EL SALVADOR: A NET ASSESSMENT OF THE WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000100040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of t
Intelligence 25X1
El Salvador:
A Net Assessment
of the War
ALA 86-10006
February 1986
187
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Directorate of
Intelligence
El Salvador:
A Net Assessment
of the War
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American
Analysis, with a contribution from
ALA. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.
Division, ALA,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Secret
ALA 86-10006
February 1986
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El Salvador:
A Net Assessment
of the War
zation efforts.
Key Judgments In our judgment, the Salvadoran armed forces-largely because of US
Information available economic and military assistance-broke the tactical stalemate in the
as of 20 January 1986 lengthy conflict with the rebel alliance in 1984, and in 1985 forced tactical
was used in this report. -
changes on the insurgents that have underscored the government's superi-
ority and disheartened the rebel leadership. Nevertheless, we believe that a
decisive defeat of the guerrillas during the next two years is unlikely, that
the attrition of rebel manpower will continue to be a relatively gradual and
costly process for the government, and that rebel commanders will continue
to shift to a terrorist strategy designed to offset the widening numerical
and materiel advantages of the Salvadoran armed forces. As a result, we
believe the government will remain particularly vulnerable to dramatic acts
of urban terrorism and continuing economic sabotage that have the
potential to undermine-or at the very least slow-Salvadoran democrati-
Guerrilla military fortunes, in our view, have declined appreciably in the
last two years and are now at or near their lowest ebb since the onset of
hostilities in 1980. In addition to the rebels' loss of the tactical initiative,
government successes have magnified divisions between the political and
military factions of the rebel alliance, sapped insurgent morale, and
contributed to increased desertions. Moreover, we believe the insurgents
are receiving significantly less materiel assistance from Havana and
Managua. This reduction appears to stem in part from reduced need due to
the declining guerrilla combat strength-down some 3,000 from a late
1983 peak of 10,000 to a current level of some 7,000-and from the shift to
small-unit, less resource-intensive tactics. Concurrently, US pressures and
Cuban and Nicaraguan reevaluations of near-term prospects for rebel
victory have contributed to a scaling back of support to levels designed to
maintain rather than expand the insurgency.
In our judgment, the insurgents' waning military prospects also are
attributable in part to the improved performance of the Salvadoran armed
forces, now numbering some 51,000 men. In particular, the military-
largely as a result of US assistance and training support-has been able to
be more aggressive in the countryside and make better use of expanding
airpower and ground probes.
Although we believe the insurgents are no longer capable of launching and
sustaining major offensives, they remain a dangerous force able to inflict
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ALA 86-10006
February 1986
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significant political, economic, and military damage. Despite the govern-
ment's substantially improved performance, rebel casualties are actually
down this year compared to last year, and the insurgents' strategy of small-
scale operations in the countryside and terrorism and sabotage in the cities
should enable them to conserve manpower and husband other resources. In
addition, we expect that they will continue to foster student and labor
unrest.
In our judgment, the insurgents recognize that their strategy and tactics
are unlikely to bring them victory. From their perspective, however,
terrorism and sabotage have the potential of highlighting the vulnerability
of the government, driving a wedge between civilian and military organiza-
tions, deflecting government attention from other issues such as the
economy, and possibly helping provoke a rightwing backlash.
We believe the experience of the last two years demonstrates that the
government's ability to counter these threats is a long-term process and
that progress during the next two years will remain gradual. We believe
that the military will continue to do best in the countryside, where its
manpower advantage-currently 7 to 1-will better enable the high
command to keep pressure on the guerrillas. Progress in building up civil
defense forces and implementing the "National Plan" of military-civic
action programs, however, is likely to be slow, given economic constraints
and the questionable commitment of some Salvadoran field commanders.
In the cities, we believe the government can expect to make only modest
headway in combating urban terrorism. Although the government has
announced numerous plans and created new organizations to better
coordinate its antiterrorist efforts, we see little prospect of rapid improve-
ment in their effectiveness. Government efforts will continue to be
hindered by shortages of equipment and training, and lack of coordination
between sometimes competing agencies and organizations charged with
providing security.
Although we do not believe either the government or leftist insurgents are
well positioned to win a final victory during the next two years, we admit
the possibility of two alternative outcomes. In the first, the capability and
performance of the Salvadoran military could improve more rapidly than
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currently expected, allowing the armed forces to take the war more
aggressively to the rebels, and reducing the insurgency to somewhere near
the "nuisance" status that characterized it in the late 1970s. Another
possible outcome would be that increased rebel terrorism and economic
sabotage over time could undermine the credibility and viability of the
Duarte government, particularly if cooperation between the President and
the military decreased, and external aid-including the delivery of SA-7
missiles-increased. In our judgment, the successful use of SA-7s by the
rebels could have a particularly adverse psychological effect on the military
as well as make the Air Force more reluctant to risk its air assets.
Looking beyond the domestic aspects of the war, relations between the
United States and El Salvador will continue to be colored in large measure
by Salvadoran dependence on Washington for economic and military
assistance. Above all, San Salvador wants Washington to increase its
economic and military commitment while continuing to express public
support. At the same time, we believe the rebels have concluded that
continuing terrorism and economic sabotage will weaken US resolve and
provoke renewed public debate in the United States over the wisdom of
supporting the Duarte government. As the rebels try to raise the cost of
supporting the civilian regime, we expect that US personnel-perhaps
including dependents-increasingly may become targets of terrorist acts.
