MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE SMALLER PERSIAN GULF STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000200090002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
of the Smaller
Persian Gulf States
Military Capabilities
Secret
NESA 84-10237
August 1984
Copy 4 3 4
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ff Directorate of
", Intelligence
Military Capabilities
of the Smaller
Persian Gulf States
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf
Division, NESA
Secret
NESA 84-10237
August 1984
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Summary
Information available
as of 2 July 1984
was used in this report.
of the Smaller
Persian Gulf States
Military Capabilities
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 and the possibility that the
conflict might spread throughout the Persian Gulf region have imparted a
sense of urgency to efforts by the smaller Gulf states-United Arab
Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain-to increase their military
capabilities. The acquisition of modern weapon systems costing over $5
billion and the pursuit of regional military cooperation are at the center of
these efforts.
Nonetheless, current programs, even when fully implemented, will not
provide these states with an adequate defense, in our view. All of the
smaller Gulf states have small populations, limiting the extent of their
military expansion programs. Moreover, these states soon will have
acquired as much modern equipment as they are capable of absorbing, in
our judgment. Because of such constraints, they will continue to depend on
other countries to guarantee their security.
The armed forces of the smaller Gulf states will remain weak compared to
those of Iran and Iraq:
? The air and air defense forces of the smaller Gulf states cannot
effectively defend vital oil facilities and military installations or ade-
quately support their naval and ground forces. A principal liability is the
proximity of Iranian airbases, which sharply reduces warning time.
? The navies cannot prevent a concerted effort to impede shipping within
the Persian Gulf or through the Strait of Hormuz. The navies have
inadequate air defense and no minesweeping capability, but their modern
antiship missiles could inflict substantial losses on hostile surface forces.
? The armies, although relatively well equipped and mobile, are small and
poorly motivated and would be quickly overrun by determined invading
forces.
Serious manpower and operational deficiencies will continue to plague the
smaller Gulf states:
? The various armed forces receive little training in complex tactical
situations or in coordinating ground, air, and sea operations. Efforts to
improve training are under way but are unlikely to produce substantial
increases in military effectiveness for several years.
? The states have difficulty maintaining their equipment even in peace-
time, and the acquisition of more modern arms will further strain
maintenance capabilities and reduce operational readiness.
iii Secret
NESA 84-10237
August 1984
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? The smaller Gulf states are all experiencing acute manpower shortages
and will continue to depend on foreign personnel to maintain and operate
their military equipment. Although programs are under way in all of the
countries to train native personnel, these countries do not have a large
enough skilled manpower base to staff adequately their military
establishments.
Military coordination among the Gulf states, which could alleviate some of
the weaknesses of the individual armed forces, is at a rudimentary stage.
Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states formed the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) in 1981, in part to improve military cooperation. We judge,
however, that a substantial amount of joint training and organization
remains to be accomplished before the Gulf military forces can work
together effectively. Still, these states together field a sizable and generally
well-equipped force that could contribute to a multilateral defense of the
Arabian Peninsula in conjunction with other powers.
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Military Threats to the Smaller Gulf States
Operational Deficiencies 2
Current Capabilities 2
Growing Military Cooperation
Implications for the United States
Smaller Gulf State Armed Forces 7
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Figure 1
Regional Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf
Iran
Air Force
Combat aircraft
SAM batteries/launchers
Navy
65-808
23/293
Major combatants
Missile boats
Army
Brigades
32
Personnel
600,000`
Tanks
900
Armored vehicles
900
Artillery
750
Number estimated to be operational.
.Allminikfr!})Yb\
P. 011 a. Y.
South y i Yemen
Regional Armed Forces: Order of Battle
Irca Saudi Arabia Kuwait Oman U.A.E. Bahrain Qatar
475 187 41 38b 30 - 14
75/385 15/94 4/27 3/36 2/21 - 1/12
140 7 2 2 6 1 1
650,000 35,000d 10,000 16,000 40,000 2,000 4,000
3,100 440
2,100 1,315
1,400 295
b
235
18
113
-
24
526
82
663
148
227
75
69
93
8
6
Includes five aircraft in storage. Estimated strength figures vary from 500,000 to 700,000.
dDoes not include 18,000 men in the National Guard.
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Military Capabilities
of the Smaller
Persian Gulf States
Military modernization and regional cooperation
among the Arab states along the Persian Gulf were
originally stimulated by the British withdrawal from
the region in the early 1970s. These activities were
accelerated at the end of the decade by the replace-
ment of the Shah with a fundamentalist revolutionary
regime in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 and the
resulting threat that the war might spread throughout
the region added a further sense of urgency to efforts
by the smaller Gulf states to increase their military
capabilities.'
Military Threats to the Smaller Gulf States
The smaller Gulf states face a variety of possible
threats to their security. These range from Iranian
attacks on oil facilities or Iranian-sponsored internal
subversion to a massive Soviet invasion to occupy the
oilfields.'
Both Iran and Iraq have large military establishments
capable of overwhelming the smaller Gulf states. The
threat of a major invasion of the Gulf states by either
country is remote, however, as long as the Iran-Iraq
war continues.
The most likely military threat to the Gulf states, in
our judgment, is Iranian attacks in retaliation for
continued support of Iraq. Iranian action could take
the form of airstrikes or commando raids against oil
facilities, further harassment of shipping in the Gulf,
or attempts to mine or blockade Gulf ports or the
Strait of Hormuz
Iran first demonstrated its ability to hit targets in the
Gulf by using commandos to destroy Iraqi offshore
oil-loading terminals in November 1981) and by an
airstrike on Kuwaiti oil facilities in October 1981.
