian sector. The still sizable current-account deficit is being covered by substantial assistance from the US and by other capital inflows. Since the austerity program was im- plemented in mid-1974, Israel has devalued the Israel; pound by 40 percent, cut back nonessential budget outlays, and instituted wage and tax reforms. As a result of these policies, together with the worldwide recession, Israel's real gross national product fell 6 percent during the fir,, half of 1975 compared with the same period in 1974, the first such decrease in nine years. Private per capita consumption fell 5.5 percent, industrial output 3 percent, and investment 11 percent. The consumer price index cooled to a 12-per- cent annual rate during the first nine months of the year, compared with 30 percent in the same period in 1974. Despite the economic downturn, the unemployment rate at midyear was only 3.5 percent, compared with 3 percent at year-end in 1974. Increased emigration and frequent military callups have limited the number of workers look- ing for jobs.. lsra,:I's current-account deficit this year, while manageable, is likely to reach a record $3.7 billion. Exports, hindered by sluggish US and West European demand, should grow only 5 perccnt. A good harvest, which permitted expanded food exports, will keep the increase from falling even lower. Israel will import $2 billion in defense goods in 1975, 18 percent above the level in 1974 and four times the 1973 prewar rate. At the same time, the economic slowdown has cut back growth in civilian imports. Israel officials are forecasting a 4-percent increase in the value of these imports, or a real drop of 5 percent. The trade deficit is likely to increase by $800 million in 1976, mainly because of higher military imports. This estimate assumes that nonmilitary consumption will continue to be curtailed by Tel Aviv's restrictive policies. Civilian imports are likely to rise only 5 percent. Transfers and capital receipts, including US a3sistance, will also in- crease so that Israel will not need to draw down its foreign exchange reserves. During recent cabinet-level deliberations on the fiscal budget for 1976, Finance Minister Rabinowitz took a tough stand on the need for in- creased austerity measures. This has led to rumors of more devalk-ations, reductions in government services, and new taxes. Major new measures will not be required if the pending US aid bill is fund- ed at close to requested levels. Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 : SECRET The 58th anniversary parade passes through Red Square USSR: THE ANNIVERSARY WALTZ The USSR observed the 58th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution last week in ways that seemed designed to avoid giving meaningful political signals. All the Moscow-based Politburo members turned out for the festivities except F. D. Kulakov, party secretary for agriculture and wide- ly regarded as a political comer. Kulakov, who also missed last year's observance, may have been ill last week. The Politburo chose Arvid Pelshe, the oldest (76) and one of the least influential Politburo members, to deliver the principal address on the eve of the holiday. It clearly would be hard for any observers, inside or outside the USSR, to build persuasive or tantalizing political hypotheses around the figure of Pelshe. An effort was made to suggest that all is well with General Secretary Brezhnev. On several oc- casions Pelshe paid homage to Brezhnev, and these references were greeted with "thunderous applause." The television cameras repeatedly focused on Brezhnev during Pelshe's-speech, ap- parently to show that he is still in charge and to allay suspicions about his physical and political well-being. Brezhnev also had well-publicized meetings with the heads of the Uruguayan and Argentine Communist parties and this week add- ed West German President Scheel to his list of visitors. As to the substance of Pelshe's speech, the only noteworthy item on the domestic side was his gloomy statement on agriculture. He reported that since the revolution agricultural production SECRET Page 8 WEEKLY ?SUPIIV1ARY Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Nov.14, 14,75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 had not increased as rapidly as industrial produc- tion and admitted that difficulties still have to be overcome in the agricultural sector. Pelshe did not give a harvest figure nor did he mention Soviet grain purchases abroad. In his speech, Pelshe also defended the Soviet record on human rights and criticized "illusory and unreal" democratic rights in the capitalist world. The foreign policy portion of Pelshe's address was a notably restrained recitation of familiar Soviet themes. Detente received Pelshe's un- inspired endorsement, together with the ritual warning that its opponents-notably political spokesmen for the "military-industrial complex" -remain active. He made no prediction, as Foreign Minister Gromyko has recently, that the 25th party congress will reconfirm Moscow's current foreign policy line. In contrast to Gromyko's anniversary address last year, Pelshe accorded relations with the Western powers perfunctory treatment. The US received only one brief, albeit favorable, paragraph; relations with Western Europe and Japan were assessed in an additional three sentences. Pelshe referred to "realistic trends in the rul- ing circles" of the leading capitalist states, but said nothing about the contribution of summitry to US-Soviet relations nor did he