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 Contents
Key Judgments
Scope Note
Introduction
The Salvadoran Military
1
Areas of Improvement
1
Manpower and Training
Military Reorganization
3
Expanded Airpower
Continuing Weaknesses
The Insurgency
Dwindling Resources
Manpower Reductions
8
Loss of Firepower
Reduced Funding
Declining Popular Support
11
Residual Rebel Strengths
Organization
Communications and Intelligence
12
Propaganda and Front Groups
13
Changing Rebel Tactics
Government Response
In the Countryside: Civic Action and Civil Defense
16
In the Cities
18
Outlook: Continuing Conflict
Implications for the United States
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Figure 1
AhuachapInf 'S17 EI sly dor
San Salvador 'Cerrosle
Acajutla La Liberted T / L `n Vices
Guatemal
TT ea*igali
Isla de
wimil z
*Quits
Ecuador
*Bogetti
Colombia
*Caracas
Venezuela
United States
South
Pacific
Ocean
Imopan
ize .
Jamaica
North
Atlantic
Ocean
Dominican
?'Qepublic
St. Christopher -.Antigua and Barbuda
and Nevis t,
Dominica Y
St. Vincent and , oS;. Lucia
the Grenadines Barbados
? Grenada
IITrinidad and
Tobago
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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El Salvador:
A Net Assessment
of the War
In our judgment, the military stalemate in El Salva-
dor's six-year-old conflict was broken in 1984, as a
better led, more mobile, and increasingly aggressive
Army gained the military advantage against the
guerrillas in the countryside. Rebel leaders have been
forced almost entirely to abandon emphasis on large-
unit attacks in favor of small-unit and urban terrorist
actions. The insurgents now face a significantly stron-
ger military foe that outnumbers them 7 to 1 and
whose leaders increasingly are confident of eventual
victory. Nevertheless, the battle for El Salvador his-
torically has been cyclical, and the insurgents have
proved to be a resilient force capable of exploiting the
Salvadoran military's continuing weaknesses, as wit-
nessed by the rebel commando raid on the Army's
training center at La Union in October 1985 that
resulted in more than 100 soldiers killed or wounded.
This paper discusses the current state of combat in El
Salvador. It evaluates the changing strengths and
weaknesses of the Salvadoran military and the insur-
gents, and identifies the key factors that have enabled
the Army to gain the tactical momentum. The paper
also examines the rebels' likely goals and strategies
over the next two years, paying particular attention to
the significance of their recent tactical shifts. The
paper concludes by assessing the implications for the
United States of what we believe is the changed
balance of forces in El Salvador.
In our judgment, the changed military balance be-
tween government troops and the insurgents reflects
the improved capabilities and responsiveness of the
Salvadoran military. In the last two years, the armed
forces-with strong US financial, material, and logis-
tic support-have been able to seize and hold the
battlefield initiative. The increasingly effective use of
manpower and equipment advantages as well as the
development of a "winning" attitude within the offi-
cer corps has resulted in a more aggressive counterin-
surgency program that has kept the guerrillas on the
strategic defensive. Nevertheless, persistent organiza-
tional and performance shortcomings remain and will
continue to hamper efforts to achieve a definitive
military victory.
Areas of Improvement
Manpower and Training. In our judgment, the Salva-
doran armed forces have made significant strides in
both increasing their size and improving the quality
and scope of training. Overall troop strength has
expanded by more than 60 percent in the last two
years with the armed forces growing from 32,000 in
late 1983 to approximately 51,000 at present, accord-
ing to
Tare remaining on active
duty, particularly those in key frontline commands.
increasingly is filtering down to the
rank and file. The Salvadoran training center at La
Union-employing a more organized syllabus than in
the past-now trains tactical units of seasoned veter-
ans as well as individual recruits
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Figure 2
Guerrilla Operating Areas
Guerrilla front boundary
Traditional guerrilla base area
Area of relatively free guerrilla
movement
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Table 1
Salvadoran Armed Forces' Expansion
150
7,360
soldiers involved in formal NCO leadership classes
and weapons specialization courses.
Military Reorganization. The dramatic expansion in
force strength, according to
military brigades has restructured its standard infan-
try battalions into counterinsurgency forces with their 25X1
own support and weapons elements. These units are
broken down into company-size reconnaissance forces
able to operate independently in the field for longer 25X1
periods of time. US Embass
US Embassy sources, has reinforced morale and
institutional cohesiveness already noticeably improved
as a result of earlier reorganizations. Since late 1983,
the Salvadoran military has completely restructured
its headquarters staff and tightened command and
control of its combat units. Changes in personnel and
in administrative and operational policies have gener-
ated positive responses within the officer corps, large-
ly because they have focused the energy and resources
of the armed forces on military as opposed to political
matters. In our judgment, the increasing willingness
of military officers to "leave politics to the civilians"
has reduced potentially harmful distractions and ten-
sions in the armed forces, forged greater military
unity of purpose, encouraged tactical innovation, and
improved morale among officers and enlisted ranks
alike.
Restructuring, in many cases, also has permitted the
military to better use its trained units
that special long-range patrol and 25X1
reconnaissance units, complemented by Navy com-
mandos, are capable of infiltrating guerrilla-held
zones to 25X1
and analysis also have grown in number and
have become tactically more proficient
In addition, the US training of combat paramedics
and the use of medevac helicopters since 1984 have
significantly reduced the number of soldiers killed in
action, More 25X1
units now have permanently assigned medical person- 25X1
nel both in garrison and in the field. US Embassy and
defense attache reporting also indicates that these
medical personnel have become part of the larger
government effort to win popular support in the
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 Saalvador
ti?San Vicente
ti i,^ San ;c
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Figure 3
Military Brigades and Zone Boundaries
Grua t e m apt a
Son
Santa
Ana
rChalatenango
1,:. El Paralso
"'Manta Ana,::
/~?trL~o!