Although Tehran's air capabilities have diminished
since then, the Iranian Air Force still has approxi-
mately 70 operational aircraft and probably can
conduct raids against the Gulf states.
The Iranian Government has repeatedly warned that,
if its oil exports are disrupted, it will retaliate against
countries on the Arabian Peninsula that support Iraq.
In late March 1984 the Iraqi Air Force began using
its Super Etendard aircraft equipped with Exocet
antiship missiles against shipping near Khark Island.
The Iranian Air Force initiated retaliatory strikes
against Gulf shipping in mid-May, and. the Iranian
Navy began to stop and board selected merchant ships
in the Gulf in late May.
Iranian-backed sabotage and subversion by the Shia
and expatriate populations in the Gulf states consti-
tute an additional threat to the security of these
states. Since the Iranian revolution five years ago, the
Khomeini regime has given paramilitary training and
religious indoctrination to more than 1,000 Shias
from the Gulf states. We believe Tehran's long-term
goal is to establish an organizational and ideological
base for the creation of Islamic republics throughout
the region. in those
states with large Shia populations- a. rain, Kuwait,
and Saudi Arabia-Tehran supports formal organiza-
tions to recruit Shias and to develop clandestine
networks. In states with fewer Shias-UAE, Qatar,
and Oman-local Shias are recruited individually for
' This paper focuses on the capabilities, effectiveness, expansion,
and military modernization programs of the smaller Gulf states-
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain.F
training in Iran.'
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Modernization Efforts
When the British withdrew their forces from the
Persian Gulf in 1971, the five smaller Gulf states had
virtually no modern military forces. Since that time,
each of the Gulf states has sought to improve its
military capabilities through expanding forces, ac-
quiring more modern weaponry, and improving opera-
tional efficiency. Collectively since 1981 they have
explored ways of promoting regional defense through
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Since the mid-
1970s they have acquired more than 100 jet fighters
and fighter-bombers, over 20 modern missile-
equipped vessels, over 100 modern surface-to-air mis-
sile launchers, and thousands of armored vehicles,
The military modernization programs of these states
have given high priority to air and coastal defenses.
During the past decade the smaller Gulf states have
spent more than $5 billion procuring fighter aircraft,
air defense missiles, and command and control elec-
tronics equipment and in building modern, well-
equipped airfields. They also have spent almost $1
billion in constructing new navy bases and acquiring
missile attack boats. The states have spent less than a
billion dollars, however, to procure more modern
equipment for their ground forces. The ground forces
have not expanded significantly, and they are
equipped with modest numbers of aging tanks, artil-
lery pieces, and antitank weapons. Most of the air
force and naval first-phase expansion and moderniza-
tion efforts are nearing completion.'
Despite their magnitude, these military programs
have not been an unmanageable financial burden for
the Gulf states. Economic development and social
welfare programs continue to be generously funded,
and military expenditures have caused little public
resentment, in our view. None of the states, except
Kuwait, have a military draft that might contribute to
social unrest, and the Kuwaiti draft is easily circum-
vented. All of the smaller Gulf states already have
very large expatriate populations, and the presence of
foreigners in the armed forces causes no serious
internal political problems for the regimes, in our
judgment.
' For a fuller assessment of the smaller Gulf states' force structures,
capabilities, and modernization programs, see the appendixF___1
Operational Deficiencies
The principal military strength of the smaller Gulf
states is their modern weaponry. This advantage,
however, is offset by shortages of skilled manpower;
difficulties in operating and maintaining military
equipment; and inexperience in planning, directing,
coordinating, and executing complex military opera-
tions.
The various armed forces receive little training in
complex tactics or in coordinating ground, air, and sea
operations, according to attache reporting. Field
training generally involves no more than simple ma-
neuvers and basic firing exercises. Opposing forces are
not used, and combined arms exercises with the
different services are rare. Training exercises need to
become more realistic and complex before the combat
capabilities of the Gulf military forces can be im-
proved, in our view.
The states already have difficulty maintaining and
operating their equipment in peacetime, and the
acquisition of additional modern equipment will fur-
ther strain maintenance capabilities and reduce oper-
ational readiness. The quality of pilots relative to the
capabilities of their aircraft is likely to decline as
pilots convert to more advanced aircraft such as the
Mirage Fl, the Mirage 2000, and the Tornado.
All the Gulf states are faced with severe and chronic
military manpower shortages, and they must continue
to rely on thousands of foreign personnel.
the states are accelerating
efforts to train natives for critical positions-such as
commanding officers and pilots-but numerous Paki-
stani, British, and other foreign personnel continue to
be needed for equipment maintenance throughout the
region
Current Capabilities
Because of their manpower, training, and operational
deficiencies, the armed forces of the smaller Gulf
states remain weak compared to those of Iran and
Iraq. The forces of Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar
are only marginally effective and individually could
not resist major Iranian military moves against them.
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The armed forces in Oman, however, are effective and
capable of defeating the Iranians in limited engage-
ments.
We believe the air defense capabilities of the Gulf
states are inadequate to defend against Iranian air-
strikes. Only Oman could sustain a modestly effective
air defense for a week or more. The other four air
forces, we believe, would collapse in sustained, high-
intensity air operations.
Air defense is hampered by the proximity of Iranian
airbases across the Gulf and the lack of an integrated
regional air defense network, in our judgment. The
Arab Gulf states would have no more than 15 min-
utes' warning of an Iranian strike under the best of
circumstances. The three air forces that have inter-
ceptor squadrons (UAE, Kuwait, and Oman) would
have little time to scramble fighters to intercept a
surprise Iranian airstrike before it reached the target
area.
Ground-based air defenses in the Gulf states also are
inadequate to defend against airstrikes, in our view.