allude to Brezhnev's next visit to Washington. He endorsed further progress at SALT but, in a departure from the usual order, mentioned, both MBFR and Soviet UN arms control initiatives before SALT. Pelshe devoted considerable attention to the world communist and "national liberation" movements, including some warm words for visiting North Vietnamese party chief Le Duan. Pelshe's castigation of China's "Maoists" evoked from his audience the only real enthusiasm generated by the speech. He warned Peking about "encroachments" on the "interests" of the USSR and, in a new addition, its "friends." The amount of military equipment displayed during the Moscow parade was well below that exhibited last year. Only 151 vehicles participated, compared to about 300 last year. The military parade in Leningrad was similarly curtailed, con- fined to a march-by of troops with no large items of military equipment. In a break with previous years, the Moscow parade did not include strategic missiles, tracked vehicles, or new equip- ment of any kind. The Soviets did display the SA-8 and SA-9 surface-to-air missiles, indicating their growing interest in tactical air defense. Defense Minister Grechko's brief address in Red Square on November 7 contained the usual invidious comparisons of communist and capitalist societies. He expressed satisfaction, however, with the trend toward a relaxation of world tension and toward cooperation among states with different social systems. While Grechko warned of "aggressive imperialist forces," he singled out for specific cr;ticism only "Peking's leaders" and their "provocative policy." He added that the party and government are working to strengthen Soviet "economic and defense capacity." 25X1 Soviet leaders observe the parade SECRET Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 SECRET ECONOMIC SUMMIT Seeking Political Dividends At the economic summit in Paris this weekend European and Japanese leaders-ac- companied by their foreign and finance ministers-will all be looking for results they can use to bolster their national and international positions. The US will be importuned by the French to return to international monetary "stability" and by others to give priority to the harmonization of economic policies. US support may also be sought in the dispute over a separate seat for Britain at next month's conference of developed and developing states. The developing states will probably look at the summit results as indicating the degree of solidarity existing among the developed countries as the December con- ference approaches. The French have been seeking a return to fix- ed-later amended to "stable"-currency ex- change rates since President Giscard first called for the conference. West German, British, Italian, and Japanese leaders, at first reluctant to par- ticipate in such a forum, have come to recognize their stake in successful talks on this or other issues. The summit will therefore cover a broad range of issues. In addition to a discussion of monetary problems, the agenda has expanded to include economic policy coordination against recession, trade in raw materials, development problems, and East-West trade. In addition, the leaders may discuss the threat of trade protec- tionism and the status of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva. Of all leaders at the conference, Giscard has the greatest political stake in demonstrating some visible progress. A successful summit would help restore a sense of dynaroism to French foreign policy in the wake of the snub delivered to Gisca1d during his recent visit to Moscow. Another consideration, which the US embassy in Paris says is not being discouraged by French of- ficials, is that the summit represents a success for the French aim to participate in an exclusive group that would lead the other industrialized democracies. Seeing no chance for an early agreement to return to fixed exchange rates, Giscard professes this is only a long-term goal; now he wants a commitment to work towards less flexible, "viscous," exchange rates. In addition to its interest in monetary affairs, Paris will urge acceptance of the French view in favor of establishing worldwide price agreements on raw materials. The French will push this argu- ment in relation to trade with the developing world and trade in agricultural goods-pa rticular- ly grains. West German Chancellor Schmidt's principal aim at the summit will be to push his views on greater coordination of economic policies among industrialized states. Germany faces national elec- tions next fall, and success in making his views felt would reinforce Schmidt's international and domestic standing. Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Schmidt will ask that the I !S review its economic policies with an eye to helping lead other countries out of recession. Schmidt may raise the issue of harmonization of export credit policies but is not likely to get a favorable hearing from Giscard on this. Schmidt will also support moves to develop a common strategy for the developed countries at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation next month. This conference will bring together ministerial-level representatives from 27 industrialized, oil-exporting, and poor developing states to discuss energy, raw materials, development, and related financial issues. Flexible exchange rates have generally favored the UK, and London initially was among the most reluctant to accept Giscard's invitation to discuss their abolition. Prime