Ahuachapan)
Military zone boundary
11 S n
!Sawa r
San
Salvado
nate~ V ~~ ~.* <
Brigade headquarters
Department boundary
Road
c ; Vicent
La Paz ( ? ,
Honduras
Morazan L
J 1~~ San Miguel,
Usuluton c San Miguel
Usulut>n?*
countryside by regularly treating guerrilla and civil-
ian casualties.
The armed forces also are expanding a psychological
operations program designed to win greater popular
support. During the past year
hat improved resources and organiza-
ton nave en anced the effectiveness of operations
directed at the rebels. For example, propaganda leaf-
lets and public address systems mounted on aircraft
/La L/bertad l t~v
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
La Union'
,-, ~,N
Golfo de
Fonseca
have carried the government's message to the insur-
gent rank and file in regions heretofore inaccessible to
the government. According to
guerrilla combatants and their supporters deserted in
1985, often in direct response to the psychological
US Embassy reporting, hundreds of
operations campaign.
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Tactical Shifts.
manpower and training improvements and organiza-
tional shifts have been matched by tactical progress in
the field. Although improvements have evolved slowly
and remain subject to frequent setbacks, we believe-
based on a large body of
and the US Embassy-that tactical c anges
nave oeeen central to the government's ability to break
the strategic stalemate that existed from 1981
through 1983
that, during the perlo the armed forces,
strapped by meager human and material resources,
adopted a garrison mentality that focused on defend-
ing urban bases and on engaging the enemy only
during daylight hours. This permitted the rebels-
who in our judgment were then as well trained, led,
Table 2
Major Air Force Assets
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Mid-1983 Current 25X1
36 82 25X1
motivated, and often as well equipped as their oppo- Since mid-1983, according to US Embassy and
nent-to move freely throughout large portions of the
countryside and to operate relatively unhindered at
night.
however, that by
the end of the armed orces-partly as a result
of the restructuring of the chain of command-were
employing their limited resources in a more sophisti-
cated counterinsurgency strategy. Better trained and
motivated junior officers began to receive leadership
opportunities ahead of more senior officers at the
battalion and company levels, while selected senior
enlisted men were given greater responsibilities at the
platoon and squad levels. The impact of these changes
was magnified by the increasing provision of better
equipment-including standardized automatic weap-
ons, webgear, adequate ammunition, and provisions.
At the same time
that heavy-suppo ,
mortars, recoilless rifles, and artillery became more
available to line commands.
Expanded Airpower. In our judgment, the gradual
strengthening of the Salvadoran Air Force has been a
critical factor in enabling the government to pursue
new and more effective strategies.
the Air Force in the last two
years has doubled its number of transport helicopters
and quadrupled its inventory of support gunships and
attack aircraft-helicopters, prop planes, and jets.
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against risking civilian casualties. Insurgent claims
notwithstanding, the
Air Force has consistently limited itself to attacking
legitimate military targets. In the one confirmed
instance in 1985 when the Air Force mistakenly
bombed a small hamlet killing several civilians, the
government quickly apologized and compensated
monetarily the families of the victims,
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that the mili-
tary has become increasingly skilled at operations
coordinating air support, intelligence, and ground
troop deployment. So-called Pink Team operations
involve an observation helicopter scouting and mark-
ing the location of a target-either a guerrilla base
camp or insurgent personnel on the move-followed
by air attacks by other helicopters or fixed-wing
gunships and the insertion by helicopter of a reaction
team of 20 to 60 men from the Airborne Battalion.
a high-ranking guerrilla leader in April 1985,
and resulted in an estimated 40 insurgents being
killed in a July 1985 operation.
Pink Teams also have taken a severe toll-in terms
of casualties, confiscated documents, and captured
leaders-on the Revolutionary Party of Central
American Workers (PRTC), the group responsible for
the 19 June slaying of the US Marines.
reporting,
the government's use of airpower also has become
more sophisticated and effective. Ground troops are
displaying greater precision when calling for air sup-
port missions, and pilots are given strict instructions
Continuing Weaknesses
While numerous improvements have occurred, a num-
ber of deficiencies still hamper the military's perfor-
we believe the military's ability to overcome them is
limited and that improvements during the next two
years will be incremental at best.
defense attache sources
gade headquarters, according to
In our judgment, the tradition of rewarding loyalty
and longevity with promotion to senior command
positions continues to weaken leadership and under-
mine accountability. Although it appears these prac-
tices are less pronounced than in the past judging
from recent promotion lists-they nevertheless still
exert considerable influence, in our judgment. This is
particularly true at the most senior levels, in our
opinion, where military academy graduating class
allegiances, as well as business and family ties, often
take precedence over merit. For example, a senior
Army colonel-a classmate of members of the high
command-was given a top general staff position in
early 1984, despite the fact that only weeks before his
incompetence allowed guerrillas to overrun his bri-
corruption and abuses of authority among officers
also continue to be tolerated, although less so than in
the past. Judging from local press accounts and US
Embassy reporting, the public perception lingers that
In addition,
the military remains above civilian authority.