Only Kuwait has medium-range surface-to-air mis-
siles. The other four countries are equipped with
inadequate numbers of short-range surface-to-air mis-
siles and antiaircraft guns that provide only point
defense against air attacks.
We judge that the navies of the Gulf states have a
limited capability to contest an Iranian naval attempt
to disrupt shipping. They are not capable of mine-
sweeping operations or of reopening the Strait of
Hormuz if it is blocked. The five navies have no major
surface combatants or minesweepers, but their
Exocet-equipped missile boats could sink or heavily
damage virtually any ship in the Iranian Navy. All of
the navies have inadequate air defense and lack
experience in joint operations with their respective air
forces.
The ground forces are adequately equipped and orga-
nized, but we believe that, except for Oman, they are
poorly motivated and trained and would be quickly
overrun in the event of a determined land invasion by
one of the regional powers.
In general, we believe that the smaller Gulf states
have taken realistic steps to improve their military
capabilities and have acquired as much modern equip-
ment as they are capable of absorbing effectively.
Within the individual forces, equipment standardiza-
tion is well developed and causes few logistic prob-
lems, in our view. The GCC as a whole, however, has
just begun to address the problem of equipment
standardization among the various forces, and the
organization's stated goal of equipment interopera-
bility is years away, in our view.
Growing Military Cooperation
Military cooperation among the Gulf states, which we
believe could alleviate some of the weaknesses of the
Gulf military forces, is in a formative stage. In 1981,
mainly in response to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq
war, the five smaller Gulf states and Saudi Arabia
formed the Gulf Cooperation Council. Following the
Iranian-backed coup attempt in Bahrain in December
1981, the states focused on the increased threat from
Iran. The six states are addressing regional air de-
fense, joint action against internal subversion and
external attacks, and acquisition of common military
equipment.'
In late 1983 and early 1984 the members of the
Council held their first joint military exercises. The
exercises were rudimentary in their tactics, in our
judgment, but were the first practical steps toward
improving regional military cooperation. The exer-
cises also demonstrated the growing ability of the
Gulf states to transport units and execute maneuvers
outside their home territories (see inset).
Much still remains to be done, however, to overcome
the political and military obstacles to effective cooper-
ation. The GCC has made little progress in establish-
ing a permanent command structure or in sharing
national command authority, a political problem we
believe is unlikely to be resolved in the near future, if
at all. In particular, the Gulf states have not estab-
lished a combined command structure for air defense
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Gulf State Joint Military Exercises
Peninsula Shield. Peninsula Shield, the first joint
exercise by the Gulf states, was held near Al Hamra
in the western UAE during 6-22 October 1983. Penin-
sula Shield was primarily afield training exercise for
ground forces, and contingents from all six GCC
states participated,
The major accomplishment of the exercise, in our
judgment, was the efficient movement of sizable
forces to the UAE from the other GCC states.
Beginning on 2 October, 18 Saudi Air Force C-130s
airlifted elements of the Saudi airborne brigade
stationed at Tabuk 1,300 kilometers to the UAE.
This airlift included the unit's vehicles, crew-served
weapons, and artillery, as well as 1,000 paratroopers,
The Saudi C-130s
also airlifted a Bahraini infantry unit into the train-
ing area.
Kuwait moved a mechanized infantry battalion by air
and road to the UAE. Heavy-lift transporters carried
the battalion's equipment along the coastal roads to
the exercise area. Saudi Air Force F-I 5s provided air
cover for the convoy while it was in Saudi Arabia,
according to US military officers. The 750-kilometer
Air Exercises. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia followed the
ground exercise with two joint air exercises in No-
vember 1983 and January 1984. Oman and the UAE
held a similar exercise in February 1984.
The three large air exercises provided useful insights
for the participants into the different equipment and
doctrines of the Gulf airforces. They also allowed
more realistic training for fighter pilots, air defense
crews, and command and control components and
demonstrated the ability of the participating states to
deploy and maintain aircraft away from their home
bases
forces or channels for sharing targeting information
that could shorten their reaction time during an air
attack. They have not established the necessary radar
early warning networks, compatible communications
equipment, and interoperable air defense weapon
systems. Even if political differences within the GCC
are resolved, it will be years before an effective
regional air defense network is established.
Outlook
We judge that the military forces of the smaller Gulf
states are likely to make only slow progress in reme-
dying their operational deficiencies and in improving
cooperation in the next few years. The smaller Gulf
states will continue to have difficulty in absorbing,
maintaining, and effectively using the new weapons
entering their inventories. Efforts by the individual
states to expand training programs, improve com-
mand and control, and enhance the readiness of
equipment and units will slowly improve the overall
effectiveness of their forces but are unlikely to pro-
duce dramatic results.
equipment with new weaponry.
Because of these problems, the smaller Gulf states are
likely to concentrate on assimilating weapon systems
already present or on order rather than on acquiring
large numbers of additional advanced weapons. Re-
porting from Embassy and attache sources indicates
that the Gulf armed forces do not plan to expand
significantly beyond their present size. Still, some
modern equipment remains to be delivered, and the
states also plan to continue slowly replacing older
The acquisition of more modern weaponry will have
the greatest impact on the air forces and navies. By
the end of 1986 the air forces of Kuwait, Oman, and
the UAE will have replaced most of their older
aircraft with modern fighters, and Bahrain will have
fighter aircraft for the first time. By the end of this
summer, Kuwait will receive eight West German-
built missile boats to give its fledgling Navy its first
combatants. Bahrain has ambitious plans for expand-
ing its small flotilla of patrol vessels, and Kuwait and
Qatar are acquiring helicopters armed with antiship
missiles.