Minister Wilson's foremost concern will be to secure cooperation from:. the other participants to help the UK meet its current economic problems. He will probably not ask directly, however, that the US and Ger- many expand their economies at a faster rate. Fac- ed with increased demands at home to impose barriers to imports, Wilson may seek understan- ding from other leaders of pressures that could push him to move toward protectionism. The West Germans and French could seize on these British requests to get London to soften its stand on separate representation at the December conference. The British move has stymied efforts by the industrialized states in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to select their eight representatives for the conference. The original plan called for single representation of all the EC members, but Britain has insisted that its interests as an oil producer and a financial center cannot be ade- quately represented by the EC. Giscard and Schmidt may use the opportunity to point out the inconsistency of British claims to independence on energy matters with London's pleas for recognition of its dependence on other economic issues. Italy, not invited to the summit at first, will have in many ways fulfilled its major goal simply by attending. Rome will also be looking for help, however, in reflating its economy, but the relatively minor role Prime Minister Moro and his advisers are likely to play in other areas will, in some ways, only serve to re-emphasize Italy's junior-partner status. Italian participation will also highlight the frustration of the smaller EC members and other Europeans who are not participating in the sum- mit. These states, who are resigned to, but not pleased with, their exclusion would prefer utiliz- ing already established international forums where they are represented. The small EC states in particular will question whether the summit ap- proach can do anything but hander EC efforts to coordinate economic and financial policies. Canada is particularly displeased with Paris' ada- mant refusal to consider participation by Ottawa in the face of statements of support from the US and other participants. Paris will apparently try to make amends by pushing Canada as one of two co-chairman of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. The summit is a particularly important political event for japan: it is the first time Tokyo has participated in such a meeting since before the war. Tokyo still feels unsure of its position, however, and may wonder whether it has in fact been in on all of the advance work between other participants. SECRET Page 11 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 SECRET MBFR: PROBLEMS FOR THE WEST The force reduction talks in Vienna have avoid commitments to the East to discuss matters marked time since the seventh round began in that would give the Soviets a voice in West Euro- mid-September, awaiting the introduction of the pean defense discussions and limit allied military West's nuclear proposal. Differences among the flexibility. Western allies make it uncertain, however, whether the proposal will be tabled before the As a result of these anxieties, there have been round ends in December. several discussions in the EC in recent months on the Vienna negotiations, largely at the insistence The West's nuclear proposal would add to of the Germans. Bonn has argued that these dis- the basic allied negotiating offer a willingness to cussions are designed merely to define distinctly withdraw some US nuclear warheads and delivery European interests in a force reduction agree- systems from Europe. It also would offer to in- ment. They have thus sought to involve the clude discussion-but not reduction-of air force French, who do not participate in the Vienna manpower levels in the negotiations. The talks, both in order to neutralize the effect of proposal is designed to obtain Soviet withdrawal French opposition to the force reduction talks on of a tank army and agreement to a common man- the German domestic scene and to draw Paris into power ceiling in order to arrive at the overall discussions of European security. numerical equality of forces that NATO is seek- ing. The Soviets have been insisting that the While enthusiasm for the discussions in the reductions include Western nuclear and air EC appears to have waned in recent weeks under forces, which they contend make up for the the twin burden of intra-European differences Soviet advantage in ground manpower and and strong opposition from NATO, the discussion equipment. participants continue to resist invitations from NATO to report in detail on their deliberatiosis, Substantial progress has been made in allied and the talks are likely to continue in a variety of negotiations on how and when to table the alternative forums. nuclear proposal. The few issues that nc'v remain, however, are especially difficult. Expecting that Bonn and London have suggested another the negotiations will move forward once the trilateral meeting of the US, German, and British proposal has been introduced, and believing it representatives to work out allied differences the biggest bargaining chip the West is likely to over the nuclear proposal. The US has resisted this play, some European allies-notably the British bid on the grounds that such a meeting would and the Germans-seek to ensure that the make it impossible to table the nuclear proposal proposal is not presented until the allies decide before the end of