The military also continues to be plagued by periodic
tactical breakdowns.
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Figure 4
El Salvador: War Casualties
Government forces
killed in action 500
Government forces
wounded in action
Guerrillas killed
in action
Guerrillas wounded
in action
two of the more common deficiencies the failure of
some field commanders to follow operational plans as
well as the imnroner denlovmen of troonc
due to an alleged lack of
aggressiveness by the Army. In other regions,
that avor large-scale sweeps close to head-
quarters instead of sustained small-unit operations
farther afield
We believe the uneven and unbalanced development
of the Navy and the three security forces-the Na-
tional Police, Treasury Police, and National Guard-
also works against the military's ability to wage a
coordinated and comprehensive anti-insurgent strate-
gy
th a units as no
been matched by needed increases in seacraft and
trained sailors. As a consequence, the coast remains
largely unsupervised by maritime patrols, and equip-
ment and facilities necessary to support even the
currently modest level of naval operations are decid-
edly inadequate, according to
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In our judgment, the security forces will require
major additional funding and training if they are to
become full partners with the regular military services
in combating the rebels. The security forces-princi-
pally assigned to larger provincial cities and the
capital-are now ill equipped and poorly trained to
meet their broad police responsibilities, which include
fighting crime and serving as antiterrorist reaction
forces, rural constabularies, and paramilitary combat
troops. The US Embassy believes that more and
better weapons, logistics, communications, intelli-
gence, and manpower are especially important for the
security forces in the capital if they are to be effective
against the urban terrorist threat.
sapped guerrilla morale and led to increased deser-
tions, Politi-
cally, the increasing turn to terrorism has sharpened
longstanding disputes within the guerrilla alliance.
Based on the tactical record, the guerrillas' increasing
reliance on small-unit attacks continues. With the
exception of the dramatic attack at the military
training center in La Union in October 1985, the
insurgents have not been able to claim a decisive
major victory since they overran an Army garrison
and destroyed an important bridge in late 1983.
Large-scale insurgent operations-defined here as
attacks by more than a hundred men-have fallen off
In our view, liaison with the neighboring Guatemalan
and Honduran militaries is another weak spot.
Throughout the six-year conflict, US Embassy report-
ing has shown that the Salvadoran military has
established only token cooperation with its counter-
parts in those two countries to help control rebel
logistics, communications, and combat operations.
The longstanding border dispute between El Salvador
and Honduras and continuing mutual suspicion since
the 1969 war have made cooperation between Teguci-
galpa and San Salvador particularly difficult. Over
the past year, relations were characterized by fre-
quent misunderstandings and recriminations as well
as several minor clashes.
in both
countries indicates that the level of military coopera-
tion is likely to remain low until the parties can
resolve their border disagreements.
Dwindling Resources
A survey of key indicators suggests that the Salvador-
an guerrillas have been on the defensive for the last
two years, and, in our judgment, they are now more
than ever further from achieving military victory.
Recurring Army sweeps have uprooted insurgents
from base areas and disrupted their supply systems.
Shortages of essentials such as food and weapons-
made worse by decreased external support-have
considerably,
from an average of several per month in 1983 to only
about one per month in 1985. In addition, these
attacks have been largely against civil defense units
and poorly trained and equipped security forces rather
than against Army units.
Based on figures compiled from General Staff reports,
during the first eight months of 1985, the guerrillas
killed on average some 45 percent fewer Salvadoran
soldiers than during the same period in 1984. We
note, however, that the average number of govern-
ment troops wounded per month increased by more
than 50 percent, suggesting, in our judgment, that
reduced fatalities may in part be due to the govern-
ment's improved medevac performance as well as to
greater insurgent use of mines that often maim rather
than kill. Overall, the guerrillas have inflicted compa-
rable numbers of total casualties on government
forces for the last several years, although 1985 month-
ly averages have been nearly 15 percent higher than
those of 1984, that is, 260 compared with 230 in 1984.
The reduction of government troops killed in action,
however, and the military's greater manpower levels
have made the casualty rate far less of a burden on
government forces.
Manpower Reductions. Recruitment difficulties,
casualties, and desertions have cost the rebels
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Table 3
Components of the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front (FMLN)
People's Revolutionary Rafael Arce Zablah Brigade (BRAZ) Faction's leader, Joaquin Villalobas, considered best guerrilla
Army (ERP) military strategist. Most active militarily; generally operates inde-
pendently of other groups.
Popular Liberation Forces Felipe Pena Mendoza Group Traditional proponent of protracted war; small splinter groups
(FPL) operate in San Salvador area.
Armed Forces of Rafael Aguinada Carranza Battalion Military arm of Communist Party; cooperating more with FPL in
Liberation (FAL) combat operations.
Armed Forces of National Sergio Hernandez and
Resistance (FARN) Carlos Arias Battalions
Revolutionary Party of Luis Adalberto Diaz Detachment Least influential faction; emphasis on urban operations. Responsi-
Central American ble for 19 June killing of US Marines in San Salvador.
Workers (PRTC)
significant losses of men in the last two years. We
believe the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN) reached its highest effective strength
of some 10,000 armed combatants in late 1983, of
which about 7,000 were well-armed, well-trained, and
combat-experienced rebels. Since then, we believe the
insurgents have incurred a net loss of some 3,000 men.
reporting suggests that,
w t e guerrilla combat ea hs may be declining as the Losses stemming from combat casualties and deser-
rebels have been avoiding direct confrontations with tions helped prompt the rebels to begin a massive
government troops, desertions have generally in- forced recruitment campaign in 1984,
disillusionment with the guerril-
la cause, low morale caused by more difficult living
conditions, and diminished prospects for victory are
prime incentives to desert.