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The inexperience of the military forces of the Gulf
states in using their new aircraft, ships, and surface-
to-air missiles will continue to hamper, in our view,
the coordination of air defense within individual states
and effective air support to the army and navy. It will
also inhibit the conduct of complex joint exercises
among the Gulf states.
Implications for the United States
For the near future the smaller Gulf states will need
major power assistance to defend successfully against
conventional military attack, in our judgment. Con-
tinued GCC military cooperation and force modern-
ization programs will increase the ability of the Gulf
states to resist an attack until friendly forces arrive, as
well as provide a multilateral framework for Western
involvement. Although the smaller Gulf states could
not individually defend against most conventional
threats, together they can field a sizable and generally
well-equipped force that, we judge, can contribute to a
multilateral defense of the Arabian Peninsula in
concert with the United States and other outside
powers
Although these Gulf states are often critical of US
policies, the recent Iranian attacks on tankers have
caused some of them to seek limited US military
support. Additional requests for US assistance are
likely if Iranian attacks in the Gulf increase, in our
judgment. We believe the Gulf states will turn to the
United States for more specific guarantees of military
assistance, although they will be reluctant to under-
take highly visible joint planning and military cooper-
ation. The extent of their willingness to cooperate
with Washington-beyond seeking assurances of sup-
port-will depend on their sense of imminent danger
and their judgment of the reliability of the United
States as a protector.
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Appendix
Smaller Gulf State Armed Forces
Air Forces
UAE. The backbone of the 3,000-man UAE Air Force
is two squadrons of Mirage-III/5 fighter-bombers
based near the capital of Abu Dhabi. The Mirages are
aging, and one squadron will be replaced by 18
Mirage 2000 fighters that were purchased in 1983,
according to US Embassy reporting. The replacement
aircraft for the second squadron has not been chosen,
but the A-10, F-20, Mirage 2000, and F-16 have all
been considered. Other aircraft include six Gazelle
helicopters equipped with HOT antitank missiles and
a number of combat-capable jet trainers. Within the
Emirates, Dubayy maintains an independent air wing
equipped with 10 Aermacchi MB 326 light strike/
trainer aircraft and a few helicopters and small
transports, but its military potential is negligible.
The UAE Air Force, like other services of the Gulf
states, depends heavily on foreign personnel to main-
tain and operate its equipment. Until mid-1983 the
Air Force was commanded by a seconded Pakistani
officer. Pakistanis still perform almost all of the
maintenance and even pilot some of the Mirages,
according to Embassy reporting.
We believe that senior Air Force officers are deter-
mined that eventually only UAE pilots will fly combat
aircraft. To eliminate the need for foreign pilots, the
UAE last year graduated its first class of pilots and
may sign a pilot training agreement with Morocco,
according to Embassy reporting. The Air Force prob-
ably can reach its training goals within a few years,
but the pilot-to-aircraft ratio is unlikely to exceed 1:1,
too low to allow the Air Force to fly all of its aircraft
at once or to sustain combat operations for more than
a short period. In addition, it will take several years
before enough new pilots are trained to fly combat
missions in the advanced models of aircraft likely to
be acquired. The already limited combat capabilities
of the Air Force may decline while the training and
new equipment programs are in progress
To increase the flexibility of the Air Force, a third
squadron composed of ground attack aircraft, either
the F-16 or A-10, may be formed as a complement to
the new French interceptors. Another option being
discussed is rebuilding the UAE's Mirage-III/5s, but
the reported cost and limited capabilities of these
aircraft probably preclude this option. Other expan-
sion plans include the purchase of a squadron of
attack helicopters armed with antitank missiles to
support the Army.
Air defense in the UAE is hampered by the short
combat radius of the Mirage-III/5. The main fighter
airbase at Abu Dhabi is too far from the Strait of
Hormuz for the Mirages to conduct combat missions
there or over Dubayy, Ash Shariqah, and the other
emirates in the northeastern part of the federation. In
late 1983, in response to increased Iranian threats to
the Gulf states, the UAE Air Force deployed almost
one-third of its Mirages from the base at Abu Dhabi
to the international airport at Ash Shariqah, accord-
Although the Mirages
can patrol the Strait of Hormuz and the northern
emirates from this airfield, they are more vulnerable
to an Iranian airstrike or sabotage
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Figure 4. French Super Puma
helicopter with Exocet antiship
The Air Force cannot provide effective ground sup-
port to the Army. The two services rarely conduct
realistic joint training exercises, and the short combat
radius of the Mirages is further decreased when
heavily loaded with ground attack ordnance. In the
event of major hostilities, we believe that the opera-
tional readiness of the Mirages will quickly decline
and that the few remaining operational aircraft will
most likely be primarily involved in air defense mis-
sions. The Army will have to rely on Air Force attack
helicopters for air support.
Kuwait. The 4,000-man Kuwaiti Air Force-the larg-
est in the smaller Gulf states-suffers from a low
readiness rate and too few proficient pilots. The Air
Force has one fighter squadron, two ground attack
squadrons, two helicopter attack squadrons, two
transport squadrons, and a training squadron. The
most effective combat unit is the fighter squadron
equipped with 14 Mirage F1 fighters and Matra air-
to-air missiles. This squadron has a higher operational
readiness rate than the two A-4-equipped ground
attack squadrons. All of the fighter pilots are Ku-
waitis, but aircraft maintenance is almost totally
carried out by foreign contract personnel, primarily
Pakistani, Few
fighter pilots have fired live air-to-air missiles, accord-
ing to Embassy reporting, and exercises involving
close air support for the Army are rare. A few aircraft
reacted to Iranian airstrikes against border outposts
and oil facilities in Kuwait in 1981, but the experience
highlighted operational deficiencies and tactical con-
straints. The shortage of trained pilots and the limited
number of operating bases limit the ability of the Air
Force to sustain combat operations. Any damage to
either of Kuwait's two airbases will immediately
degrade Air Force combat capabilities.