the present sound. Because it is among themselves how to respond to Soviet assumed that the allies basically favor an agree- demands for European force reductions. ment, there is some reason to think that the remainices can be worked out in The Europeans are especially concerned that b ilateral gsesifons. Presentation of the nuclear the allies not signal any willingness to reduce or proposal during the present session is limit European-as opposed to US-arms and nevertheless in do..ot. equipment. The Germans, whose large army is of special concern to the Soviets, are arguing for a Aware that the West hopes to table tF.e collective allied reduction commitment to avert long-awaited proposal during the present round, the possibility that Germany will be singled out to the Soviets reacted initially by disparaging the take all or most of the European reductions. Apart military significance of the Proposed nuclear from the immediate desire of the Germans to withdrawals and demanding that the offer also avoid individually any diminution in their own respond to their desire for reducti:ris in West security, the more general European interest is to European forces that the West hay reserved for a SECRET Page 12 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 later phase. This denigration of the Western proposal Is mainly tactical in nature, intended to show that the Soviets do not regard it as a pan- acea. The Soviets will probably be receptive to the proposal if and when it is tabled. Ever since the start of the negotiations the Soviets have insisted that nuclear elements be included in the reduc- tions, and they can scarcely reject a proposal in which NATO finally moves toward acceptance of their position. While the Soviets will thus probably agree to incorporate the nuclear proposal as an element in the negotiations, this does not mean that they will accept all of its specifics or that a meaningful agreement will quickly follow. The Soviets still appear to be interested in making progress in the negotiations and have offered a modification of their approach to the question of defining whether intermediate types of forces fit into air or ground categories. It appears that the Soviets are toying with ways to juggle force figures in such a way that the appearance of a common ceiling will be created. This approach will probably be unacceptable to the West because the underlying disparity would not be affected, but the Soviet move could foreshadow greater willingness to meet Western FINLAND: NEON GOVERNMENT LIKELY The prospects for the formation of a new majority coalition government, needed to deal effectively with Finland's difficult economic problems, were enhanced last week by the vic- tory of the Social Democrats in a hard fought election for control of the Metalworkers' Union, Finland's largest and most influential union. Following inconclusive parliamentary elections in September, most party leaders were unwilling to talk seriously about the makeup of the next government until after the Metalworkers' election. A Communist victory would have further complicated efforts now under way to form a government and raised doubts about the ability of the next govern- ment to come up with strong economic measures. concerns once the nuclear proposal has been for- mally presented. 25X1 EC: FARM POLICY WORRIES The EC has begun a thorough review of the common agricultural policy that will receive high-level attention when the nine heads of state and government meet in December. Last year, Bonn made the review a condition for West Ger- man consent to an increase in farm support prices. Despite the polemics during the past year over EC farm policy, attention is now focused on several modest reforms. The Nine presumably have realized that the common agricultural policy already represents so many carefully worked out compromises that radical changes are politically impossible. i 'uring its initial months, the review was hampered by the campaigning before the June referendum on continuing British membership in the EC that made an oversimplified reform of The Social Democrats captured 259 of the 506 seats to the Metalworkers' convention on December 14. The Communists won 240 seats, while the Center Party took 7 seats. Earlier predictions of a close tally that would have enabled the Center Party to cast the deciding votes did not pan out. The Social Democrats now have the upper hand in charting the course of the union for the next four years. Although the margin of vic- tory was slim, the Social Democrats' morale will get a boost from their election showing. Their discouraging performance in the parliamentary elections and a scandal involving the smuggling of funds from West Germany and Sweden to aid in the Metalworkers' election had seriously dampened party enthusiasm. Page 13 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 assified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 SECRET agricultural policy an issue. Since then, the British have had little to say, but the West Germans, the French, and the Italians have contributed acrimoniously to the debate. Chancellor Schmidt, a former finance minister and the first postwar chancellor to have few inhibitions about seeking political influence commensurate with West Germany's economic strength, has long made political hay out of his criticism of waste and inefficiency in the Brussels bureaucracy. With an eye to stringent budget pressures in Bonn and close national elections next year, Schmidt has been