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Table 4
Armed Forces' Casualties a
Mid-
Mid-
Mid-
Jan.
Dec.
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Casualties
3,000
3,500
3,200
2,700
3,100 b
(killed or
wounded)
Military
17,314
28,350
32,039
39,800
51,100
strength
The figures we have used are Salvadoran military statistics.
b This figure includes our estimate for the December 1985 casualty
rate.
the rebels face the prospect of increasingly confront-
ing better trained government personnel with fewer
battle-hardened insurgent veterans.
it appears to us that the military's
buildup and the guerrillas' growing inability to ac-
quire military hardware from outside sources have
widened the gap in firepower.
armed forces' surveillance and interdiction a orts
have hampered regular guerrilla resupply routes and
forced the insurgents to draw on caches of weapons
and munitions stored throughout the country.
In addition, Cuba and Nicaragua-the primary
sources of external aid-appear to have cut back their
supply of arms to the insurgents,
have had to contend with declining financial support
from foreign sources. In our judgment, the all stems
from growing disenchantment and distrust of the
guerrillas among many traditional foreign donors, the
existence of competing "revolutionary" and humani-
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Internationally, US Embassy and press reporting
indicates that some governments and groups in West-
ern Europe and Latin America that earlier were
sympathetic to the Salvadoran left have begun slowly
to extend diplomatic and financial support to the
Faced with a financial crisis, insurgent factions in-
creasingly have been forced to turn to tactics the
recognize alienate the populace,
Declining Popular Support.
estimatedH
We earlier
Duarte administration.
Unless the insurgents change their strategy or the
government seriously missteps, we believe rebel ap-
peal is likely to continue to decline, particularly if the
guerrillas continue to attack civilian targets. Al-
though, in our judgment, the guerrillas will continue
to enjoy the following of a hardcore of dedicated
supporters-unlikely to be dissuaded by anything
short of total government victory-the insurgents will
find it difficult to sell their cause to less committed
and more apolitical Salvadorans.
Internal Factionalism. Within the movement, the
rebels' declining military fortunes have sharpened
leadership rivalries and debates over tactics and strat-
egies.
indicate that some progress is being made in consoli-
dating the top echelon of the insurgency into a more
unified command, and that these efforts are reflected
that in early in an increase in joint small-unit operations and
1980 the guerrillas probably enjoyed the support of training exercises.
perhaps 15 percent of the Salvadoran citizenrv
we believe that general
popular support for the rebels has fallen to less than 5
percent during the last two years.
Nevertheless, the weight of evidence, in our judgment,
indicates that the rebels will not be able, at least in
the near term, to overcome internal problems and
create a unified military force throughout the ranks.
We believe rebel infighting-including the refusal of
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some units to share funds, equipment, intelligence,
and support personnel-will continue to hamper the
guerrillas' war effort.
years. In particular, the insurgents' organizational,
intelligence, and communications strengths should
help them weather an extended period on the political
and military defensive.
By dispersing into ever smaller
Disputes between the political and military wings of
the insurgency-often aired in public communiques-
also underscore the lack of a unified rebel command
structure. Although these divisions, in our judgment,
are not likely to lead in the near term to an irrepara-
ble rupture, they seriously undermine the credibilit
Residual Rebel Strengths
Despite its numerous weaknesses, we believe the rebel
alliance is capable of marshaling enough resources to
maintain a credible war effort for at least the next two
bassy and
units, the guerrillas have been able to reduce fatalities
and husband their resources in the face of increasing-
ly aggressive Army offensives, according to US Em-
and wounding about 75.
When opportunities arise, the rebels still are able to
mass some units for specific operations outside of
their areas of concentration. Since the beginning of
1985, for example, insurgents have raided several
small towns in relatively secure areas, seriously dam-
aged urban telecommunications facilities, and even
attacked the national penitentiary on the outskirts of
the capital, freeing over 150 prisoners. In October
1985-in the midst of the Duarte kidnaping-the
insurgents launched a nighttime raid on the military
training center in La Union, killing some 43 soldiers
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Australia. At least three representatives are responsi-
ble for liaison with Eastern Bloc countries and Libya.
Such elements also oversee propaganda activities and
financial collections of solidarity groups.
We believe student organizations in El Salvador-
particularly leftist groups at the National Universi-
ty-remain an important source of support for the
insurgent alliance.
The US Embassy re-
ports that Marxist-led student groups have participat-
ed in a number of street demonstrations in 1985
protesting US "intervention" and the government's
Propaganda and Front Groups. A review of press
reports shows that diverse Salvadoran pressure
groups, such as the self-appointed Human Rights
Commission, several religious "watchdog" agencies,
and a growing number of "mothers' committees"-
which US Embassy sources indicate are propaganda
fronts for the insurgents-continue visible and vocal
political agitation both at home and abroad. Although
we believe the overall number of rebel sympathizers
or supporters has decreased dramatically,
the guerrillas continue to
value the activities of these groups because of the
publicity they are able to generate.