The Air Force also lacks the necessary radar and
command and control structure to provide adequate
warning of hostile airstrikes. Even with such radars,
the lack of fully trained pilots means that Kuwait
cannot prevent attacks against critical economic tar-
gets-including oil installations and water desalina-
tion plants. In addition, the Mirage aircraft have
inadequate IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) equip-
ment, and the A-4 aircraft lack an all-weather capa-
bility.
The two ground attack squadrons and the two helicop-
ter attack squadrons, we believe, can provide limited
air support to the Army for a short time. Joint
training exercises with the Saudi Air Force in late
1983 and early 1984 indicate that the A-4 squadrons
can sustain high sortie rates for several days, accord-
ing to US military personnel. The small size of the
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Table 1
Smaller Gulf States: Aircraft Inventories,
1984 and 1990
Fighters/
Fighter-
Bombers
Attack
Helicopters
366
20b
30b
14
3
8
a Projected.
b Data reflect minimum projections. Totals could be higher.
Combat
Trainers
45 69
14b 28
9 9b
14 14
8 8
country puts potential frontlines easily within range of
the ground attack aircraft, greatly facilitating Air
Force efforts to provide close support to the Army.
New equipment programs will increase the number
and improve the quality of the Air Force's weaponry
but will compound existing manpower and mainte-
nance problems. These programs include the delivery
of a second squadron of Mirage F1 fighters, an
electronics upgrading of the existing Mirage fighters,
and the purchase of six Puma helicopters equipped
with Exocet antiship missiles. Faced with chronic
manpower shortages, however, the Air Force will
remain dependent on foreign personnel to provide
essential aircraft maintenance.
Oman. The 2,500-man Omani Air Force has the
highest combat capability of the smaller Gulf states.
Its aggressive British and British-trained pilots, realis-
tic training, and well-maintained equipment give it a
high operational readiness rate and the best ground
support and light strike capability of the smaller Gulf
states. Until the recently purchased British Tornado
fighters are deployed in the late 1980s, however,
Oman's air defenses will remain dependent on the two
Jaguar fighter-bomber squadrons and a squadron
equipped with aging Hawker Hunters. Neither air-
plane is particularly well suited for an air defense role.
Another major drawback for the Air Force is the
location of its three main operating bases. The main
Air Force base at Thumrait is in the southern part of
the country near the border with South Yemen and is
ill suited for staging operations over the northern part
of the country and the Strait of Hormuz. The second
major base at As Sib, outside the capital, houses no
combat squadrons and is also an international airport.
It will need better fueling capabilities and aircraft
shelters to become a fully combat-capable airbase.
The newest airbase on Masirah Island, recently up-
graded with new facilities and aircraft revetments
constructed by the United States, houses a recently
formed Jaguar fighter-bomber squadron.
The five light transport squadrons regularly provide
support to the Army throughout the country. Airlift
exercises with the Army are frequent, and the Air
Force can quickly move an infantry battalion to any
part of the country.
The recent Air Force expansion and the shortage of
trained Omani pilots and technicians will reinforce
the Omani Air Force's dependence on the British,
The deployment of the
Tornado fighter and the possible purchase of addition-
al advanced aircraft, moreover, will require the con-
tinued presence of British pilots for at least several
years.
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Qatar. The 250-man Qatari Air Force has very
limited combat capabilities. Its small number of
fixed-wing aircraft can provide almost no air defense
or ground support. Ground attack capabilities depend
on the helicopter wing equipped with light attack
helicopters. The Air Force is heavily dependent on
foreign personnel from Pakistan and Great Britain to
provide both maintenance and pilots and will remain
so for the near future.
Planned improvements include the delivery of a
squadron of 14 Mirage Fl fighters this summer and
eight Sea King helicopters equipped with the Exocet
antiship missile. The new equipment will be a signifi-
cant improvement, but it will take several years before
Air Force pilots and maintenance personnel are fully
trained.
Bahrain. The 100-man Bahraini Air Wing, consisting
of only a few helicopters and no fixed-wing aircraft,
has only token combat capabilities. Planned improve-
ments include the construction of Bahrain's first
airbase and the formation of a fighter aircraft squad-
ron. Although Bahrain has a few pilots undergoing
training in Saudi Arabia on the F-5E fighter, it still
has not decided which fighter aircraft to purchase,
according to US Embassy reporting. The government
has considered the F-5E, F-16C, F-20, and Mirage
Fl.
In addition, agreement on the source of funding for
the purchase program has not been realized. The new
acquisitions will compound the Air Wing's severe
manpower shortages and dependence on Pakistani,
,Jordanian, and Indian pilots and maintenance
personnel.
Air Defenses
UAE. The UAE air defense brigade is deployed near
the capital of Abu Dhabi and consists of a battery
(nine launchers) equipped with the French-made
Crotale, a battery (12 launchers) of the British-made
Rapier, and two regiments of light, towed antiaircraft
guns. The surface-to-air missile equipment was deliv-
ered in the early 1970s, and we judge that not all of
the launchers are operational because of poor mainte-
nance. The independent Army brigade in Dubayy is
equipped with a few hand-held RBS-70 short-range
surface-to-air missiles.