especially critical of any moves to raise community expenditures for agriculture. In France, rivalry between President Giscard d'Estaing and Prime Minister Chirac has added to the difficulty over EC farm pokey. Chirac made his national reputation during 1972-1974 as an agriculture minister who advanced the interests of the French farmers through theatrical tactics in Brussels. At Chirac's insistence, Paris contravened EC regulations this fall with a tax on Italian wine shipments. Italian Agriculture Minister Marcora has been particularly aggressive in promoting Rome's point of view. He has emphasized that the Com- munity allocates a larger share of its resources to support the prices of agricultural commodities produced in northern rather than southern regions, and he asks corrective action. Marcora, who owns a livestock and dairy farm in Italy's Red Belt, operates from a strong position in Rome as a leader on the rise in the newly influential left wing of the Christian Democratic Party. Reform Review Implementation of several reforms suggested by the EC Commission would greatly extend the scope of the Community's common farm policy, but such steps are likely to face stiff apposition in the member countries. The changes are aimed at overcoming some of the long-standing problems associated with the common agricultural policy, especially with regard tc surplus production, but implementing the changes would require ad- ditional expenditures-a step certain to be criticized in a time of economic difficulty. The member states are nevertheless getting down to considering politically feasible reforms. Some members hope to clear up misunderstand- ings about the program and prove that the com- mon tarm policy is not the drain on EC resources that its critics allege. Future debate will take place at several levels, with Commission and national officials working closely with representatives of farm organizations. The EC heads of government, however, will probably have to establish guidelines for farm policy reform when they meet in Rome at the beginning of December. Within the next few months the EC is likel , y to endorse Commission suggestions for more stockpiling of farm products, long-term contracts for overseas sales of food, and the adjustment of grain price ratios to encourage use of surplus low-grade wheat as a feed grain. The EC is less likely to accept Commission proposals looking toward greater producer responsibility in avoiding surpluses, increased farm size, more use of direct payments to farmers as a substitute for price supports, and extension of the common agricultural policy to more products. Nearly three fourths of the EC's budget is spent on agriculture, with dairy support the largest single item. National critics find Brussels an easy target for the planning that leads to surpluses of milk, butter, beef, and wine. The member governments nevertheless recognize that the large proportion of the Com- munity's budgetary outlays devoted to agriculture is necessary because Brussels has assumed budgetary responsibility from national governments. Moreover, more EC farmers are in- volved in tha troublesome dairy sector than in any other. Even at the height of bitter debate during the past year, none of the EC members has spoken rout in favor of dismantling the Com- munity's agricultural program and returnin to national Tarn olic SECRET Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 SECRET ARGENTINA: IMPEACHMENT MOTION An impeachment motion against President Maria Estela Peron, introduced late last week, is gaining support in congress. The motion charges gross incompetence as well as large-scale misuse of public funds. At least three opposition political groupings have already lined up behind the motion, and the largest opposition group, the Radical Civic Union, seems to be moving in that direction. Parties allied with the Peronists in the governing coali- tion are said to favor impeachment also, at least unofficially. Recent schisms within the Peronist party ma3 provoke defections that could ensure passage of the motion. Late last week, the party formally ex- pelled Buenos Aires Governor Victoria Calabro, a prominent unionist and spokesman for those Peronists who oppose the President. The L'S em- bassy reports that his ouster could well provide the 20 or so Peronist votes needed for passage of the measure. Peron's recent actions have led some to speculate that she is deliberately seeking to provoke a military coup and thus achieve a kind of martyrdom. She remains isolated in her hospital room, taking counsel only from a small clique of followers of ousted Lopez Rega. During the period of her hospitalization, Peron has ig- nored requests from cabinet members that she meet with them to discuss government business. ruvaw,cII rerun iouowmg ner recent resumption of the presidency SECRET Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 ECUADOR: A SHAKY PRESIDENCY President Rodriguez continues to hold on to the presidency, but only because the military is disunited and unable to agree on a successor. Despite his best efforts, Rodriguez has not been able to gain the support of the military, and his regime still is plagued by discontent, economic problems, charges of corruption, and plotting. The President's intention in the is ng term to restore civilian control of the government has suf- fered a setback. Last month's cabinet changes, which removed two civilians from their posts, in- creased the military's dominance. Rodriguez' re- President Rodriguez cent signing of a bill making journalists "liable for crimes against the state," plus the arrest of former Ecuadorean president Arosemena and conser- vative leader Trujillo, may be evidence of a decrease in civilian influence. 