The insurgents continue to seek international support
and recognition. The political arm of the insurgen-
cy-the Revolutionary Democratic Front, for exam-
ple-has established interest sections and information
offices throughout the world, and is linked with some
70 "solidarity" organizations in North and South
America, Europe, and Africa, according to
the media, and U
S Embassy reporting. C
rebel "representatives"
service over 30 Western countries, including the
United States, Canada, France, most NATO mem-
bers, Switzerland, Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, and
In our judgment, the Marxist labor sector comple-
ments student activism in support of the insurgency.
According to Embassy reporting, extreme leftist
unions have engaged in repeated work stoppages and
demonstrations against government ministries, auton-
omous agencies, and private firms since President
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 "National Forum," and apparently hope to re-create
the "Popular Forum" of the late 1970s-an opposi-
tion movement made up of virtually every left-of-
center grouping in the country. US Embassy sources
with access to the left believe that such an effort could
undermine the emerging democratic process from
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Marxist unions. For example, US Embassy infor-
mants have cited as evidence the government's
botched attempt in May 1985 to storm a hospital
occupied by militant Social Security employees that
ended in the killing of four policemen and provoked
considerable public dismay.
The left,) (hopes its
labor strength will help to win popular sympathy for
more widespread work stoppages that, in turn, will put
greater pressure on the Duarte administration. In our
judgment, the rebels already can claim some progress,
as underscored by the turnout of 10,000 leftist union
members and their sympathizers during the 1 May
1985 Labor Day march in the capital. US Embassy
observers have noted that the 1985 march was in stark
contrast to the gathering of only a few hundred in
1984. he
insurgents hope to parlay new government austerity
measures-announced in January 1986-into union
support for a general strike.
Rebel leaders publicly claim to be initiating a "new
phase" of the conflict-a war of attrition that will
exact maximum costs on the government with mini-
mum expenditures of their own resources. Insurgent
strategy now calls for increased economic sabotage,
saturation of the countryside with antipersonnel mines
and boobytraps, hit-and-run assaults on poorly de-
fended military and civilian targets, and urban terror-
ism. While such a strategy is unlikely to allow the
rebels to defeat the now militarily stronger Salvador-
an armed forces, it could-by escalating terrorism,
economic destruction, and political turmoil-slow or
even reverse the democratization process.
On the political front
he rebels are focusing on an escalation of
political agitation by radical church and human rights
groups, militant student associations, and labor
unions. the guerril-
las are planning a new umbrella organization, the
within
In our judgment, the "new phase" is in fact a survival
Public statements made by guerrilla leaders
hint that, although they expect to continue fighting
indefinitely, they are casting an eye toward the 1988
US election period. By that time,
the guerrillas hope the prospect of a seeming-
ly interminable war will have convinced US public
opinion and the
Changing Rebel Tactics
Among the most dramatic tactical shifts by the
guerrillas in 1985 has been the widespread and indis-
criminate use of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines
and boobytraps.
in early January 1985 that the rebel alliance had
decided to saturate roads and rural areas with mines,
using explosive charges calculated to achieve maxi-
mum psychological impact by maiming rather than
killing. During the first six months of 1985, the
Salvadoran military reported that nearly 30 percent
of government battlefield casualties came from mines.
In recent months
Ines and boobytraps have continued to account
or 4 percent of all military deaths and 47 percent of
Rebel use of mines is not only more frequent but also
more technically sophisticated.
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Figure 5
El Salvador: Guerrilla-Initiated Actions
Moving average
Raw data
The rebels also are escalating their sabotage of eco-
nomic targets. Official statistics show, that during the
o 0 50
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first six months of 1985 such operations increased
more than 550 percent over the same period in 1984.
Prominent targets have included the nation's electri-
cal grid, telecommunications and other public ser-
vices, commercial transport, and private agricultural
facilities. In January 1986, the rebels destroyed near-
ly 40 electrical pylons causing lengthy blackouts in
San Salvador and throughout much of eastern El
US diplomats and military personnel also are
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Salvador.
Terrorism also is now a favored tactic. According to
public statements by rebel spokesmen
the guerrillas are engaging
in rural terrorism to convince the populace that the
government does not exercise authority in the coun-
tryside. In the first half of 1985, insurgent raiders
destroyed 75 provincial town halls and other nonmili-
tary public facilities, compared to about 12 during all
of 1984, according to US Embassy reporting.
Moreover, the rebels abducted more than two dozen
mayors from towns in the east following the March
1985 legislative and municipal elections, murdering
two of them. In a particularly brutal episode in April
1985, guerrilla death squads massacred 29 men and
women in Santa Cruz Loma in La Paz Department on
the suspicion that they were civil defense personnel
and government supporters. Rebel leaders generally
have defended these tactics publicly by claiming that
"US intervention" in El Salvador leaves them no
choice.
The majority of reporting also indicates a broad leftist
commitment to urban terrorism and a willingness to
defend its use despite opposition from some non-
Marxist elements of the insurgent alliance, the main-
stream Catholic Church, and Salvadoran public opin-
primary targets; the rebels evidently believe that
terrorism against US personnel will force Washington
to reduce its presence in El Salvador and perhaps
eventually cut back its financial and material support.
Government Response
We believe that, although the Salvadoran Govern-
ment will be able to maintain its current military
momentum in the countryside, it faces a considerably
more difficult job in curbing urban terrorism. The
government has had some recent successes in captur-
ing key urban guerrilla leaders, but, in our view, it
will remain vulnerable during the next year or two to
terrorist actions similar to the June 1985 Zona Rosa
massacre or the kidnaping of President Duarte's
daughter.
In the Countryside: Civic Action and Civil Defense.