The UAE plans a substantial improvement in its
ground-based air defenses. One of the antiaircraft
regiments will be reequipped with 19 Swiss 35-mm
Oerlikon antiaircraft guns purchased in early 1983. In
late 1983 the UAE purchased five batteries (47
launchers) of the US I-Hawk missile, to be delivered
over the next four years, according to US Embassy
reporting. The I-Hawk system was chosen, in part,
because it is compatible with Saudi Arabia's air
defense system. The need for at least 400 personnel to
man the new I-Hawk system, however, will strain the
UAE's limited base of trainable manpower
In addition, the five I-Hawk batteries are not likely to
be based in locations that maximize the air defense of
the UAE as a whole. Each of the emirates within the
federation retains considerable autonomy and will
apply political pressure on the federal government for
air defenses, and this will affect deployment locations.
Kuwait. Kuwait's air defense brigade is equipped with
four batteries (27 launchers) of I-Hawk surface-to-air
missiles, a battalion of short-range, hand-held Soviet
SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, and a battalion of towed
antiaircraft guns. The I-Hawks provide area coverage;
the short-range SA-7s and the antiaircraft guns are
capable of providing only limited point defense.
The air defense brigade gained limited combat experi-
ence during Iranian airstrikes in 1981 when a border
outpost and a gas oil separation plant were attacked.
All of the component battalions were deployed during
the raid, but no Iranian aircraft were shot down.
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Figure 5
Persian Gulf States' Air and Air Defense Forces
People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen
(South Yemen)
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Figure 6. French Crotale
surface-to-air missile. F
Kuwait's air defense does not have a centralized
command and control center and suffers from the
same lack of training and manpower shortages as its
other forces. The I-Hawk batteries depend on US
contractors for maintenance and are frequently only
30 percent operational
I Even when operational, poorly trained and moti-
vated crews seriously impair the effectiveness of the
system,
Planned improvements include a $200 million com-
mand and control project agreed upon in late 1983
with France. New equipment purchases include a
battalion of 12 Soviet advanced model SA-8 surface-
to-air missiles, scheduled to be delivered in late 1984,
that will be used to reequip the antiaircraft artillery
battalion, according to Embassy reporting. Kuwait
has expressed interest in additional Soviet air defense
weapon systems.
Oman. Omani ground-based air defense is capable of
providing only point defense around selected military
installations. Fighter aircraft are used for area de-
fense. The Omani Air Force includes three squadrons
(36 launchers) of the low-level, short-range Rapier
surface-to-air missiles that normally are deployed
around the three main airbases. The Air Force,
however, practices deploying the Rapiers to remote
parts of the country, including the Musandam Penin-
sula on the Strait of Hormuz. Air defense in the Army
is provided by a few hand-held SA-7 surface-to-air
missiles and newly acquired British Blowpipe surface-
to-air missiles. In addition, the Army is planning to
form a small antiaircraft artillery unit, according to
attache reporting.
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Table 2
Smaller Gulf States: Air Defense Weapons,
1984 and 1990
I-Hawk Short-Range
SAM SAM
Launchers Launchers
a Projected.
b Additional guns may be in storage.
Hand-Held Antiaircraft
SAM Artillery
Launchers
1990.
1984
1990.
1984
1990
81
801
1,105
136
258
13
60n
X38
700
700
60 b
84
56
360
20
Qatar. Ground-based air defense in Qatar is provided
by 12 recently delivered British Rapier surface-to-air
missiles. The air defense radar early warning net,
however, is inadequate to provide sufficient warning
time. In the event of an Iranian airstrike, Qatari air
defense-unless at maximum alert-probably could
not engage attacking aircraft effectively,
Bahrain. Ground-based air defense in Bahrain con-
sists of a handful of light antiaircraft guns and a few
short-range hand-held surface-to-air missiles that
cannot provide more than a point defense for a few
selected facilities. The island of Bahrain, however, is
partly protected by Saudi I-Hawk batteries based at
Dhahran.
Navies
UAE. The UAE Navy is designed to be a coastal
patrol force and probably cannot carry out its primary
mission of protecting offshore oil facilities. The Navy
is equipped with six German-built patrol boats armed
with Exocet antiship missiles and six British-built
patrol boats. In addition, it has a few small, lightly
armed US and British coastal patrol boats. The
Navy's only operating base is at Abu Dhabi, although
the UAE has held exploratory talks with the French
about constructing additional bases along the coast.
Budgetary constraints and a debate over spending
more money on the Navy, we believe, will probably
preclude further expansion of the Navy in the near
future. The purchase of additional ships was also
discouraged by the former Egyptian commander of
the Navy, who retired last year, until the current ships
are fully integrated into the service, according to
Embassy reporting
Of the UAE's services, the Navy probably has the
highest percentage of local personnel. The new com-
mander and almost all deck officers are natives, and
only below-deck officers and enlisted personnel are
foreign, primarily Pakistanis, Sudanese, Omanis, and
Egyptians,
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Figure 8
Persian Gulf States' Naval Forces Deployment
Jazirat al Ghanam- E ,,
(Goat Island) 9:~
Ado f Oman
Lint
L,
Ash Sh$rigab'?
\ ld
\ P
People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen I
Major combatants
(destroyers, frigates)
Raysyt
? q
Wadhim 'Alwa'? ' MUSCAT
As Sib* V
Oman
Jairrat
Ma;irah
100 Kilometers Boundar retiresentatlon is
100 miles not ne?es sany amhoritanve.
UAE
1,500
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Table 3
Smaller Gulf States: Selected Naval Forces,
1984 and 1990
Missile Oceangoing
Patrol Patrol
Boats Boats
a Projected.
b Data reflect minimum projections. Totals could be higher.
Medium Coastal
Landing Defense
Craft Missile
Batteries
26 2 2 2 2
Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Navy has no combat capabili-
ties. The fledgling 600-man force has a newly com-
pleted naval base south of Kuwait City and no
combatants. Coastal patrolling is conducted by the
400-man coast guard equipped with 40 small, lightly
armed coastal patrol craft.