25X1 The President's inability to deal with economic problems has added to public discon- tent. Popular economic measures, such as the re- cent reduction in import tariffs, have been overshadowed by persistent problems in labor, industry, and agriculture. The labor unions appear to be Rodri uez' most immediate problem. The Presi ent's reaction may we e a actor a fecting his longevity as the nation's leader. 25X1 President Rodriguez is also faced with mak- ing a decision on oil policy, which will affect all areas of the economy. He will have to decide how to adjust the price of Ecuador's oil in light of the recent OPEC increase. If the selling price is forced up, Ecuador's oil will no longer be competitive and significant oil revenues will be lost. Even if the oil remains competitive because of market fluc- tuati:)ns, a price hike without tax relief for the oil companies will reduce the already lagging incen- tive to exploit existing sources of oil, upgrade facilities, and undertake further exploration. Despite all the problems the President faces, there is still no coordinated movement to replace him. Opposition to his regime, however, is in- creasing, and his future is put in doubt by eroding military support and increasing political and economic pressures. 25X1 SECRET Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Y Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 `RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 SECRET IA GUATEMALA-BELIZE S- --king a Compromise Guatemalan leaders are looking for ways to defuse the volatile Belize issue, but time and political considerations stubbornly held by the three parties involved in the dispute may be working against a peaceful settlement. The reinforcements sent into Belize last week by the British in response to a buildup of forces on October 31 on the Guatemalan side of the border have convinced the Guatemalans that London is determined to defend against an inva- sion. British forces in Belize, now about 1,100 troops plus six Harrier attack aircraft-which are vastly superior to any airpower Guatemala has-have the capability of defending all but remote jungle areas of Belize. Faced with the strong probability that a military action with even a limited objective would fail, the Guatemalans are seeking to find a solution through negotiations with the British. Guatemala has accepted as a foregone con- clusion that the Brit sh-sponsored resolution on Belize will be adopted by a large margin in the UN. Guatemalan leaders then will have to carry through on their threats to respond with military action, or risk losing face. Not yet willing to foreclose all options short of war, a Foreign Ministry official this week held the door open to the possibility of renewed negotiations with the British. He said That there can be many ways to resolve the issue peacefully, such as the international Court of justice, arbitra- tion, or a friendly mediator. The implication is that Guatemala very much wants the US to take on this role-and, of course, to favor Guatemalan interests. In another attempt to reach a solution through diplomacy, Guatemala this week laid the groundwork for intervention by the OAS. The OAS played a major role in calming the last flare-up of the Belize dispute in 1972. The reaction to the British reinforcements has thus far been restrained, although the Guatemalans are concerned that incidents with British forces patrolling the border could occur and lead to a clash of serious proportions. Mexico has proposed a compromise resolution that calls for the parties involved to refrain from any action that would delay negotiations or jeopardize har- mony in the region. Guatemala seems willing to accept the Mexican proposal, but feels that it has come too late in the game and has no real pu,sibility of acceptance in the UN. What the Guatemalans are really looking for jr some gesture from the British indicating that meaningful negotiations are a distinct possibility. President Laugerud will need something to offset the domestic reaction, both from the public and from the hawks in the military, that seems certain to follow passage of the British resolution. A public announcement before the UN acts on the resolution, coupled with a private ap- proach by the British to give Guatemala some clear indication of what London has in mind to settle the dispute, would probably be enough to prevent, or at least forestall, an outbreak of hostilities. If the British do not offer a face-saving device, the risk of a military conflict will increase. Still, there is no guarantee that London would be able to persuade Belize to agree to Guatemala's very exacting demands. Guatemala has in the past insisted on a sizable chunk of Beli- zean territory, in addition to satisfying economic and security concerns, before it would relinquish its claim. The Belizeans are hardly likely to agree to any significant territorial concessions. Guatemala would have to scale down its demands considerably in order to make headway on a settlement. At this point, there are few signs that either side would be willing to back down. 25X1 Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY Nov 14, 75 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/15: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020049-5