In our judgment, the Salvadoran military is capable
of continuing and perhaps building on the strategies
that have given it the advantage in the countryside.
he military
high command, for example, now recognizes that
regular patrol bases for elite units operating in guer-
rilla areas can counter the standard rebel ploy of
fleeing Army sweeps but returning quickly when
government forces depart. In addition, we believe the
Salvadoran military is capable of improving on cur-
rent efforts to:
? Develop additional "Pink Teams" to increase the
military's airmobile capabilities. These units are
designed to coordinate helicopter and fixed-wing
aircraft with land assaults against insurgent bases.
Three additional teams are being drawn u and
could be based at the nearly completed F
reporting. By so doing, the government would im-
prove considerably its reaction time in the militarily
active eastern part of the country.
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? Continue frequent sweeps into rebel strongholds and
logistic centers in an effort to erode guerrilla morale
further, and disrupt rebel supply lines.
? Continue to focus on interdicting guerrilla resupply
We believe that, although the Salvadoran military is
capable of maintaining the upper hand during the
time frame of this assessment, longer-term progress
requires more comprehensive counterinsurgency pro-
grams. Such efforts to date are constrained by a lack
of resources and technical expertise, as well as a less-
than-total commitment on the part of some civilian
and military authorities.
According to US Embassy reports, civic action efforts
heretofore have revolved around a "National Plan"
that calls for eliminating the insurgents from a partic-
ular area followed by a combined military-civilian
effort to strengthen local government and restore
essential public services. A National Commission,
consisting of representatives from seven participating
national ministries, is charged with charting govern-
ment policy while similar committees exist at the
department and municipal levels. Implementation of
the plan began first in mid-1983 in San Vicente
Department and was extended to neighboring Usulu-
tan in 1984. Both departments are key agricultural
areas for the government as well as important logistic
hubs for the insurgents.
Although by late 1985 the program technically had
been extended to seven more departments,
indicates slow progress. Overall,
we concur with the US Embassy that the armed
forces have yet to provide sufficient security to desig-
nated areas and that efforts by local field command-
ers continue to be largely ad hoc. Some commanders,
reporting, are threatening communities with a cutoff
of development aid unless they establish civil defense
units. Perhaps more important, President Duarte has
yet to strongly support the program or involve the
private sector in it. One indicator of the government's
lack of support is the declining budget allocation that
civic action programs have received. Over the period
1980-85, the government budget as a percentage of
the GNP has remained constant, but funds for public
works and services have declined by about one-third.
In the related area of civil defense, the military's
training program, started in early 1984, so far has
produced about 140 instructors who in turn have
trained some 7,000 civil defense members, according
to US Embassy and attache reporting. Overall, how-
ever, the government
fell far short of achieving its goal of establishing a
total of 165 units in all 14 departments by the end of
1985, and in fact has only some 53 units in 262
municipalities. The program is designed to develop a
core of local residents willing and able to defend their
homes from insurgent attacks after an area has been
initially secured by the armed forces.
In some cases, according to
localities are reluctant to
es a is um s un ess a armed forces commit them-
selves to come to their aid. The military, however, is
hesitant to make such a commitment in the absence of
an active and credible civil defense unit, and, even
when such units exist, the military often is slow to
respond. The US Embassy reported that in one inci-
dent in July 1985 a civil defense unit in Chalatenango
was mauled because the nearest military garrison-
less than 3 kilometers away-waited several hours
after the insurgents had withdrawn to send help
The US defense attache reports that few of the local
volunteers are armed, and then only with carbines;
radios linking units with regular military forces also
are inadequat
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These problems aside, the civil defense units have
scored some successes against the insurgents. F_
successfully defended the area against two rebel
attacks in 1985. In October 1985, a smaller unit
engaged an insurgent group twice its size and inflicted
several casualties. In our judgment, public anger and
opposition to rebel tactics of mining and robbery-
borne out in recent Embassy reporting-has the
potential to make civil defense units a more appealing
alternative to the lack of rural security.
In the Cities. We concur with the US Embassy
assessment that the Duarte administration's ability to
counter rebel urban terrorism is inadequate and that
the government will continue to be plagued by short-
ages of weapons, radios, and vehicles, as well as a lack
of training in counterterrorist operations.
acknowledged that government efforts were
being hampered seriously by an "acute" shortage of
vehicles and communications.
On the plus side, reporting indicates that public
security forces are making an effort to work together
more closely. The new US-supported Special Investi-
gative Unit (SIU) has been empowered by President
Duarte to investigate acts of terrorism, while a special
US-trained, 48-man antiterrorist unit has been
formed to react to the guerrilla threat in the capital.
In the wake of the kidnaping of his daughter, Duarte
publicly announced plans to create a National Securi-
ty Council to coordinate military and civilian counter-
insurgency efforts and to prevent the insurgents from
driving a wedge between various civilian and military
elements.
We expect the government to register successes
against the urban terrorist network but, at the same
time, to remain vulnerable to spectacular and dramat-
We believe, however, that the insurgents remain
capable of carrying out urban terrorist attacks that
will draw public attention to their cause and highlight
the government's continuing security weaknesses.
We believe that Salvadoran Government forces prob-
ably will continue to make inroads against the insur-
gents over the next two years, but they are not well
positioned to win a decisive military victory. The
government has strengthened its ability to withstand
the insurgent war of attrition, however, and we believe
it will maintain the military initiative. Progress in
implementing broader local programs that we believe
are necessary to root out the durable, rebel hardcore is
likely to be more gradual and uneven.