Expansion plans call for a 2,000-man navy with eight
missile boats equipped with Exocet antiship missiles
purchased from West Germany to be delivered in late
summer 1984. Two of the missile boats were launched
in 1983, and crews are undergoing training in Germa-
Oman. The Omani Navy can conduct combat opera-
tions in the Gulf of Oman and is the most effective
and experienced navy in the region. Commanded by a
seconded British rear admiral, the 1,500-man navy
consists of four Exocet antiship missile-equipped pa-
trol boats, four oceangoing patrol boats, four coastal
patrol boats, and seven support ships. British officers
continue to hold important positions in the service;
many of the shipboard naval technicians are Paki-
stani; and virtually all maintenance is performed by
Pakistanis, according to Embassy reporting.
The Omani Navy is experienced in monitoring com-
mercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz from its base
on Goat Island and frequently conducts training
exercises there. These have included assault landings
with shore bombardments and close air support, as
well as small exercises with the US Navy, according
to defense attache reporting. In reaction to Iranian
threats to close the Strait of Hormuz in late 1983, the
Omani Navy stepped up operations near the Strait
and deployed one of its Exocet missile boats to its base
r the Musandam Peninsula, ac-
Planned improvements include the construction of a
new naval base at Wudam Alwa, closer to the Strait
of Hormuz than the present main operating base at
Muscat.
Qatar. The Qatari Navy has a limited capability to
conduct combat operations near its coast. The 700-
man Navy consists of three Exocet-equipped missile
boats and six patrol boats. In addition, two truck-
mounted Exocet coastal defense batteries are on
order. The Navy is plagued by the same manpower
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shortages as Qatar's other services and is heavily
dependent on foreign personnel for maintenance and
crews, according to Embassy reporting. The Exocet-
equipped missile boats were delivered in 1983, and it
will probably take the Navy at least another year
before all the ships are fully combat capable. There
are no further expansion plans.
Bahrain. The small Bahraini Navy has a very limited
capability to conduct operations near its coast. The
Navy consists of a newly delivered Exocet-equipped
attack boat, two patrol boats, and a landing ship. The Expansion plans include the delivery of two additional
Navy has conducted rudimentary training operations missile attack boats and indefinite plans for the
with Saudi minesweepers based in the Gulf~~ purchase of additional patrol boats, according to
Embassy reporting.
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Ground Forces
UAE. The UAE's Army of approximately 34,000 men
consists of five combat maneuver brigades (one ar-
mored, one mechanized infantry, two infantry, and
one Royal Guard) and combat support units, includ-
ing one artillery brigade, an air defense brigade, a
special forces unit, and an engineer unit. The Emirate
of Dubayy maintains a separate infantry brigade of
6,000 men that essentially is an independent unit. The
Army can provide substantial assistance to internal
security forces. If faced with a serious land invasion,
however, we believe that the Army could not maintain
a coherent defense for more than a few days and
would quickly collapse without outside assistance.
As much as 60 percent of Army personnel are foreign-
ers from 21 countries, but primarily Omani tribes-
men, according to Embassy reporting. Because of the
large proportion of foreigners in the Army, the gov-
ernment is uneasy about its political reliability. The
UAE leadership remains concerned over Omani irre-
dentism-a concern sustained by Oman's refusal to
establish diplomatic representation in Abu Dhabi. A
strike in early 1984 by Omanis in the Army protesting
pay and benefit cuts only reinforces government
unease about the Army.
Of the many nationalities in the Army, the Moroc-
cans play a disproportionate role. The approximately
1,500 to 2,000 Moroccans constitute a cadre of
reliable troops that has become a powerful praetorian
guard. They help man the Army's two tank battalions;
Defense planning in the UAE is complicated by
continuing political disputes among the emirates.
Interemirate security cooperation has deteriorated in
recent years, and three of the seven emirates have or
plan to establish independent military forces.
they partly man the artillery brigade; and they exclu-
sively man two companies of the special forces unit LEA]
deployed on Abu Dhabi Island,
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Figure 12
Persian Gulf States' Ground Forces Deployment
Jahrah Kuwait
* KUWAIT
7A~ lazireh-ye Kherk
(Khark Island)
United
Arab Emirates
no def," boundary.
Oman
Mechanized infantry brigade , de,,ne
d Infantry brigade
vdW Combat support brigade
\'d
People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen
100 Kilometers Boundary repro entat on
n t necessarily authoritative
100 Miles e
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The 6th Royal Guard Brigade, containing only Abu
Dhabians or Moroccans, was the first unit to be
equipped with French equipment, the AMX-30 tank
and the AMX-10 armored personnel carrier. This unit
is responsible for maintaining security in the capital
and protecting the Abu Dhabi royal famil
The special forces unit, approximately 900 men, is
comprised primarily of local personnel and Moroccans
and is equipped with light trucks and light weapons.
This unit has had airborne training, and we believe it
may be designated part of the GCC's Rapid Move-
ment Force
The Army does not conduct frequent or realistic field
training exercises. Its first large exercise in over three
years, in January 1983, simulated defense against an
amphibious assault and airdrop on oil facilities. In
October 1983 the UAE was host to the first GCC
joint military exercise in which several of its units
participated, The
Dubayy Defense Force did not participate in either
exercise.
The Army is equipped primarily with French and
British equipment but has shown interest in US
material. The Army plans to form a helicopter attack
unit armed with antitank missiles,
Additional equipment purchases under study
according to Embassy reporting
Kuwait. Kuwait's 10,000-man Army is organized into
two combat brigades (one armored and one mecha-
nized infantry), a combat support brigade, and sup-
port units. The bulk of the Army is deployed 20
kilometers north of Kuwait City at Al Jahrah. In the
event of a ground invasion, the armored brigade and
the combat support brigade (which includes artillery
and Frog-7 surface-to-surface rocket units) would
defend the Mutla Pass, immediately north of Al
Jahrah. The mechanized infantry brigade, stationed
south of the capital, would defend the coastline or
provide reinforcements to the Al Jahrah area, depend-
We estimate that the Kuwaiti Army could not main-
tain a coherent defense for more than a few days
against an invasion by either Iran or Iraq. Major
outside assistance would be needed almost immediate-
ly to prevent a collapse of Kuwaiti defenses.F_~
Bedouin tribesmen from the border areas near Iraq
and Saudi Arabia comprise at least 80 percent of the
Army. Even the commander of the Army's armored
brigade is a Saudi Bedouin, and most of the troops in
his brigade are from the same tribe
Bedouin Army personnel probably
place a higher value on loyalty to officers from the
same tribe than to officers who are Kuwaiti. The
strong influence of tribal loyalties could have a major
impact on the reliability of Army units during a crisis.
Native Kuwaitis dominate the officer corps but make
up less than 20 percent of the Army. Overall reenlist-
ment rates for the Army are low (under 15 percent),
a
factor that helps perpetuate reliance on the Bedouin
The Army has more modern weapons than it can
effectively absorb. Equipment includes Chieftain
tanks, M- 113 armored personnel carriers, US and
French self-propelled artillery, TOW antitank mis-
siles, and Soviet Frog surface-to-surface rockets. The
crews are poorly trained and motivated, and much of
the equipment suffers from poor maintenance. Be-
cause of equipment failures, commonly due to the
reluctance of crews to perform even the most routine
maintenance, we judge that the capabilities of the
Army will continue to be limited
Oman. The 16,000-man Omani Army is a highly
capable light infantry force with extensive counterin-
surgency experience. Its commander, British Maj.
Gen. John Watts, commanded a Gurkha brigade and
the elite Special Air Services Regiment in the British
Army. According to the US defense attache, he is
popular with the Omanis
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The Army is an effective counterinsurgency force, but
its ability to deal with a conventional attack from Iran
or South Yemen would be hampered by a shortage of
antitank weapons and tanks, limited artillery support,
Table 4
Smaller Gulf States: Ground Forces
Personnel Armored Mechanized Infantry Artillery/
Brigades Infantry Brigades Combat
Brigades Support
Brigades
Total 72,000 2 5 5 4
UAE a 40,000 1 2 3 2
and a weak logistics organization. The mountainous company-size airborne unit. Special combat units
terrain and narrow coastal belt in Dhofar Province, include several small territorial security units de-
however, favor defense and would put severe logistic ployed in northern Oman.
constraints on South Yemen's ability to concentrate
forces for a conventional attack in the border region.
The Army units in the northern part of the country
near Iran would have to be quickly reinforced to
defend against an Iranian landing on the Musandam
Peninsula. Were the Iranians to succeed in taking the
peninsula, an Omani counterattack would have to
take the form of an amphibious assault supported by
Additional ground force units not under the command
of the Ministry of Defense include the Royal Guard
Brigade and the Special Forces units. These units are
nominally commanded by the Sultan and report di-
rectly to the royal palace,
airstrikes. In our judgment, the Omani armed forces The Royal Guard Brigade of approximately 3,000
probably could not mount such an operation without men is commanded by a British officer and provides
outside assistance. security for the Sultan and royal facilities. The bri-
The Omani Army is organized into two infantry
brigades and combat support units. The two infantry
brigades contain eight infantry battalions, three of
which are composed exclusively of Baluchis recruited
in Pakistan. The Baluch battalions, commanded by
British or Baluch officers, contain 4,000 men and are
permanently deployed in defensive positions along the
border with South Yemen. The other five are Omani
infantry battalions-two stationed in Dhofar Province
and three garrisoned in northern Oman. The Omani
battalions regularly rotate with each other so that all
five are familiar with and have experience in the
South Yemen border area. Combat support units
include a small armored "regimen" with 18 tanks
and some armored cars, an artillery regiment, and a
gade is equipped with French armored cars, light
antitank weapons, and light, crew-served weapons.
The Special Forces unit of 300 to 400 personnel is
primarily designed to play an antiterrorist role. It is
also used for counterinsurgency operations in the
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Table 5
Smaller Gulf States: Selected
Ground Force Equipment
Tanks
Total
113
235
18
24
Chieftain
165
12
M-60
6
AMX-30
95
24
other
18
70
Armored vehicles
Total
663
526
82
227
148
AMX-lop
18
18
M-113
Saracen
136
27
AML-M-3
333
110
VAB/VTT
150
Scorpion
76
31
Saladin
69
114
41
8 _
Ferret
77
101
10
12
8
Surface-to-surface
rocket launchers
Antitank guided 79 88 60 50
missile launchers
Qatar. The Qatari Army is a brigade-size force of
approximately 4,000 men equipped with British and
French equipment. It consists of a battalion-size
armored arm, an infantry brigade, and an artillery
battalion. In our judgment, the Army could not
defend against a major land attack. It could provide
major assistance to the internal security forces
The Army is heavily dependent on foreigners from
over 20 Arab and South Asian countries for mainte-
nance and personnel. The Qatari contingent to the
GCC exercise in October had to be reduced because
of the requirement that no foreign personnel be
included, The Ranger
unit trains with the British Special Air Services
Regiment and is probably one of the more effective
units.
Bahrain. The Bahrain Defense Force consists of a
2,000-man infantry battalion equipped primarily with
armored cars and light weapons. We believe that the
force has virtually no combat capabilities beyond
guarding against Iranian commando raids and provid-
ing assistance to the internal security forces.
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