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Balanced against this, we believe the military fortunes
of the insurgents will continue to decline, albeit not at
a dramatic rate. Popular support for the rebels is
likely to continue to dwindle, in part because of their
worsening human rights record. Moreover, attempts
to justify murder, kidnaping, robbery, and economic
sabotage-as well as their outright rejection of the
democratization process-are likely to continue cost-
ing them economic and diplomatic support overseas.
Overall, however, we do not believe the balance has
tipped sufficiently to allow for a definitive resolution
of the war. In particular, we believe government
performance will continue to be characterized by
erratic progress subject to some reversal. The govern-
ment's "National Plan" is likely to be particularly
vulnerable to guerrilla sabotage and harassment.
Likewise, in our judgment, further advances in the
two-year-old civil defense program-which we believe
is critical to establishing more permanent government
control in the countryside-will be difficult to achieve
given the lack of material resources and the lackluster
commitment of some local Army commanders.
US targets of opportunity that, from their perspective,
will draw attention to US involvement in San Salva-
dor. The insurgents, for example, publicly noted that
they viewed the October 1985 attack on the military
training center as a partial failure because no US
military personnel were killed. We also believe that
US personnel-including dependents-will remain
potential kidnap victims. Recent US Embassy 0 25X1
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have had some success in penetrating US installations 25X1
and surveilling US personnel and dependents.
More challenging and threatening in the short run,
however, is the insurgents' turn to urban terrorism.
We believe that, although this shift does not threaten
to bring down Duarte, prolonged urban terrorism and
sabotage has the potential to sap popular support for
the government, sow dissension between the military
and the civilian authorities, and undermine longer-
term economic and administrative reform. In particu-
lar, we believe the manipulation of labor groups has
the potential to cripple the economy. Moreover, dra-
matic acts will continue to keep the guerrilla cause in
the public eye and contribute to the impression that
the insurgents are gaining strength.
In our judgment, the rebels' recent shift in strategy
and tactics is designed in part to raise the cost of
Washington's support for El Salvador. At one level,
we believe the insurgents will continue to search for
At another level, we believe the insurgents also calcu-
late that Washington's support for San Salvador will
wane in the face of an extended war of attrition.
Although the guerrillas almost certainly do not expect
the current administration to weaken its support for
Duarte, we believe they see some prospect of sharpen-
ing the debate in the United States over Washington's
role in the Salvadoran conflict. This goal could be
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the hardline 25X1
guerrilla leaders dominate decisionmaking in the re-
bel movement, they appear willing to buy time by
allowing more moderate political representatives to
engage in a dialogue with the Duarte government.
In our opinion, there is no prospect that the Duarte
government will be able to wean itself during the next
two years from its material and financial dependence
on the United States. In addition to continuing eco-
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will look for continuing public and diplomatic appro- 25X1
bation of both the government's conduct of the war
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Although we believe it unlikely, we cannot discount
the possibility that the military situation in El
Salvador could turn rapidly in favor of either the
government or the insurgents during the next two
years, as outlined in the following two alternative
scenarios.
Government Forces Move Toward
Decisive Defeat of Rebels
Under this scenario, dramatic improvements in the
performance of the Salvadoran armed forces coupled
with a series of tactical blunders-thus far not
exhibited-by the rebels could reduce the insurgency
to little more than the nuisance value that character-
ized it during the late 1970s. In particular, we believe
this outcome would require sizable increases in for-
eign assistance to the Salvadoran armed forces.
In our judgment, the evolution of this scenario would
be marked by the government becoming increasingly
aggressive in pursuing large-scale sweeps, small-unit
reconnaissance and harassment operations, and coor-
dinated air and artillery attacks. In addition, we
believe the government would have to make equally
strong advances in combating urban terrorism, partic-
ularly by improving their security performance.
Should such improvements occur, among other signs,
we would expect to see that:
? The insurgents believed they no longer could de-
pend on traditional area strongholds to provide
security and sanctuary.
? The rebels were having greater difficulty with arms
resupply and being forced to rely largely on existing
reserve caches.
? Desertions were significantly increasing.
? The ranks of guerrilla terrorism networks were
being severely depleted.
Government Performance Falters Badly
Allowing the Insurgents To Seize
the Military and Political Offensive
Under this scenario, the government's ability to stay
the course against the insurgent war of attrition
would decrease precipitously, undermining the legiti-
macy and credibility of the Duarte government. In
particular, we believe a wave of terrorism or im-
proved battlefield performance by the insurgents-
perhaps as a result of the introduction of more
sophisticated weaponry such as the SA-7-could
contribute to a public impression that the government
was losing control. An increase in leftist-inspired
strikes and sabotage could further erode the govern-
ment's position and bring the economy to a standstill.
Under this scenario, we would expect to see signs
that:
? The military increasingly believed that the prosecu-
tion of the military situation required more decisive
action than a civilian government was capable of
providing.
? The public at large was losing confidence in Duar-
te's leadership and the electorate was becoming
increasingly polarized.
? Political parties become increasingly paralyzed by
infighting.
? Economic conditions suffered a quick and sharp
deterioration.
? Guerrilla unification efforts were resulting in the
establishment of an authentic insurgent army led by
a monolithic command element and following a
well-defined strategic battle plan.
? Increased external support for the rebels, perhaps
including the introduction and successful use of
SA-7 antiaircraft missiles.
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